UNIVERSITY OF TORONTO
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A

VIEW

OF

LORD BOLINGBROKE'S

PHILOSOPHY,

COMPLEAT,

In Four LETTERS to a FRIEND.

In which his whole SYSTEM

Of INFIDELITY and NATURALISM

IS

EXPOSED AND CONFUTED.

With the APOLOGY prefixed.

BY

[William Warburton]

THE THIRD EDITION.

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AN

APOLOGY

FOR

The *Two First Letters*:

Which may now serve for

A VINDICATION OF THE WHOLE.

SOON after the publication of the two first of these Letters I had the honour of an anonymous advertisement, in the warmest terms of friendship lamenting the displeasure, which my treatment of Lord Bolingbroke had given to that part of the *Public*, where the Advertiser had an opportunity of making his observations.

There was in this friendly notice so many sure marks of the Writer's regard to the Author of the *View*; so much good sense, elegance, and weight of Authority in the composition; and the whole so superior to every thing, but the force of plain and simple truth, that I had as much pleasure in the honour of the admonition as I had real pain for the occasion.

He assures me I shall never know from what hand it came: so that when such a Writer will remain unknown, it is foolish as well as indecent to presume to guess.

Yet I am very confident that a Friend so generous could never intend, by keeping himself out of sight, to deprive me of the means of vindicating my conduct to him. I am rather inclined to think, that, he took this method to oblige me to convey my Apology to *him*, which he had a right to expect, thro' the hands of *that Public*, which appear to have none: and which yet, I am persuaded, it was his principal concern, I should first satisfy. For I must inform my Reader, that the severe reflexions, I am about to quote, are not his proper sentiments, but the sentiments of those whom he is pleased to honour with the name of the *Public*.

They are introduced in this manner: *I am grieved to the heart to find the reception your two Letters meet with from the World.*—I am very sure he is; and so, I think, must every good man be; and more for the sake of *that* World than for mine. For what must an indifferent person think of a World, by profession, Christian, of so exceeding delicate a feeling as to be less scandalized at three or four bulky volumes of red-hot Impiety, because they come from a

LORD,

LORD, than at the cool contempt of ſuch an inſult, in a Defender of the Religion of his Country, becauſe he may be a poor Prieſt or an ignoble Layman? Will not every impartial man lament with me ſo abject a ſtate of things, as that muſt be, where atheiſtic principles give leſs offence to our politeneſs, than ill manners; and where, in *good Company* you may be better received with the plague-ſore upon you, than the itch?

It vexes me (ſays the anonymous writer) *to hear ſo many poſitively deciding that the Writer muſt be —— by the* SCURRILITY *and abuſe.*—— The term is a little ſtrong. But the beſt of it is, that it is one of thoſe words the *Public* think themſelves at liberty to apply indifferently, either to *ſcandalous abuſe* or to *honeſt reproof*, juſt as they happen to be diſpoſed to the Author, or the Subject. The equity of this kind of judgment, ſo readily paſſed upon Authors, had been ſufficiently apparent in the caſe of one much more conſiderable than the Author of the *View*. The Author of the *Divine Legation of Moſes* compoſed a book in ſupport of Revelation; and ſenſible that the novelty of his Argument would give the alarm, and bring down whole bands of Anſwerers upon him, he did all he could to invite fair quarter. He publickly engaged that a candid,

and ingenuous Adverſary ſhould never repent him of his civility. Anſwerers, as he foreſaw, came down in abundance: but it was not his hap to meet with one who treated him with common good manners. Of about a hundred of theſe writers, One or two, and no more, he thought fit to anſwer; and, (who can wonder?) without much ceremony. This was in the heat of controverſy, when his reſentments were freſh; and the injury aggravated by every circumſtance of the loweſt malice and moſt bare-faced miſrepreſentation. Since that time to the preſent, a courſe of many years, he has ſeen theſe miſerable railers, ſome with names, and ſome without, go on in all the nonſenſe and billingſgate with which they ſet out. Yet tho' he has ſeen all this, and without any other marks of reſentment than a contemptuous ſilence, he could not eſcape the character of a *ſcurrilous and abuſive* Writer. It was in vain to appeal to his provocations then, or to his forbearance ever ſince.

But to return to the Author of the *View*. He was detected, it ſeems, by his *ſcurrility and abuſe*. Surely there muſt be ſome miſtake, and my Lord's own dirt imputed to his Anſwerer. The Author of the *View* ſeems to be in the caſe of a Sca-

Scavenger, (his enemies, I hope, will take no offence at the compariſon) who may not indeed be overclean while at ſuch ſort of work; but it would be hard to impute that ſtink to him, which is not of his making, but of his removing.

The Letters are univerſally read; and it is almoſt univerſally agreed that Lord Bolingbroke deſerved any treatment from You, both as a man perſonally ill uſed by him, and a member of that ORDER, WHICH HE HAS TREATED IN THE LIKE MANNER:——In a Law of Veſpaſian, we read, *Non oportere maledici Senatoribus; remaledici, civile faſque eſt.* And the equity of it ſeems here to be allowed. But I will claim no benefit from the Authority of Veſpaſian, nor even from that which I more reverence, my anonymous Friend's. The truth is, that nothing perſonal ever once entered into my thoughts while I was writing thoſe two Letters. Had that been the caſe, it would rather have been the ſubject of my vanity, than my reſentment. For nothing could be more glorious for an obſcure writer of theſe dark and cold days, than to find himſelf treated in the ſame manner with the greateſt and moſt famous of the golden Ages of antient and modern Literature.

——*But* (says the anonymous letter) *it may dishonour a Gentleman and a Clergyman to give him that treatment he deserved, especially after his death. It is falling into the* VERY FAULT *so justly objected to him: every body would have applauded your selecting those instances of his railing, arrogance, and abuse, had not you followed his example.*—This Public then takes it for granted, that treating a licentious Writer as HE DESERVES, may *dishonour a Gentleman and a Clergyman.* Here, I think, we should distinguish. When the thing concerns only the civil interests of Particulars, a *Gentleman* has but little provocation for unusual severity of language, and less right to personal reflexion, especially on one of superior Quality. But when the highest of our religious interests are attacked, the interests not of this man, nor of that; not of this Community, nor the other; but of our common Nature itself; and where the People are appealed to, and invited to be Judges, there, I think, all paultry distinctions of Title cease, they vanish before so great an object, and every *Gentleman* who loves his Religion and his Country should take the quarrel on himself, and repel the insult with all his vigour.

"When TRUTH or VIRTUE an affront endures,
"Th'affront is mine, my Friend, and ſhould be yours.
POPE.

The manners of a *Clergyman*, if they are to be diſtinguiſhed from the manners of a *Gentleman*, conſiſt in Zeal for God, and Charity towards Man. The occaſion will ſometimes call out one, ſometimes the other: they may be exerted ſeparately, but never at one another's expence; for they are diſpoſed by Nature to be joint promoters of the common good: as in the caſe before us, I preſume to ſay, a zeal for God is the greateſt Charity to Man.

Now when Opinions of that kind, which the *View of L. Bolingbroke's Philoſophy* expoſes, proceed to their extreme, not to confute them in terms either of horror or ridicule, for fear of tranſgreſſing the civil maxims of politeneſs, would be like that Preacher, the Poet ſpeaks of, who ſcrupled to mention *Hell* before his audience at Court.

If then, amongſt the Chriſtian duties, there be a force to be exerted againſt Deceivers, as well as a patience to be obſerved in compaſſion to thoſe who are miſled; and that the occaſion before us was not a time for vigor-

ous measures; I desire to know when this time comes?

When men are sincere in their mistakes, after a diligent and candid search; when the subject is of small moment, such as the mode of discipline, the measure of conformity, or a distinction in Metaphysics; the mistaken, and even the perverse should be treated with tenderness. But when the avowed end of a Writer is the destruction of Religion in all its forms; when the means he employs, are every trick of prevarication and ill faith; and every term of scurrility and abuse; when, to use the expression of Cicero, *est inter nos non de* terminis, *sed de* tota possessione *contentio*, Then, a practised calmness and an affected management look like betraying the Cause we are intrusted to defend; or, what is almost as ill, like defending it in that way only which may turn most to our private advantage: As where, in questions of the greatest moment, we comply with this *fashionable indifference*; or flatter it into a Virtue; when we should have striven to rekindle the dying sparks of Religion by a vigorous collision with its professed Enemies, *whose faces* (to use the unpolite lan-

language of the Prophet) *are harder than a Rock* [1].

Men who have had Chriſtianity indeed at heart have never been diſpoſed, in capital caſes like the preſent, to ſpare or manage the Offender. When the incomparable STILLINGFLEET undertook to expoſe the enormity of the Court of Rome, in turning the *diſpenſation of the word* into a lucrative trade, he proſecuted the controverſy with ſo much vigour of ſtyle and ſentiment, as to be reviled by thoſe who found themſelves affected by it, with the names of *Buffoon* and *Comedian*. *The ſervant of the Lord* (ſaid they) *muſt not ſtrive, but be gentle unto all men; in meekneſs inſtructing thoſe who oppoſe themſelves.* An anſwer equally apt and ſatisfactory. Without doubt, offenders would find themſelves much at their eaſe, when ſecure from the reſentment of the *Laws*, they underſtand they have nothing to fear from the animadverſion of the *Learned*.

But this leads me to another conſideration, which may further juſtify the Author of the *View*, in the account he has given of this relentleſs Enemy of RELIGION and SOCIETY.

[1] Jer. v. 3.

The Engliſh Government, ſecure in the divinity of that Religion which it hath eſtabliſhed, and jealous of that Liberty which at ſo much expence it hath procured, doth now, with a becoming conſciouſneſs of the ſuperiority of Truth and Reaſon think fit to ſuffer this, and many other writings, (tho' none ſo criminal in the form and manner, to paſs thro' the Preſs, into the hands of the People; writings, in which not only the Inſtitutions of poſitive and national Worſhip have been inſulted, but even thoſe very GROUNDS OF NATURAL RELIGION, which hitherto have been eſteemed the bond of civil Society, as they inforce obedience on the principle of Conſcience. A bond, which no Nation under heaven but our own have ever ſuffered to be brought in queſtion: becauſe no Nation but our own, has a perfect confidence in Truth, or is in perpetual alarm for Liberty.

But do flagitious Writers therefore become more privileged or reſpectable? Or rather, Is there not the greater need that thoſe evils, which the Public cannot redreſs, ſhould at leaſt be checked and oppoſed by a private hand? Why do the civil Laws of all other Nations interfere to puniſh theſe offenders, but to prevent

vent the miſchiefs of their writings? Why are not the ſame Laws put in execution here, but from the experience, or, at leaſt, from a foreſight, that recourſe to them has been, or may prove, injurious to public Liberty? However, the *end* is confeſſed to be of the utmoſt importance, tho' *theſe means* may be thought incommodious. What is left then, but to uſe others of a private nature, where no ill conſequences are derived to any but to the Inſtrument employed in the correction of theſe evils? Now the miſchief done by licentious Writers is from their credit with the People. If their credit be undeſerved, the way lies open for the Defender of Religion to leſſen it, either by Ridicule or ſerious expoſtulation. The Author of the *View* preferred the firſt. He thought it more effectual; for now-a-days, Folly diſcredits more than Impiety: He thought it more generous; for he had no deſign of bringing in the Magiſtrate to ſecond his arguments. Nor is he one of thoſe impertinents who are for directing Authority, or who think there is any need of ſuch as him,

" To virtue's work, to urge the tardy Hall,
" Or goad the Prelate ſlumb'ring in his Stall.

He rather thinks it becomes him to follow their example. The CONVOCATION, in their late addreſs to his MAJESTY, *lament the depravity*

pravity of our times, evidenced beyond all former examples, by the publication of writings which ſtrike at the very vitals of all Religion and ſhake the foundations of civil Government. Yet they are ſo far from throwing the ſcandal on the State, or calling out upon the civil Magiſtrate for redreſs, that, as if they even reſpected the ſlander of their Enemies, *they engage themſelves to his Majeſty to exert themſelves to the utmoſt, to maintain the honour of our moſt holy faith.* Let no one therefore take offence, that a private man has adventured to lend his hand to that work which the whole body of the Clergy hath, with ſo much glory to themſelves, engaged to undertake.

But his Lordſhip's *death* is a further objection to the manner in which his writings are treated.

——Cuperem ipſe Parens ſpectator adeſſet !

Had theſe *Eſſays* been publiſhed during his life, and had the Author of the *View* deferred his remarks upon them, in expectation of this good time, the cenſure might appear to have its weight. But what ſhall we ſay if his Lordſhip was publicly invited to give *his Philoſophy* to the world, by the promiſe of a ſpeedy anſwer ?

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If a Writer's death may ſkreen his Works from the treatment they would deſerve in his life, he has a very effectual way to ſecure both his Perſon and his Principles, from diſgrace. Yet, where this is mentioned as an aggravation, it is confeſſed that in theſe poſthumous Works publiſhed by his Lordſhip's direction, the Author of the *View* is abuſed in the groſſeſt manner. Now, what is ſaid in diſcredit of a living Writer, and by one of his Lordſhip's Authority in politics and letters, may prove a real injury: The harm to a dead Writer is but imaginary. This is only ſaid to ſhew, that had the Author of the *View* retaliated, as he never had it in his thoughts, the return had been ſtill ſhort of the provocation.

But He commits the VERY FAULT *objected to Lord Bolingbroke—and in ſelecting the inſtances of his railing and arrogance he follows his Lordſhip's* EXAMPLE. — This would be weighed. Lord Bolingbroke has, in the moſt contemptuous manner, reviled almoſt all the Wiſe and Virtuous of antient and modern times. He has railed at the primitive Saints; the modern Doctors, the whole body of the Chriſtian Clergy; and, in a word, the whole race of Mankind; which, ever ſince Religion came amongſt us, deſerves,

deſerves, he ſays, to be conſidered in no other light than as one great aggregate of Lunatics. He has abuſed *Moſes* and *Paul*; he has ridiculed the SON, and blaſphemed the FATHER. Here is another Writer, *who by his ſcurrility and abuſe is judged no other than*——and what has he done? *He has fallen into the ſame fault, and followed his example.* What, Has he likewiſe *railed* at all the Good, the Virtuous, and the Pious? Has he likewiſe had the *arrogance* to ſay, that the World was one great Bedlam? Has he likewiſe blaſphemed his Creator and Redeemer? Alas! no. Two ſuch Writers would be too much for one age! And yet, what leſs can juſtify *this* Public in ſaying, that the Author of the *View* has *fallen into the ſame fault with Lord Bolingbroke, and followed his example?* All he has done is occaſionally telling the World, That his Lordſhip, once in his life, was for bringing in *Popery* and the *Pretender*; and is now for introducing *Naturaliſm*, a more ſpecious form of Atheiſm: that he is overrun with paſſion and prejudice: that he underſtands little or nothing of the ſubjects he handles, which yet he treats with ſovereign contempt: that his learning is ſuperficial, his reaſoning ſophiſtical, and his declamation

tion inflated: and that, if ever Religion ſhould happen to regain its hold on the People, his *Philoſophic* works will run the hazard of being applied to the loweſt and vileſt uſes. This is the ſubſtance of what he has ſaid. And if this be falling into the *ſame fault*, *and following his Lordſhip's example*, the Author of the *View*, for aught I can perceive, muſt be content to plead guilty.

But we will ſuppoſe, the *manner* of writing only, as ſeparated from the *ſubject*, is here to be underſtood. Is the railing at all Mankind; at all Religion; at God Almighty himſelf, but of the ſame ſpecies of writing with His, who ſhall tell the world, that this Railer was once as much an Enemy to the *Civil*, as now to the *Religious* Conſtitution of his Country; that he reaſons ill, and that he declaims worſe? Did the politeneſs of a *Clergyman* or a *Gentleman* require, under pain of being matched with his Lordſhip in *railing* and *arrogance*, that, after the Author of the *View* had quoted all his Lordſhip's horrors in principle and expreſſion, he ſhould have added, "This, good "People, is the FIRST PHILOSOPHY, which "is to be ſubſtituted amongſt you, in the place "of RELIGION. But take me along with "you;

" you; Tho' this, indeed, be the bane and
" poiſon of your HOPES; tho' it reduce Hu-
" manity to the moſt diſconſolate and forlorn
" condition, by depriving it of the MORAL
" Ruler of the World, and by diſſolving all
" the ties of CIVIL Government; Yet, Cou-
" rage! The Author was a man of diſtinguiſhed
" Quality, of uncommon abilities, and of infi-
" nite politeneſs. His great talents for *Buſineſs*
" enabled him to ſee what was beſt for Society;
" his penetration into *Philoſophic* matters, what
" was beſt for human Nature; and his profound
" knowledge of *Divinity*, what was beſt for
" Both. He had governed States; he had in-
" ſtructed Kings; and this laſt great Book of
" Wiſdom was the reſult of all his ſkill and
" experience."

All this indeed I might have ſaid: and, it is probable, a good deal of it I ſhould have ſaid, had the aim of my *View* been to recommend Myſelf; and to raiſe a reputation from the defeat of this mighty Man. Had this, I ſay, been my aim, the raiſing the character of an Adverſary who was preſently to fall by my hand, would hardly have been amongſt the laſt of my Contrivances. But as I had another purpoſe, the

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preventing the miſchiefs of his Book, I took the different method of reducing his Authority to its juſt value; which, by having been over-rated, had prepared the way for the eaſy reception of his Opinions amongſt a corrupt People.

The Letters, ſays *this* Public, (whoſe ſentiments have been, with ſo much real kindneſs, conveyed unto me) *purport to be a View of Lord Bolingbroke's Philoſophy. They are a view of his life, morals, politics, and converſation. It may be true and juſt. But that is not the queſtion. Whether he made a good treaty, or wrote the Craftſman, neither concludes for nor againſt the divinity of the Chriſtian Religion.*

I readily confeſs, that, had Lord Bolingbroke's *Morals* and *Politics* nothing to do with his *religious Principles*, I had acted both an invidious and an idle part to bring in his *Treaties* and his *Craftſmen* into a *View of his Philoſophy*. But I held all theſe to be the various parts of the ſame Syſtem, which had contributed in ſupport of one another to produce a Whole.——I can believe he found it for his eaſe in *retirement*, to adhere ſtill cloſer to a ſet of Principles, which having forwarded his Practice, enabled him to bear the retroſpect of it's effects: but I am much miſta-

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ken if he did not *begin the World* with his notions of GOD and the SOUL; hence his rounds of buſineſs and amuſements.

" Now all for Pleaſure; now for Church and State.
POPE.

The reſt followed in courſe. For, as Cicero well obſerves, *Cum enim* DECRETUM *proditur, Lex veri rectique proditur: quo a vitio et* AMICITIARUM *proditiones, et* RERUM PUBLICARUM, *naſci ſolent.*

But this is not all. I beg leave to ſay, there was not only a cloſe connexion between his Principles and his Practice, but that it was neceſſary to a juſt defence of Religion againſt him, to take notice of that connexion.

One of his Lordſhip's pretended purpoſes, in his Philoſophic *Eſſays*, was to detect the abuſes brought into the Chriſtian Religion by a CORRUPT CLERGY: My aim in this *View* was to expoſe a ſpecies of Atheiſm, inculcated on the ruin of all Religion by an IMPIOUS LAYMAN.

Conſider, how his Lordſhip proceeded. —— Not that I place my juſtification on his example: that, indeed, would be confirming the charge I am endeavouring to refute; neither would I in-

I inſiſt upon the right of retaliation; for, tho' that be ſomething a better plea, it is the laſt which a Writer for Truth would willingly have recourſe to. I quote his Lordſhip's method with perfect approbation, as that which right reaſon preſcribes to all who propoſe the detection of error and impoſture. His Lordſhip's point, as we ſaid, was to ſhew, that the Clergy had corrupted the purity and ſimplicity of Religion. It is not my deſign to inquire with what ingenuity he has repreſented the Fact, or how juſtly he has deduced the Conſequences, which he pretends have riſen from it. He has ſhewn ſome corruptions; he has imagined more; and dreſſed up the reſt of his catalogue out of his own invention; all which, he moſt unreaſonably offers as a legitimate prejudice againſt Religion itſelf.--- Well, be it ſo, that the Clergy are convicted of abuſe and impoſture. The queſtion, which every one is ready to aſk, who thinks himſelf concerned to enquire into the truth of the fact, is, CUI BONO? What END had the Clergy to ſerve by theſe corruptions? His Lordſhip thinks the queſtion reaſonable, and is ready to reply, That they had a wicked antichriſtian Yoke to impoſe upon the necks of Mankind: in order to which, they contrived to introduce ſuch kind of corruptions into

Religion

Religion as beſt tended to pervert men's underſtandings, to intimidate their wills, and to impreſs upon their conſciences, an awe and reverence for their ſpiritual Tyrants. The anſwer is ſatisfactory, and ſhews the uſe of this method of detecting error. With his rhetorical exaggerations, with the extenſion of his liſt of corruptions, with his ridiculous inferences, I have, at preſent, no concern.

As the Author of the *Eſſays* had, what he called, a tyrannical Hierarchy to unmaſk; ſo, the Author of the *View* had, what he called, a declared, an impious, an outrageous Enemy of all Religion to expoſe. I believe they are both rightly named. Now, as errors to be detected, we muſt trace them to their ſource; and as errors influencing practice, we ſhall find their original to be in VICE.

His Lordſhip had publickly and openly, in his reſpectable Character of a NOBLEMAN, a STATESMAN, and a PHILOSOPHER, declared Religion to be all a Cheat, ſupported only by Knaves and Madmen; which indeed was a large Party, ſince, by his own account, it takes in the whole body of Mankind. His Lordſhip had been

held up to the People [2] as an ALL ACCOMPLISHED Perſonage, full and complete in every endowment of civil and moral Wiſdom: And the enchanting vehicle in which his triumphant Character was conveyed, had made it received, even againſt the information of our ſenſes. A PUBLIC thus prejudiced, would, on ſuch a repreſentation of his Lordſhip's religious principles as his *Eſſays* contain, and the *View* collects together, be ready to aſk "could ſo ſublime a Genius be diſpoſed to deprive himſelf, and us, of all thoſe bleſſings which Religion promiſes, had he not diſcovered, and been perfectly aſſured, that the whole was a deluſion; and therefore in pity to Mankind, had broke the Charm, which kept them from ſeeing their preſent good, in fond expectation of a recompence in the ſhadowy regions of futurity?" We ſay, *deprive himſelf*, for he ſeems ſufficiently vext, and ſenſible of his diſappointment, when awaked from the pleaſing dream of a life to come. *There is no one thought* (ſays his Lordſhip) *which ſooths my mind like this: I encourage my* IMAGINATION *to purſue it, and am heartily afflicted when* ANOTHER FACULTY *of the intellect comes boiſterouſly*

[2] See the fourth Ep. of the *Eſſay on Man*, and the great Poet's other Works.

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in, and WAKES *me from so pleasing a dream, if it be a dream* [3]."---In this manner I supposed, that they, for whose use the *View* was intended, were disposed to argue; I mean that part of them who yet retain any concern for another life; and who have not thrown off, together with their Guides, all thoughts of their journey thither. Now, against this dangerous prejudice, the Defender of Religion was to provide. He was first to remove their delusion concerning Lord Bolingbroke's Philosophic Character; and to shew, that he had none of those talents of Reasoning, of Learning, or Philosophy which are necessary to qualify a man to decide on so important a Question. But this opposed only one half of their prejudice. They could by no means be brought to think that so good a Man, so benevolent a Citizen, so warm a friend to Mankind, as his Lordship's *Essays* represent him, could be lightly willing to forego that great bond of Society, that great support of Humanity, RELIGION. The Advocate of Religion therefore, unless he would betray his cause, was obliged to shew, that the Social light, in which his Lordship puts himself, and in which he had been placed by his poetical Friend, was a false one; that his moral virtues

[3] xiii Letter to Swift in Pope's Works, Vol. ix.

were

were the counterpart of his religious principles; And public virtue (according to his favourite Cicero) embracing and comprehending all the private [4], it was to the purpoſe of ſuch a defence, to ſhew, that his Lordſhip had been a BAD CITIZEN.

" Prodita laxabat portarum clauſtra Tyrannis
" Exſulibus——

Now tho' Religion has the ſtrongeſt allurements for the Good and Virtuous, it abounds with objects of affright and terror to the profligate and abandoned; who, in ſuch circumſtances, have but this for their relief, Either to part with their Vices, or their Religion. All the world knows his Lordſhip's choice. He himſelf tells us, it was made on the conviction of Reaſon; others think, by the deluſion of his Paſſions. The World is to determine; and that they might judge with knowledge of the caſe, the Author of the *View* attempted to obviate the latter part of this popular prejudice; which would not ſuffer them to conceive any reaſon ſhort of demonſtration, that could induce a man in his ſenſes to part with the *ſoothing* conſolation of futurity, as his Lordſhip ſo juſtly calls it.

[4] *Omnes omnium Charitates* PATRIA *una complexa eſt.*

And now, I suppose, every candid Reader will allow, at least I am sure the candid Writer of the anonymous Letter will allow, that his Lordship's *Morals* and *Politics* come within the *view of his Philosophy*; where the question is of the TRUTH or FALSHOOD of Religion; and of his Lordship's AUTHORITY to decide in it.

To sum up this Argument: His Lordship descants on *Romish superstition*; the Author of the *View*, on *his Lordship's Philosophy*: Not to shew for what *end* the one was established, or by what *means* the other was produced, is relating Facts without *their Causes*; which the Writer on *the use of history* justly throws into the class of unprofitable things: and therefore his Lordship, speaking of the corruptions brought by the Clergy, into Religion, accounts for them by a SPIRIT OF DOMINION; and the Author of the *View* speaking of his Lordship's religious principles, reminds the Reader of his MORAL PRACTICE; but so far only as served that purpose, and was, besides, notorious to all mankind.

Lord Bolingbroke (says this Public) *deserved every thing of you; but who are those friends and admirers of his, whom you represent applauding all he wrote; whom you bring in unnecessarily upon*

on many occaſions. I dare ſay they are very few. You had better have named them.

As unexceptionable perhaps as that liberty might have been thought, I ſhould certainly have ventured on it, had I conceived it poſſible for the Reader to underſtand, by ſuch *friends and admirers*, any of thoſe few illuſtrious Perſons, whom Lord Bolingbroke's politeneſs, his diſtance from buſineſs, his knowledge of the world, and, above all, his ambition to be admired, occaſionally brought into his acquaintance; and who gave dignity and reputation to his retirement. The Chief of theſe I have the honour to know, and the pleaſure of being able to inform thoſe who do not, that they were ſo far from being in the principles of his *Philoſophy*, that ſome of them did not ſo much as know what thoſe Principles were; and thoſe who did, gave him to underſtand, how much they deteſted them. Indeed, nothing but this Fact, which I here aſſert on my own knowledge, can account for the diſpoſition in his Will, concerning his *Philoſophic* papers. And were it only for the ſake of this fair occaſion, of explaining myſelf, I could readily excuſe all the hard thoughts *this Public* ſeems to have entertained of me. As to

the *friends and admirers who applauded all he wrote*, I meant thoſe who perſuaded him to change his mind, and give thoſe *Eſſays* to the Public, which he had over and over declared were only for the inſpection of a Few; and which thoſe Few had given him to underſtand, were fit for no body's inſpection at all. Nay he ſeems willing the World ſhould know to whom it was indebted for this benefit, by his letting thoſe places in his *Eſſays* ſtand, where he declares his own opinion of their *unfitneſs for general communication.*

But what grieves and hurts your friends moſt (ſays this Public) *is ſtill behind. Poor Pope did not deſerve to be treated by you with ſo much cruelty, contempt, and injuſtice. In a work where Lord Bolingbroke is repreſented as a Monſter, hated both of God and Man, Why is Pope always and unneceſſarily brought in, only as his friend and admirer? Why as approving of, and privy to all that was addreſſed to him? Why ſhould he, who had many great talents, and amiable qualities, be deſcribed only by the ſlighting Epithets of* tuneful *and* poetical. *You ſay, Pope* announced the glad tidings of all theſe things. *In what work can he be ſaid to have done it, except in his* Eſſay on Man?

Man? *This is throwing a reflexion on the excellent* Commentary *on that* Eſſay.

The Editor of Pope's Works certainly thought with this generous Animadverter, that the great Poet *deſerved* every thing of his Friends. For he tells us "That to have been one of the greateſt Poets in the World was but his ſecond praiſe: that "Pope was in a higher Claſs. He was one of the "*nobleſt works of God:* He was an *honeſt Man*. "A man who alone poſſeſſed more real virtue "than, in very corrupt times, needing a Satyriſt "like him, will ſometimes fall to the ſhare of "multitudes. His filial piety, his diſintereſted "friendſhips, his reverence for the conſtitution "of his Country, his love and admiration of "Virtue, and (what was the neceſſary conſequence) his hatred and contempt of Vice, "his extenſive Charity to the indigent, his warm "benevolence to Mankind, his ſupreme veneration of the Deity, and above all, his ſincere "belief of Revelation, (the Editor tells us) "ſhall, amongſt other things, be the ſubject of "the hiſtory of his Life. NOR (ſays he) SHALL "HIS FAULTS BE CONCEALED. It is not for "the intereſts of his Virtues that they ſhould. "Nor indeed could they be concealed if we

" were so minded, for they *shine* thro' his vir-
" tues; *no man being more a dupe to the specious*
" *appearance of Virtue in others* [5]."

But then, who it was that *treated poor Pope with cruelty, contempt, and injustice*, Lord Bolingbroke, or the Author of the *View*, let this *Public* themselves judge; and, by their freedom from passion and resentment, at a time when a *friend* would be most *hurt*, they appear well qualified to judge impartially.

When, on the publication of the *Patriot King*, Lord Bolingbroke did indeed use the memory of poor Pope with exceeding *contempt, cruelty, and injustice*, by representing him, in the *Advertisement* to the Public, as a busy ignorant interpolator of his works; a mercenary betrayer of his trust; a Miserable, who bartered all the friendship of his Philosopher and Guide, for a little paltry gain. Who was it then that manifested his *hurt and grief for poor Pope?* Was it *this Public!* Or was it the *Author of the Letter to Lord Bolingbroke*, on that occasion?

But in what consists the *contempt, cruelty, and injustice* of the *View?* The *contempt* is in the *slighting epithets of tuneful and poetical:* the *Cruelty* in giving instances of Pope's unbounded ad-

[5] See the Editor's *Advertisement* to his works.

miration

miration of Lord Bolingbroke; and the *injuſtice* in ſaying that he denounced the *glad tidings of the firſt Philoſophy*, and that he approved and was *privy to all that was addreſſed to him.*

My uſing the epithets of *tuneful and poetical*, in ſpeaking of a man who had many ſuperior qualities, was, I humbly conceive, well ſuited to the occaſion. It is where I ſpeak of Pope as an idolatrous admirer of Lord Bolingbroke: and they aptly inſinuate what I would have them mean, that, *Judgment* had there nothing to do; but all was to be placed to the friendly extravagance of a poetical *Imagination.* Who could fairly gather more from it, than that my intention was to place his Lordſhip's *ingratitude*, and Mr. Pope's *idolatry* ſide by ſide, in order to their ſetting off one another?

But *cruelty* is added to contempt, in the inſtances I give of Pope's unbounded admiration. I am verily perſuaded, had Pope lived to ſee Lord Bolingbroke's returns of friendſhip, as well in his Lordſhip's uſual converſation, [6] as in the *advertiſement to the Patriot King*, he would have been amongſt the firſt to have laughed at his own deluſions, when this treatment of him had

[6] See the concluſion of the fourth Letter.

once broken and diſſolved the Charm; at leaſt, he would have been ready to laugh with a Friend, who ſhould chuſe to turn them into ridicule. For he held this to be amongſt the offices of friendſhip, to laugh at your friend's foibles till you brought him to laugh with you;

" Laugh at your Friends; and if your Friends be ſore,
" So much the better, you may laugh the more."

as implying, that, while they continued *ſore*, they continued to ſtand in need of this friendly operation.

My *injuſtice* conſiſts in ſuppoſing *Pope was privy to all that was addreſſed to him.* An injuſtice indeed, had I ſuppoſed any ſuch thing; I, who with greater certainty than moſt men, can affirm, that he was privy to nothing of the ſecret, but the deſign of the Addreſs, and the preliminary Diſcourſes. So little did Pope know of the Principles of the *firſt Philoſophy*, that when a common Acquaintance, in his laſt illneſs, chanced to tell him of a late converſation with Lord Bolingbroke, in which his Lordſhip took occaſion to deny God's *moral atiributes* as they are commonly underſtood, he was ſo ſhocked that he did not reſt till he had aſked Lord Bolingbroke

ngbroke whether his informer was not miſtaken? His Lordſhip aſſured him, he was; of which, Pope with great ſatisfaction informed his Friend. Under this ignorance of his Lordſhip's real ſentiments it was, that Pope gave eaſy credit to him, when he vapoured that *he would demonſtrate all the common Metaphyſics to be wicked and abominable* [7]. And this leads me to that part of the charge, where it is ſaid, I could only mean the ESSAY ON MAN, by the *glad tidings of the firſt Philoſophy*. I meant a very different thing; and alluded to the following paſſages in his LETTERS. *Do not laugh at my Gravity, but permit me to wear the beard of a Philoſopher, till I pull it off, and make a jeſt of it myſelf. 'Tis juſt what my Lord Bolingbroke is doing with* METAPHYSICS. *I hope you will live to ſee, and ſtare at the learned figure he will make on the ſame ſhelf with Locke and Malebranche* [8]. And again, *Lord Bolingbroke is voluminous, but he is voluminous only to deſtroy volumes. I ſhall not live, I fear, to ſee that work printed* [9]. Where, by the way, his fancy that this METAPHYSICS was de-

[7] *Bolingbroke to Swift*, Letter xlviii. Vol. ix.
[8] Letter lxxi. Vol. ix. [9] Letter lxxiii.

ſigned for the public, ſhews he knew nothing of the contents. This then was what I meant. The *Eſſay on Man* I could not mean. For in the 55th page of the *View*, I make the fundamental doctrines of that *Poem* and of his Lordſhip's *Eſſays* to be directly oppoſite to one another. The one, a real Vindication of Providence againſt Libertines and Bigots: the other a pretended Vindication of it againſt an imaginary Confederacy between Divines and Atheiſts.

Thus I have explained, in the beſt manner I am able, my reaſons for ſpeaking of this great Poet in terms which give offence. But what ſhall we ſay, if this air of negligence to his memory was aſſumed, the better to conceal the Author of an anonymous Epiſtle? The motive ſure was excuſable; tho' the project was without effect: for *this Public* have poſitively decided, that *the Author muſt be ——by the ſcurrility and abuſe.*

But, *Had you purſued* (ſay they) *the advantage you have ingeniouſly taken from an expreſſion in one of Pope's Letters, to have ſhewn that Pope differed from Bolingbroke where he was in the wrong; that he not only condemned but deſpiſed the futility of his reaſoning againſt Revelation;*

that

that where he was right Pope improved but never ſervilely copied his Ideas, you would have done honour to your Friend and Yourſelf: you would have ſerved the cauſe of Religion: you would have diſcredited Lord Bolingbroke the more by the contraſt ——

Now all this, the Reader will ſee in the *fourth Letter*, I had actually done; and (as it was in it's place) fully and largely too. In the mean time, every body might ſee, it was what I was ready, on a fit occaſion, to do, by the paſſage referred to juſt above from the *ſecond*; where *Pope is honoured, and Lord Bolingbroke the more diſcredited by the contraſt.*

But I muſt not leave this head without taking notice of one expreſſion in the cenſure. It is ſaid, that the *View* REPRESENTS *L. Bolingbroke as a Monſter hated both of God and Man.* The expreſſion had been juſter, had it been — *from the View it may be* COLLECTED; becauſe, whatever ideas Men may form of his Lordſhip from a peruſal of the *View*, they ariſe from his Lordſhip's own words, which are faithfully quoted: What the Author of the *View* adds, is only a little harmleſs raillery, which can preſent the Reader with no idea but what (in the opinion

of *Pope*) arises from every fruitless attempt of Impiety.

" Heav'n still with LAUGHTER the vain toil surveys,
" And buries madmen in the heaps they raise.

That the Author of the *View* assisted in the dressing up so strange a sight, as *a Monster hated both by God and Man*, was very far from his intention. He made a scruple of accompanying his Lordship's quotations with those reflexions of serious indignation which such a Scene of horrors naturally suggests, lest he should be thought to aim at something more than private animadversion. He therefore generously endeavoured to turn the public attention from the *horror*, to the *ridicule*, of the *first Philosophy*, and to get his Lordship well laughed at; as being persuaded, that when the Public is brought to that temper, its resentment seldom rises to any considerable height.

Men had better speak out, and say, the Author of the *View* ought to have represented L. Bolingbroke as neither *detestable*, nor *ridiculous*. He could have wished, that his sense of honour and duty would have permitted him to have done so. He is neither a Fanatic, nor an Enthusiast,

thuſiaſt, and perhaps ſtill leſs of a Bigot. Yet there are occaſions when the moſt ſober, and candid thinker will confeſs, that the intereſts of Particulars ſhould give way to thoſe of the Public. It is true, there are others, when politeneſs, civil prudence, and the private motives of Friendſhip, ought to determine a man, who is to live in the world, to comply with the ſtate and condition of the times; and even to chuſe the worſe, inſtead of the better method of doing good. But his misfortune was that this did not appear to him to be one of thoſe occaſions, in which, when he had explained the Doctrines and Opinions of an erroneous Writer, he could leave them with this reflexion: "Theſe are the "Writer's notions on the moſt important points "with regard to human happineſs. They are "indeed very ſingular and novel. But then "conſider; the Writer was a great man, and "high in all the attainments of Wiſdom; there-"fore weigh well and reverendly before you "condemn what I have here expoſed to your "Judgment."—But had I, with a view to prudence, ſaid this, Would it have ſecured me from OFFENCE, the very thing that PRUDENCE would moſt avoid? Would it not rather have furniſhed out another handle, a handle for the making me a con-

a Confederate in his guilt, only a little better diſguiſed? Had this happened, it would not have been the firſt time I had been ſo ſerved, when endeavouring to *avoid offence*.

And yet there was but one of theſe three ways; Either to laugh, to declaim, or to ſay nothing. I choſe the firſt, as what I fancied leaſt obnoxious; in which, however, I was miſtaken; and as moſt likely to do good; in which, I ſtill hope, I was not miſtaken.

The only harm L. Bolingbroke, whoſe reputation of parts and wiſdom had been raiſed ſo high, can poſſibly do, is amongſt the PEOPLE. His objections againſt Religion are altogether of the popular kind, as we feel by the effects they have had, when uſed by their original Authors, long before his Lordſhip honored them with a place in his *Eſſays*. What then was that Man to aim at, who had made it his buſineſs (indeed without being ſet on work) to put a ſpeedy ſtop to the miſchief, and neither to palliate the doctrines, nor to compliment the Author of them, but to give a true and ſuccinct repreſentation of his *Syſtem*, in a popular way; to make a right uſe of that abundance, which the ESSAYS and FRGMENTS afforded, to ſhew that his Lordſhip's *Principles* were as

fooliſh

fooliſh as they were wicked; and that the *Arguments* uſed in ſupport of them were as weak as they were bold and overbearing: that he was a pretender in matters of Learning and Philoſophy; and knew no more of the genius of the Goſpel, than of that ſuppoſed corruption of it, which he calls, *artificial Theology*. This I imagined to be the only way to reach his Lordſhip's AUTHORITY, on which all depended; and then, the very weakeſt effort of ridicule would be able to do the reſt. Theſe were my motives for the method I laid down; and whatever impropriety there may be in divulging them in a way that tends to defeat their end, it ſhould, I think, be laid to the account of thoſe who make this explanation neceſſary.

I have been the longer on this matter as it will ſerve for an anſwer to what follows.

Lord Bolingbroke (ſays this Public) *is ſo univerſally and ſo juſtly obnoxious to all ſorts and ranks of people, that from regard to him, no body cares how he is treated, but be aſſured your* MANNER *has deſtroyed all the merit of the work.* ——Tho' with regard to the *manner* I have ſaid enough; yet the candid Reader, I am ſure, will allow me to add a word or two *Concerning the effect of an unacceptable manner, in a work of public*

public ſervice. It had, till of late, been always deemed deſert to do a general good, tho' in a way not perfectly acceptable. But we are now become ſo delicate and faſtidious, that it is the *manner of doing*, even in things of higheſt importance, which carries away all the merit. And yet, this falſe delicacy on a queſtion of no leſs moment than *Whether we ſhall have any Religion or none at all*, ſeems as abſurd as it would be in a Great man to take offence at an officious neighbour for ſaving his falling Palace, by a few homely props near at hand, when he ſhould have conſidered of a ſupport more conformable to the general taſte and ſtyle of Architecture in his Lordſhip's ſuperb piece; or to find him diſconcerted by that charitable hand, which ſhould venture to pull his Grandeur by head and ſhoulders out of a flaming apartment.

But in theſe ſuppoſitions I grant much more than in reaſon I ought. I ſuppoſe the PUPLIC TASTE, which the *manner* in queſtion has offended, is a reality, founded in Nature; whereas 'tis the fantaſtic creature of Faſhion, and as ſhifting and capricious as its Parent. TRUTH, which makes the *matter* of every honeſt man's enquiry, is eternal; but the *manner ſuited to the public taſte*, is nothing elſe than conformity to

our

our preſent paſſions, or ſentiments; our prejudices, or diſpoſitions. When the truths or the practices of Religion have got poſſeſſion of a People, then a warmth for its intereſts, and an abhorrence of its Enemies, become the public taſte; and men expect to find the zeal of an Apoſtle in every defender of Religion: But when this awful Power has loſt its hold, when, at beſt, it floats but in the brain, and comes not near the heart, then, if you expect to be read with approbation, you muſt conform your *manner* to that polite indifference, and eaſy unconcern, with which we ſee every other trial of ſkill plaid before us.

But now I am advanced thus far, I will venture a ſtep further. When Infidelity firſt made its appearance amongſt us in ſet Diſcourſes addreſſed to the Public, our eccleſiaſtical Watchmen inſtantly took the alarm; and communicated it to their Brethren with a warmth and vigour that gave luſtre to their high Truſt. No Writer eſcaped unnoticed; no argument remained unanſwered; and a learned Critic received public honours, as the deliverer of his Country, in reſcuing common ſenſe from the very filliеſt raphſody [4] that ever diſgraced

[4] *Diſcourſe of Freethinking.*

human

human Reaſon. But ſince the danger is become imminent, or, to ſpeak more properly, ſince the miſchief ſo much dreaded has done it's work, and one would naturally expect to ſee this vigilance increaſed, and the Body up in arms, we find a perfect peace and tranquillity reign amongſt them. Which, were it not attended with equal unconcern, one might miſtake for a well grounded confidence in vigorous meaſures. As if it were our unhappy fate to be ſtill miſtaken, as well when we thought the *Church in danger*, as now when we appear to believe it *triumphant!*

Indeed (ſays this Public) *it*, [your manner] *has furniſhed your enemies with a handle to do you infinite miſchief. Your* COLD *friends lament and make the worſt ſort of excuſe, by imputing it to a temper contracted from the long habit of drawing blood in controverſy; Your* WARM *friends are out of countenance, and forced to be ſilent, or turn the diſcourſe.*

Would not any one by this, imagine, that the Author of the *View*, after much pretended oppoſition to Infidelity, was at laſt detected of being in confederacy with it, and all along artfully advancing its intereſts; that the Maſk had unwarily

unwarily dropt off, and that he ſtood confeſſed, what Lord Bolingbroke has been pleaſed to call him, *an Advocate for civil and eccleſiaſtical Tyranny.* At leaſt, no one would imagine, that this *handle afforded to his enemies of doing him miſchief*, was no other than the treating the Author of the moſt impious and inſulting book that ever affronted public juſtice, as a bad Reaſoner and a worſe Philoſopher, whoſe VANITY led him to abuſe every *Name* of Learning, and his FEAR to diſcredit every *Mode* of Religion.

Theſe *cold Friends* however acted in Character; the great ſecret of whoſe addreſs is the well poiſoning an Apology, or, as the excellent writer better expreſſes it, *making the very worſt excuſe they can find.* But here, methinks, we want their uſual caution, which rarely ſuffers an ambiguous expreſſion to admit of a favourable meaning: For, the compliment *of drawing blood in controverſy*, the Author of the *View* may fairly take to himſelf with great complacency. As his *Controverſy* has always lain in a quarter very remote from political altercation; neither with Miniſters nor Factions; and on no leſs a queſtion than the truth and honour of Religion, againſt Infidels and Bigots; the *drawing blood* ſhews him to have been *in earneſt*, which

which is no vulgar praiſe. It would be but poor commendation, I ween, of a brave Engliſh Veteran, who had ſeen many a well-fought field for Liberty and his Country, to ſay, he never *drew blood*; tho' ſuch a compliment might recommend the humanity of a Champion at Hockley-hole. When the ſituation of the times have engaged two learned Men, at the head of oppoſite factions in a Church, to engage in a party-quarrel, and play a prize of diſputation, with the reward placed, and often divided, between them, it is no wonder if there ſhould be much ceremony, and little *blood ſhed*. But the Author of the *View* writes for no Party, nor party-Opinions; he writes for what he thinks the TRUTH; and, in the point in queſtion, for the CLERGY, its Miniſters; (they will *forgive him this wrong*) and as Both of them are yet by good fortune of public authority, he thinks himſelf at liberty to ſupport them, tho' it be by *drawing blood* from premeditated impiety, from low envy, or malicious bigotry; which, he apprehends, are not to be ſubdued by management or a mock-fight. Yet as much *in earneſt* as he is, he ſhould be aſhamed to turn the ſame arms againſt ſimple error; againſt a naked adverſary; or againſt the man who had thrown away his weapons; or, indeed, againſt any but him,

him, who ſtands up boldly to defy Religion, or, what is almoſt as bad, to diſhonour it, by falſe and hypocritic zeal for the errors and corruptions which have crept into it. In a word, had I written with any oblique views, and not from a ſenſe of duty, I ſhould have ſuited the entertainment to the taſte of my Superiors. For a man muſt be of a ſtrange complexion indeed, who when he has *conformed to Religion* for his convenience, will yet ſcruple to go on, and reap the benefit of his compliance, by *conforming to the Faſhion.*

So far as to the Author's *cold Friends.* With reſpect to his *warm* ones, They have not plaid their parts ſo well; they ſeem to have given up their Cauſe too ſoon. They might have ſaid with truth, and a full knowledge of what they ſaid, " That no man was more diſpoſed than the Author of the *View*, to comply with the temper of the times; and eſpecially with the Inclinations of his Friends; to whoſe *ſatisfaction* he has been ever ready to ſacrifice his own inclinations; but, to their *ſervices*, every thing—except his duty and his honour: Was he capable of doing this he would not deſerve a virtuous Friend: That probably, he conſidered the matter in queſ-

tion

tion as one of thoſe excepted caſes, where he could hearken to nothing but the dictates of honour, and the duties of his ſtation: That he ſaw *Religion* inſulted, a *moral Governor* defied; *Naturaliſm*, a ſpecies of *Atheiſm*, openly, and with all the arts of ſophiſtry and declamation, inculcated; and the oppoſing World inſolently branded as a cabal of fools, knaves, and madmen." They might have ſaid, "That where errors of ſmall conſequence are in queſtion, or even great ones, when delivered with modeſty and candour, ſuitable meaſures are to be obſerved: but that here the impiety and the inſult were both in the extreme." To which, in the laſt place, they might have added moſt of thoſe other conſiderations, which have been urged in the courſe of this Apology. And had they been ſo pleaſed, the Defence had not only been better made, but with much more dignity and advantage to their Client.

However the Author of the *View* has yet the vanity, amidſt all this mortification, to reflect, that there is a very wide difference between *diſpleaſing*, and *the being diſapproved:* and that *this very Public*, who complain by the pen of my anomymous Friend, feel that difference. The decencies of Acquaintance, the impreſſions

of

of habit, and even the moſt innocent partialities, might make them uneaſy to ſee Lord BOLINGBROKE expoſed to contempt: But their love of the Public, their reverence both for its Civil and Religious intereſts, will make them ſee with Pleaſure his PRINCIPLES confuted and expoſed. When a noble Roman had in public Senate accuſed one of the greateſt Peſts of his age and country, he obſerved that the vigour with which he purſued this Enemy of the Republic, made many worthy men uneaſy; but he ſatisfied himſelf with this reflexion, *tantum ad fiduciam vel metum differt, nolint homines facias, an non probent.*

In a word, my duty to God, to my Country, to Mankind at large, had, as I fancied, called upon me to do what I did, and in the *manner* I have done it. If I have offended any good Man, any Friend to my perſon, or my Cauſe, it is a ſacrifice to Duty; which yet I muſt never repent of having made, tho' the diſpleaſure of a Friend be the ſevereſt trial of it. I know what that man has to expect, both from *Infidelity* and *Bigotry*, who engages WITHOUT RESERVE in the ſervice of Religion.

" Ah! let not VIRTUE too, commence his Foe!

How-

However I have long ſince taken my party: "Omnia praecepi, atque animo mecum ante peregi. "Nec recuſo, ſi ita caſus attulerit, luere "poenas ob honeſtiſſima facta, dum FLA-"GITIOSISSIMA ULCISCOR."

Jan. 4, 1755.

TO

TO

***** ***** Esq.

DEAR SIR,

LORD BOLINGBROKE'S PHILOSOPHY, so much and so long talked of, is now come, and very fairly, into the hands of the public. For I think it would be injustice to the editor to suppose his Lordship did not design us this LEGACY. His last Will sufficiently declares his kindness to us. But, you will say, he speaks of his Philosophy as a thing composed only for the solace of a few friends in a corner [1]. What then? might not his Lordship change his mind, and extend his benefits? Hardly, you think, without *contradicting* his professed principles. So much the better. The publication then will be of a piece with the rest. And never trouble your head with one *contradiction*, where you may meet with a thousand.

Quid te exempta levat spinis de pluribus una?

[1] "Let us seek truth, but seek it quietly as well as freely. "Let us not imagine, like some who are called FREE-THINK-"ERS, that every man who can think and judge for himself (as "he has a right to do) has therefore a right of SPEAKING, any "more than of *acting*, according to the full freedom of his "thoughts. The freedom belongs to him as a rational creature. "He lies under the restraint as a *member of Society*. — As we "think for ourselves, we may keep our thoughts to ourselves or "communicate them with a DUE RESERVE, and in such manner "ONLY, as it may be done without *offending the Laws of our "Country, and disturbing the public peace.*" — *Introductory Letter to Mr. Pope*, Vol. iii. p. 343. Quarto Edition.

Now tho' I know You have as little Curiosity to hear what a Freethinker can object to the FAITH which has got possession of your heart, as what a pick-pocket can chicane to the Property in your purse: yet the name of L. BOLINGBROKE'S METAPHYSICS, (which, I think, were become as famous, and hitherto as little understood, as his POLITICS) cannot sure but incline you to some slight acquaintance at least with this FIRST PHILOSOPHY, as he calls it; and which, in the manner of other Conquerors, he erects on a general desolation.

The only part of his Lordship's Character, that yet remained equivocal, was his *literary*. How this will fare by the publication of his *Philosophy*, I will not pretend to say; perhaps not altogether so well as his Friends might give him the pleasure to expect. He frequently tells his reader, that the Doctrine of his ESSAYS and FRAGMENTS had been occasionally thrown out amongst them, and made the subject of many free conversations. And while he harangued in that circle, I will suppose he met with the applause he sought after. But had he chose himself to bring them to the bar of the Publick, he might have seen strange revolutions. "Illic, et Judex *tacet*, et "Adversarius *obstrepit*, et nihil TEMERE DICTUM "perit: et, siquid TIBI IPSE SUMAS, PROBANDUM "est: et, omisso MAGNA SEMPER FLANDI TUMORE, "loquendum est [1]." Indeed his Lordship could hardly expect to escape the severity of this Tribunal but by the superior evidence of his principles: since his meditations on divine matters are so extensive, that scarce any one, who has written in defence of Virtue,

[1] Quint.

or

or Religion, but will find himself either insulted in his person or misrepresented in his opinions; and this, merely for being in the great man's way.

But surely, when a person of his Lordship's polite manners had condescended to enter into learned altercation, the world might expect, at least for the *courtly management of Controversy*, a most consummate Model, which should either reform, or should for ever discredit, the grosser Polemics of the Schools. So that tho' the DIVINE might expect no great *matter* from these oracles of reason, yet he should readily accept his amends in the *manner* of so elegant a pen. And perhaps You, who have observed their commerce with the world, and their conduct to one another, might be apt to think they would have been no losers by the bargain. Indeed, Divines have been generally thought wanting in forms; whether their pride prompts them to appeal to the Authority of reason; or their prudence teaches them to submit to the Wisdom of their Betters. And the management of their Controversies in the Schools, and their interests in Courts, have, on different accounts, been equally obnoxious both to the dealers in Truth and Falsehood. I would willingly avoid both their extremes. For I would, if possible, preserve and support that love and reverence to an useful body, which the noble Writer, relying not on his own politics but on other men's, has in his *fourth Essay* devoted to Destruction. He, indeed, may call for aid on the *Secular arm*; he has the old reason for so doing; but I dare say, the *Clergy* never will. Things are now come to that pass, that the State seems to be in more need of their

Support, than They, of the State's. For, tho' the cavils of licentious men always *end* in the Confirmation of Truth and Virtue, yet they generally *set out* in looſening the hold, which Religion had got upon the PEOPLE. And when that is gone, what other Engine the Magiſtrate will invent, to keep the Multitude in order, They, whoſe principal concern it is, would do well to conſider.

As I ſaid, then, I had taken it for granted, that our noble Adverſary, for an Adverſary he has condeſcended to be, would be principally anxious to teach us in his writings, what was his wont in converſation, that ſtudied politeneſs, which is ſo well fitted to keep inferiors at a diſtance: And that, when he had declared mortal war againſt every thing the world hath hitherto called RELIGION; and againſt every Order of PRIESTS, or MINISTERS, which civil Government has thought proper to eſtabliſh, for the ſupport of it, we ſhould ſee his attack carried on by the faireſt as well as ſtrongeſt reaſoning, the gentleſt as well as firmeſt addreſs, and the politeſt as well as keeneſt raillery.

But how were we diſappointed, to find this Conſervator of States, this Legiſlator in Philoſophy and Religion, utterly unable to raiſe his head above the rank contagion of the Schools: to ſee Polemics go their uſual train; and this Sun of our new Syſtem, whirled along the turbid vortex of Controverſy, like any the moſt *ignoble* of the earthly Bodies! But his POET, or rather his *Prophet*, (who ſo magnificently announced to us the glad tidings of all theſe good things) had prepared us for it. He had contem-

plated

plated this ſtrange phenomenon: not, indeed, without ſurprize. Is it not, ſays he,

——— "mighty odd?

"A fit of vapours clouds this DEMI-GOD!"

To be plain, I met with nothing in theſe big volumes, but the rankneſs of SOUTH without his force; and the malignity of MARVEL without his wit. You ſhall not take it on my word: the evidence lies before us. Give me leave then to preſent you with a SPECIMEN, under his own hand, of his candour, his temper, and infinite politeneſs. And tho' one can but ill judge of the *harveſt* by a ſample of the field-flowers, yet we may form a pretty good gueſs of the *ſoil*.

Nor is this intemperance of language, of which I propoſe to give you a taſte, the mere eſcape of fancy or humour, which it would be candid to overlook: It is a ſort of *formula dicendi*, without which, all his Lordſhip's authentic acts of Legiſlation would be invalid: It is the very *Spirit* of his *new Religion*, without which, the whole would be indeed but a *dead letter*.

It was with the leſs reluctance I entered upon this part of my deſign, that I might have to juſtify myſelf to the world for the plainneſs and freedom with which I may hereafter chance to treat his Lordſhip's REASONING; for, as Quintilian well obſerves, "Præ-"ſtatur hoc aliquando etiam DIGNITATIBUS ut li-"bertatis noſtræ ratio reddatur, ne quis nos aut *petu-"lantes* in lædendis his, aut etiam *ambitioſos* putet."

Without any further prologue, then, let the Shew begin: Only premiſing, that as his Lordſhip had a FIRST PHILOSOPHY to erect, he had an immenſe

deal of rubbiſh to remove: The authority of every great Name, and of every ſacred Order, ſtanding directly in his way.

With CUDWORTH he begins: and of CUDWORTH he ſays, *The heads of many reverend perſons have been turned by a preternatural fermentation of the brain, or a philoſophical delirium. None hath been more ſo than this Divine* [3]. Again, CUDWORTH [in his INTELLECTUAL SYSTEM] *gives you little leſs than a nonſenſical paraphraſe of nonſenſe. It was not his fault. The good man paſſed his life in the ſtudy of an unmeaning jargon; and as he learned, he taught* [4].

To talk, like CUMBERLAND, *of promoting the good of the whole Syſtem of rational Agents, amongſt whom God is included, and of human benevolence towards him, is to talk metaphyſical jargon and theological blaſphemy* [5].

CLARKE *triumphs in this fooliſh and wicked rhodomontade, &c.* [6]. — *All* CLARKE *ſays about the diſcovery of God's will, is a rhapſody of preſumptuous reaſoning and of prophane abſurdities* [7]. — *Audacious and vain Sophiſt! His terms have a ſolemn air, that may impoſe on the unwary, and confirm the habitual prejudices of others; but more abſurdity cannot be ſtuffed into ſo few words* [8].

Of WOLLASTON, he ſays, *But I will detain you no longer about ſuch diſcourſe as would convince you, if you heard it at* MONROE'S, *that the Philoſopher who held it was a patient of the Doctor's not yet perfectly reſtored to his ſenſes* [9]. Again, of the ſame excellent Perſon, *We have here an example of the ſecond ſort of Madneſs men-*

[3] Vol. iii. p. 353. of his Works, in Quarto.
[4] Vol. iv. p. 92.
[5] Vol. v. p. 82.
[6] Vol. v. p. 252.
[7] Vol. v. p. 292.
[8] Vol. v. p. 395.
[9] Vol. iii. p. 518.

tioned

tioned above. The man who writ all this nonſenſe was a man of parts. — But when theſe learned Lunaticks, &c. [10].

CLARKE and WOLLASTON ſoon grow outragious; and ready to be chained together. Indeed from henceforth they are rarely ſhewn aſunder. We ſometimes find them in the *height of a metaphyſical frenzy* [11]: And, by what one can perceive, without much provocation. They had proved the Soul to be a thinking ſubſtance diſtinct from Matter: We may allow them to be jealous of the glory of this atchievement. But who conteſted it with them? No body, that I know of, before his Lordſhip. And he very civilly let them enjoy the honour of it for life.

The Preſident FORBES is *really mad*; but it is only *quoad hoc*. For obſerve, he was *no Divine by profeſſion, but ſomething better* [12]. Indeed, not much. He was a LAWYER. Of which UNLEARNED Profeſſion, as he calls it, *ninety nine in a hundred at leaſt*, (he ſays) *are Petty-foggers, Sharpers, Brawlers, and Cavillers* [13].

But, to give the better edge to his well-tempered language, he ſometimes dips it in irony: and then it is, *The good Earl of Nottingham*; and the *righteous Biſhop Sherlock*. They deſerved his anger. The Firſt publickly defended, and ably too, that *Faith* which ſtands ſo much in his way: and the Other ventured to oppoſe that *Party*, whoſe patronage he had condeſcended to aſſume [14].

[10] Vol. v. p. 374.
[11] Vol. iii. p. 514.
[12] Vol. v. p. 523.
[13] Vol. ii. p. 353.
[14] See *the Craftſman*.

He comes next to the whole BODY of the Chriſtian Clergy. And now the *firſt Philoſophy* begins to work, and the taſk to grow ſerious. The PRIMITIVE SAINTS and DOCTORS have the precedence, as is fitting. "The liſt of MARTYRS conſiſted, I "believe, of thoſe who ſuffered for BREAKING THE "PEACE[15]. The PRIMITIVE CLERGY were, under "pretence of Religion, a very LAWLESS TRIBE[16]." "ALL the Chriſtian FATHERS uſing a DELIRIOUS "STYLE, it became that of Chriſtian Theology[17]." "It would ſcarce be poſſible to believe that the "greateſt Saints and Doctors of the Church had "talked ſo much BLASPHEMOUS NONSENSE, and "employed ſo much *artifice* about it, if their writ- "ings were not extant[18]." — "Of all this *ab-* "*ſurdity, profaneneſs, and ridicule*, they who built up "Chriſtian theology were guilty." — You aſk, with ſurpriſe and impatience, What this *abſurdity* was? He was going to tell you; for he never minces matters. "They ADDED (ſays he) the EPISTLES to the "GOSPELS; the doctrines of PAUL to thoſe of "CHRIST; till the APOCALYPSE became a part of "our holy Scriptures[19]." And now, I hope, you are ſatisfied. If not, take what follows, "Chri- "ſtian Divines and Philoſophers have done more to "DEBASE our notions of the ſupreme Being, than "all the Doctors of Polytheiſm[20]."

This was reaſonably well, for new-beginners: But nothing like the exploits of MODERN DIVINES.

[15] Vol. iv. p. 434. [16] Id. ib.
[17] Vol. iv. p. 612. [18] Vol. iv. p. 303.
[19] Vol. iv. p. 371. [20] Vol. iii. p. 541.

"It

" It is MADNESS, *or something* WORSE *than madness*, for Divines to imagine themselves able to " comprehend a whole Oeconomy of divine Wisdom " from *Adam* down to *Christ*. And yet this is so cus- " tomary, that not only the learned and ingenious, " but every dabbler in Theology, who must pass for " a *fool* or a *knave* whenever he grows extravagant, " affects to reason in the same manner [1]."

— " Would Divines insist chiefly on the external " proofs of the authenticity of Scripture — they " would avoid *a great deal of* BLASPHEMY [2]." — " They are absurd and licentious in urging both the " external and internal evidence of Revelation [3]."

— " Our Divines turn themselves to declaim on " certain and undoubted marks of divine Authority " of the Scriptures of the Israelites — Let us com- " pare some of these supposed marks with those of " human original, and they will stare us in the face, " and point out plainly the FRAUD and IMPO- " STURE [4].

— " It is common and yet astonishing to observe, " with how much solemnity and confidence almost " all those who teach and defend Christianity, pre- " sume to AFFIRM ANY THING, tho' never so evi- " dently FALSE [5]."

— " The best, and even such as pass for the fairest " controversial Writers, improve by artifice the na- " tural infirmity of the human mind. They do, on " purpose, confound ideas and perplex the significa-

[1] Vol. iv. p. 274. [2] Vol. iii. p. 272.
[3] Vol. iv. p. 273. [4] Vol. iii. p. 288.
[5] Vol. iv. p. 295.

" tion of signs — the most scandalous frauds are ap-
" plauded under the name of subtilities. This I call
" theological fraud [6]." Hence, in another place, he says, that *folly and knavery prevail most amongst Divines* [7], and again, that They are THE PLAGUES AND SCOURGES OF THE WORLD [8].

" The doctrine of Clarke and other Christian Di-
" vines about our obligation to imitate God is FALSE
" and PROFANE [9]."

" Divines have IMPUDENTLY and WICKEDLY as-
" sumed, that there is a law of right reason common
" to God and man [10]."

" What I have advanced will be treated as an im-
" pious paradox by some of the trifling solemn dog-
" matists in Criticism and Theology, who have ad-
" vanced so many *absurd and impious* paradoxes of
" their own [11] "

We now come to what the noble Author calls the DELIRIUM OF METAPHYSICAL THEOLOGY [12]. —
" The man who walked soberly about in the Bedlam
" of Paris, and believed himself God the Father,
" was mad. Thus the Philosopher, who takes a
" bold leap from a few clear and distinct ideas to the
" first principles of things, is *mad* [13]."

" The *reasoners à priori* resemble very much one
" sort of MADMEN. Some of these are so VERY
" MAD that they lose all use of their reason. Others
" again deduce consequences, and argue very justly,

[6] Vol. iii. p. 424--5.
[7] Vol. v. p. 6.
[8] Vol. iv. p. 435.
[9] Vol. v. p. 65.
[10] Vol. v. p. 77.
[11] Vol. v. p. 190.
[12] Vol. iii. p. 356.
[13] Vol. iv. p. 139.

" but

" but are STILL MAD: becauſe they reaſon from " principles that have no appearance of reality out " of their own overheated and diſordered imagina- " tions. You will find inſtances of this kind, with- " out the trouble of going to *Bedlam*; but you will " find them principally in *Colleges* and *Schools* [14]."

— " They deſerve to be treated like patients pro- " per for Dr. MONROE, and to be put under his care. " Nothing leſs than *Metaphyſics* could have turned ſo " many good heads [15]."

Well then, Divines are all MAD; and, for fear of miſchief, in ſafe cuſtody. Sometimes, indeed, his Lordſhip lets them out to cool, and air themſelves; nay, he is ſo good to give them their lucid intervals; but it is only to *play the rogue*, and to *cant in the pulpit*; and then, back again to their kennel, to *Monroe*, and his diſcipline; or, what is much worſe, to his Lordſhip's; to hear themſelves called *Fools*, *Knaves*, *Cheats*, *Madmen*, *Impoſtors*, and *Blaſphemers*. And, for theſe haſty changes of the Scene, he has contrived a moſt ingenious expedient. He has divided the Clergy into the two claſſes of *Theologians* and *Metaphyſicians*: in the firſt of which, the KNAVE is predominant; in the ſecond, the MADMAN. So that he has of either ſort always ready and at hand, juſt as he wants them. But as *Madmen* are much eaſier dealt with than *Knaves*, he has prepared one common BEDLAM for them all. *For God forbid* (he ſays) *he ſhould be as uncharitable as Divines*, to think they deſerved a worſe place, *as blaſphemming in their ſenſes* [16]. Good man! How kind

[14] Vol. v. p. 396.
[15] Vol. v. p. 417.
[16] Vol. iv. p. 464.

now is all this! How humane! What shall the Clergy do for him in return? Alas! he thinks not of it; his *modesty* is still greater than his *charity*: and he is only anxious not to be misunderstood. He is even ready to fear that Divines should take his honest freedom in dudgeon; and that it may possibly *procure him, in return, some ecclesiastical* BILLINGSGATE; *to be called infidel, deist, and perhaps atheist. My reply* (says he) *to* SO ANGRY *Disputants should be* CALM, AND SUCH AS MIGHT TEACH CHARITY *to those who preach it so much, and practise it so little* [17]. To say the truth, his Lordship seems, like JUSTICE SHALLOW in the Play, to be suspicious of those he had so well entertained. *Davy*, (says the Justice, of his Court Guests) *be civil to these Knaves, for they will* BACK-BITE. *Not worse than they are* BITTEN (replies Davy) *for they have marvelous foul linen.* Whether his Lordship found the *Priest's Surplice* in the like condition, or whether he has left it so, is not material. No marvel at it's evil plight, when it has been so long over-run with Vermin; such as Toland, Chub, Morgan, and those who have been since bred out of them.

The BILLINGSGATE, however, if we give but equal credit to what we see of his Lordship, and to what we hear of the Clergy from their Enemies, lies pretty nearly between them. Yet I agree with him it becomes the Ministers of Religions, much less than it does his Lordship. They are *Disputants*; he is an *Orator*. Their business is to *reason*; his is to *rail*. While each confines himself to his province, all goes well. But should they change weapons; should the Orator attempt to reason, and the Disputant be pro-

[17] Vol. iv. p. 225.

voked

voked to rail, every thing would be out of order. I venture, on the authority of Quintilian, to reckon *railing* amongſt the ARTS of Eloquence. "CONVI-"TIIS implere VACUA cauſarum," ſays this able Rhetor. It is true he holds it to be of the leſs perfect kind — "eſt enim prorſus CANINA ELOQUENTIA." But his Lordſhip might naturally think, that his *Dog-Eloquence*, was well enough fitted to their *Dog-Logic*. However, Quintilian would not overload this ſpecies of Eloquence, nor would I; tho' neither of us be diſpoſed to extol it; he confeſſes there is yet a ranker kind. "Sed hæc minora ſunt ILLO VITIO 'ANIMI, quo MALEDICUS a MALEFICO non diſtat, "niſi OCCASIONE." "In which, ſays he, nothing "but *opportunity* is wanting to make the *evil-ſpeaker* "an *evil-doer*." But the *Miniſter of State* muſt join the *Orator* before this compound excellence can diſplay itſelf; juſt as the *Divine* and *Atheiſt* muſt *conſpire* to make that ARTIFICIAL BLASPHEMY, which gives his Lordſhip ſo much concern.

But the mention of this CONSPIRACY reminds me that it is now high time to give you ſome account of it.

Hitherto we have only the out-lines, or, at moſt the general air of this *Clerical Portrait*; all he could catch at the firſt ſitting. A horrid combination finiſhes the Picture: a CONFEDERACY BETWEEN DIVINES AND ATHEISTS, TO DISHONOUR AND DEGRADE THE GOD OF THE UNIVERSE. This is the ſtriking feature; and ſo artificially diſpoſed, that, turn the Portrait which way you will, it has ſtill a *plotting*, which, in his Lordſhip's juſtice, is little better than a *hanging look*.

A Con-

A Confederacy ſo mad, ſo monſtrous, may perhaps ſtartle you at firſt. But don't be frightened. Take my word for it, it will come to nothing. It is a Treaty of his own making. And you have heard enough of his talents for Treaty-making. It is true, you ſay, he could reconcile the moſt unnatural alliances to the delicacy of his *morals*; and the moſt ridiculous miſcarriages to the ſuperiority of his *Politics*; but a *confederacy between Divines and Atheiſts!* Was any thing ſo odious! What think you, my Friend, of that blind bargain he once drove between certain of King George's Proteſtant Subjects, and a Popiſh Pretender? How *that* came to nothing, he has not thought fit to tell us, in his curious account of that tranſaction [18]. But, as to *this* confederacy, I may have an opportunity of ſhewing you, that, after all his pains to form it, he betrayed and diſſolved it, himſelf. At preſent, my buſineſs is only to ſhew you what he *ſays* of it.

" After pleading the cauſe of natural and revealed " Religion, I am to plead the cauſe of God himſelf, " againſt DIVINES AND ATHEISTS IN CONFEDERA- " CY [19].

" The conduct of Chriſtian Divines has been ſo far " from defending the Providence of God, that they " have joined in the clamour againſt it. Nothing has " hindered, even thoſe who pretend to be his Meſ- " ſengers, his Embaſſadors, his *Plenipotentiaries*, from " renouncing their allegiance to him, as they them- " ſelves have the FRONT TO AVOW, but the hypo-

[18] See the whole Letter to Sir W. Windham.

[19] Vol. v. p. 305.

" theſis

" theſis of a future ſtate. On this hypotheſis alone " they inſiſt; and therefore if this will not ſerve their " turn, God is diſowned by them, as effectually as if " he was ſo, in terms [20]." " Divines, if not " Atheiſts, yet are ABETTERS of Atheiſm [1]."

" That there were ſome men, who knew not God " in all ages may be true: but the ſcandalous taſk of " COMBATING HIS EXISTENCE under the maſk of " Theiſm, was reſerved for Metaphyſicians and " Theologians [2]."

— " Divines are ſtill more to be blamed. A CON- " FEDERACY WITH ATHEISTS becomes ill the pro- " feſſors of Theiſm. No matter. They PERSIST, " and have done their beſt, in concert with their " allies, to DESTROY the belief of the goodneſs of " God: — They endeavour to DESTROY that of his " goodneſs, which is a farther article of their Al- " liance [3]."

" The CONFEDERACY between Atheiſts and Di- " vines appears to have been carried VERY FAR — " Nay the Atheiſt will appear, to that reaſon, to " which they both appeal, more conſiſtent in his ab- " ſurdity than the Divine [4]." " Divines UP- " BRAID God's goodneſs, and CENSURE his Juſ- " tice [5]." — " INJUSTICE is, in this life, aſcribed " to God, by Divines [6]."

" The whole Tribe of Divines, like Wollaſton " and Clarke, do, in effect RENOUNCE the God " whom you and I adore, as much as the rankeſt of

[20] Vol. v. p. 487--8.
[1] Vol. v. p. 485.
[2] Vol. v. p. 307.
[3] Vol. v. p. 393.
[4] Vol. v. p. 348--9.
[5] Vol. v. p. 417.
[6] Vol. v. p. 541.

" the

" the Atheiſtical Tribe. Your Prieſts and our Par-
" ſons will exclaim moſt pathetically, and RAIL OUT-
" RAGEOUSLY at this aſſertion. But have a little
" patience, and I will prove it to their ſhame to be
" true [7]."

Give me leave, Sir, for once, to go a little out of my way to vindicate the whole body of Divines from the horrid calumny of this imaginary Confederacy. To ſay the truth, the charge is too ſerious to be paſſed over with the ſame lightneſs I am diſpoſed to treat the reſt of his Lordſhip's Extravagances.

Be pleaſed then to underſtand, that ATHEISM has ever endeavoured to ſupport it ſelf, on a FACT, which has indeed all the certainty that the evidence of ſenſe can give it; namely *the unequal diſtribution of moral good and evil.*

— " Cum res hominum tanta caligine volvi
" Adſpicerem, *lætoſque diu florere nocentes,*
" *Vexarique pios* —— LABEFACTA CADEBAT
" RELLIGIO," ——

was the common language of the impatient ſufferer. From hence the Atheiſt inferred, that the Univerſe was without an intelligent Ruler; and all things driven about by that Fate or Fortune, which firſt produced them. DIVINES oppoſed this *concluſion:* for they did not venture to be ſo paradoxical as, with his Lordſhip, to call in queſtion *the premiſſes*, a phenomenon which objected itſelf to all their Senſes. They demonſtrated, ſtrictly demonſtrated, the Being of a God, and his MORAL attributes: And then ſhewed, that if the whole of man's exiſtence were

[7] Vol. v. p. 485.

included

included in this life, the present distribution of moral good and evil would contradict that Demonstration. They, therefore, inferred, on their part, that the whole was not included in this life: but that man was reserved for an after reckoning; in which, an *equal distribution of rewards and punishments* would amply vindicate the providence of a righteous Governor.

But *Atheists* were not the only enemies that *Divines* had to deal with. There was a set of men, who allowed an intelligent first Cause, endowed with those moral attributes, which Divines had demonstrated: and, on that account, called themselves DEISTS. Yet they agreed so far with *Atheism*, as to confine the whole of man's existence to the present life. These, the *Divines* combated, in their turn; and with the same arms; but in an inverted order. In disputing with the *Atheist*, the principle held in common, was *the present unequal distribution of Good and Evil.* So that to cut off their conclusion from it, of NO GOD, they demonstrated his Being and Attributes: and from that proof inferred that the inequality would be set right. With the *Deist*, the common principle was *the Being and Attributes of God.* Therefore, to bring them to the allowance of a FUTURE STATE, they appealed to the present *unequal distribution* of good and evil (which these Men, as well as his Lordship, were very backward to allow and very industrious not to see) and from that inequality inferred, that there must be such a State.

This is a short and true account of their contest with ATHEISTS and DEISTS, so far as the subject of *a future state* came in question: In either controversy, that State is deduced from *the moral attributes:* only with

with this difference. In the diſpute with Athoiſts, the demonſtration of thoſe attributes is *made*; in the diſpute with Deiſts it is *allowed*. The final purpoſe againſt Atheiſm is to prove the BEING AND ATTRIBUTES of God; the final purpoſe againſt Deiſm is to prove a FUTURE STATE: For neither *natural* nor *revealed* Religion can ſubſiſt without *believing that God* IS, *and that he is a* REWARDER *of them that ſeek him* [8]. Thus, we ſee, the *queſtion*, in either controverſy, being different; the *premiſſes*, by which each was to be proved, muſt needs be different. The difference is here explained: the premiſſes, in the argument with Atheiſts, were the *moral attributes*; the premiſſes, in the argument with Deiſts, the *unequal diſtribution* of good and evil.

What Enemy to Religion now, could ever hope to ſee a Calumny either thrive or riſe on ſo unpromiſing a ground? or flatter himſelf with the expectation of an advocate bold enough to tell the World, that this conduct of the DIVINES was a CONFEDERACY *with* ATHEISTS, *to decry God's providence; to blot out his attributes of goodneſs and juſtice; to combat his Government; and to deny his very exiſtence?* The RIGHT HONOURABLE Author does all this: And more; — he expects to be believed. It is true, this is a fine believing age: Yet I hardly think he would have carried his confidence in our credulity ſo far, had he ſeen his way clear before him. —— His Lordſhip is always ſublime, and therefore often cloudy; commonly, at too great a diſtance to look into the detail of things, or to enter into their *minuteneſs*: (for which, indeed, he is perpetually felicitating his Genius.) So that, in his *general view* of Theologic matters, he has jumbled

[8] St. Paul, theſe

these two Controversies into one; and, in the confusion, commodiously slipped in one Fact for another. He, all the way, represents Divines as making *a future State* THE PROOF *of God's moral attributes:* Whereas, we now see, on the very face of the controversy, that they make *the moral attributes* A PROOF *of a future State.* Let us consider how the dispute stands with *Atheists.* These men draw their argument against a God, from the condition of the moral world: The Divine answers, by demonstrating *God's Being and Attributes:* and, on that demonstration, satisfies the objection. Consider how it stands with the *Deist.* Here, God's Being and Attributes is a common principle: And on this ground the Divine stands, to deduce a *future state* from the unequal distribution of things.—But this was to support his slander of a CONFEDERACY. There was no room to pretend that God's Being was made precarious, by proving a *future state,* from his attributes; but could he get it believed, that Divines proved the Attributes from a *future state,* he would easily find credit with his kind Readers, for the rest.

Well then, the whole amount of his CHIMERICAL CONFEDERACY comes to this, That *Divines and Atheists hold a principle in common*; but in common too with all the rest of mankind; namely, that there are irregularities in the distribution of moral good and evil. His Lordship has been angry with all POLITICAL, as well as all RELIGIOUS Parties in their turns. Suppose he had taken it into his head to ornament a CRAFTSMAN with the detection of a *political confederacy,* between the WHIGGS and JACOBITES, to dethrone KING GEORGE; because both denied that he reigned

reigned *jure divino*: *Mother Osborne* would have ſmiled at this, in ſpite of all her gravity; and told him, that the *Whiggs* only urged a common principle to ſupport their Monarch's title againſt *indefeaſible hereditary right*, the nonſenſical claim of his Adverſary. And is it not as evident that, in this pretended *anti-theological conſpiracy*, *Divines* employed the other common principle, to ſupport Religion againſt *Atheiſm and Deiſm!* But whatever his Lordſhip might think proper to diſguiſe in this reaſoning, there is one thing the moſt careleſs Reader will never overlook; which is, that, under all this pomp of words and ſolemnity of accuſation, you ſee lurking that poor ſpecies of a Bigot's calumny, which, from *one* principle held in common with an obnoxious party, charges his Adverſary, with *all* the follies or impieties that have rendered it odious. This miſerable artifice of impoſture, had now been long hiſſed out of learned controverſy, when the noble Lord took it up; and, with true political ſkill, worked it into a SHAM PLOT; to make RELIGION diſtruſt it's beſt Friends, and take refuge in the FIRST PHILOSOPHY.

TINDAL and COLLINS were manly Adverſaries. They knew how to invent, to puſh, and to purſue an Argument. But what does this noble Writer know — His Followers will tell you. They admire him for his Wit and Eloquence. But They admire, where You and I ſee nothing but an inflamed ſpirit, and an inflated ſtyle. For (to uſe the words of a great Maſter [9] of expreſſion) TRUE ELOQUENCE I *find to be none but the ſerious and hearty love of* TRUTH: *And that, whoſe mind ſoever is fully poſſeſſed with a fer-*

[9] Milton.

vent

vent desire to know good things, and with the dearest CHARITY *to infuse the knowledge of them into others; when such a man would speak, his words, like so many nimble and airy Servitors trip about him at command, and in well-ordered files, as he would wish, fall aptly into their own places.*

He has not yet done with the CHRISTIAN CLERGY. What remained behind was to collect together his scattered abuse; and to pour it all at once on that venerable Body, with an unfeeling hand, and unrelenting heart.

"Nothing more (says he) will be wanting to answer all the ends of *artificial Theology*, than to assume that they who minister in holy things are the "*Omrahs*, the *Vizirs*, and the *Bassas* of THIS MIGHTY KING, whose commands they publish, interpret, and execute, or cause to be executed, rather "than his EMBASSADORS: by assuming which latter "characters, they seem to lessen, over modestly, "the dignity of their own order, and to raise that of "the Laity too high: BUT I AM ASHAMED TO "HAVE SAID SO MUCH ON THIS SUBJECT [10]."

He may pretend what he pleases. But who ever it was that brought him to *shame*, it certainly was not the Clergy. They are ready to assure him, in the words of the Poet,

"Let SHAME come when it will, we do not call it."

Besides, after what has passed, I see nothing he has to be *ashamed* of; unless it be for stealing the paultry joke of *Embassadors* and *Plenipotentiaries* [11] from Lord Shaftsbury:

[10] Vol. v. p. 540--1. [11] See p. 14. of this Letter.

" Far be it from me (purſues this Right Honour-
" able Perſon) and from every lover of Truth and
" common ſenſe, to wiſh that the race of Metaphy-
" ſicians and Caſuiſts ſhould increaſe, or ſo much as
" continue. But ſince there are, have been, and will
" be ſuch men in all ages, it is very reaſonable to
" wiſh that they may ſerve to the ſame good purpoſe
" that the HELOTES, the DRUNKEN SLAVES did at
" Sparta; and that their DELIRIUM, inſtead of im-
" poſing on others, and even infecting many, may
" be at length LAUGHED OUT of the world [12]."
What pity is it his Lordſhip himſelf had not tried this expedient; (whoſe efficacy, other Lords of better temper, ſo kindly recommend and practiſe,) and employed the pleaſantry of his *wit* to laugh the Clergy out of the world, rather than the ſublimity of his *eloquence* to ſcold them out of it. He may rail thro' all his figures, at *the impertinence of Logic, the futility of Metaphyſics, the fraud of Diſputation, and the blaſphemy of Divinity* [13]: Theſe are the arms of impotent hyſterical Women when they want to have their will. After the long labours of a HOOKER, a STILLINGFLEET, a CUDWORTH, a SPENCER, a TILLOTSON, and a CLARKE, the Engliſh Clergy may anſwer his Lordſhip, in the words of *De Roſny*, as I think the ſtory goes, to ſome old Ladies of the *Guiſian League*; who, when HENRY IV. had got poſſeſſion of Paris, were one day very eloquent in their invectives againſt him: " Good ancient Gentlewomen, ſaid this rough old Soldier, ſpare your breath, and ſet your hearts at reſt, for OUR MASTER is not a man to be ſcratched and ſcolded out of his KINGDOM."—But when, be-

[12] Vol. v. p. 446. [13] Vol. iv. p. 353.

tween his malice and his magic, he had transformed the CLERGY into *drunken ſlaves*; you muſt not think he would neglect ſo good an occaſion of expoſing them to his NOBLE SPARTANS. Indeed the Entertainment is at hand: and no coſt is ſpared of laviſh expreſſion to ſet out theſe drunken revels. "The Choirs "of birds (ſays he) who whiſtle and ſing, or ſcream "at one another, or herds of beaſts who bleat and "low, or chatter and roar, at one another, have juſt as "much meaning and communicate it as well — Such "is the common converſation — Such, too, for the "moſt part, are all the public diſcourſes that are "held, and the SOLEMN HARANGUES OF THE PULPIT [14]."

After ſo large a gleaning from his Lordſhip's abundance, you will diſpenſe with me from gathering up his looſer flowers of ſpeech; ſuch as, *abſurdity, effronderie, knavery, folly, nonſenſe, delirium, frenzy, lunacy, downright madneſs, impiety, prophaneneſs, blaſphemy,* and *atheiſm:* which, like ſeed-pearl, are every where ſcattered over the embroidery of his eloquence.

Tho' our indignation at this torrent of ribaldry, makes us prompt enough to aſk,

—— "An quæ
"Turpia cerdoni, Voleſos Brutumque decebunt?"

yet I am ready, in charity to ſuſpect, that his Lordſhip may be abuſed. Who knows, but juſt as his Lordſhip gave BOWNCE, (his friend's dog) the ſentiments of his Maſter [15], ſo his Lordſhip's Secretary,

[14] Vol. iii. P. 422—3.

[15] *The world* (ſays his Lordſhip to Pope) *is as well fitted for* BOWNCE *as for* YOU, *with reſpect to phyſical nature; and with reſpect to* MORAL *nature,* BOWNCE *has little to do beyond hearkn-*

attending

attending to two at once, his Lord and his Lord's Parrot, might unaware put down to the great man, what indeed belonged to the Favorite: who, however *eloquent* he might be, yet, we are told, was *no Philosopher*.

" The Coxcomb bird, so talkative and grave,
" That from his cage cries *cuckold*, *whore*, and *knave*,
" Tho' many a passenger he rightly call,
" We hold him no Philosopher at all."

And I the rather suppose the Secretary to be here in fault, since his Lordship, in one place, seems to think, that ribaldry and ill language disgrace the *animal implume*, *bipes*, the *two leg'd*, *unfeather'd Philosopher*. For, speaking of Spinoza and Hobbes, he says, *Let it not be said, they are men of* depraved understandings, and depraved morals; this is to rail not to argue. To *rail*, then, when we should *argue* is, in his Lordship's opinion, unbecoming a Philosopher: unless you will suppose, that these two *Atheists* were especially favoured, for not being found in bad company, or taken in the fact, wickedly confederating with *Divines* and *Metaphysicians*.

Seriously, as good men may be scandalized to find their best and ablest Pastors accused of *blasphemy* and *prophaneness*, it will be right to tell the plain truth: which is no more than this, that his Lordship is apt

ing to the still whispers, *the* secret suggestions, *and the* sudden influences *of instinct*. Vol. v. p. 467. This, the Reader sees, is intended for a compliment on the following stanza of his Friend's *Universal Prayer*.

" Where I am right, thy grace impart,
" Still in the right to stay;
" Where I am wrong, O teach my heart
" To find that better way."

to

to annex *new ideas*, to *old words*; and not very careful to give us notice of his handy-work. So, in the case before us, Who would suspect, that teaching a *law of right reason, common to God and man*; and inforcing *man's obligation to imitate God*, were BLASPHEMY *and* PROPHANENESS? Yet such they are; or we must renounce the *first Philosophy* [16].

So then, as what has hitherto been *Piety* is become *Blasphemy*; we need not wonder that his Lordship turns the garb of old threadbare blasphemy; and gives it the new gloss of piety.

But now comes a scene indeed. The two REVELATIONS and their two FOUNDERS are brought upon the stage. And here, his *piety* pretends so much to the impulse of conscience, that you would suspect he thought himself, like St. PAUL, under the malediction of a woe if he *preached not his new Gospel.*

Of MOSES, he says, "It is impossible to excuse all "the puerile, romantic, and absurd circumstances in "the author of the Book of Genesis, which nothing "could produce but the habit of dealing in trifling "traditions, and a most profound ignorance. It is "impossible to read what he has writ on this subject "without feeling contempt for him as a philosopher, "and horror as a Divine [17]."

"The PENTATEUCH has such evident marks of "falsehood, as can be objected to no other writings

[16] DIVINES HAVE IMPUDENTLY AND WICKEDLY ASSUMED THAT THERE IS A LAW OF RIGHT REASON COMMON TO GOD AND MAN. Vol. v. p. 77. — And again, TO PREACH UP THE OBLIGATION OF IMITATING GOD IS FALSE AND PROFANE. Vol. v. p. 65.

[17] Vol. iii. p. 233.

" except to profeſſed Romances, nor even always to " them [18]."

" We may laugh at Don Quixote, for reading " Romances till he believed them to be true hiſto- " ries, and for quoting Archbiſhop Turpin with " great ſolemnity; but when Divines ſpeak of the " PENTATEUCH as of an Authenthic Hiſtory, and " quote Moſes as ſolemnly as he did Turpin, are they " much leſs mad than he was [19]?" *Don Quixote* is his Lordſhip's favorite ſimile; and comes as often over as the *Aſs* and *Lion* in Homer. But *mocking* (as the proverb ſays) *is catching*. Whoever attentively conſiders his Lordſhip's ESSAYS, will, I dare ſay, be of my mind, That the much reading *his maſter* LOCKE, who was deeply engaged with School-divines and Metaphyſicians, had the ſame effect on his Lordſhip's temper, in an advanced age, and under a bilious habit, that the reading books of Chivalry had on the prudent Gentleman of La Mancha. And, by his own confeſſion, *a man's head is ſoon turned by complex and abſtract ideas*. From henceforth the enchantments of *Schoolmen* and the gigantic Forms of *Metaphyſical Divines* got entire poſſeſſion of his underſtanding. Conſider what you can make of the following remark, without ſuppoſing with me, that theſe fancies had made very deep havoc in his brain. " *That* " THEOLOGY, ſays he, which pretends to deduce " the duties of a man from ſpeculations concerning " the *moral attributes of God*, is to be reckoned in the " claſs with NATURAL MAGIC [20]." Now, if you

[18] Vol. iii. p. 271.
[19] Vol. iii. p. 280.
[20] Vol. iv. p. 621.

ſeek,

ſeek, I do not ſay for the *elegance*, but for the *common propriety* of this obſervation, any where out of his Lordſhip's hurt and wounded imagination, you will ſeek for it in vain. Yet, allow him but his *Theological Magicians*, and you ſee, their *Theology* could be nothing elſe than *natural Magic*.

So again, — *Clarke ſhall not force me into Atheiſm; no nor Wollaſton neither*; What is this, but *Don Quixote*, up and down? dreadfully afraid that theſe Necromancers would, at laſt, force him into their ENCHANTED CASTLE of a *future ſtate*; for ſo he calls it in a letter to Lord Bathurſt [1], where he threatens to demoliſh it, as built upon unholy ground, by *Divines and Atheiſts in confederacy*.

No doubt, every Reader muſt have obſerved this unaccountable rage and horror whenever a DIVINE comes croſs his Lordſhip's fancy. One would think, they had ſerved him the ſame trick the Enchanters plaid Don Quixote; that they had run away with his *Library*, and walled up his *Study-door*. Moſt true it is, that not long before this immenſe Treaſure of the *firſt Philoſophy* was given to the world, certain of theſe wicked Magicians had turned it all into *fairie-favours*: And the Public, on it's firſt appearance, found nothing in it better proved than the truth of the old Adage, *Pro Theſauro, Carbones*. And indeed, if I was not perfectly ſatisfied that no man in his ſenſes could miſtake the value of this *new Money*, I ſhould make a ſcruple of laying ſo much of it before him; eſpe-

[1] "To diſcover error in axioms, ſays he, or in firſt principles "grounded on facts, is like breaking of a charm. The EN-"CHANTED CASTLE, the ſteepy rock, and the *burning lake* diſ-"appear." *On retirement and ſtudy*, Vol. II. p. 525.

cially the following pieces, which have an uncommon glow, as if they came hot from the place where they were minted.

" THE WHOLE SYSTEM OF THE LAW OF MOSES, " like the whole syſtem of his conduct, WAS FOUND- " ED ON MURDER [2]."

" The *Jews* blended together, at once, in the " moral character of God, injuſtice, cruelty, and " partiality. — They made him an object of terror " more than of awe and reverence; and their Reli- " gion was a Syſtem of the RANKEST SUPERSTI- " TION [3]."

" The JEWS with more inconſiſtency, and not leſs " profanation, than the Pagans, dreſſed up the one " ſupreme Being in all the rags of humanity; which " compoſed a kind of motley Character, ſuch as " fooliſh Superſtition, and mad Enthuſiaſm alone " could aſcribe to him, and ſuch as no man who be- " lieves him an all perfect being can hear without " horror [4]."

" The Jews give ſuch notions of the ſupreme " Being as no People on earth, but this, would have " aſcribed, I do not ſay to God, but to the worſt of " of thoſe monſters, who are ſuffered or ſent by God, " for a ſhort time, to puniſh the inquity of men [5]."

From MOSES and JUDAISM, his Lordſhip deſcends to PAUL and CHRISTIANITY. Let us ſee whether he gives Them better quarter.

" CHRISTIANITY abrogated the *Law*, and con- " firmed the *hiſtory of Moſes*; from the times, at leaſt,

[2] Vol. v. p. 183.
[3] Vol. v. p. 531.
[4] Vol. v. p. 529.
[5] Vol. v. p. 515.

" when

" when St. PAUL undertook, like a true cabaliſtical " Architect, with the help of type, and figure, to " raiſe a new Syſtem of religion on the old founda- " tions [6]." " The Goſpel of CHRIST is one " thing; the Goſpel of St. PAUL another [7]." " He preached a Goſpel in contradiction to CHRIST's, " and directly repugnant to it [8]."

On this account, I ſuppoſe, it was, that he dignifies PAUL, with the elegant appellation of the LEATHER-DRESSING PONTIFF. But the immediate occaſion of giving him this new title of honour, was particularly happy. His Lordſhip was on a favorite topic, he was abuſing the firſt Meſſengers of the Goſpel, for their claim to maintenance. He was conſcious, PAUL came not within his cenſure. So that, leſt this ſhould give the Apoſtle too much credit; he informs the reader, in his polite way [9], that he had a *trade*, and could ſhift for himſelf. For it ſeems, nothing but downright ſtarving will acquit the Apoſtles of theft and extortion, at his Lordſhip's Tribunal.

" JESUS (in his opinion) had no intention of " ſpreading his Religion further than amongſt the " *Jews*; but PAUL, bred at the feet of Gamaliel, " ſaw further than that poor ignorant fiſherman " Peter." — The ſenſe requires you ſhould read, *that poor ignorant Carpenter Jeſus:* and ſo without doubt his Lordſhip deſigned his compliment. Well, but what did PAUL ſee further? It was this, " That the contempt and averſion in which both the nation

[6] Vol. iii. p. 288. [7] Vol. iv. p. 313.
[8] Vol. iv. p. 326--7. [9] Vol. iv. p. 423.

" and the Religion of the Jews were held by the " reſt of mankind, would make it much more eaſy " to convert the Gentiles at once to Chriſtianity, " than to make them Jews firſt, in order to make " them Chriſtians afterwards [10]."

For it ſeems — " To DISSEMBLE was a funda- " mental principle of apoſtolical conduct. PAUL " practiſed it. We have his own word for this; and " he boaſts of it [11]." His Lordſhip lets us know, that *Paul* had aſſurance enough to do any thing. For ſpeaking of the Apoſtle's famous argument *ad modeſtiam — Nay, but, O man, who art thou that replieſt againſt God?* &c. [12]. He ſays, " There is ſome- " thing ſo IMPUDENT, as well as abſurd in this pro- " ceeding, that, common as it is, one can ſee no " example of it without ſurpriſe [13]."

" CAN he be leſs than mad, ſays his Lordſhip, " who boaſts a revelation ſuper-added to reaſon, to " ſupply the defects of it, and who ſuper-adds rea- " ſon to revelation to ſupply the defects of this too, " at the ſame time? This is madneſs or there " is no ſuch thing incident to our nature. And " into this kind of madneſs, ST. PAUL, profound in " cabaliſtical learning, hath fallen [14]." And yet, as mad as it is, all Governments have matched it, when they *ſuper-added* civil Laws, to natural con- ſcience or Religion, *to ſupply the defects of it*; *and ſuper- added* natural conſcience or Religion to Civil Laws, *to ſupply the defects of thoſe too, at the ſame time.* But more of this in it's place.

[10] Vol. iv. p. 306.
[11] Vol. iv. p. 306--7.
[12] Rom. ix. 20.
[13] Vol. iii. p. 307.
[14] Vol. iv. p. 172.

" St.

" St. PAUL carried into the Apoſtleſhip a great " deal of that ASSUMING AIR, which is apt to ac- " company much learning, *or the opinion of it* — a " great profuſion of words, and of involved and un- " connected diſcourſe, even on thoſe ſubjects which " required to be moſt clearly and diſtinctly deve- " loped. — He was a *looſe paraphraſer, a Cabaliſtical* " *Commentator*, as much, *at leaſt*, as any ancient or " modern Rabbin [15]." " St. PAUL's ſyſtem of " Religion, is an *intricate and dark Syſtem, with, here* " *and there, an intelligible phraſe, that caſts no light on* " *the reſt, but is rather loſt in the gloom of the whole* [16]." — " Having ſaid ſo much of the *intelligibility of* " *Paul's Goſpel*, TRUTH authoriſes me to add, that " where it is intelligible, it is often ABSURD, or " PROPHANE, or TRIFLING [17]." — " PAUL " taught *predeſtination* and UNLIMITED PASSIVE OBE- " DIENCE: the one abſurd, the other both abſurd " and IMPIOUS [18]."

Was it allowable to laugh, amidſt all theſe horrors, what mortal could forbear? *Unlimited paſſive obedience*, quoth he! The noble Lord had been ſo long accuſtomed to the cant of his Faction, which made St. Paul the preacher of I cannot tell what nonſenſe under that name, that he ſeems now in good earneſt to believe he was ſo. A juſt judgment on the Politician; to come at laſt, to give credit to his own Flams. However, in this inſtance, at leaſt, one would hope St. Paul might have been ſpared, if it were only for old-acquaintance-ſake; and the hard

[15] Vol. iv. p. 326--7. [16] Vol. iv. p. 328.
[17] Id. ib. [18] Vol. iv. p. 510.

ſervice they had put the LEATHER-DRESSING PONTIFF upon. But it is bad truſting, we ſee, to the gratitude of Stateſmen. Happy for us, PAUL has yet an able Defender; who will never be wanting in what he owes to gratitude and honour. I only take the liberty to drop a hint. It is well known to thoſe who were in the ſecret of his Lordſhip's paſſions and his party, that *Clarke* and *Wollaſton* found the worſe treatment for being the favorite Philoſophers of Q. C. who knows whether St. *Paul*, fared the better for being patronized by his learned Friend?

"CHRISTIANITY (ſays his Lordſhip) became FA-"NATICISM in the FIRST profeſſors of it. Men "corrupted it by ARTIFICIAL THEOLOGY. And "ſome will be apt to think, that the firſt of theſe men "was PAUL — Divines will be FURIOUS to hear "SUCH LANGUAGE [19]." Alas! No. He gueſſed ill of the mood, in which his Works were to find them. They laugh at his vanity; and pity the *fury* that inſpired *ſuch language*. Indeed he gives them ample exerciſe for all their pity: for having done with PAUL, he now directs the poiſon of his tongue againſt JESUS CHRIST himſelf.

"The truth is, CHRISTIANITY preſerved, in "many reſpects, a ſtrong tang of the ſpirit of Ju-"daiſm. The ſupreme Being took a milder appear-"ance; his favour was confined no longer to one "people. The MESSIAH came and redeemed "fallen Man. CHRISTIAN THEOLOGY diſcovers in "this myſterious proceeding the love of God to "Man; his infinite juſtice and goodneſs. BUT

[19] Vol. v. p. 275.

"REASON

" REASON will discover the fantastical, confused, and " inconsistent notions of Jewish Theology, latent in " it; and applied to another system of Religion. " *This love will appear partiality; this justice will ap-* " *pear injustice; this goodness will appear cruelty.* On " the whole, the moral character imputed to the su- " preme Being by Christian Theology differs little " from that imputed to him by the Jewish. The " difference is rather apparent than real [20]." " The scene of Christianity has been ALWAYS a scene " of dissention, of hatred, of persecution, and of " BLOOD [1]."

Speaking of CHRIST's *Sermon on the Mount*, he says, — " Some [of the precepts] are directed to the " *Jews* only, and some more immediately to the Dis- " ciples of Christ. The second sort seem fit enough " for a *religious Sect*; but are by no means practica- " ble in the general Society of Mankind. *Considered* " *as general duties they are impracticable, inconsistent* " *with* NATURAL INSTINCT, *as well as* LAW, *and* " QUITE DESTRUCTIVE OF SOCIETY [2]."

" The CHRISTIAN THEOLOGY has derived from " the *Jewish*, a prophane licence, which *makes men* " *blaspheme without knowing they blaspheme, and makes* " *their very devotion impious* [3]."

" I would sooner be reputed, nay I would sooner " be, a Pagan than a Christian, or an Atheist than " a Theist, if to be one or the other it was necessary " to believe such ABSURDITIES as these; which,

[20] Vol. v. p. 532.
[1] Vol. iv. p. 511.
[2] Vol. iv. p. 299, 300.
[3] Vol. v. p. 519.

" however disguised and softened by a *certain cant of* " *expression*, are directly PROPHANE; and indirectly, " or by consequence at least, *blasphemous* [4]."

" ALL THE BEDLAMS OF THE WORLD cannot " match the absurdities that have been propagated " by Christians, whether heretics or orthodox, con- " cerning the *making and governing of the world by the* " *ministration of inferior Beings:* Beings not eternal, " but produced in time by *emanation, or some other* " *inconceivable manner of generation* [5]."

" We cannot believe the SCRIPTURES to be " God's *word*, tho' we know the physical and moral " System are his *Work*, while we find in them such " repugnancies to the Nature of an all-perfect Being; " not mysteries, but absurdities; not things incom- " prehensible, but things that imply manifestly con- " tradiction with his Nature [6]."

In a word, he tells us, that " THE RELIGION OF " NATURE HAS BEEN TURNED ALMOST INTO BLAS- " PHEMY BY REVELATION [7]." " To believe " (says he) that *Jesus was the Messiah* is said by some " [meaning his *Master Locke*] to be the *unum neces-* " *rium* of FAITH, but TO OBSERVE THE LAW OF " NATURE IS THE UNUM NECESSARIUM OF DU- " TY [8]."

But now having exposed MOSES, CHRIST, and PAUL; having decried the falshood of the TWO RE- VELATIONS, and ridiculed the absurdity of sacred SCRIPTURE; he shews us, in mere charity, after the example of the WISE ALPHONSUS, how either System

[4] Vol. iv. p. 34. [5] Vol. iv. p. 72.
[6] Vol. iii. p. 306, 7. [7] Vol. iii. p. 498.
[8] Vol. iv. p. 410.

might

might have been mended, had his lordſhip been conſulted; while, like the WISE ALPHONSUS, he believes juſt as much of God's *Word*, as the Other did of his *Works*.

Firſt, he hints, how the LAW might have been better planned. "God purchaſed the obedience of "the *Jewiſh* People by a mercenary bargain. It was "ill kept on their part. And the Law, with all it's "ſanctions, was continually violated; ſometimes re-"jected; and had, in no degree, a force ſufficient to "maintain itſelf in obſervation and reverence. Now, "one of the moſt conceivable perfections of a Law "is, that it be made with ſuch a foreſight of all "poſſible accidents, and with ſuch proviſions for the "due execution of it, in all caſes, that the *Law* may "be effectual to govern and direct theſe accidents, "inſtead of lying at the mercy of them. — Another "the moſt conceivable perfection of a *Law* conſiſts "in the clearneſs and preciſion of its terms.—Theſe "will be found, no doubt, and ought to be expected, "when God is the Legiſlator [9]."

He next ſhews us, how he could have improved the GOSPEL, had he been of God's privy-counſel. "Had the doctrine of future rewards and puniſh-"ments been taught by CHRISTIANITY in terms "*more general and leſs deſcriptive*; had the puniſh-"ments been repreſented, for inſtance, like the re-"wards, to be, ſimply, ſuch *as eye never ſaw, nor ear "heard, nor the heart of man could conceive*, it might "have been maintained in credit, and had an uni-"verſal and real influence perhaps, to the great ad-"vantage of religion [10]."

[9] Vol. iii. p. 292,3. [10] Vol. v. p. 542.

An inattentive reader may be ſurprized perhaps, at this wantonneſs of his Lordſhip's pen, That when he had given it as his fixed decree, that all which the world hath hitherto called *Religion*, is a public miſchief, and a *future ſtate*, an abſurd fable; he ſhould with great formality deliver in a plan which would have given *credit* and *real efficacy* to nonſenſe and impiety. But we muſt conſider, He had been ſo long playing the PHILOSOPHER, that he had reaſon to apprehend we might forget the other part of his ſublime Character, the LEGISLATOR. He therefore deemed it expedient to give us a ſlight caſt of his office, in rectifying the blunders of MOSES and JESUS CHRIST.

With regard to MOSES and his *Law*, I have ſo much to ſay to his Lordſhip, that I ſhall reſerve it for an after-reckoning. The other is but a ſmall matter, and may be ſettled here.

I ſuſpect then, our LEGISLATOR, in this remark concerning the manner in which JESUS revealed a *future ſtate*, did not ſufficiently attend either to the nature of the human mind, or to the genius of the Goſpel. He would have, we ſee, the account of *future puniſhments as general*, and *as little deſcriptive*, as that of *future rewards*. He ſeems to think the latter well managed, and with propriety: which yet he meaſures on the imaginary impropriety of the other: He appears to have no idea of any poſitive excellency it has in itſelf. I ſhall endeavour therefore to explain *why* this method of repreſenting *future rewards* was right: By which it will appear, that the other, of repreſenting *future puniſhments*, was by no means wrong.

To

To grow *particular* and *descriptive*, whether of future rewards, or future punishments, the Speaker must borrow his images from *material and corporeal* things; because the Hearer has no faculties of sensation proper to comprehend ideas taken from things *Spiritual*. Now when a follower of Christ is so far advanced as to have his Faith work by *hope*, his sentiments grow refined, his ideas purify, and he is rising apace towards that perfection which the Gospel encourages him to aspire after. But while *fear of punishment* chiefly operates upon him, he is yet in the lowest state of probation; his imagination is gross, and his appetites sensual. Is it not evident, then, that a *descriptive* Heaven of delights would be ill suited to that purity and elevation of mind, solely fixed by *hope*, on happiness; and as evident that a *general undefined* denunciation of Hell would not have force enough to make the necessary impression on a sensual fancy agitated by *fear?* Let not his Lordship's admirers, therefore, be offended, if we believe that, in this point, the Author of our Salvation went at least one step beyond their Master, in *true Politics*.

At length, for a concluding stroke, his Lordship comes from vilifying BOTH RELIGIONS, and their FOUNDERS, to rail against the GOD of *both Religions*. And with this I shall close the horrid Scene.

" IF WE BELEIVE IN MOSES, AND HIS GOD, WE " CANNOT BELIEVE IN THAT GOD WHOM OUR REA- " SON SHEWS US [11].

" CAN ANY MAN PRESUME TO SAY THAT THE " GOD OF MOSES, OR THE GOD OF PAUL, IS THE

[11] Vol. iii. p. 307.

" TRUE

" TRUE GOD? The God of MOSES is partial, un-
" juſt, and cruel; delights in blood, commands aſ-
" ſaſſinations, maſſacres, and even exterminations of
" people. The God of PAUL elects ſome of his
" creatures to ſalvation, and predeſtinates others to
" deſtruction, even in the womb of their mothers.
" And, indeed, if there was not a Being INFINITELY
" MORE PERFECT than theſe, there would be no God
" at all, nor any true Religion in the world [12]."

Who, that hears this dreadful language, without knowing from what quarter it comes, but will ſtrait call to mind the words of the Satyriſt?

" Not Danté, dreaming all th' infernal State,
" Beheld ſuch ſcenes of envy, ſin, and hate.

But when we underſtand them to be the ejaculations of this Noble Philoſopher, the Confeſſor of Truth, the Advocate of Virtue, and the Reſtorer of baniſhed Nature; employed, as he himſelf tells us, or rather *ſet apart*, TO PLEAD THE CAUSE OF GOD HIMSELF AGAINST DIVINES AND ATHEISTS IN CONFEDERACY [13]; when we conſider, I ſay, all this, What are we to think, but that they are the pious breathings of an over-heated zeal: and tho' expreſſed in no conſecrated terms; (indeed ſuch as had been much worn in the ſervice of the CRAFTSMAN) yet when new-ſet in his Lordſhip's immortal Panoply of the FIRST PHILOSOPHY, they may now prove as uſeful, to advance the *fear of God*, as before, to promote the *honour of the King*.

It is in HATE as in LOVE; hard to diſtinguiſh the *divine* from the *carnal* ſpecies; or rather to ſeparate

[12] Vol. v. p. 567. [13] Vol. v. p. 305.

the

the different ebullitions of what is but one and the same species. Hence it is, that the melting strains of the *Mystic*, the *Methodist*, and the *Moravian*, so often smell of the STEWS; and hence, by parity of reason, the thunder of his Lordship's eloquence may naturally re-echo, as it were, from BILLINGSGATE.

But these things make You serious: and You ask, "Who, that hath ever heard Lord Bolingbroke's Story, would have suspected, that his GOD and his COUNTRY lay so near his heart? And yet his *Political* and *Philosophic* Writings, say you, are full of *Lamentations*; where, like another Jeremy, he bewails the dishonours which wicked PRIESTS, and wicked POLITICIANS, have brought upon the Church and State: Nay, in his extreme fondness for these his favourite Objects, he suffers himself to be alarmed with something less than panic terrors. He is afraid the *Whigs* will bring in the *Pretender*; and apprehends, the *English Clergy* have made large steps towards *Atheism*."

I know what you drive at. You would insinuate, that those who have nothing to fear, and a great deal to hope from Religion, are not wont to give it up so easily. For HOPE encourages men to *search* into the grounds of what Religion promises; though FEAR often hinders them from giving proper attention to what it threatens. You are ready to say to his Lordship,

"Si VIRTUTIS eras avidus, RECTIQUE BONIQUE
"Tam sitiens, quid RELLIGIO tibi sancta nocebat?
"Aspera quippe nimis visa est? Asperrima certe
"GAUDENTI VITIIS, sed non virtutis amanti.

Card. Polig.

You

You are for applying to his right honourable Perſon, the old trite aphoriſm, *That wicked principles ſpring out of a wicked life.* But what ſays another noble Peer to this? "Fain would the Bigot, in conſequence "of his *moral maxims*, and *political eſtabliſhments*, con- "found *licentiouſneſs in morals* with *liberty of thought*, "and make the *libertine*, who has the LEAST MASTE- "RY OF HIMSELF, reſemble his direct oppoſite [14]."

It may be ſo, you will ſay. But Lord Bolingbroke ſure, could never object to the imputation which *bad morals* caſt upon a *Teacher of Truth:* He, who ſees it ſo clearly, and preſſes it ſo charitably, upon the whole body of the *Chriſtian Clergy*. "How (ſays his Lord- "ſhip) can the CLERGY of your Church, or of ours, "pretend that they contribute now, or EVER DID "CONTRIBUTE, to the reformation of mankind? "No age can be pointed out, wherein ALL THE "VICES, that Tully imputes to moſt of the heathen "Philoſophers, did not prevail AMONGST MOST of "the Chriſtian Divines with great circumſtances of "aggravation. They have not only ALL THE VICES "incident to human nature in common with other "men, but they have had the peculiar Vices of their "Order. I WILL SAY BOLDLY, they are, in gene- "ral, much fitter to hinder, by their EXAMPLE, than "to promote by their DOCTRINE, the Advancement "of Religion, natural or revealed."

We have, it is true, been favoured with very ample accounts of the immoral conduct both of antient Philoſophers and Modern Churchmen; and theſe, even by ſome of the more charitable of their own

[14] *Characteriſtics*, Vol. iii. Miſc. 5. Chap. 3.

reſpective

respective Bodies. FREE-THINKERS have been bashful, and more on the reserve: nay they might have been thought Saints, for any thing their modesty would have suffered, had it not been for the *Confessions* of one of them, the famous CARDAN; who, like another St. *Austin*, seems sworn to leave nothing behind him in the inkhorn. The account he gives of himself deserves transcribing.—— "In diem viventem, nugacem, religionis contemptorem, illatæ injuriæ memorem, invidum, tristem, insidiatorem, proditorem, suorum osorem, turpi libidini deditum, solitarium, inamœnum, austerum, obscœnum, lascivum, maledicum, varium, anxi-pitem, impurum, calumniatorem [15], &c." This was fair dealing: and he who was so *free* with himself, might be excused if he spared no body else. But men do not use to be wanton on so nice a subject; and *Freethinkers* have generally *more* MASTERY OF THEMSELVES, says the noble Author of the *Characteristics:* Whenever therefore we see it done, we must conclude it to be done for some good purpose; such as, emulation of the Christian Confessors; who, to display the powers of *Grace*, did not scruple to tell the world, with great simplicity, what they were by by *Nature:* And thus, Cardan to shew us, that the FIRST PHILOSOPHY is as efficacious in all great changes, has fairly told us how well befriended he had been by his *Stars*. However, let his design, in presenting us with this picture of his amiable turn of mind, be what it would, we are much beholden to him for setting the Example. Though, like all other good Examples, it may possibly end where it set

[15] *De vita sua.*

out;

out; and the *first Philosophy* wait with patience for some less incommodious way of recommending itself. And indeed, while Infidelity, which is the *cure*, is unjustly supposed the *cause* of these Peccadillos, we need not wonder our Philosophers should soon think themselves at liberty, and be as soon disposed, to turn their view from their own morals to those of the Clergy: and affirm *boldly*, with his Lordship, that *the order in general is much fitter to hinder by their* EXAMPLE, *than to promote by their* DOCTRINE, *the advancement of Religion.*

What shall we say then? May it not be better to leave the *Examples* of both to shift for themselves; and to consider only their *Doctrines?* I think it would; and will therefore proceed from his Lordship's TEMPER, to his PRINCIPLES. But this must be the subject of another Letter.

I am, *&c.*

LET-

LETTER II.

IT has been obſerved, that uncommon bleſſings, whether civil or religious, ſeldom happen till hope grows deſperate, and long expectation has wearied out itſelf in vain. Then it is the criſis approaches, the ſuperiour Genius beſtirs himſelf, and the *admiring* world is taken in by ſurpriſe.

——Quod optanti Divûm, promittere nemo
Auderet, volvenda dies en! attulit ultro.

Never was this obſervation ſo well verified: for never was mankind in ſo deplorable a way as when his Lordſhip arrived from — what other Syſtem is not yet diſcovered; tho' his tuneful Friend was very poſitive he belonged not to this: Inſomuch, that when the laſt Comet appeared, and came pretty near the Earth, he uſed to tell his acquaintance, he ſhould not be ſurprized if in the event it proved, that it was ſent only to convey his Lordſhip home again; juſt as a Stage-coach ſtops at your door to take up a Paſſenger. Be this as it will: Bad indeed was our condition when Lord BOLINGBROKE arrived, — what ſhall I ſay, *to be a light to thoſe who ſat in darkneſs?* No, this is the work of meaner miſſionaries; but, to RESTORE MANKIND TO THEIR SENSES.

For his Lordſhip, in his account of the general DELIRIUM which had ſeized the *Clergy*, had given us but a *ſpecimen* of our condition: the MADNESS was UNI-

UNIVERSAL. Insomuch, that (as he well expresses it) ALL THE BEDLAMS OF THE WORLD [1] were not sufficient for these things. And indeed how should they! For, to confess the truth, these visions of what he calls an *over-heated imagination*, such as, belief in the *moral Attributes of God*, *the immortality of the Soul*, *a particular Providence*, *and a future state*, had infected all times and places.

"ALL EUROPE (says his Lordship) GREW DELIRIOUS [2]. Christianity was left to shift for itself in the midst of a FRANTIC WORLD [3]." And again, "OUR WORLD seems to be, in many respects, THE "BEDLAM OF EVERY OTHER SYSTEM OF INTELLIGENT CREATURES: and, with this unlucky circumstance, that they who are *most mad* govern, in "things of the greatest moment, them who are *least* "*so* [4]." By what is here dropt in the concluding words you understand, why his Lordship chose to make the *Clergy* lead up the *Brawls* in this mad dance; and the *Leather-dressing Pontiff* himself to preside as Master of the Revels.

But to find all Mankind mad, is perhaps more than you expected. What then? Is the madness less real for being universal? — I think not: but surely, more desperate. Tell us, therefore, what strange disaster occasioned this general insanity. Was it some evil disposition of the Stars? — So, indeed, it is reported [5]. The WORLD, it seems, like the men of *Abdera* [6],

[1] Vol. iv. p. 72. [2] Vol. iv. p. 377.
[3] Vol. iv. p. 353. [4] Vol. iv. p. 316.
[5] Vid. *D. N. J. C. geneseos thema*, inter Cardani opera.
[6] See *Lucian de conscr. Hist.*

had

had seen a Tragedy in a very hot day: which left so strong an impression on their fancies, that they all thought themselves concerned in the subject. Some ran about from Country to Country, to tell their story; and the rest have been ever since rehearsing and celebrating those affecting Scenes, at home! till LORD BOLINGBROKE, like another HIPPOCRATES, came to their relief: and, having first well physicked them of their Faith and their Fancies, brought them to themselves, by applying to their hurt imaginations, the sovereign Restorative of his FIRST PHILOSOPHY. Of which, I am now, as I promised, to give you some account.

But to see this extraordinary Man in a just light, it will be proper to shew what *Man* was before him. A RELIGIOUS ANIMAL he is allowed to be, on all hands: And, till the coming of this FIRST PHILOSOPHY, *Religion* was understood to rise on that wide basis, on which the *fanatical Knave*, PAUL, had the art to place it; that "He who cometh to God must "believe that he IS: and that he is a REWARDER of "them who diligently seek him [7]." For, men who supposed the infinite *goodness and justice* of God to be as demonstrable as his infinite *power and wisdom*, could not but conclude from his *moral attributes*, that he REWARDED; as well as from his *natural attributes*, that he CREATED.

On the more complex notion, therefore, of a MORAL GOVERNOR, all mankind supposed RELIGION to arise; while NATURALISM, the Ape of Religion, was seen to spring from the simpler notion of a PHY-

[7] Hebr. xi. 6.

SICAL

SICAL PRESERVER: which, however, they were ready to diſtinguiſh, on the other hand, from the *Unnaturaliſm* (if one may ſo call it) of *ranker Atheiſm*.

RELIGION, therefore, ſtands, and muſt, I think, for ever ſtand, on thoſe two immoveable Principles of PRESERVER and REWARDER, in conjunction.

The *length* or *ſhortneſs* of human exiſtence was not primarily in the idea of Religion, not even in the complete idea of it, as delivered in ST. PAUL's general definition. "The Religioniſt, ſays he, muſt "believe that God *is*, and that he *rewards*."

But when it came to be ſeen, that he was not always a *Rewarder* here, men concluded this life not to be the whole of their exiſtence. And thus a FUTURE STATE was brought into Religion; and from thenceforth became a neceſſary part of it.

To explain my meaning, if ſo clear a thing needs further explanation. GOD, under the *phyſical* idea of *Preſerver* and Creator appears uniform, regular, and inſtant to his *Creatures*: Under the *moral* idea of *Rewarder* and Governor, he ſeems frequently to be withdrawn from his *Servants*. For tho', in the moral diſpenſations of things here, good and evil be often proportioned to deſert; yet often, too, they are otherwiſe adjuſted. The Antient Religioniſt, therefore, confiding in his Demonſtration of the *moral* as well as the *natural* attributes of the Deity, concluded, That the *preſent* was not the only ſtate ordained for man; but that in ſome other life, theſe irregularities would be ſet right. Hence a FUTURE STATE became in all ages and countries (except one, where the moral adminiſtration of providence was different) inſepa-

rable

rable from, and essential to, the various Religions of mankind. Even the mere Vulgar, who did not reach the force of this Demonstration, yet seeing the marks of moral Government, amidst the frequent interruptions of it, embraced the doctrine of a *future State* as confidently as the Learned. For plain Nature had instructed them to reason thus, — If all were *regular*, nothing needed to be set right: and if all were *irregular*, there was no One to set them right.

Such was the ANTIENT RELIGION OF NATURE: To which, modern Divines have generally agreed to give the name of THEISM, when professed by those who never heard of *Revelation*; and the name of DEISM, when professed by those who would never give credit to it.

In this State our noble Philosopher found the *religious World*; or, more properly, this was the language he heard re-echoed from one end of the Globe to the other; But it was a language, he tells us, he did not understand. It was to his ears, *like the choirs of birds, who whistle and sing, or scream, at one another: or the herds of beasts, who bleat and low, or chatter and roar, at one another.* He rejects it, therefore in the lump, as the inarticulate din of ENTHUSIASM and ABSURDITY; the brutal issue of *pride* and *ignorance*; and so, but with much greater of his own, erects the FIRST PHILOSOPHY on it's ruins.

1. He permits us to believe, that an intelligent Cause made the world; and, by his *physical* and *general* Laws still governs it; but not by *moral* or *particular*.

2. He bids us to understand, that this World was no more made for man than for every animal besides:

nor was man made for any other World, nor consequently, (as Divines have dreamt) for happineſs.

3. That, by the *arbitrary conſtitution* of things in the human ſyſtem (which may have a contrary diſpoſition in other ſyſtems) Virtue promotes happineſs and Vice brings on miſery.

4. That THIS CONSTITUTION, together with the coactivity of CIVIL LAWS, contain all the rewards and puniſhments attendant on Virtue and on Vice.

5. That prayer, ſupplication, and every other office of Religion in uſe amongſt men, to implore good, and to deprecate evil, are fooliſh and fanatical: for that all religious duty is comprized in *ſubmiſſion to the eſtabliſhed order of things.*

He ſums up his whole Syſtem in theſe words. "A "ſelf-exiſtent Being the firſt cauſe of all things, in- "finitely POWERFUL and infinitely WISE, is the God "of natural Theology. And the whole ſyſtem of "natural Religion reſts on it, and requires NO BROAD- "ER FOUNDATION [8]." That is, it is enough for *him who cometh* to this new Religion, *to believe that God* IS; and not that he is a REWARDER *of them who ſeek him.* And again, "When men have proved the "exiſtence of an all-perfect Being, the Creator and "Governor of the Univerſe, and demonſtrated his "infinite POWER and WISDOM, from his works, "when they have done this, THEY HAVE DONE "ALL; *this includes the whole of natural Theology, and* "*ſerves abundantly to all the ends of natural Reli-* "*gion* [9]."

[8] Vol. v. p. 316. [9] p. 453.

What

What theſe *ends of natural Religion* are he tells us very plainly. They are, to fit us for *our ſtation here, and to ſupply our real wants in it.* — " In like manner [that is, as he expreſſes it, *for the neceſſary uſes of human life and no more*] " the knowledge of the Crea- " tor is on many accounts neceſſary to ſuch a crea- " ture as man: and therefore we are able to arrive, " by a proper exerciſe of our mental faculties, from " the knowledge of God's works, to a knowledge " of his EXISTENCE, and of that infinite POWER " and WISDOM which are demonſtrated to us in them. " OUR KNOWLEDGE CONCERNING GOD GOES NO " FURTHER [10]."

Now tho' we ſhould be ſo complaiſant to theſe *Principles* as not to call them ATHEISTIC, yet I am afraid the Profeſſor of them, whoever he be, muſt be content with no better a name. For tho' the *Principles* may be called NATURALISM, yet if *Scripture* has defined an ATHEIST right, to be one who HAS NO HOPE, and is WITHOUT GOD IN THE WORLD [11], our Profeſſor of Naturaliſm comes within the deſcription. For tho' he acknowledges the being of a God, yet as he is *without a God in the world*, that is, a Being who preſides over it, as the moral Governor of it, which is the foundation on which all Religion ſtands, Religioniſts will think of no other title for him. And ſurely he will be properly defined. For tho' the abſtract term *Atheiſm* carries, as it's principal idea, a relation to God's BEING: yet, *Atheiſt*, in the concrete, ſeems to have it's chief relation to God's

[10] Vol. iv. p. 86. [11] Epheſ. ii. 12.

GOVERNMENT. This is not obſerved for any kind of conſequence it is to Religion, in what claſs the Public ſhall be pleaſed to rank his Lordſhip; but merely to ſet in a true light the honourable Perſon's ingenuity, in aſſuming the character of an *Advocate for Religion*, at the very time he is labouring to root it out of human Society.

Old NATURALISM, thus traveſtied in the garb of new *Religion*, his Lordſhip beſtows, as his laſt and moſt precious Legacy, on his own dear Country: if you will believe him, the only *reformed Religion* that can be called *pure*, and the only *revealed Religion* that has the mark of *truth*. What the World hath hitherto called by thoſe names being, as he aſſures us, an evil in itſelf; and miſchievous to man in it's eſſential conſtitution. And he proves it, as they ſay, in mood and figure. —— "To keep up the ſenſe of "it [*i. e.* of *Religion*] in the minds of men, there "ſeem to be but two ways. To STRIKE THE SENSES frequently, by public and ſolemn acts of religious worſhip; and to HEAT THE BRAIN by notions of an inward operation of the Spirit, and of "a ſort of myſtical devotion, independent of outward forms, and even INCONSISTENT with them. "One of theſe leads to SUPERSTITION, the other "to ENTHUSIASM. Both are ſilly —— Superſtition "is folly: Enthuſiaſm is madneſs. It is good to be "on our guard againſt both [12]."

Without doubt. But how ſhall it be done? *Religion* is an evil in itſelf, and ſo admits of no qualification. It neceſſarily requires, as his Lordſhip tells

[12] Vol. iv. p. 310-11.

us,

us, on man's part, public acts of worship; and on God's, the private operation of the Spirit: But these *lead* to *superstition* and *enthusiasm*; that is, to *folly* and *madness*; to the depravation, nay to the destruction of our reasonable Nature. This is not all: these *necessary means* are not only hurtful but impracticable. You could not use them, was you foolish or mad enough to venture on them; for they are, he says, INCONSISTENT, and destroy one another. What then is to be done? To *be upon our guard*; to keep *Religion* at arms length, till his Lordship brings up his reserve of *Naturalism*, to our relief. Let this be our Shield of Brass. Under this we may repose in peace, undisturbed by any frightful dreams of Hell and the Devil.

This, Sir, is the Enchiridion of his Lordship's FIRST PHILOSOPHY. How simple, you will say, how close, how round, how full, is this *new Dispensation?* A dispensation *of Religion* shall we call it? No matter. The times are ripe for it under any name. Yet I can hardly agree to those fancies, I told you of, which had possessed his poetical Friend; who, misled perhaps by that obscure hint, that *our World was only the Bedlam of every other system of intelligent Creatures* [13], supposed, in good earnest, his *Philosopher and Guide* to be sent down from some superior orb, as Physician to the Hospital. Without question he was made for the Age, and the Age for him. And they may well congratulate one another on their happy meeting. Yet, if we must be doctrinated by a Poet, (and, now-a-days, Milton is much oftener quoted

[13] Vol. iv. p. 353.

by Divines, than Hooker) I ſhould be rather diſpoſed to give credit to the man who told me, that he heard the evil Genius of Britain addreſs his Lordſhip on his firſt ſetting out, in ſtrains like theſe,

" Be as a planetary plague, when Jove
" Will o'er ſome high-vic'd City hang his poiſon
" In the ſick air." ——

But to return to his Syſtem. It riſes on theſe four principles.

Firſt, That we have no adequate ideas of the MORAL ATTRIBUTES of God, his *goodneſs* and his *juſtice*, as we have of his NATURAL, to wit, his *power* and his *wiſdom*.

Secondly, That a FUTURE STATE is a Fable.

Thirdly, That the JEWISH and the CHRISTIAN *Revelations* are falſe. And

Fourthly, That REVELATION ITSELF is impoſſible.

Indulge me with a few remarks on his Lordſhip's management, under each of theſe heads.

1. Divines, in their proof of the *moral attributes*, having of late much inſiſted on the arguments *a priori*, as they are called, his Lordſhip ſuſpected, and what he ſuſpects of ill he always takes for granted, that theſe attributes could not be proved *a poſteriori*, or from *God's works*; the way by which, he owns, his *natural attributes* may be demonſtrated. So that having pronounced the arguments *a priori* to be *jargon, nonſenſe, impiety and blaſphemy*; the *moral* attributes of God are fairly eraſed at once out of the *intellectual ſyſtem*. And he had no farther trouble on this head than to decorate CLARKE, who was chiefly con-

converſant in the reaſoning *a priori*, with variety of abuſive names. As to the reaſoning itſelf, our great Man's reſpect for that is ſo profound and ſo diſtant, that I defy any one unacquainted with metaphyſical arguments, even to gueſs what kind of things they are for which the famous Miniſter of St. *James's* is ſo ſeverely handled. For while the *Divine* ſuffers, the *Reaſoner*, as we ſay, always eſcapes. Now indeed you ſee him ſeized upon, and ready, as you would think, to be cut up alive, and immolated to the *firſt Philoſophy*; when a *fit of railing* ſhakes his Lordſhip; and the Storm falls upon the whole Body of *modern Schoolmen*: And ſo the Doctor eſcapes for that time. He is again laid hold on, and every thing ready for execution; when a *fit of learning* comes upon his Lordſhip; and *Pythagoras*, *Plato*, *Socrates*, and the whole band of *ancient Metaphyſicians* paſs in review, and each receives a laſh as he paſſes: And ſo the Doctor eſcapes for the ſecond time. After all theſe victories without blood-ſhed, his Lordſhip, as is fitting, takes his eaſe, intent only on his future Triumphs: in the mean time, amidſt much ſelf-applauſe, his ESSAYS end, and the *ſubtile* Doctor remains unhurt.

But when need requires, I would have you know, that nothing can keep him from his Logic. Marry, then, on ſome great occaſion indeed, as when the *novelty* of the ſubject invites him, or the true ſtate of it is *little underſtood*, you ſhall have no reaſon to complain of brevity: then you ſhall ſee him employ one half of his Volumes to prove the corrup-

tions of the CHURCH OF ROME, and near another half, to expose the jargon of the SCHOOLMEN.

2. We come to the second point, the doctrine of a FUTURE STATE; which being supported by the great moral argument of "the unequal distribution "of good and evil amongst men," his Lordship is as large in confuting this as he was sparing in his answer to the metaphysical proofs of the *moral attributes*.

He first endeavours to shew the argument to be founded on a mistaken fact, and that there is no such *unequal* distribution: He is almost tempted to tell you, that every thing is exactly regular and in order. But this is a paradox too unmanageable even for his Lordship. He therefore comes down somewhat lower; and appears to be tolerably contented, if you will but take his word that the inequality is not near so great as *pulpit-Declaimers* would make you believe: that the disorders which follow the abuse of man's free-will are not to be placed to the account of that dispensation, which our ignorance and presumption make us fancy God is obliged to alter and reform. However, *equal* or *unequal*, his capital maxim clears up all. WHATSOEVER IS, IS RIGHT: and therefore the argument of these *confederated* Divines, which goes upon a supposed WRONG, is *absurd and blasphemous*. Whatever *answer* this reasoning may deserve, I believe no man who understands the world will expect that a well-bred man should give it.

But I cannot omit, on this occasion, to do justice to his poetical Friend; by shewing the difference between Mr. POPE's Philosophy and his Lordship's. They both employ the maxim of *Whatever is, is right.*

right. But to know, with what propriety and judgment, we must consider against whom they write. Mr. Pope's *Essay on man* is a *real* vindication of Providence against *Libertines* and *Atheists*; who quarrel with the present constitution of things, and deny a future State. To these he answers that *whatever is, is right*: and the reason he gives, is, that *we see only a part of the moral system, and not the whole*; therefore these irregularities serving to great purposes, such as the fuller manifestation of God's goodness and justice, they are *right*. Lord Bolingbroke's *Essays* are a *pretended* vindication of Providence against an *imaginary confederacy between Divines and Atheists*; who use a common principle, namely, the *inequalities in God's moral government here*, for different ends and purposes; the One to establish a *future State*; the Other to discredit the *Being of a God*. His Lordship, who opposes their different conclusions, endeavours to overthrow their common principle, by his Friend's maxim, that *whatever is, is right*; not because the present state of our *moral* world (which is part only of a more general system) is necessary for the greater perfection of the whole, but because our *moral world* is an entire system of itself. His Lordship *applies* the maxim no better than he understands it. Mr. Pope urges it against Atheists and Libertines, who say the constitution of things is *faulty*: so that the reply, *whatever is, is right*, is pertinent. His Lordship directs it, against Divines, who say, indeed, that this constitution is *imperfect*, if considered separately, because it is a part only of a whole, but are as far as his Lordship from calling it *faulty*: therefore the reply, *whatever is, is right*, is

impertinent. In a word, the Poet directs it againſt Atheiſts and Libertines, in ſupport of Religion properly ſo called; The Philoſopher, againſt Divines, in ſupport of Religion improperly ſo called, namely NATURALISM: and the ſucceſs is anſwerable. Mr. Pope's argument is manly, ſyſtematical, and convincing. Lord Bolingbroke's, confuſed, prevaricating, and inconſiſtent. Thus, his Lordſhip will have nothing irregular or amiſs in the *moral world*; for this is impiety, the very bond of that *confederacy* ſealed between Divines and Atheiſts. In vain you tell him of a *future ſtate*, to vindicate the providence of God; this is viſionary nonſenſe. But, if you talk of *phyſical evil*, he has his anſwer ready, *This world is but one wheel of a vaſt machine*. You will aſk, then, why Pope's ſolution is not to be admitted, who ſays the ſame of *moral* evil which his Lordſhip does of *phyſical*? For a plain reaſon; his Lordſhip can allow our *phyſical* ſyſtem to be only a part, without any hazard of his *firſt Philoſophy*. But when once you allow as much to the *moral*, you are in danger of bringing in *Religion*.

But why, you will aſk again, would his Lordſhip thus run himſelf a-ground; ſometimes by diſcrediting his reaſoning with a ſilly paradox; ſometimes by betraying it with an unwilling confeſſion; and, at beſt, by only giving it the poor ſupport of a miſunderſtood and miſapplied maxim; when his great and noble principle of NO MORAL ATTRIBUTES diſſolves the CONFEDERACY at once. For if we have no ideas of God's moral attributes, the iſſue of our reaſoning on his ways will be the ſame as if he had none. And if he has none, they need not, ſure, be vindicated; which

which is the ſole purpoſe of his reaſoning on the ſtate of the moral world. All I can ſay to this is, that his Lordſhip appears to have been ſo harraſſed with this phantom of a FUTURE STATE, that no Charm, no Security was to be neglected that could contribute to his eaſe or protection. Hence it is he will depend on neither of his arguments, of — *no inequality* or — *but a little:* and therefore, to make all ſure, caſts about for a third of more acknowledged efficacy.

This he finds in the SOUL'S MATERIALITY. From whence, he contrives to perſuade himſelf that it can be no *ſubſtance* (which he calls *pneumatical madneſs*) but a mere *quality* of body, produced by the configuration of it's parts, and periſhing with that diſpoſition of them. I ſay, he contrives to perſuade *himſelf*; and I mean no more. Had his point been to perſuade his Reader, we muſt ſuppoſe he would have ventured, at leaſt, to confute the arguments of CLARKE and BAXTER: who, on the principles of the Newtonian Philoſophy, have demonſtrated *that the ſoul is a ſubſtance*, diſtinct from the body, and different from matter. Inſtead of this, he flies to his uſual conſolation, ABUSE. He calls them *impious* and *blaſphemers* for preſuming to limit the Omnipotent: when the higheſt of their Preſumption amounts but to this, the ſuppoſing *God can exert no power, which implies a contradiction*; ſince this imaginary power is indeed impotency. Nay, he would willingly perſuade himſelf there were no ſuch arguments in being. For, ſpeaking of the reaſoning, which induced men to conclude, the ſoul to be a ſubſtance diſtinct from the body, he repreſents it thus, "Men

" taking it for granted that they knew all the per-
" ceivable properties of matter, they concluded that
" such things as could not be accounted for by
" these, were to be accounted for by the properties
" of some other substance [14]." And again, " Va-
" nity and presumption determine Philosophers to
" conclude, that because they cannot account for the
" phænomena of the mind by what they know very
" superficially of solid extended substance, this mind
" must be some other substance [15]." Such, in-
deed, was the state of the controversy when LOCKE skimed over the argument. But CLARKE and BAXTER went deeper. They draw their conclusion, not on the presumption that they knew all the knowable qualities of matter, and that between these and *Thought*, there was no perceivable connexion; but from this clear and solid truth, that from the little we do know of body, we see a contradiction in supposing *intelligence* to be a quality of matter. For thus they reasoned, tho' we know not all the powers of matter, yet we know certainly it cannot have *inconsistent* and *contradictory* powers. It is allowed to have essentially, a vis inertiæ, or that it *resists a change of it's state*; it is impossible, therefore, that it should, at the same time, have spontaneous motion, or *effect a change of its state*. If this be the case (and to deny that it is the case, is confounding all the principles of human knowledge) then it is *impossible the soul should be material*—But his Lordship feasts us with the same fine argument on the *motion of body*. " They are
" unable, (says he) to conceive how body can act

[14] Vol. iii. p. 502. [15] Vol. iii. p. 508-9.

" at

" at all, and therefore they ſuppoſe the immediate " preſence and action of an incorporeal agent in " every operation of corporeal nature [16]." Whereas the truth is, they fully conceive from the vis inertiæ of *body* or its reſiſtance to a change of its ſtate, the abſolute impoſſibility that it ſhould act at all: and, from thence ſee the neceſſity of an *incorporeal agent in every operation of corporeal nature*. You will think, perhaps, his Lordſhip knew no more of this queſtion than as it ſtood in his *Maſter Locke*; and that he had never heard of *Baxter*, who has carried it furtheſt, and treated it the moſt profoundly. I ſhould have thought ſo too, but that I find his Lordſhip, in one place, ſpeaking with that contempt of *Baxter's* reaſoning which is his wont, whenever any thing he cannot anſwer bears hard upon the *firſt Philoſophy*. It is where he honours us with his own thoughts concerning ATTRACTION. " Attraction, " (ſaith his Lordſhip) may be, notwithſtanding all " the *ſilly abſtract reaſoning* to the contrary, a REAL " PROPERTY OF MATTER [17]." Now you are to underſtand that *Baxter*, when he has evinced the truth of NEWTON's idea of *attraction* (who makes it no *real*, or eſſential, *property of matter*) employs this idea to prove, that it implies a *contradiction* to ſuppoſe, the ſoul may be a quality of matter. This great truth, deep reflection and a thorough comprehenſion of the Newtonian Philoſophy enabled *Baxter* to demonſtrate. On the other hand, no reflection, no Philoſophy, nothing but mere *intuition* made his Lordſhip conclude that it is ſo far from being a *con-*

[16] Vol. iv. p. 168. [17] Vol. iii. p. 547.

tradiction, that the *ſoul is a quality of matter*, that it is a ſelf-evident fact. But, you ſhall hear his own marvelous words: "I am perſuaded that God can "make material ſyſtems capable of thought, be- "cauſe I muſt renounce one of the kinds of know- "ledge that he has given me, and the firſt, tho' not "the principal in the order of knowing, or admit "that HE HATH DONE SO [18]." Locke only contended for a bare *poſſibility*: His Lordſhip ſees the *neceſſity*: ſo much wiſer is the Diſciple than his Maſter.

3. But let us now go on with his Lordſhip's ſyſtem. His third great principle is the FALSHOOD of the *Jewiſh* and *Chriſtian* REVELATIONS. And here you will find no argument omitted that bears with the leaſt force againſt either of them. It is true, they are none of his own. They are borrowed from the *Minute Philoſophers* that went before him: of whom it muſt be owned his Lordſhip is a very cloſe and humble imitator.

His attack on revealed Religion is in two parts. The *firſt* is a confutation of it's truth, as it lies in it's purity, in ſacred Scripture: the *ſecond*, an inſinuation of it's falſhood, as it is ſeen in it's corrupt ſtate amongſt modern churches.

Judaiſm is attacked more fully and avowedly in the firſt way: and *Chriſtianity*, in the latter.

1. All the arguments againſt Revelation, as repreſented in the Bible, are taken from BLOUNT, TOLAND, COLLINS, CHUBB, MORGAN, and their fellows. I muſt except, indeed, the atrocious terms

[18] Vol. iii. p. 531.

in

in which they are always inforced. For the iniquity of the times would not ſuffer thoſe Confeſſors of truth *to put forth more than half their ſtrength*, as his Lordſhip aſſures us [19]. When I obſerve, his reaſoning here is taken from theſe men, it is not ſpoken in diſparagement of it: for to ſay the truth, it is the beſt in all his *Eſſays*.

One thing, indeed, falls out unluckily. All his Lordſhip's great Originals, in common with the reſt of Mankind, profeſſed to believe the MORAL ATTRIBUTES of the Deity. And, on this principle, inforced their arguments againſt the truth of revealed Religion: indeed, what other principle is there that will afford any ground for an objection againſt it? It is doubted, whether a moral diſpenſation come from the Author to whom it is aſcribed. The doubt ariſes from our knowledge of his moral character; between which and the diſpenſation there is a ſuppoſed diſcordancy: But take away the moral character and the doubt ceaſes with it. Yet his Lordſhip profeſſes to have no idea of theſe *moral attributes*. No matter. They were neceſſary to be taken into ſervice here, for the ſake of carrying on his ſchemes: and a Philoſopher can drop his principle, as a Politician does his friend, when he is of no uſe, and renew his acquaintance again when he is. Theſe diſcarded *Attributes* therefore are on this occaſion taken into favour; ſoon indeed, to be diſmiſſed again, and his OLD PRINCIPLE of *no morality* in the Godhead, reaſſumed, when he wants to guard againſt the terrors of a FUTURE STATE; in which, to do it juſtice, it performs true Knights-ſervice.

[19] Vol. iv. p. 163.

Much

Much indeed is it to be lamented, that his *old principle* ſhould ever grow capricious; and that when it had ſo effectually excluded God's moral Government, as recommended by *natural Religion*, it ſhould oppoſe itſelf to thoſe arguments which are for excluding God's moral government as recommended by *Revelation*. But after all, what if his Lordſhip played booty, and was for bringing in a *political Religion* by a ſide wind; juſt as Father Harduin eſtabliſhed *Church Tradition*. The Jeſuit, when he had deſtroyed all the monuments of antiquity, concluded we ſhould be glad to take refuge in an *infallible guide*: and the noble Politician could not but ſee that when he had taken away God's moral attributes, he had removed all grounds for doubting of the divine origine of the *Magiſtrate's Religion*, from *Amaſis* and *Mneves*, to *Thor* and *Odin*.

2. An hiſtorical deduction of the abuſes and corruptions of Chriſtianity in the CHURCH OF ROME, to advance ſuperſtition, fanaticiſm, and ſpiritual tyranny, makes the ſecond part of his Lordſhip's reaſoning againſt REVELATION; and the ſubject of the largeſt of his *four Eſſays*.

On this head he expatiates in all the forms of Piety, Patriotiſm, and Humanity. He bewails the diſhonours done to Religion; he reſents the violations of civil Liberty; and he vindicates the common ſenſe of mankind from the ſcholaſtic jargon of an ignorant, debauched, and avaricious Clergy.

" Felicia tempora, quæ te
" Moribus opponunt: habeat jam ROMA pudorem.

On

On so trite a topic, the triumph of every true Protestant from Fox to Mr. Chandler, that is, from the first to the last good writer upon the subject, his Lordship may be well excused for unloading his Commonplace. Whatever there is of a better taste, he has taken from Hooker, Stillingfleet, Barrow, and such other of the English Clergy who have most successfully detected the errors, and set bounds to the usurpations of Popery. But as the object of our Divines in this detection was to recommend the Gospel-truth; and of his Lordship, to discredit it; he had need of other helps: And these, too, were at hand; such as Hobbes, Toland, Tindal, and Gordon; whom he faithfully copies, both in exaggerating the abuses, and in drawing false consequences from the reform of them. Thus, according to those Divines who wrote *for truth*, SCHOOL PHILOSOPHY was modestly complained of as hindering the advancement of real knowledge; as keeping men busied in trifling controversies; and as making them often mistake words for things. But with my Lord, and these his better guides, who wrote *against Revelation*, SCHOOL PHILOSOPHY is boldly accused to have blotted out all knowledge, and to have left nothing in it's stead but *madness*, *frenzy*, and *delirium*. So again, The end of those Divines in opposing Church-Tyranny was to introduce a RELIGIOUS SOCIETY on the principles of Gospel-liberty: but the end of these Philosophers in decrying Popery is to establish a *civil*, in the place of a *religious* usurpation, and to make the CHURCH A CREATURE OF THE STATE. In the mean time, he says *boldly* and well, "That some men are IMPUDENT

" DENT enough to *pretend*, others SILLY enough to " *believe*, that they adhere to the Goſpel, and main- " tain the cauſe of God againſt infidels and heretics " when they do nothing better nor more than expoſe " the conceits of men [20]." But while he is thus buſy in obſerving what happens at one end of this common fallacy, where the *conceits of men* are miſtaken for the cauſe of God, he ſuffers himſelf to ſlip in, at the other: and does juſt the ſame *againſt* the Goſpel, which theſe *impudent* and *ſilly* men do *for* it. He expoſes the knavery of powerful Churchmen, and the folly of profound Divines; and then *pretends*, or *believes*, that he hath diſcredited Revelation itſelf.

However, to part friends with the DIVINES, after ſo many hard words, he teaches them how to prop up, in ſome *plauſible way*, their bungling ſyſtems of ARTIFICIAL THEOLOGY, juſt as he had before taught God Almighty himſelf to mend his *two Diſpenſations*. " Let us (ſays he) ſuppoſe a Theiſt objec- " ting—the believer might reply—he might add—he " might add—and all this with great *plauſibility* at " leaſt [1]." You will ſay now, I envy my Lord the glory of his inſtructions, ſo well calculated to defend *artificial theology*, or otherwiſe I, who am not ſparing of my quotations, would have given them at large. To tell you the truth, I ſuppreſſed them with deſign; and in order to excite the Reader's curioſity. I am told there is need of it; and that this *firſt Philoſophy*, this *phyſic of the ſoul*, is not ſwallowed with that eagerneſs which might he expected or hoped

[20] Vol. iv. p. 385. [1] Vol. v. p. 279.

for

for, on the first appearance of so great a blessing. You will suspect, by what you have observed in my former Letter, that the Public may possibly be overdosed. But what if they be? It is only making it a little more palatable, and his Followers will soon reconcile them to their Physic.

4. His Lordship's fourth and last great Principle is the IMPOSSIBILITY of REVELATION in general. He has refused no arms, we see, to combat the Revelations God hath *actually given*. He would seem to relax a little of his hostility, as to those which God may *possibly give:* for in one place he says, *he will not absolutely pronounce against the possibility of God's revealing his will to man.* But whether he equivocates, whether he altered his mind, or whether he simply forgot himself (a matter of little consequence) most true it is, that he hath formally laid down, and largely insisted upon, certain Principles, which make revealed Religion a thing UTTERLY IMPOSSIBLE.

First, As to INSPIRATION, He not only denies all reality in the Thing, but will not allow so much as any meaning in the Word. And a MIRACLE, he holds amongst matters impossible; what never did, nor ever can exist.—But now, Without the first, no divine Messenger could be sent; for he must receive his Orders from God: and, without the second, no divine Messenger would be believed; for he must have his Credentials to Man: and these credentials, on his Lordship's own principles, can be no other than *miracles*.

But here again you are to observe, that on this subject likewise, Infidelity is no more indebted to him than

than for his good will. All he urges againſt *Inſpiration* and *Miracles* having been firſt urged by HOBBES and SPINOZA: by the one, with more ſubtilty and exactneſs; by the other, with infinite more elegance.

Secondly, As to NATURAL RELIGION, His Lordſhip holds it to be full, perfect, and well underſtood. He holds, likewiſe, that the only conceivable purpoſe of *Revelation* muſt be to *republiſh* this *natural Religion*. The conſequence is, and this his Lordſhip gives us to underſtand, that the uſe of *Revelation* is ſuperſeded. For if it teaches *more* than natural Religion taught, or *different* from what it taught, the Revelation is evidently falſe; If only the *ſame*, it is evidently ſuperfluous.

Thirdly, As to a PARTICULAR PROVIDENCE, This, his Lordſhip utterly rejects. But *revealed* Religion is nothing elſe than the exerciſe of that very Providence, to ſome declared end and purpoſe in the moral Syſtem.

On all theſe accounts, he concludes, and conſequentially enough, that REASON HAS NOTHING FURTHER TO DO, WHEN REVELATION BEGINS [2.]

You have now, Sir, the whole of HIS LORDSHIP'S SYSTEM, together with his principal topics for the ſupport of it; both indeed very ſuccinctly delivered: enough however to ſhew you that theſe famous ESSAYS, which you have ſo often heard cried up as the very Mine, and Treaſury of all divine and human

[2] Vol. v. p. 274.

truths,

truths, are indeed little other than a Magazine or Warehouſe of other men's lumber: or (not to diſhonour his Lordſhip by a low compariſon) like the mouth of your neighbouring SEVERN, turbulent and dirty: which, let fabling *Poets* ſay what they pleaſe, we are ſure never derived it's ſource from the pure and perennial Urn of a *Demi-God:* but, if one may gueſs by the taſte and colour, became thus conſiderable from the confluence of ſhallow brooks and babbling rivulets, of ſtagnant ditches, common-ſewers, and yet ſtranger mixtures, ſcoured off and put into a ferment by the haſty rage of ſome peeviſh land-torrent.

THE main pillar of his Syſtem, you ſee, is this extravagant paradox, *That we have* NO ADEQUATE *ideas of God's moral attributes, his* GOODNESS *and* JUSTICE, *as we have of his natural, his Wiſdom and Power.* And here, let me obſerve once for all, that his Lordſhip uſes the words, *inadequate ideas*, and, *no ideas*, as terms of the ſame import. And I think, not improperly. I have therefore followed him in the indifferent uſe of either expreſſion. For the reaſon of his calling our ideas of God's *moral attributes*, INADEQUATE, is, becauſe he denies that goodneſs and juſtice in God, and goodneſs and juſtice amongſt Men, are the ſame IN KIND. But if not the *ſame in kind*, we can have *no* idea of them; becauſe we have no idea of any *other kind* of goodneſs and juſtice.

As the reaſoning on this head, contrary to his uſual wont, is intirely his own; and extremely curious in itſelf, I will once more go a little out of my way to ſet it in a true light; that it may neither impoſe by it's novelty; nor too much ſhock You and all good men by it's unchecked atrocity.

His three Poſitions are,

1. That, by *metaphyſics*, or the reaſoning *a priori*, we can gain no knowledge of God at all.

2. That our knowledge of his *attributes* are to be acquired only by a contemplation on his *Works*, or by the reaſoning *a poſteriori*.

3. That in this way, we can only arrive at the knowledge of his *natural* attributes, not of his *moral*.

" IT is from the conſtitution of the world ALONE " (ſays his Lordſhip) and from the ſtate of mankind " in it, that we can *acquire any ideas* of the divine " attributes, or a *right to affirm any thing about* " *them* [3]."

" The knowledge of the Creator is on many ac- " counts neceſſary to ſuch a creature as man: and " therefore we are made able to arrive by a proper " exerciſe of our mental faculties, *from a knowledge* " *of God's works to a knowledge of his exiſtence*, and of " that infinite POWER and WISDOM which are de- " monſtrated to us in them. OUR KNOWLEDGE " CONCERNING GOD GOES NO FURTHER [4]."

" Artificial Theology connects by very problema- " tical reaſoning *a priori*, MORAL *attributes*, ſuch as " we conceive them, and ſuch as they are relatively " to us, with the *phyſical* attributes of God; tho'

[3] Vol. v. p. 331. [4] Vol. iv. p. 86.

" there

" there be no ſufficient foundation for this proceed-
" ing, nay, tho' *the phænomena are in ſeveral caſes re-*
" *pugnant* [5]."

Having thus aſſured us that the ideas of God's *moral attributes* are to be got by no conſequential rea-ſoning at all, either *a priori* or *a poſteriori*, the only two ways we have to knowledge; He rightly con-cludes, that if Man hath ſuch ideas, they were not found but invented by him. And therefore, that no-thing might be wanting to the full dilucidation of this curious point, he acquaints us who were the au-thors of the FICTION, and how ſtrangely the thing came about.

" Some of the Philoſophers (ſays his Lordſhip)
" having been led by a more full and accurate con-
" templation of Nature to the knowledge of a ſu-
" preme ſelf-exiſtent Being of infinite *power and*
" *wiſdom*, and the firſt Cauſe of all things, were not
" contented with this degree of knowledge. They
" MADE A SYSTEM of God's MORAL as well as
" *phyſical* attributes, BY WHICH TO ACCOUNT FOR
" THE PROCEEDINGS OF HIS PROVIDENCE [6]."

Theſe Philoſophers then, it ſeems, invented the ſyſtem of God's *moral attributes*, in order to account for the difficulties ariſing from the view of God's *mo-ral government*. If the World till now had been ſo dull as to have no conception of theſe Attributes; his Lordſhip's Philoſophers, we ſee, made amends; who were ſo quick witted to conceive, and ſo ſharp ſighted to find out, the obliquities of a *crooked* line before they had got any idea of a *ſtraight* one. For

[5] Vol. v. p. 316. [6] Vol. iv. p. 48.

juſt

juſt to this, neither more nor leſs, does his Lordſhip's obſervation amount, that—*they made a Syſtem of God's moral attributes, by which to account for the proceedings of his Providence.* 'Till now, no man could conceive how any doubts concerning *moral Government* could ariſe but on the previous ideas of the *moral attributes* of the *Governor*. This invention of his Lordſhip's old Philoſophers puts us in mind of an ingenious Modern, the curious SANCHO PANCHA; who, as his hiſtorian tells us, was very inquiſitive to diſcover the author of that very uſeful invention we call SLEEP: for, with this worthy Magiſtrate, Sleep and good Cheer were the *Firſt Philoſophy*. Now the things ſought after by Sancho and his Lordſhip were at no great diſtance: for if *Sleeping* began when men firſt ſhut their eyes, it is certain the *idea of God's Goodneſs* appeared as ſoon as ever they opened them.

Dr. Clarke's Demonſtration of the moral attributes *a priori*, I ſhall leave, as his Lordſhip is pleaſed to do, in all it's force. If the Doctor's followers think their Maſter's honour concerned, where his arguments are not, they have a large field and a ſafe to ſhew their proweſs. I rather chuſe to undertake the noble Philoſopher on his own terms, without any other arms than the arguments *a poſteriori*. For he is ſuch a Champion for the good Cauſe, that he not only appoints his Adverſaries the Field, but preſcribes to them the uſe of their weapons.

But his Lordſhip, like other great men, is not eaſily approached; and when he is, not always fit to be ſeen. You catch his FIRST PHILOSOPHY, as Butler's Hero did Ariſtotle's FIRST MATTER, *undreſſed, and without a rag of form*, however flaunting and flutter-

ing

ing in FRAGMENTS. To ſpeak plainly, his Lordſhip's entire neglect of method betrays him into endleſs REPETITIONS: and in theſe, whether for want of preciſion in his ideas, propriety in his terms, or art in his compoſition, the queſtion is perpetually changing; and rarely without being new-covered by an equivocal expreſſion. If you add to this, the perpetual CONTRADICTIONS into which he falls, either by defect of memory, exceſs of paſſion, or diſtreſs of argument, you will allow it to be no eaſy matter to take him fairly, to know him fully, and to repreſent him to the beſt advantage: in none of which offices would I be willingly defective. Indeed, when you have done this, the buſineſs is over; and his Lordſhip's reaſoning generally confutes itſelf.

When I reflect upon what this has coſt me, the reading over two or three bulky volumes to get poſſeſſion of a ſingle argument; which now you think you hold, and then again you loſe; which meets you full when you leaſt expect it; and ſlips away from you the very moment it promiſes to do moſt: when, I ſay, I reflect upon all this, I cannot but lament the hard luck of the *Engliſh* CLERGY, who, tho' apparently leaſt fit, as being made Parties; certainly leaſt affected, as there is nothing that can impoſe on a Scholar, and a great deal that may miſlead the People, are likely to be the men moſt engaged with his Lordſhip in this controverſy. Time was, when if a Writer had a diſpoſition to ſeek objections againſt Religion, tho' he found them hardly, and urged them heavily, yet he would digeſt his thoughts, and methodize his reaſoning. The Clergy had then nothing to do but to anſwer him, if they found themſelves

able. But since this slovenly custom (as Lord SHAFTSBURY calls it) has got amongst our Free-thinkers, of *taking their physic in public*, of throwing about their loose and crude indigestions under the name of FRAGMENTS, things which in their very name imply not so much the *want*, as the *exclusion* of all *form*, the Advocate of Religion has had a fine time of it: he must work them into consistence, he must mould them into shape, before he can safely lay hold of them himself, or present them handsomely to the Public. But these Gentlemen have provided that a Clergyman should never be idle. All, he had of old to attend, was the saving the souls of those committed to his care. He must now begin his work a great deal higher; he must first convince his flock that they have souls to be saved. And the spite of all is, that at the same time his kind Masters have doubled his task, they appear very well disposed to lessen his wages.

WE have observed, that the DENIAL of God's *moral attributes* is the great barrier against Religion in general: but it is more especially serviceable in his Lordship's idiosyncratic terrors; the terrors of a *future State*. To these we owe his famous book of FRAGMENTS, composed occasionally, and taken as an extemporaneous cordial, each stronger than the other, to support himself under his frequent paroxysms. For, set the *moral attributes* aside, and we can neither form any judgment of the *end* of man, nor of the nature of God's moral government. All our knowledge will be confined to our *present* state and condition [7]. It is by these Attributes, we learn,

[7] One of his Lordship's Corollaries therefore from the Proposition of *no moral attributes*, is this, "Our Knowledge that

that man was made for *happineſs*; and that God's diſpenſation to us *here* is but *part* of our moral ſyſtem: This naturally extends our views to, and terminates our knowledge in, *Futurity*.

The fate of all Religion therefore being included in the queſtion of God's *moral attributes*, I hold it of much importance to prove againſt his Lordſhip, that MEN MAY ACQUIRE ADEQUATE IDEAS OF THEM in the ſame way, and with equal certainty, in which they acquire the knowledge of God's *natural attributes*: And the knowledge of *theſe*, his Lordſhip deduces from its orginal in the following words.

" All our knowledge of God (ſays he) is derived " from his works. Every part of the immenſe Uni- " verſe, and the order and harmony of the Whole, " are not only conformable to our ideas or notions " of WISDOM and POWER, but theſe ideas and no- " tions were impreſſed originally and principally by " them, on every attentive mind; and men were led " to conclude, with the utmoſt certainty, that a Being " of infinite *wiſdom* and *power* made, preſerved, and " governed the ſyſtem. As far as we can diſcover, " we diſcern theſe in all his works; and where we " cannot diſcern them, it is manifeſtly due to our " imperfection, not to his. This now is real " knowledge, or there is no ſuch thing as know- " ledge. We acquire it immediately in the objects " themſelves, in God, and in Nature, the work of " God. We know what *wiſdom* and *power* are: we " know both intuitively, and by the help of our " ſenſes, that ſuch as we conceive them to be, ſuch

" concerning God goes no further than for the neceſſary uſe " of human life." Vol. iv. p. 486.

" they appear in the Work: and therefore we " know demonſtratively that ſuch they are in the " Worker [8]."

All this is mighty well: and on theſe very grounds I undertake to prove that men may get as clear and preciſe ideas of God's GOODNESS and JUSTICE.

But, to prevent, or, indeed, now things are gone thus far, rather to *redreſs* all ambiguity in the terms, and equivocation in the uſe of them; it will be proper to explain what true PHILOSOPHY means by GOD's WORKS, whether *phyſical* or *moral*.

Now, it means, if I am not miſtaken, that CONSTITUTION OF THINGS which God hath eſtabliſhed, and directed to a plain and obvious end: no regard being had to thoſe impediments or obſtructions in it's courſe, which the Author of nature hath permitted to ariſe from any part of the *material*, or *intellectual* Creation.

Thus, when we conſider his *phyſical* works, in order to make our eſtimate of his *wiſdom* and *power*, we conceive them as they are in themſelves; and in the perfection of their conſtitution; tho' the greater portions of the *phyſical* ſyſtem may, from the intractability of Matter, be ſubject to ſome *inconſiderable irregularities*; which, as the true PHILOSOPHER [9] obſerves, *will be apt to increaſe till this Syſtem wants a reformation:* and tho' the ſmaller Portions, ſuch as the bodies of animals, may, from various accidents in their conception and birth, often want that convenient formation and adaption of their parts, from the won-

[8] Vol. v. p. 524. [9] Newton.

derful

derful contrivance of which, in the various bodies of animals in general, arises so illustrious an evidence of the *wisdom* and *power* of the Workman.

Surely, then, common sense and all equitable measure require us to estimate God's *moral Works* upon the same standard: to consider what the *moral constitution is in itself:* and (when the question is of God's *goodness* and *justice)* to keep that view distinct: and not suffer it to be disturbed or broken by any interruptions occasioned by the perverse influence either of the passion or action of material or immaterial Beings. For, here, Both concur to violate the Constitution: In the *natural* system, man's *Free-will* has no place: in the *moral*, the abuse of *Free-will* occasions the greatest of it's disorders.

In prosecuting this question, therefore, As, in order to acquire and confirm our ideas of God's *wisdom* and *power*, we consider the *natural system* so far forth only as it's order and harmony is supported by the *general Laws* of matter and motion: so, in order to acquire and confirm our ideas of his *goodness* and *justice*, we should regard the *moral system* so far forth only as it's order and harmony is supported by that GENERAL LAW, which annexes *happiness to virtue, and to vice, misery.*

Thus much, and only thus much, is *God's work*, in either system: and it is from *God's work* we are to demonstrate his *Attributes.* The rest, (where disorders real or apparent obtrude themselves to obstruct our views in these discoveries) proceeds from *Matter* and the *human Mind.*

And it is not to be forgotten, that the conclusion we draw from hence, in support of our *adequate* ideas

of God's *moral* attributes, has the greater ſtrength upon his Lordſhip's own principles; who holds, that this Conſtitution ariſes *ſolely from the* WILL of God: For then we are ſure that the WILL, which annexes happineſs to virtue, and miſery to vice, muſt ariſe from God's *moral* rather than from his firſt *phyſical* nature.

Having premiſed thus much; no more, indeed, than neceſſary to obviate one continued SOPHISM, that runs thro' all his Lordſhip's reaſonings, againſt the *moral attributes* (where, the courſe and operation of that *moral* Conſtitution, as it appears under the diſturbances occaſioned by man's *free-will*, is perpetually put for the *Conſtitution itſelf*) I now proceed to ſhew, from GOD'S WORKS, that we have as preciſe ideas of his GOODNESS and JUSTICE as of his *power* and *wiſdom*.

His Lordſhip obſerves, that *from every part of the immenſe univerſe, and from the harmony of the whole, men are led to conclude, with the utmoſt certainty, that a Being of infinite wiſdom and power made, preſerved, and governed the ſyſtem.* This, he obſerves in favour of the *natural* attributes. And what ſhould hinder men from making the ſame obſervation in favour of the *moral*, viz. That the happineſs and miſery, by the very conſtitution of nature, attendant on Virtue and on Vice, lead men to conclude, with equal certainty, that a Being of infinite *goodneſs* and *juſtice* made, preſerves, and governs the ſyſtem?

The exiſtence of this *moral Conſtitution* his Lordſhip acknowledges. Let us conſider it, therefore, both as it reſpects BODIES of men, and INDIVIDUALS.

That *Communities* are always happy or miſerable in proportion as their Manners are virtuous or vicious, his

his Lordſhip himſelf is the readieſt to demonſtrate. If ſuch a Conſtitution of things does not beſpeak the Author of it *good* and *juſt*, how is it poſſible to conclude any thing of the character of the Creator from his Works? His Lordſhip thinks, that from the marks of wiſdom and power in the *phyſical ſyſtem* we learn with the utmoſt certainty that God is *wiſe* and *powerful*; and he ſays, that we acquire this knowledge immediately, as it were, by our ſenſes. Are there not the ſelf-ſame marks of goodneſs and juſtice in this part at leaſt of the *moral ſyſtem* that reſpects Communities? And do not we come to know as immediately by our ſenſes, and as certainly by our reaſon, that God is *good* and *juſt?*

If we conſider the *moral Conſtitution*, as it reſpects *Particulars*, we ſee virtue and vice have the ſame influence on our happineſs and miſery. Here, indeed, we find more interruptions in the means to the end than in the other part. Our material and our intellectual Natures have here more power to diſorder the harmony of the Syſtem. In *Communities*, it can rarely be diſturbed, but by a Peſtilence, or that other moral Plague, a Hero or a Conqueror: Amongſt *Particulars*, indeed, phyſical evil and the abuſe of free-will operate more ſtrongly. But when once the demonſtration of the *moral attributes* is clearly made from that part of the Conſtitution which regards *Communities*, it can never be ſhaken by the diſorders in that, which regards *Particulars*. The eſtabliſhed truth is now a Principle for further diſcoveries; and all we can fairly deduce from theſe diſorders is the CERTAINTY of a *future State*. But this by the way.

What I inſiſt upon at preſent is, that, to decide the queſtion concerning God's *Attributes*, we are to conſider the Conſtitution of things, as it is in itſelf, ſimply. This is, properly, *God's work*. The diſorders in it, occaſioned by the abuſe of man's *free-will*, is not *his* work, but *man's*. This, his Lordſhip too, upon another occaſion, namely, when he combats the argument of a *future ſtate*, from an unequal Providence, is perpetually repeating. So that theſe diſorders muſt, even on his Lordſhip's own principles, be excluded from the account, when we eſtimate God's Nature and *Attributes* from his *Works*.

" But we ſee not thoſe diſorders in the *natural* world, which we both ſee and feel in the *moral*." This would be ſome objection did God in the *moral*, as in the *natural* ſyſtem, direct *immediately*, or conſtitute things *mechanically*; or had Free-will the ſame influence on the *natural* as on the *moral* ſyſtem.—Did God direct in both Conſtitutions, *immediately* or *mechanically*; or did he direct immediately and mechanically in neither, and that yet the *moral* remained more ſubject to diſorder than the *natural*, it might indeed follow that we had not ſo clear ideas of God's *goodneſs* and *juſtice* as of his *wiſdom* and *power*: But ſince he has thought fit to leave man, FREE; and has been pleaſed to ſuffer the abuſe of free-will to affect the *moral* ſyſtem, and not the *natural*; as this, I ſay, is the caſe, the ſuperiour irregularities n the *one* do not take off from the equal clearneſs of the demonſtration, which re ſults from the natureof *both* Conſtitutions. " This difference (to ſpeak in " the words of a late writer) is not to be aſcribed to " a contrary conduct in the Governor of the two " Syſtems, but to the contrary natures of the Sub-

" jects.

" jects. Paſſive matter being totally inert, it's re-
" ſiſtance to the Laws impreſſed upon it, muſt be
" extremely weak: and conſequently the diſorders
" ariſing from that reſiſtance proportionably ſlow and
" unheeded: while that active ſelf-moving principle,
" the Mind, flies out at once from the centre of its
" direction, and can every moment deflect from the
" line of truth and reaſon. Hence moral diſorders
" began early, became exceſſive, and have continu-
" ed, through all ages, to diſturb the harmony of
" the Syſtem [10]."

What is here ſaid will, I ſuppoſe, be ſufficient to confute the following aſſertions; and to detect the miſtake on which they ariſe.

" Every thing (ſays his Lordſhip) ſhews the *wiſ-*
" *dom* and *power* of God conformably to our ideas
" of wiſdom and power in the *phyſical* world and in
" the *moral*. *But every thing does not ſhew in like*
" *manner the* juſtice *and* goodneſs *conformably to our*
" *ideas of theſe attributes in either. The phyſical attri-*
" *butes are in their nature more glaring and leſs equi-*
" *vocal* [11]."

And again, " There is *no ſufficient foundation* in the
" phænomena of nature to connect the moral attri-
" butes with the phyſical attributes of God. *Nay,*
" *the phænomena are in ſeveral caſes repugnant* [12]."

But ſince he goes ſo far as to talk of the *want of a foundation*, and even a *repugnancy*; Before I proceed with the main branch of my reaſoning, I will juſt urge one ſingle argument for the reality and full evi-

[10] *The principles of natural and revealed Religion, in a courſe of Sermons at Lincoln's-Inn.* Vol. i. p. 66.

[11] Vol. v. p. 524. [12] Vol. v. p. 316.

dence of the *moral attributes:* and it ſhall be taken from himſelf, and ſhall conclude on his own principles.

He tells us, that ſuch as he, "who apply themſelves to the *firſt Philoſophy*, apply themſelves to the "nobleſt objects that can demand the attention of "the mind — To the ſignification of GOD's WILL, "concerning the duties we owe to him, and to one "another [13]."

And again, "It is ſufficient to eſtabliſh our *moral* "obligations that we conſider them relatively to "our own ſyſtem. From thence they ariſe: and ſince "they ariſe from thence, it muſt be the WILL of that "Being who made the ſyſtem, that we ſhould obſerve and practiſe them [14]."

Let me aſk then, How it is that we collect this WILL from the objects which his Lordſhip allows us to contemplate, namely, his WORKS *in this ſyſtem?* He will ſay from certain *qualities* in thoſe objects. — What are thoſe qualities? He will reply, the *fitneſſes* of means to ends. — Who was the Author of theſe fitneſſes? He hath told us, the *God of nature* — It was God's *will* then, that we ſhould uſe the *means*, in order to obtain the *ends*. Now, in the *moral* Syſtem, the means are virtuous practice; the end, happineſs. Virtue therefore muſt needs be pleaſing to him; and Vice, as it's contrary, diſpleaſing. Well, but then, as to this *like* and *diſlike*; it muſt be either capricious, or it muſt be regulated on the nature of things. *Wiſdom*, which his Lordſhip condeſcends to give his Maker, will not allow us to ſuppoſe it capricious. It is regulated therefore on the nature of things. But if the nature of things be, as his Lordſhip holds it is, the conſtitution of God, and *dependent on his will*, then he who is pleaſed with

[13] Vol. v. p. 447. [14] Vol. v. p. 452.

virtue,

virtue, and displeased with vice, must needs be himself *good* and *just*.

To proceed now with the principal branch of our reasoning. His Lordship goes on thus. *But men not only might collect God's natural attributes from the physical system, but in effect they did: and all men, at all times, had these notions so strongly impressed on them, that they were led to conclude with the utmost certainty for a Being of infinite power and wisdom.*

I desire to know in what time or place it ever happened, before his Lordship philosophised at *Battersea*, and could *find no foundation, in the phænomena of nature, to connect the moral with the physical attributes of God*, that a Man, who believed God's infinite wisdom and power, did not with equal confidence believe his infinite goodness and justice? In truth, these two sets of ideas, the *physical* and *moral* attributes of the Deity, were equally extensive, they were equally steddy, and, till now, they were always inseparable.

He says, that *as far as we can discover, we discern infinite wisdom and power in all God's works: and where we cannot discern them, it is manifestly due to our imperfection, not to his.*

What his Lordship here says will deserve to be considered. A comparison is insinuated between our discovery of infinite power and wisdom from the *physical* works of God; and our discovery of infinite goodness and justice from his *moral* works; in which, the advantage is given to the former. Now, in order to come to a just decision in this point (omitting at present the notice of his general Sophism which operates in this observation, as in the rest) we must

diſtinguiſh between the *means of acquiring* the knowledge of God's Attributes, and that *knowledge when acquired.*

As to the firſt, (the *means of acquiring,*) there ſeems to be ſome advantage on the ſide of God's PHYSICAL works. For, as his Lordſhip rightly obſerves, *where we cannot diſcern wiſdom and power in the phyſical works it is due to our imperfection, not to his: for as men advance in the knowledge of nature we ſee more and more of wiſdom and power.* And he inſinuates, we cannot ſay the ſame concerning the difficulties in the *moral* ſyſtem. It is true, we cannot. But then let us tell him, neither can we ſay the contrary. The reaſon is, The phyſical ſyſtem lies open to our enquiries; and by the right application of our ſenſes to well tried experiments, we are able to make conſiderable advances in the knowledge of Nature. It is not ſo in the *moral* ſyſtem; all we know here are a few general principles concerning its Conſtitution; and further than this, human wit or induſtry is unable to penetrate. Theſe general principles are, indeed, amply ſufficient to deduce and eſtabliſh the *moral attributes* from the *moral ſyſtem*; but not ſufficient to remove all difficulties that ariſe from what we ſee of the actual adminiſtration of that ſyſtem. So that, tho' *we* cannot ſay, that *as we advance in the knowledge* of the moral ſyſtem *we ſee more and more of goodneſs and juſtice*; So neither can *his Lordſhip* ſay (tho' his words ſeem to inſinuate he could) that as we advance, we ſee *leſs and leſs.* Whereas the truth is, beyond thoſe general principles, we cannot advance at all.

But

But then, as to the second part in the distinction, (the *knowledge of the attributes, when acquired.*) I hold the advantage, and a great one it is, lies altogether on the side of the MORAL. And this, I cannot better explain to you than in the words of the writer, quoted just before: "Tho' the idea (says "this Divine) of God's *natural* attributes be as clear "in the abstract, as that of his *moral*, yet the idea "of his moral attributes is, in the concrete, more "adequate than that of his natural. The reason "seems convincing. The moral relation in which "we stand to God, as free agents, is just the same "whether man exists alone, or whether he be but a "link in the chain of innumerable orders of intelligences surrounding the whole Creation. Hence "we must needs have a full knowledge of our duty "to him, and of his disposition towards us: on "which knowledge is founded the exactness of our "conceptions of his moral attributes, his *justice* and "*goodness*. But the natural relation in which we, or "any of God's creatures, stand towards him, as "material Beings, is not the same when considered "simply, as when a portion of a dependent and "connected whole. Because whenever such a whole "exists, the harmony and perfection of it must first "of all be consulted. This harmony ariseth from "the mutual subserviency and union of its parts. "But this subserviency may require a ministration of government, with regard to certain portions of matter thus allied, different from what "might have followed had those portions stood "alone, because that precise disposition, which might "be fit in one case might be unfit in the other.

" Hence we, who know there is a Whole, of which " our material ſyſtem is a Part; and yet are totally " ignorant both of it's nature and extent, can have " but a very confuſed idea of that phyſical relation " in which we ſtand towards God: ſo that our con- " ceptions of his *natural* attributes, his *power* and " *wiſdom*, which are founded on that idea, muſt in " the concrete be proportionably vague and inade- " quate [15]."

But you will aſk, perhaps, whence ariſes this reciprocal advantage which the *moral* and the *natural* attributes have over one another, in the *means of acquiring* the knowledge of them, and the preciſion of *that knowledge when acquired?* I will tell you in two words. Of *our own phyſical* ſyſtem, we know many particulars, (that is, we diſcover much of the *means*, but nothing of the *end*) and of the *univerſal* phyſical ſyſtem we are entirely ignorant. On the other hand, we know but few particulars of *our own moral* ſyſtem, (that is, we diſcover only the *end*, and not the *means*) and of the *univerſal* moral ſyſtem we underſtand the general principles.

His Lordſhip proceeds. *This now* [the knowledge of God's *natural* attributes] *is real knowledge; or there is no ſuch thing as knowledge. We acquire it immediately in the objects themſelves,* IN GOD, *and in nature the work of God.*

What his Lordſhip means by, *in God*, in diſtinction from the *work of God*, I confeſs I do not underſtand: Perhaps it may be intended to inſinuate, in honour of the *natural attributes*, that they may be even proved

[15] *The principles of natural and revealed Religion, in a courſe of Sermons at Lincoln's Inn*, Vol. i. p. 58, *& ſeq.*

a priori;

a priori; for this is not the first time by many, when after having heartily abused a person or thing, he has been reduced to support himself on the authority, or the reasoning they afford him. Or perhaps, it was only used to round the period, and set off his eloquence. However, I agree with him, that this is *real knowledge*. And so too, I think, is the knowledge of the *moral* attributes, so gained. Why truly, says his Lordship, *I do allow just so much goodness and justice in God as we see in that* CONSTITUTION, *which annexes happiness to virtue and misery to vice. But this*, says he, *I think, had better be called* WISDOM. I think so too; if by *so much*, he means no more than what concerns God's *natural government*: and that he means no more is plain from his making the *natural* consequence of vice and virtue the only sanction of the moral Law. But I will venture to go further, and say, that, from what we see in this *Constitution*, we may collect PERFECT goodness and justice. *Matter* and man's *Free-will* disturb the System: But if the *Constitution* be the effect of God's *Will*, as his Lordship holds it is; and the mark of his *Wisdom*, as all mankind hold with him; Does not that *Wisdom* require that his *Will* should not be defeated? Would it not be defeated, if the disorders occasioned by the perverseness of his Creatures were not remedied and set right? And is not A REMEDY the clearest mark of PERFECT *goodness* and *justice?*

Take it in another light. Free-will crosses the *Constitution*, which God, by establishing, shews he intended should take place. This *present* disturbance could not have been prevented, because, according to my Lord and his Poet, it was necessary to the schemes

ſchemes of divine wiſdom, that there ſhould be ſuch a creature as MAN:

"For in the ſcale of reaſoning life, 'tis plain
"There muſt be, ſomewhere, ſuch a rank as man."

The conſequence is, that the diſorder will be *hereafter* rectified.

Had Man indeed been made *unneceſſarily*; and this Man had broke in upon God's general Syſtem, his Lordſhip might have had ſome pretence to ſay, as he does, that GOD MEANT THE SYSTEM SHOULD NOT BE FURTHER PURSUED; that is, that the ſcheme which annexes happineſs to virtue and miſery to vice, ſhould remain in it's preſent condition of an incomplete diſpenſation, to all eternity. But ſince Man is acknowledged to be a *neceſſary* part of a general Syſtem, complete in all it's members, it is nonſenſe to talk of *God's not meaning the particular Syſtem ſhould be further purſued*, when that *further purſuit* is only to bring it to it's natural period; ſhort of which, it would remain unfiniſhed nay, unformed.

He goes on. *We know what* WISDOM *and* POWER *are. We know both intuitively, and by the help of our ſenſes, that ſuch as we conceive them to be, ſuch they appear in the* WORK; *and therefore we know demonſtratively that ſuch they are in the* WORKER.

And do we not know what GOODNESS and JUSTICE are? Do we not *intuitively*, and by the *help of our ſenſes know*, that ſuch as we conceive them to be, ſuch they appear in the WORK, namely, in that *conſtitution of things*, which, his Lordſhip tells us, annexes happineſs to virtue, and miſery to vice? And may we

we not *demonſtratively* collect from thence that ſuch they are in the WORKER? ſince this Conſtitution, his Lordſhip tells us again, is the effect of God's WILL. On his own principles, therefore, applied to his own ſtate of the reaſoning *a poſteriori*, it appears, that God is of *infinite goodneſs* and *juſtice*, as well as of *infinite wiſdom* and *power*.

But to give AUTHORITY to his partial reaſoning, (the uſual ſupport of all partialities,) He, in one place, puts it into the mouth of *Anaxagoras*. "Should you "aſk *Anaxagoras* (ſays he) what *goodneſs* is, or *juſ-* "*tice?* He might bid you, perhaps, turn your eyes "inward, firſt; then, ſurvey mankind; obſerve the "wants of individuals, the benefits of ſociety, and, "from theſe particulars, frame the general notions "of *goodneſs* and *juſtice*. He might go a ſtep fur- "ther: and add, this is *human* goodneſs and *human* "juſtice, ſuch as we can comprehend, ſuch as we "can exerciſe, and ſuch as the ſupreme mind has "made it both our duty and intereſt to exerciſe, by "the conſtitution of the human ſyſtem, and by the "relations which ariſe in it: from all which our no- "tions of *goodneſs* and *juſtice* reſult, and are com- "pounded."

We know then, what *goodneſs* and *juſtice* are, as well as what *wiſdom* and *power* are; *we know both intuitively and by the help of our ſenſes, that ſuch as we conceive them to be, ſuch they appear in the work.* For he bids us *turn our eyes inward*; then *ſurvey mankind*; and laſtly, obſerve how *reaſon*, from the *conſtitution of human nature*, confirms our *intuitive* knowledge, and that which we gain by the *help of our ſenſes*. But what does all this ſignify, if *Anaxa-*

goras

goras or his Lordſhip be in an humour of concluding againſt their own premiſſes? Hear then how the ſpeech ends.——"Of *divine goodneſs* and divine juſ-"tice might this Philoſopher conclude, I AM UN-"ABLE TO FRAME ANY ADEQUATE NOTIONS [17]. What? Unable to *frame* thoſe notions which God, by his *moral* Conſtitution, has put into our hands; and by the declaration of his WILL has taught us to *apply?*——This old *Philoſopher*, I ſuppoſe, was not brought in to be laughed at, like his drunken Church-HELOTES [18]; yet he plays the fool to admiration.—*We* DO KNOW, ſays Anaxagoras, *what* Goodneſs *and* Juſtice *are: we know both intuitively, and by the help of our ſenſes, that ſuch as we conceive them to be, ſuch they appear in the* WORK; *and* THEREFORE *we* DO NOT KNOW *that ſuch they are in the* WORKER.

Might I be permitted to addreſs myſelf to this Renegado Sophiſt, I would ſay,—Your brethren, the antient Philoſophers, reaſoned *a poſteriori* in this manner, "Can you think there is *wiſdom* and *power* in you, and none in your Maker?"—By no means. They reaſoned well.—Let me aſk you then, is there *goodneſs* and *juſtice* in you, and none in your Maker?" His anſwer, I ſuppoſe, would be the ſame. But, prompted by his Lordſhip, into whoſe ſervice he is now entered, he perhaps might add, That, from *human goodneſs* and *juſtice* we cannot come to the NATURE of the *divine*. What hinders us, I pray you? Is it not from our *intuitive conception* of our own *wiſdom* and *power* that we gain an adequate idea of

[17] Vol. iv. p. 116, 17. [18] Vol. v. p. 446.

God's?

God's? Are *wiſdom* and *power* MORE PERFECT, as they are found in man, than *goodneſs* and *juſtice?* If therefore the IMPERFECTION of theſe attributes in Man hinder our acquiring an adequate idea of thoſe in God, we can have no adequate idea of his *wiſdom* and *power:* If the IMPERFECTION does not hinder, then we may have an adequate idea of his *goodneſs* and *juſtice.*

But, the inference to God's *power* and *wiſdom*, his Lordſhip ſays, is ſupported by what men ſee of the effects of them, in his Works; the order and harmony of the phyſical Syſtem. Do we not ſee likewiſe the effects of God's *goodneſs* and *juſtice*, in the order and harmony of the *moral*, in the happineſs that naturally attends virtue and the miſery conſequent on vice? And is not the *moral* Syſtem as much *God's Work*, as the *phyſical?*

Thus, Sir, you ſee, that by the *very reaſoning*, his Lordſhip EMPLOYS to prove the *natural* attributes, and by the *very method* he PRESCRIBES to us for proving the *moral*, we have demonſtrated *theſe* with a preciſion and a certainty, at leaſt equal to the *other*. His Lordſhip ſeems to have been aware of the event; and therefore when he had ſet us at defiance, he tried to put the change upon us, under pretence of reminding us, that the *moral attributes* ſhould be examined by, or *applied to*, THE CONSTITUTION OF THE WORLD AND THE STATE OF MANKIND IN IT [18]. I had full as much reaſon to be aware of his Lordſhip. And therefore, in ſtating the queſtion, at my entrance on the ſubject, I obviated this miſerable Sophiſm. I call it by no better name, becauſe it is not *the conſtitution of the world or the ſtate of mankind*

[18] Vol. v. p. 331.

in

in it, but the CONSTITUTION OF THE MORAL SYSTEM, or the nature of Virtue and Vice, as they essentially operate to produce happiness and misery, by which God's *moral attributes* are to be tried and ascertained. But this, which is a steddy, uniform view, he would have us turn from; to contemplate that obscure, disturbed, and shifting Scene, the actual state of vice and virtue, of misery and happiness, amongst men. That is, he would have us conclude concerning God's nature, not from his VOLUNTARY CONSTITUTION of things, but from the BREACHES in that constitution made by the abuse of man's free-will: which yet, (when he is arguing *for an equal providence*) he again and again confesses ought not to be charged upon God; and declaims violently against the folly of those who impute the effects of that abuse to him. Tho' here, (in his various attempts to blot out *the idea of God's moral attributes*) he be full of the disorders of the moral System considered as part of God's design.

But since I have mentioned his arguments for an equal providence, I should be unjust to You, who expect a fair *view* of his Lordship's Philosophy from me, if I concealed another of his contradictions. — He had both Man's *future State* and *God's moral attributes* to throw out of the religious world; or, to speak more properly, he had RELIGION to overturn, by taking away it's very ESSENCE: and as the *irregularities* in the present administration of Providence stood in the way of his first attempt; and the *consistency* of the moral System, in the way of the other; when he argues against a future State, You would think there were no *irregularities*; and when he argues

gues againſt the moral attributes, You would think there was no *conſiſtency*.

We now come to his Lordſhip's particular objections againſt the *moral attributes*. One of them is that they are BOUNDED.

" They [the Divine] go further. As God is " perfect and man very imperfect, they talk of his " *infinite goodneſs* and *juſtice*, as of his infinite wiſdom " and power; tho' the latter may preſerve their nature " without any conceivable bounds, and the former " muſt ceaſe to be what they are, unleſs we conceive " them BOUNDED. Their nature implies neceſſarily " a limitation in the exerciſe of them. Thus then " the *moral attributes*, according to this Theology, " requires infinitely more of God to man than men " are able, or would be obliged if they were able, " to exerciſe to one another: greater profuſion in " beſtowing benefits and rewards, greater vigour in " puniſhing offences [19]."

You have here his Lordſhip's own words; and nothing leſs could induce any one to think ſo diſadvantageouſly of this Righter of wrongs and Redreſſer of grievances, as they neceſſarily imply. Let us conſider the *premiſſes* and examine the *inferences* both *implied* and *expreſſed*.

He ſays, 1. That the *moral attributes are bounded*; 2. That the *natural are not bounded*. Let us ſee to what the firſt propoſition amounts; and how much truth there is in the ſecond.

1. The *moral attributes* are conſidered by us as relative to *intelligent* creatures: The *natural* are not

[19] Vol. v. p. 528.

ſo.

ſo conſidered. Thus the goodneſs and juſtice, when relative to man, are greatly *bounded*; a certain low degree of reward ſuffices for his *good*; a certain low degree of puniſhment for his *evil* actions. Let God's goodneſs and juſtice reſpect a higher rank of intelligent Beings, and they will be then *leſs bounded*; for greater rewards and puniſhments will be required: and ſo on, to the higheſt rank of intelligent creatures. Yet as the higheſt is at infinite diſtance from the Creator, the exerciſe of the moral attributes, as they bear relation to his intelligent creatures, muſt be ſtill *bounded*.

2. His ſecond propoſition is, that *the natural attributes are not bounded*. It is true, theſe cannot be conſidered as relative to God's *intelligent* creatures; yet ſince, in their exerciſe, they muſt be conſidered as relative to his Creation at large; and ſince Creation, however immenſe, is not infinite, the natural attributes ſo conſidered are not infinite: but if not infinite, they are *bounded*. There is no difference therefore, in *the exerciſe* of God's attributes, between the *moral* and the *natural*, ſave only in the degree.

But if we conſider God's *moral* and *natural* attributes more abſtractedly, not as they are *in the exerciſe*, and relative to intelligent Beings, and to actual Creation, but as they are in his nature, then they are both *unbounded*. Thus we ſee his Lordſhip's notable diſtinction is both imaginary and uſeleſs.

However, let us give him all he aſks; and then ſee what he will be able to *infer* from it.

1. His firſt inference ſeems to be this: As the *moral* attributes are bounded, and not infinite like the *natural*, our idea of them muſt be obſcure and inadequate.

What!

What! becauſe they are better adapted, as things *bounded* certainly are than things *infinite*, to human contemplation? Our idea of ſuch of God's attributes as bear relation to a Being, whoſe nature and properties we know, namely MAN, muſt needs be more adequate and better defined than the idea of ſuch attributes as bear relation to Beings, whoſe nature and properties we know not, namely the UNIVERSE.

2. His other *inference*, is expreſſed in theſe words: *Thus then the moral attributes, according to this Theology, requires infinitely more of God to man than men are able, or would be obliged if they were able, to exerciſe to one another.* To ſay, the moral attributes, according to Chriſtian Theology, or, as he is pleaſed to call it, *artificial Theology*, requires INFINITELY *more*, is a wretched calumny. To ſay, it *requires more*, is true. And for this plain reaſon: the relation between Creator and Creature is very different from that, between Fellow-creatures; therefore the *goodneſs* is more abundant: The relation between Lord and Servant is very different from that between Fellow-ſervants; therefore the *juſtice* is more ſevere. And if it would not be deemed too IMPUDENT to refer his Lordſhip to Scripture, for inſtruction (eſpecially in a matter where the abuſe of Scripture was chiefly intended) he might there have found a *Parable* which would have ſet him right: and has always kept *artificial Theology*, whatever he might think, from going wrong. But *infinite*, when applied to the *exerciſe* of a moral attribute in reference to man, is his Lordſhip's nonſenſe, with due reverence be it ſpoken, not the *nonſenſe of artificial Divines*. They were not ignorant that the rule, *infir-*

miorem vel deteriorem partem ſequitur conſequentia, held as well in *Morals* as in *Logic*. Tho' God be infinite, man is finite; and therefore, with reſpect to him, the exertion of a *moral* attribute is finite, not infinite. His Lordſhip himſelf ſaw ſomething of this, as appears by his own words. *The nature of the moral attributes implies neceſſarily a limitation in the uſe of them.* And why would he ſuppoſe Divines could not ſee as far into this matter as himſelf?

But if there be an error in *artificial Theology* he is as ſure, at one time or other, to eſpouſe it; as he is, at all times ready to calumniate the Divine who holds it. Men, in their ill adviſed zeal to defend the Scripture-doctrine of the Son's divinity, were not always ſufficiently careful in ſelecting their arguments. Amongſt ſuch as had perhaps been better let alone, they employed this; That as man's offence was againſt an infinite Being, it required an infinite ſatisfaction; which none but ſuch a Being could give. Now his Lordſhip, we ſee, eſpouſes this very principle, to diſcredit God's moral attributes, and the *artificial Theology* of Jeſus Chriſt; which ſpeaks, indeed, of infinite rewards; but not as matter of *due*, but of *grace*.

As the being *bounded* is one of his Lordſhip's objections againſt the *moral attributes*, ſo the being merely HUMAN, is another.

"After Dr. CLARKE (ſays he) has repeated over "and over that all the *moral attributes* are the ſame "in God as in our ideas; and that he who denies "them to be ſo may as well deny the divine *phyſical* "*attributes*, the Doctor inſiſts only on two of the "former, on thoſe of *juſtice* and *goodneſs*. He was "much in the right to contract the generality of his "aſſer-

" assertion. The absurdity of ascribing TEMPE-
" RANCE, for instance, or FORTITUDE, to God,
" would have been too gross, and too visible even to
" eyes that prejudice had blinded the most. But
" that, of ascribing *justice* and *goodness* to him, ac-
" cording to our notions of them, might be better
" covered, and was enough for his purpose, tho'
" NOT LESS REALLY ABSURD [20]."

Which shall we most admire: His *Knowledge* or his *Ingenuity*? Or shall we follow the advise of his Motto, and *Wonder at nothing* [1].

When men contemplate what they call moral virtue, or the attributes of Humanity, they divide them into two classes, perfectly distinct from one another. In the first are comprized those which belong to man under the idea of a free intelligent Being, such as *goodness* and *justice*: in the second, those which belong to him under the idea of a creature of his own imperfect species, such as *temperance* and *fortitude*. The first belong to all free intelligent Beings; the latter, only to such a Being as man: *Those* arise out of the nature of free intelligence, and so are common to all: *These*, from the imperfections of a very inferior creature, and so are peculiar to Humanity; for we easily conceive a higher Order of free intelligences, in which the moral virtues of the second class have no place. They are superior to the impressions of fear, and so have no occasion to exert *fortitude*: They are removed from the temptation of excess, and so have no room for the exercise of *temperance*. Now when CLARKE, or any other Di-

[20] Vol. v. p. 311. [1] *Nil admirari.*

vine,

vine, had said, that *the moral attributes are the same in God as in our ideas,* What attributes could they possibly mean but those of the *first class*; those which belong to Beings under the idea of free intelligences? STUPID as his Lordship is pleased to make Divines, they could never *blunder* at such a rate as to conceive, that those virtues or *moral attributes,* which proceed from the *imperfection* of the Creature, might belong in any manner to the Creator, whom they supposed to be *all perfect.* They held, with his Lordship, and they will hold without him, that the great God is *infinitely* wise and powerful. Were they then in any danger to give him *temperance,* which implied his being obnoxious to *folly*; or *fortitude,* which argued *impuissance?* Infinite wisdom, therefore, and infinite power, exclude from God the very ideas of *temperance* and *fortitude.* But do infinite wisdom and infinite power exclude from God the ideas of *goodness* and *justice?* On the contrary, his Lordship, as we shall see presently, is reduced to the poor shift of owning *goodness* and *justice* to be contained in infinite *wisdom* and *power.*

At present I leave His Lordship's Admirers to their own meditations on their Master's IPSE DIXIT, *That the inscribing goodness and justice to God is* NO LESS REALLY ABSURD *than the ascribing temperance and fortitude to him?*

—But CLARKE *contracted the generality of the assertion to serve a purpose.* I think he did: and for one of the best purposes in the world, that of COMMON SENSE? Had his Lordship been pleased to *contract* himself on the same principle, he had passed, per-

perhaps, for a greater Philoſopher; tho' he had certainly been a leſs Writer.

But then, if you aſk, *What purpoſe* his Lordſhip had *to ſerve*, when he uſed the equivocal word ALL, (which may ſignify either *all* of one kind, or *all* of every kind) where he obſerves, Clarke holds, *that* ALL *the moral attributes are the ſame in God*, &c? I anſwer, it was to give himſelf the poor pretence to ſay, that Clarke afterwards *contracted his generality*, or, in other words, contradicted himſelf.

A third objection againſt the *moral attributes* is, "That PASSIONS and AFFECTIONS mix with our goodneſs and juſtice; which therefore cannot be ſuppoſed to be *the ſame in kind* with God's; tho' our wiſdom and power, with which no paſſions or affections mix, muſt be the *ſame in kind* with his."

Were paſſion and affection *inſeparable* from human goodneſs and juſtice, the objection might ſeem to have ſome force; indeed, not much even then. But how miſerable muſt the objection appear to thoſe who ſee, as all men may, that they are *ſeparable?* Separable, I mean, in practice as well as ſpeculation. The true idea of human goodneſs and juſtice excludes all paſſion and affection. What hinders then our riſing, from that idea, to divine goodneſs and juſtice, any more than our riſing, from the idea of human wiſdom and power, to the divine wiſdom and power; and from perceiving, that as well the *moral*, as the *natural* attributes, are the ſame in kind, both in God and man?

But, this is not all that may be ſaid in favour of our adequate idea of God's *moral attributes*, when compared with the *natural*. For tho' paſſion mixes not with the human attributes of wiſdom and power,

yet ſomething elſe does, much more difficult to be ſeparated than PASSION, from the human attributes of goodneſs and juſtice, I mean the INSTRUMENTALITY OF MATTER. We can conceive nothing of human POWER without the uſe of ſuch an inſtrument: yet this, by his Lordſhip's own confeſſion, does not hinder us from riſing from the idea of our own wiſdom and power, to the wiſdom and power of God; and from ſeeing that they are the ſame in kind. Why then ſhould the other foreign combination hinder us from ſeeing that goodneſs and juſtice are the ſame in kind?

Still, further. The MANNER *of knowing* in God, on which depends his natural attribute of WISDOM, is confeſſedly different from what it is in man; and, at the ſame time, is a thing of which we have no conception: yet this, according to his Lordſhip's account, does not hinder our attaining to an adequate idea of *divine wiſdom*, tho' it riſes from what we ſee of the *human*.

How happens it then, that, in both theſe caſes, notwithſtanding the foreign mixture of the *inſtrumentality of matter*, and the *manner of knowing*, we attain an adequate idea of God's wiſdom and power? His Lordſhip will tell you, it is by ſeparating what is foreign, from what is native to the ideas of wiſdom and power. And ſhall not I have as much credit with You, when I tell you we acquire an adequate idea of God's goodneſs and juſtice, by ſeparating from the idea of human goodneſs and juſtice the foreign mixture of *paſſion* and *affection?*

But his Lordſhip has a greater quarrel than all this, with the *moral attributes*. They give riſe to embarraſed queſtions, diſhonourable to God, and miſchievous to Religion.

" As

" As they [the Divines] modeled God's govern-
" ment on a human plan, so they conceived his per-
" fections, *moral* as well as physical, by human ideas.
" — Thus God was said to be the FIRST GOOD:
" but then the general notion or abstract idea of this
" *good* was not only taken from human goodness;
" but was considered too with little or no other re-
" lation than to man — A question arose therefore
" on these hypotheses, *How could evil come into a sy-*
" *stem of which God was the author?* — this question
" made a further hypothesis necessary; another first
" God, another coeternal and coequal principle was
" introduced to solve it; *a first cause of all evil*, as
" the other was *of all good* [3]."

The false representation of this fact I reserve for another occasion: the false inference from it is what I now propose to consider.

His Lordship supposes, that the notion of God's *moral attributes* gave birth to an insoluble question concerning *the origin of evil*; and that this occasioned the invention of the mischievous hypothesis of the *two Principles*. Who would have suspected all this evil to arise from the FIRST GOOD! Yet so it was: And therefore the notion of such a GOOD must be *false*; or at least, very *hurtful*.

1. As to the first, if his Lordship's inference be right, it will unsettle all useful knowledge; because there is no great principle, either in *physics*, or in *natural Theology*, but which, if we be not on our guard, and wise enough to stop at the extent of our ideas, will lead us into inextricable embarras: As one might instance in a point that arises out of both these sciences,—*The agreement between free-will and prescience.*

[3] Vol. iv. p. 88.

This is a well-known case: And as one of the principal designs of this VIEW is to illustrate his Lordship's great talents, I chose it before any other, because he pretends to untie this knot, which hath so long kept the learned world intangled. "Our ideas (says "he) of divine intelligence and wisdom may be neither *fantastical* nor *false*, and yet God's MANNER of "knowing may be so different from ours, that fore-"knowledge, as we call it *improperly in him*, may be "consistent with the contingency of events; altho' "that which we call *properly* fore-knowledge *in our-*"*selves*, be not so [4]."

I have two or three remarks to make on these words.

Our ideas of God's *moral* attributes, his goodness and justice, he makes *fantastical* and *false*, on account of difficulties arising from them: yet God's *natural* attributes, his intelligence and wisdom, *may*, he says, *be neither fantastical nor false*, tho' a difficulty as great arises from them; namely, the apparent discordancy between free-will and prescience.

My second remark is, that his solution is more *fantastic* and *false* than the wildest chimera of School-metaphysics. The difficulty in reconciling God's prescience to man's free-will does not arise from our ignorance in God's MANNER OF KNOWING, but from God's ACTUAL KNOWLEDGE.

My third remark is, that his Lordship, who is here so penetrating, that he can easily reconcile *prescience* and *free-will*, is yet, in another place, so cloudy, that he cannot see how an *equal providence* and *free agency* may stand together [5]."

[4] Vol. v. p. 525. [5] See Letter iv.

My laſt remark is (and it riſes out of the foregoing) that where Religion is not concerned, his Lordſhip ſees no difficulties in any part of the ſyſtem of Creation: But as ſoon as ever Religion appears, then difficulties ſtart up by dozens.

Of this, take an inſtance from the caſe in hand. Our ideas of God's *moral attributes*, he ſays, muſt needs be falſe, becauſe the conceiving of them by human goodneſs and juſtice leads to the queſtion of the *origin of evil*, conſidered *morally*. Well. And does not the conceiving of God's *phyſical attributes*, by human wiſdom and power lead to the queſtion of the *origin of evil*, conſidered *naturally?* Yet our ideas of the phyſical attributes are neither *falſe nor fantaſtical*. But to this, his Lordſhip replies, Evil, conſidered *naturally*, is not real, but apparent only. Why ſo? Becauſe it contributes to the greater good of the whole. May not the ſame thing be ſaid of Evil, conſidered *morally?* Nay, hath it not been actually ſaid, and proved too, on the ſame principles? It follows then, that they are either both *real*, or both *fantaſtic*.

In a word, the truth is no more than this, Preſumptuous man knows not where to ſtop. He would penetrate even to the Arcana of the Godhead.

"For Fools ruſh in, where Angels fear to tread."

And this impious humour it was which gave birth to the abſurd hypotheſis of TWO PRINCIPLES. But is the folly to be charged upon our idea of the *moral attributes?* Ridiculous! We ſee it's cauſe is in vanity and ſelf-conceit; paſſions that operate alike on all principles.

2. As to his Lordſhip's ſecond inference, that *this* idea is at leaſt productive of much *miſchief*, and therefore it would be better to have none at all; Let me obſerve, that the idea of God's very exiſtence is productive of miſchief, even all the miſchiefs of Superſtition. Is it therefore better to be without a God? Who, beſides his Lordſhip, would ſay ſo [6]? Why then ſhould we think it better to be without the idea of the *moral attributes*, even tho' the evils it produced were *neceſſary?* But that is not the caſe. They are *caſual* only: the iſſue of pride and preſumption; which this idea does not at all influence.

3. HOWEVER, theſe *moral attributes*, if not hurtful, are USELESS; and this is his next cavil. "Infinite *wiſdom* and *power* (ſays his Lordſhip) have "made things as they are: how *goodneſs* and *juſtice* "required they ſhould be made is neither *coram ju-* "*dice*, nor to any rational purpoſe to enquire [7]." To inquire how the *univerſe of things ſhould be made*, ſerves indeed to *no reaſonable purpoſe*. But to inquire concerning our own ſtate and condition in this Univerſe, is either *coram judice*, or we were ſent into the world to ſtare about us, and paſs judgment upon nothing. His Lordſhip's ſophiſtry ſeems to confound two things that common ſenſe has always diſtinguiſhed; *our own buſineſs from other men's*. When the King holds a bed of juſtice, 'tis not for every Particular to inquire into all his meaſures: But every Particular who is ſummoned to attend the Court, is much

[6] He indeed ſays, *he had rather be an Atheiſt than acknowledge the Chriſtian Theology*, and we may believe him. See Vol. iv. p. 34.

[7] Vol. v. p. 363.

con-

concerned to know how he himſelf ſhall be dealt with. His Lordſhip, indeed, is ready to ſay, We are not ſummoned; that is, we are not *accountable creatures*. But this is begging the queſtion.

Again, to *inquire*, much more to preſcribe *how things ſhould be made*, in any particular ſyſtem, has all the folly, preſumption, and impiety, which his Lordſhip charges upon it: Becauſe the Parts having a relation to the Whole, an all-wiſe Architect makes them in conformity to that Whole, of which, we know nothing; and therefore our only concluſion ſhould be, that the Part we do know, is conſtituted for the beſt. But it is another thing to ſay (which is all that Divines have ſaid, how differently ſoever his Lordſhip is pleaſed to repreſent the matter) that God will act equitably with his rational Creation, by diſtributing good and evil to them according to their deſerts; becauſe this does not depend upon any Whole, of which we know nothing, but on his attributes of goodneſs and juſtice, of which, we know enough to determine with certainty concerning his final dealing with men. To paſs our judgment here is ſo far from folly or impiety, that not to do it would be ſtupidity or hypocriſy. To call this proceeding, as his Lordſhip does, the patching or botching up one Syſtem with another, is a groſs miſrepreſentation. It is fairly taking in the *Whole*, to determine concerning the deſtination of the *Parts*.

AT LENGTH, he ends juſt where he ſet out, That we have NO IDEAS of the moral attributes at all. "Upon "the whole matter (ſays he) we may conclude ſafely "from error, and in direct oppoſition to CLARKE, "that *goodneſs and juſtice in God cannot be conceived,*

" *without manifeſt preſumption and impiety, to be the ſame,*
" *as in the ideas we frame of theſe perfections when we*
" *conſider them in men, or when we reaſon about them*
" *abſtractedly in themſelves*; but that in the ſupreme
" Governor of the World they are ſomething TRAN-
" SCENDENT, and of which we cannot make any
" true judgment, nor argue with any certainty about
" them [8]." And in this, his Lordſhip tells us he is juſtified by the authority of St. PAUL and Dr. BARROW. *Theſe two great Divines* (ſays he) *are on my ſide* [9]. Who would have thought of two ſuch honourable Supporters for his Lordſhip's Atchievements? One thing I have obſerved, which may be worth reflecting on? A ſtrange propenſity in Free-thinkers to miſtake their enemies for their friends; and as ſtrange a propenſity in the Clergy to miſtake their friends for their enemies. The turn is odd enough on both ſides; and, at firſt view, ſeems a little myſterious; when, perhaps, there may be no more in it than this,— Free-thinkers have invented this trick, to amuſe the Clergy, in order to kindle their ſuſpicions, and inflame their jealouſy againſt their beſt friends: And, unhappily, the Clergy have, now and then, fallen into the ſnare.

But, after what has paſſed, who would expect that *the leather-dreſſing Pontiff* of all men ſhould have been thought worthy to ſupport the *firſt Philoſophy!* What has St. PAUL done at laſt to deſerve this honour? Why, in anſwer to the objections againſt God's diſpenſations in the religious World, the Apoſtle refers us, " for entire ſatisfaction, to the incomprehenſible

[8] Vol. v. p. 359. [9] Vol. v. p. 362.

" wiſdom

" wiſdom of God, who frequently in the courſe of his " providence ordereth things in methods tranſcend- " ing our abilities to diſcover or trace [10]." This ſolution, which is here extolled for it's great *modeſty*, is referred to, in another place, for it's greater IMPUDENCE [11]. It may be either, juſt as his Lordſhip is in humour; who, notwithſtanding his long ſtudy of LOCKE, ſeems totally to have loſt all ideas of *moral modes*. How elſe was it poſſible, after having treated the whole body of Mankind in the manner he has done, he ſhould gravely tell his Friend, " That few men, he be- " lieves, have CONSULTED others both *living* and the " *dead*, with LESS PRESUMPTION, and in a GREAT- " ER SPIRIT OF DOCILITY, than he has done [12]." I ſometimes thought a word was wrong printed; and that for *conſulted*, we ſhould read, *inſulted*; for in a great man, there is no *preſumption*, whatever meanneſs there may be, in *inſulting* his inferiors. And as for his *docility*, that will hardly be diſputed, it being certain that from the Author, whom he has *inſulted* moſt, he has condeſcended to ſteal more.

But St. PAUL ſays, *we muſt have recourſe to the incomprehenſible wiſdom of God.* In good time. But how does this prove that, in Paul's opinion, we have no adequate idea of the *moral attributes?* Unleſs the *quality* of an Agent, and his *action*, be one and the ſame thing. You, Sir, have an *adequate* conception, I am ſure, of our gracious Monarch's *goodneſs* and *juſtice*; but you have a very imperfect comprehenſion of ſeveral of his State-meaſures. I frequently at-

[10] Vol. v. p. 360. [11] Vol. iii. p. 307.
[12] *Introductory Letter to Mr. Pope*, Vol. iii. p. 320.

tempted to illuſtrate my reaſoning on divine matters from examples in human Rulers. This is a tickliſh point. And therefore I have been very careful that thoſe *regal* acts by which I would illuſtrate the *divine*, be not ſuch as proceed from the weakneſs and imperfections of humanity. If they be, the inſtance is impertinent, and ſerves for nothing but to miſlead us. This was the more carefully to be obſerved, becauſe Writers have carried theſe illuſtrations into much abuſe. And no body more than this Noble Lord, ſo famous as he is likely to become with Poſterity, for every ſpecies of falſe reaſoning.

Dr. Barrow, I preſume, will ſtand his Lordſhip in no better ſtead than St. Paul. "As the dealings "of every wiſe man (ſays the Doctor) are ſometimes "founded upon maxims, and admit juſtifications not "obvious or penetrable by vulgar conceit, ſo may "God act according to rules of wiſdom and juſtice, "which it may be quite impoſſible by our faculties "to apprehend, or with our means to deſcry. As "there are natural modes of Being and operation, ſo "there may be prudential and moral modes of pro-"ceeding, far above our reach, peculiar objects of "divine wiſdom not to be underſtood by any crea-"ture, eſpecially by creatures who ſtand in the low-"eſt form of intelligence; one remove from beaſts. "In fine, thoſe rules of equity and experience which "we in our tranſactions with one another do uſe, if "they be applied to the dealings of God will be "found very incongruous or deficient, the caſe be-"ing vaſtly altered from that infinite diſtance in na-"ture and ſtate between God and us, and from the "immenſe difference which his relations towards us "have

" have from our relations to one another [13]." What now has all this, (which relates only to the *incomprehenſible nature of God's providence)* to do with our *inadequate ideas of his moral attributes?* At leaſt, if his Lordſhip will contend, that the man who thinks God's providence *incomprehenſible*, muſt needs think our ideas of his moral attributes *inadequate*; he muſt go a ſtep further; and confeſs, that Barrow ſuppoſed our ideas of the *natural* attributes to be *inadequate* likewiſe; for he puts both on the ſame footing. *As there are* NATURAL *modes of Being and operation*, (ſays the Doctor) *ſo there may be prudential and* MORAL *modes of proceeding far above our reach.* But as this would be going too far, farther than the *firſt Philoſophy* will allow of, I ſuppoſe he would be content to give up this quotation from Barrow, as nothing to the purpoſe.

AT LAST, and when you would leaſt expect it, Common-ſenſe and Common-ſentiments return. And God's *moral attributes*, after much ado, are allowed to be in Nature. " Where Religions (ſays his Lord-" ſhip) which pretend to be revealed, prevail, a " new character of God's *goodneſs* ariſes — an *artifi-" cial* goodneſs which ſtands often in the place of the " NATURAL [14]." And this, after he had ſo often told us, that we have no adequate idea of any good-neſs at all. Well, but as awkwardly as God's *natu-ral goodneſs* comes, and, in every ſenſe, *a poſteriori*, yet it comes, and deſerves to be made welcome. " All the knowledge (ſays he) that God has given " us the means to acquire, and therefore all he " deſigned we ſhould have of his phyſical and MORAL

[13] Vol. v. p. 361, 2. [14] Vol. v. p. 431.

" nature and attributes, is derived from *his works*, " and from the TENOUR OF THAT PROVIDENCE by " which he governs them [15]." You will obſerve the words — *the tenour of that Providence* —— I have detected the ſophiſtry of them before, where I have ſtated the meaning of the terms, *God's works*. I bid you obſerve them now, to judge of the following climax, (if I may ſo call it) or walk down ſtairs. " The " wiſdom is not ſo often diſcernible by us [in God's " works] as the power of God, nor the goodneſs as the " wiſdom [16]." As ſcanty and ſlender as the knowledge is of God's moral attributes, which his Lordſhip here allows us to collect from his works, yet it flatly contradicts what his Syſtem had obliged him over and over to maintain; particularly in the following words --- *Of divine goodneſs and divine juſtice* (ſays his Lordſhip in the perſon of Anaxagoras) *I am unable to frame any adequate notions* [17], *from God's works*.

This Mock-conceſſion is again repeated, and as carefully guarded. " By natural Theology (ſays his " Lordſhip) we are taught to acknowledge and adore " the infinite *wiſdom* and *power* of God, which he " has manifeſted to us in ſome degree or other in " every part, even the moſt minute, of his Creation. " *By that too, we are taught to aſcribe goodneſs and juſtice* " *to him, wherever he intended we ſhould ſo aſcribe* " *them*, that is, wherever either his works, or the " diſpenſations of his providence do as NECESSARI- " LY communicate theſe notions to our minds, as

[15] Vol. v. p. 523, 4. [16] Vol. v. p. 335.
[17] Vol. iv. p. 116, 17.

" thoſe

" thoſe of wiſdom and power are communicated to " us, in the whole extent of both [18]."

What his Lordſhip would have you infer from this is, that we are NO WHERE taught to aſcribe *goodneſs* and *juſtice* to God; ſince the *diſpenſations of his providence* do NO WHERE, in his Lordſhip's opinion, NECESSARILY *communicate theſe notions*. But allow him his premiſes, that neither God's Works nor Diſpenſations do NECESSARILY communicate to us the notions of God's goodneſs and juſtice; Would his concluſion follow, that therefore we are no where taught in theſe works and diſpenſations to aſcribe thoſe attributes unto him? Suppoſe theſe works and diſpenſations did only PROBABLY communicate theſe notions to our minds; will not this probability teach us to aſcribe goodneſs and juſtice to him? God hath ſo framed the conſtitution of things, that man, throughout his whole conduct in life ſhould be neceſſarily induced to form his judgment on appearences and probable arguments. Why then not in this, as well as the reſt? or rather, why not in this, above the reſt? if ſo be that indeed God had not (as I have ſhewn he hath) neceſſarily communicated theſe notions. — But ſtill, what is this to our *adequate* idea of the moral attributes, the point in queſtion? God's not *neceſſarily communicating* affects only the *reality*, not the *preciſion* of the idea. All therefore we learn by the obſervation, which would thus put the change upon us, is, that his Lordſhip has a very ſtrong inclination, that God ſhould have neither *goodneſs* nor *juſtice*; ſo far as they carry with them any DISPOSITION to *reward* or

[18] Vol. v. p. 527.

puniſh.

puniſh. For as to the Attributes *themſelves*, diveſted of their conſequences; and undiſturbed by our IMPIOUS IMITATION [19], he has little or no quarrel with them. His Lordſhip certainly never intended to *teach* the common Reader more of the ſecrets of his Philoſophy than what NECESSARILY ariſes from his profeſſions. But to make God treat Mankind in this manner, communicate to their minds the appearance of Attributes which he has not, is drawing an image of the Deity from his Lordſhip's own likeneſs; the very fault he ſo much cenſures in Divines. But if it muſt needs be that God is to be repreſented either after Them, or after his Lordſhip, I ſhould chuſe to have the Clergy's God, tho' made out of no better ſtuff than ARTIFICIAL THEOLOGY, becauſe this gives him *goodneſs* and *juſtice*, rather than his Lordſhip's God, which has neither, altho' compoſed of the more refined materials of the FIRST PHILOSOPHY. In the mean time, I will not deny but He may be right in what he ſays, That men conceive of the Deity, more humano; and that his Lordſhip's God and the Clergy's God, are equally faithful copies of themſelves.

In a word, if God teaches, whether clearly or obſcurely, he certainly intended we ſhould learn. And what we get even by appearances, is real knowledge, upon his Lordſhip's own principles. For if Truth be, as he aſſures us it is, of ſo precarious a nature as to take it's Being from our own Syſtem, it muſt be *real* as far as it *appears*. "Our knowledge (ſays this

[20] OUR OBLIGATION TO IMITATE GOD IS A FALSE AND PROFANE DOCTRINE. Vol. v. p. 65.

"great

" great Philoſopher) is ſo dependent on our own " ſyſtem that a great part of it would not be *know-* " *ledge* perhaps, but *error* in any other [20]."

It is thus he involves himſelf in perpetual contradictions: And it is always thus, when men diſpute (for believe they cannot [1],) againſt common notices, and the moſt obvious truths; ſuch as liberty of will; the certainty of knowledge; and this, which, I reckon, obtrudes itſelf upon us as forcibly as either, the MORAL ATTRIBUTES OF THE DEITY.

But the game is now on foot Let us follow cloſely. We have unravelled him through all his windings; and we may ſoon expect to ſee him take ſhelter in the thick cover of God's incomprehenſible Nature; and rather than allow, more than in jeſt, the *moral attributes* of the Deity, ready to reſolve all his Attributes, both *natural* and *moral*, into one INDEFINITE PERFECTION.

But ſoft. Not yet. We muſt come to it by degrees and regular advances. Firſt, the *moral attributes* are to be *reſolved* into the *natural*.

— " If they [the *natural* and *moral* attributes] " may be conſidered ſeparately, as we are apt to " conſider them; and if the LATTER and every " thing we aſcribe to theſe, are not to be RESOLVED " *rather into the former*; into his infinite intelligence, " wiſdom, and power [2]." It is yet, we ſee, but

[20] Vol. iii. p. 356.

[1] Hear what he himſelf ſays of FREE-WILL. *The free-will of man no one can deny he has, without* LYING, *or renouncing his intuitive knowledge.* Vol. v. p. 406.

[2] Vol. v. p. 523, 4.

a queſ-

a queſtion; and that only, whether the *moral* attributes are not to be reſolved into the *natural*. In the next paſſage the matter is determined. "I think "(and what he thinks, he holds it but reaſonable "we ſhould all think) "that the *moral* attributes of "the ſupreme Being are *abſorbed in his wiſdom*; that "we ſhould conſider them only as different modifi- "cations of this *phyſical* attribute [3]."

We are not yet near the top. However, before we go any higher, let us ſet together his INCONSISTENCIES, as they appear in this ſituation. Sometimes *the ideas of divine wiſdom are better determined than thoſe of divine goodneſs* [4]: Sometimes *we have no ideas at all of divine goodneſs* [5]: And ſometimes again, (as in the place before us), the *divine goodneſs is the ſame as wiſdom*, and therefore, doubtleſs, the idea of it as well defined. Now, of all theſe aſſertions, to which will his Lordſhip ſtick? To which, do you aſk? To none of them, longer than they will ſtick to him: And ſtraggling, undiſciplined Principles, picked up at adventures, are not apt to ſtick long to any ſide: As ſoon as they begin to incline towards the enemy, he has done with them. —— Come, if you will needs have it, you ſhall. The ſecret is this. The attributes are mere NAMES; and there is an end of them. All that remains, worth ſpeaking of, is one undefined ETERNAL REASON: and ſo the Farce concludes.

"The moral ATTRIBUTES (ſays he) are *barely* "NAMES that we give to various manifeſtations

[3] Vol. v. p. 335. [4] Vol. v. p. 341, 526.
[5] Vol. iv. p. 116, 17.

"of

" of the infinite wisdom of one *simple uncompounded* " *being* [6]."

" Of divine goodness and divine justice I am un- " able to frame any adequate notions; and instead " of conceiving such distinct moral attributes in the " supreme Being, *we ought, perhaps, to conceive no-* " *thing more than this*, that THERE ARE VARIOUS " APPLICATIONS OF ONE ETERNAL REASON, WHICH " IT BECOMES US LITTLE TO ANALYZE INTO " ATTRIBUTES [7]."

To this miserable refuge is his Lordship reduced to avoid divine justice. But why, you say, did he not speak out at first, and end his quarrel with the *moral attributes* at once? Your humble servant for that. Barefaced NATURALISM has not such charms as to make her received when and wherever she appears. There is need of much preparation, and not a little disguise, before you can get her admitted even to what is called *good company*.— But then, after he had resolved to speak out, Why, you ask, does he stop again in his career; and, when his premisses are general against *all* attributes, his conclusion is particular, against the *moral* only? Not without reason, I assure you. He had need of the *natural* attributes, to set up against the *moral:* and therefore had himself *analyzed* this *eternal reason* into the specific attributes of *wisdom* and *power*. But when he saw his Adversaries might, by the same way, analyze it into *goodness and justice*, he then thought fit to pick a quarrel with his own method: But it was to be done obliquely: and hence arises all this embarrass and tergiversation.

[6] Vol. v. p. 453. [7] Vol. iv. p. 117.

He

He would willingly, if his Reader be ſo pleaſed, analyze the *eternal reaſon* into *wiſdom* and *power*: but there he would ſtop: and leave the other ſide of the *eternal reaſon*, unanalyzed: and if *goodneſs* and *juſtice* ſhould chance to ſtart out, he has a trick to *reſolve* and *abſorb* them into wiſdom and power, as only *different modifications of the phyſical attributes*. But if this revolts his Readers, and they expect equal meaſure; then, rather than give them back the *goodneſs* and *juſtice* which he has been at all this pains to proſcribe, he will throw *wiſdom* and *power* after them, and *reſolve* all into the ONE ETERNAL REASON.

Baſhful NATURALISM has now thrown aſide her Veil; and is, we ſee, ready to face down and defy her Rival; whom till now ſhe was content to counterfeit. Give me leave, therefore, to repreſs this laſt effort of her inſolence by another paſſage from the *Sermons* quoted once or twice already.

— " We have been told, and with airs of ſupe-
" rior knowledge, that theſe pretended attributes,
" as they are commonly ſpecified, and diſtinguiſhed
" into *natural* and *moral*, are a mere human fiction;
" invented, by aid of analogy from the actions,
" paſſions, and qualities obſervable in man: and
" that the ſimple nature of Deity is one uniform per-
" fection; of which, Infinity being the baſe, we can
" have no diſtinct idea or conception.

" To this it will be ſufficient to reply, that it is in-
" deed true, that theſe ſpecific attributes, from
" which we deduce all our knowledge of the na-
" ture and will of God, are formed on analogy,
" and bear relation to ourſelves. But then we ſay
" ſuch

" ſuch attributes are not, on that account, the leſs " real or eſſential. The light of the SUN is not, in " the orb itſelf, what we ſee it in the RAINBOW. " There it is one candid, uniform, perfect blaze of " glory: here, we ſeparate it's Perfection into the va- " rious attributes of red, yellow blue, purple and " what elſe the ſubtle optician ſo nicely diſtin- " guiſhes. But ſtill the *ſolar* light is not leſs real in " the Rainbow, where it's rays become thus un- " twiſted, and each differing thread diſtinctly ſeen in " its effect, than while they remained united and " incorporated with one another in the Sun. Juſt " ſo it is with the divine Nature: it is one ſimple " individual Perfection in the Godhead himſelf: " but when refracted and divaricated, in paſſing " through the medium of the human mind, it be- " comes power, juſtice, mercy; which are all ſe- " parately and ADEQUATELY repreſented to the " underſtanding [8]." But that his Lordſhip ſo frequently diſcards his own principles, I ſhould hope he would ſubmit to this illuſtration, ſince he owns *that we ſee the Deity in a reflected, not in a direct light* [9].

It is a true light then and not a falſe: and the knowledge it conveys is real, not fantaſtic: For mirrors are not wont to reflect the ſpecies of the mind's viſions, but things exterior and ſubſtantial. To turn us, therefore, from God's *attributes*, (tho' the indirect, yet the well-defined, Image of him) becauſe they diſcover ſomething to us we may not like, a HELL and a FUTURE JUDGMENT, to turn us, I ſay,

[8] *The principles of natural and revealed Religion, in a courſe of Sermons at Lincoln's Inn*, Vol. i. p. 57, 58.

[9] Vol. v. p. 524.

from

from these, to the *undefined eternal reason*, is doing like certain french Philosophers, who, when they quarrelled with Newton's Theory of light and colours, contrived to break the Prism by which it was demonstrated.

And now, Sir, to conclude my long Letter. Who is there that deserves the name of MAN, and will not own, that they are the MORAL ATTRIBUTES of the Deity which make him AMIABLE; just as the *natural attributes* make him revered and adorable? —— What is his Lordship's quarrel with the God of MOSES and PAUL, but that he is made *unamiable*, and represented without *goodness* or *justice? Their God*, therefore, he expressly tells us, *shall not be his God.* Well then: He has his God to make. And who would not expect to find him, when made by such a Workman, a God of infinite goodness and justice. No such matter: These qualities come not out of his Lordship's hands; so, cannot enter into the composition of his God: They are *barely* NAMES *that men give to various manifestations of the infinite wisdom of one simple uncompounded Being.* The pretended want of them in the God of the Jews afforded his Lordship a commodious cavil; for he had RELIGION to remove out of his way: But when he came to erect NATURALISM in it's stead, it had been very inconvenient to give them to his own Idol.

Honest Plutarch, tho' a Priest, was as warm an enemy to PRIEST-CRAFT as his Lordship. He derives all the evils of Superstition from men's not acquiring the idea of a God *infinitely good and just.* And proposes this knowledge as the only cure for Superstition. This is consistent. But what would the an-

ancient World have thought of their Philoſopher, had his remedy, after hunting for it through a hundred volumes, been a God without any goodneſs and juſtice at all.

NATURE tells us, that the thing moſt deſirable is the knowledge of a God whoſe goodneſs and juſtice gives to every man according to his works. His LORDSHIP tells us, that REASON or NATURAL RELIGION diſcovers to us no ſuch God. Now, if both ſpeak truth, How much are we indebted to REVELATION! Which, when *natural Religion* failed us, brings us to the knowledge of a God infinitely good and juſt; and gives us an adequate idea of thoſe attributes! I ſay no more than his Lordſhip has confeſſed. — *Chriſtianity*, ſays he, DISCOVERS *the love of God to man; his infinite* JUSTICE *and* GOODNESS [10].

Is this a bleſſing to be rejected? His Lordſhip has no room to ſay ſo, ſince the diſcovery is made in that very way, in which, upon his own Principles, it only could be made. He pretends, "We have no other natural way of coming to the knowledge of God but from his *works*. By theſe, *he ſays*, we gain the idea of his *phyſical attributes*; and if there be any thing in his *works* which ſeems to contradict thoſe attributes, 'tis only ſeeming. For as men advance in the knowledge of nature, the difficulties vaniſh. It is not ſo, he ſays, with regard to the *moral attributes*. There are ſo many *phænomena* which contradict theſe, and occaſion difficulties never to be cleared up, that they hinder us from acquiring an *adequate* idea of the *moral attributes*." Now admitting all this to be true, (for generally, his Lordſhip's aſſertions are ſo extra-

[10] Vol. v. p. 532.

vagant,

vagant, that they will not even admit a ſuppoſition of their truth, tho' it be only for argument's ſake,) What does it effect but this, *additional credit to Revelation?* The *phyſical difficulties* clear up as we advance in our knowledge of *Nature*, and we advance in proportion to our diligence and application. But the *moral difficulties* never clear up, becauſe they riſe out of the *Whole Syſtem* of God's moral diſpenſation; which is involved in clouds and darkneſs, impenetrable to mortal ſight: and all the force of human wit alone will never be able to draw the veil. The aſſiſtance muſt come from another quarter. It muſt come, if it comes at all, from the Author of the Diſpenſation. Well; *Revelation* hath drawn this veil, and ſo, removed the darkneſs which obſtructed our attaining an *adequate* idea of the *moral* attributes. Shall we yet ſtand out? And, when we are brought hither upon his Lordſhip's own principles, ſtill withhold our aſſent? Undoubtedly you muſt. Beware, (ſays he) of a pretended Revelation. Why ſo? "Becauſe the Religion of nature is perfect and abſolute: "and therefore Revelation can teach nothing but what "Religion hath already taught [11]." Strange! Why, *Revelation* teaches thoſe *moral* attributes; which you, my Lord, own, *natural Religion* does not teach—Here the dialogue breaks off.

"Dic aliquem ſodes, dic, Quintiliane, colorem:
"Hæremus —

And here, we are like to ſtick. His Lordſhip leaves us in a Riddle. Will you have the ſolution? It is fooliſh enough; as ſuch kind of things generally are. But if you have kept your good humour, which,

[11] Vol. v. p. 544.

I con-

I confeſs is difficult amidſt all theſe provocations of impiety, it is enough to make you laugh. I told you before, that his Lordſhip borrowed all his reaſoning againſt Revelation, from ſuch as Tindal, Toland, Collins, Chubb, and Morgan. This ſolemn argument particularly, of the PERFECTION OF NATURAL RELIGION, and the ſuperſeded uſe of Revelation, he delivers to us juſt as he found it in Tindal. Now Tindal, who held, that natural Religion taught both the *moral attributes* and a *future ſtate*, had ſome pretence for ſaying that *it was perfect and abſolute*. But what pretence has his Lordſhip to ſay it after him, who holds that natural Religion taught neither one nor the other? The truth is, he refuſed no arms againſt REVELATION; and the too eager purſuit of this his old enemy thro' thick and thin has led him into many of theſe ſcrapes.

I have now conſidered all I could find urged by the Noble Writer in ſupport of his great principle of NO ADEQUATE IDEAS OF GOD'S MORAL ATTRIBUTES; on which the whole ſyſtem of NATURALISM is, and muſt be, founded; and you ſee to what this *all*, amounts: If I ſhould ſay to juſt nothing, I ſhall ſpeak more favourably of it than it deſerves; for it tends, as I have ſhewn you, in many inſtances, to confirm the great TRUTH it is brought to overthrow. And now what I propoſed for the ſubject of this ſecond Letter is pretty well exhauſted. My firſt was employed in giving you a ſpecimen of his TEMPER; This undertakes to explain his SYSTEM; and I reſerve the two next for a diſplay of his marvellous TALENTS; tho', it is true, I have a little anticipated the Subject. For you cannot but have conceived

ceived already a very uncommon idea of his abilities, on seeing him use TINDAL'S ARGUMENTS *against Revelation*, and *for the perfection of Natural Religion*, along with his OWN PRINCIPLES of *no moral attributes* and *no future State*. The first of which principles makes one entire absurdity of all he borrows from Tindal against Revelation; and the second takes away the very pretense for perfection in natural Religion.

His Lordship's friend, SWIFT, has somewhere or other observed, that no subject in all nature but Religion could have advanced Toland and Asgill into the class of reputable Authors. Another of his friends seems to think that no subject but Religion could have sunk his Lordship so far below it: IF EVER LORD BOLINGBROKE TRIFLES, (says Pope) IT WILL BE WHEN HE WRITES ON DIVINITY [12]. But this is the strange fate of Authors, whether with wit, or without, when they chuse to write on certain subjects. For it is with Authors, as with Men: Who can guess *which Vessel was made for honour, and which for dishonour?* when sometimes, one and the same is made for both. Even this choice Vessel of the FIRST PHILOSOPHY, his Lordship's sacred pages, may be put to very different uses, according to the different tempers in which they chance to find his few Admirers and the Public; like the *China Jordan* in the DUNCIAD, which one Hero pissed into, and another carried home for his Head-piece.

I am, *&c.*

[12] *Pope's works*, Vol. IX. Letter xiv.

LET-

LETTER III.

LET me first claim your thanks for sparing You so long on the chapter of Lord BOLINGBROKE; and then ask, what You now think of this Paper-Meteor, which so flames and sparkles, and, while it kept at distance, (like a Comet, traversing the celestial Orbs, and domineering over the established System) drew after it the admiring Croud; divided in their opinions between the presage of superstitious Divines who saw it threaten pestilence and ruin to the world beneath, and the more philosophic determination of his Followers who judged it was to re-create and revive the dryness and sterility of exhausted Nature.

But your love of Mankind makes you view this strange Phænomenon with horror. Is it for this, you say, that such a torrent of abuse has been poured out upon every private Character, upon every public Order, upon every branch of Learning, and upon every Institution of Religion? — They were not poured out at hazard, for all these Things stood in his way: they were not poured out in vain, for they are given for *Arguments*, and will, I make no doubt, be so received.

The wise Quintilian, it is true, has observed, *Propriam* MODERATIONEM QUÆDAM CAUSÆ *desiderant*. And it must be confessed, that if ever *Moderation*,

ration, or temperance of expreſſion, became an Author, or was well ſuited to his Diſcourſe, it was when the purpoſe of his Work, like that of his Lordſhip's, was to overturn all ESTABLISHED RELIGION, founded in the belief of a Sovereign Maſter, ſupremely *juſt* and *good*; and all AUTHENTIC LEARNING, employed for the defence of ſuch Religion: and, on their ruins, to erect NATURALISM, inſtead of real Theiſm, and a FIRST PHILOSOPHY, inſtead of real Science. When, I ſay, a Writer had thought fit to inſult the common ſentiments of Mankind on points eſteemed ſo eſſential to their well-being, common policy as well as common decency required that it ſhould be done by the moſt winning inſinuation and addreſs; and not by calling MADMAN, KNAVE, FOOL, and BLASPHEMER, every man who would not take his Syſtem upon truſt.

But ſuperior Genius's have always thought themſelves above the reſtraint of rules. *Tully* obſerves that ARCESILAS, fitted by a turbulence of temper to confound the peace and overturn the eſtabliſhed order of things, had done that miſchief in PHILOSOPHY which TIBERIUS GRACCHUS had projected in the REPUBLIC [1]. But his Lordſhip, prompted by a nobler ambition, would play both parts in their turns, and ſhine an *Arceſilas* and a *Gracchus* too.

His ill ſucceſs in buſineſs made him turn his great talents from POLITICS to PHILOSOPHY. But he had

[1] Tum exortus eſt, ut in Optima Rep. Ti. Gracchus qui etiam perturbaret, ſic Arceſilas, qui *conſtitutam* Philoſophiam everteret.

not yet mortified that Ambition which was always prompting him to aſpire at Superiority: and he carried with him that ſufficiency and thoſe reſentments which had proved ſo ill ſuited to the Cabinets of Princes, into the Cloſet of the Philoſopher. We may add, that he entered upon *Letters* in an advanced age; and this ſtill further viciated his natural temper by an acquired infirmity, to which, as Tully obſerves, theſe untimely Adventurers are extremely ſubject. ΟΨΙΜΑΘΕΙΣ *autem homines ſcis* QUAM INSOLENTES *ſint:* "You know, ſays he, how INSOLENT "thoſe men generally are, who come late to their "book."

But now having given you *my* thoughts of his Lordſhip's aſſuming temper, it would be unfair not to give you *his own*. He had kept, it ſeems, ill company; and his natural candor and modeſty had been hurt by it. But let him tell his own ſtory: "I grow "VERY APT TO ASSUME, by converſing ſo much "with ECCLESIASTICAL WRITERS, who aſſume "much oftener than they prove [2]."

But whatever cauſes concurred to form this overbearing humour, certain it is, that his contempt of others was become ſo habitual to him, that it operates where no reaſonable provocation can be aſſigned. I have ſhewn you, in my firſt Letter, at what a rate, his diſguſt to the Morals and his averſion to the Sanctions of the GOSPEL diſpoſed him to treat all who had contributed to propagate or to ſupport *Revelation*. But how the honeſt PAGANS of antiquity had offended, who, many of them, believed no more of a *future ſtate* than himſelf, is a little hard to conceive.

[2] Vol. iv. p. 504.

Yet PYTHAGORAS, he tells you, was a turbulent Fellow, and a fanatical ſubverter of States.

Nor did PLATO's *delirious brains* [3] ſecure him from becoming, on occaſion, a paultry Cheat, and a mercenary Flatterer. For almoſt all his *Madmen* are *Knaves* into the bargain. But Plato had made himſelf obnoxious to his Lordſhip, by the *blaſphemous* title he had given to the *firſt Cauſe*; in which his *delirious brains* could find nothing but a FIRST GOOD: ſo that he was to be ſtigmatized as the Ring-leader of that wicked Sect who aſcribe *moral attributes* to the Deity.

Even SOCRATES, whoſe glory it was, as Tully aſſures us, to take PHILOSOPHY out of the Clouds, and bring it down to dwell amongſt Cities and Men, *ſubſtituted* (in his Lordſhip's opinion) *fantaſtic, for real knowledge* [4] — *and entertained and propagated* THEOLOGICAL *and* METAPHYSICAL *notions which are not, moſt certainly, parts of* NATURAL THEOLOGY [5]. We underſtand his Lordſhip very well. He means a *particular* Providence and a *future* State, the *moral* attributes of the Deity and the *ſubſtantiality* of the Soul. This apparently is *the fantaſtic knowledge which makes no part of natural Theology.*

Nor could his own SENECA, tho' ſo ſervicable [6] to him in his *Exile*, eſcape the nick-name of THE STOICAL FOP: A character indeed, which, in the diſcourſe referred to at the bottom, Seneca has enabled his Follower moſt admirably to ſuſtain.

[3] Vol. iv. p. 88.
[4] Vol. iv. p. 112.
[5] Vol. iv. p. 122.
[6] See his Lordſhip's tract, entitled *Reflections on Exile.*

When

When these Pagan Heroes fare no better, who would be concerned for Church-men? or think much to hear CYPRIAN called a *Liar and a Madman* [7]; JEROM, a *surly foul-mouthed Bully*; *and* EPIPHANIUS, *an Idiot?*

But now comes on a difficulty indeed.—PAUL and PLATO bear their crimes in their countenance: The *Gospel of peace*, he tells us, discloses nothing but *Murders*; and the idea of a *first Good* occasioned all our complaints of *evil*. But what had SCIPIO done, or REGULUS, to incur his displeasure? They were neither *artificial Theologers*, nor yet *crazy Metaphysicians*; but plain, sober, Statesmen. His Lordship's quarrel, we know, is with DIVINITY in all its forms; but he professes to admire the *moral Virtues*. And if there be any of higher dignity than the rest, and in which his Lordship would be more desirous to shine, they must needs be CHASTITY and GOOD FAITH,

" CUI, *Pudor*, &, Justitiæ soror,
" INCORRUPTA *Fides*, &c. &c.

Yet he wrests all his reading to deprive those two brave Romans of their Glory; so nobly earned, and so generously paid, by the universal voice of all ages. I am not ignorant of that childish infirmity of our nature, the fondness of ingrossing to ourselves those shining qualities, with which we happen to be dazzled; but every one will acquit his Lordship of so impotent a project: Much less would I suppose him capable of thinking, that SCIPIO and REGULUS may be still the great men they have been accounted, though stained all over with *lust* and *perfidy*.

[7] Vol. iv. p. 407.

It is true, indeed, the new Hiſtorian of Great Britain, another of theſe *firſt philoſophy-men* (for the eſſence of the Sect conſiſting in paradox, it doth as well in *Hiſtory* as *Divinity*) he, I ſay, tells us, that it will admit of a doubt, whether *ſeverity of manners alone, and abſtinence from pleaſure, can deſerve the name of Virtue* [8]. But then he is as ſingular in his notions of *Religion*. He holds but two ſpecies of it in all Nature, *Superſtition* and *Fanaticiſm*: And under one or other of them, he gives you to underſtand [9], the whole of *Chriſtian profeſſion* is, and ever was, included. On the Church of *England*, indeed, he is ſo indulgent, to beſtow *all* that Religion has to give: for when he ſets it againſt *Popery*, it is *Fanaticiſm*: but as often as it faces about, and is oppoſed to the *Puritans*, it then becomes *Superſtition*; and this as conſtantly as the occaſions return.

You will ſay I grow partial to his Lordſhip, in appearing ſo anxious for his reputation, while Your two favorite characters lye expiring under his pen. Never fear it. They have not lived ſo long to die of a fright. When his Lordſhip bluſters we know how to take him down. It is only leading him back to that *Antiquity* he has been abuſing.

Half the work is done to my hands; and I ſhall have only the trouble of tranſcribing the defence of SCIPIO againſt his Lordſhip's ſuſpicions, as I find it in an expoſtulatory Letter to him, on his recent treatment of a deceaſed friend. ——

[8] *The Hiſtory of Great Britain*, Vol. i. p. 200. 4to, printed at Edinb. 1754.

[9] See his Hiſtory throughout.

"*The*

" *The reputation of the first Scipio* (says his Lord-
" ship) *was not so clear and uncontroverted in* PRI-
" VATE, *as in public life*; *nor was he allowed by all to*
" *be a man of such severe virtue as he affected, and as*
" *that age required. Nævius was thought to mean him,*
" *in some verses Gellius has preserved*; *and* VALERIUS
" ANTIAS *made no scruple to assert, that far from re-*
" *storing the fair Spaniard to her family, he debauched and*
" *kept her* [10]. One would have hoped so mean a
" slander might have slept forgotten in the dirty
" corner of a Pedant's [11] Common-place. And
" yet we see it quoted as a fact by an Instructor of
" Kings. Who knows but at some happy time or
" other, when a writer wants to prove that *real*
" FRIENDSHIP becomes a great man as little as *real*
" *chastity*, [12] this *advertisement* [13] of yours may
" be advanced to the same dignity of credit with the
" calumny of *Valerius Antias*. If it should, I would
" not undertake to dispute the fact on which such an
" inference might be made; for, I remember, Tul-
" ly, a great Statesman himself, long ago observed,
" VERÆ AMICITIÆ *difficillimè reperiantur in iis, qui*
" *in Republica versantur*.—But the words of Nævius
" were these,

" *Etiam qui res magnas manus sæpe gessit glorioſe,*
" *Cujus facta viva nunc vigent*; *qui apud gentes solus*
" *Præstat: eum suus pater cum pallio uno ab amica abduxit.*

[10] P. 204, of the *Idea of a Patriot King*.
[11] A. Gellius. [12] See p. 201, of the *Patriot King*.
[13] Advertisement concerning Mr. Pope, prefixed to the *Patriot King*.

" Theſe obſcure verſes were, in *Gellius's* opinion, the " ſole foundation of Antias's calumny, againſt the " univerſal concurrence of Hiſtorians [14]. And what " Gellius thought of this hiſtorian's modeſty and " truth, we may collect from what he ſays of him in " another place. Where having quoted two tribuni- " tial Decrees, which, he tells us, he tranſcribed " from Records [*ex annalium monumentis*] he adds, " that *Valerius Antias* made no ſcruple to give them " the lye in public [15]. And Livy quoting this *An-* " *tias*, for the particulars of a victory, ſubjoins " concerning the number ſlain [16], — *but there is* " *little credit to be afforded this writer, who, of all Hiſ-* " *torians, is the moſt given to amplify.* And he who " will enlarge on one occaſion will diminiſh on an- " other; for it is the ſame impotence of temper which " carries him indifferently to either [17]."

REGULUS's virtue falls next under his Lordſhip's cenſure: " I know not (ſays he) whether Balbus " would have called in queſtion the STORY OF RE- " GULUS. Vid. *Au. Gellium.* It was probably fa- " bulous, in many circumſtances at leaſt, and there " were thoſe amongſt the Romans who thought it to " be ſo [18]." Would not any one now imagine, by his bringing *Au. Gellius* again upon the ſtage, that

[14] *His ego verſibus credo adductum Valerium Antiatem* ADVERSUM CETEROS OMNES *ſcriptores de* SCIPIONIS *moribus ſenſiſſe.*

[15] *Valerius autem Antias, contra hanc decretorum memoriam contraque auctoritates veterum annalium—dixit,* &c. L. vii. c. 19.

[16] *Scriptori parum fidei ſit, quia in augendo non alius intemperantior eſt.* Lib. xxxvi.

[17] *A Letter to the Editor of the Letters on the Spirit of Patriotiſm, the idea of a Patriot King, and the ſtate of Parties,* &c.

[18] Vol. v. p. 406.

there

there was another *Valerius Antias* in reserve, to depose against REGULUS likewise? Just the contrary. The Grammarian, in the ivth chapter of his vith book, confirms the common story, with an addition of the testimonies of the Historians *Tubero* and *Tuditanus*. The truth however is, that his Lordship had his Voucher, though he was shy of producing him. It was the respectable Mr. TOLAND; to whom his Lordship is much indebted for better things. Amongst the posthumous tracts of that virtuous writer, there is a *Dissertation*, intitled, *The fabulous death of Atilius Regulus:* in which, from a fragment of *Diodorus Siculus*, preserved by *Constantinus Porphyrogenitus*, he endeavours to prove, against all the Roman writers, with *Cicero* at their head, that *Regulus* did not die in torments, but of mere chagrin. Toland only denied that his virtue was put to so severe a trial; but this was enough for his Lordship, to call in question the whole story; and to add, that *there were those amongst the* ROMANS *who thought it to be fabulous*. Unluckily, the *Roman* writers are unanimous for the truth of the story. How then shall we account for his Lordship's assertion? Did he take Diodorus Siculus for a Latin writer, because he had not seen him in Greek? Or did he understand A. Gellius as quoting *Tubero* and *Tuditanus* for doubters of the common story?

As we see little reason therefore to dissent from the general opinion, and much less, to join his Lordship against it, let SCIPIO and REGULUS still preserve their rank in our esteem and admiration. For as an excellent french writer, in a Letter to his Lordship, well observes, C'est être vertueux que de rendre à la

beauté des mœurs l'hommage d'amour et de reſpect, qui lui eſt dû.

His Lordſhip's ambition was uniform and ſimple: it was only, as we ſaid, *to be at the head of things*. As he comes nearer home, therefore, he is more and more alarmed. He found his place already occupied by certain Counterfeits and Pretenders, who had, ſome how or other, got into the throne of Science, and had actually received homage from the literary world. But theſe, as it was fitting, he unmaſks and depoſes.

"SELDEN, GROTIUS, PUFFENDORF, and CUMBERLAND (ſays his Lordſhip) ſeem to be great "writers, by much the ſame right as he might be "called a great traveller, who ſhould go from London to Paris by the Cape of Good Hope [19]." I can hardly think they took ſo large a compaſs. But let us truſt to the Proverb: They and his Lordſhip will prove it between them: He ſhews us a ready road indeed, but it leads to ATHEISM; whereas, if they take us a little *about*, they bring us the *neareſt way home* to RELIGION.

He profeſſes "a thorough contempt for the whole "buſineſs of the learned lives of SCALIGER, BOCHART, PETAVIUS, USHER and MARSHAM [20]." This was natural. He owed them nothing. But thoſe to whom he is moſt indebted have no better quarter.

MARCILIUS FICINUS, he calls the *beſt Interpreter of Plato*; but, at the ſame time aſſures us, he was *perfectly delirious*. But why, you aſk, is *Ficinus the beſt Interpreter of Plato*, ſince *J. Scaliger*, who knew

[19] Vol. v. p. 68. [20] Vol. ii. p. 261--2.

ſome-

ſomething of the matter, ſays, that *he ſtript his Maſter of his purple, and put him on his own beggarly rags?* For a good reaſon; *Ficinus* taught his Lordſhip all he knew of Platoniſm. But why is he then *perfectly delirious?* For a better ſtill: he holds opinions already condemned by his Lordſhip.

His very favorite BARROW, he tells us, "goes on "a long while begging the queſtion, and talking in "a theological cant MORE WORTHY OF PAUL than "of a man like him [1] — flimzy ſtuff, which a man "is obliged to vend, when he puts on a black gown "and band [2]."

LOCKE and NEWTON, he inſinuates, were the Men: Nay, ſuch is his humility, that he puts himſelf to ſchool to *Locke*. Yet this does not ſecure his Maſter from being mighty liable to a PHILOSOPHICAL DELIRIUM [3]. And as for NEWTON, the APPLICATION *of his Philoſophy is grown, or growing into ſome abuſe* [4]. Would you know how? By affording CLARKE and BAXTER the principles whereby to demonſtrate, *that the Soul is an immaterial ſubſtance*. An *abuſe* indeed!

But as for his Maſter,—and BACON too, *as much as he admires them, he is not blind to their errors; but can, without being dazzled, diſcern* SPOTS IN THESE SUNS.——

Before I go any further, I dare venture a wager that I know what thoſe ſpots are. They are, or I am much miſtaken, the ſtains of *Faith* and the impurities of *Revelation*. But let us hear him. "I can

[1] Vol. iv. p. 278. [2] Vol. v. p. 361.
[3] Vol. iii. p. 442. [4] Vol. iii. p. 374.

" discern a tincture, and sometimes more than a tinc-
" ture, in BACON, of those false notions, which we
" are APT TO IMBIBE as MEN, as INDIVIDUALS, as
" MEMBERS OF SOCIETY,, and as SCHOLARS. I can
" discern in LOCKE sometimes ill-abstracted and ill-
" determined ideas, from which a wrong application
" of words proceeds; and propositions to which *I*
" *can, by no means, assent.* I confess further, that I
" have been, and still am at a loss, to find any ap-
" pearance of CONSISTENCY in an author, who pub-
" lished a COMMENTARY ON THE EPISTLES OF ST.
" PAUL, and a treatise on the REASONABLENESS OF
" CHRISTIANITY (which he endeavours to prove by
" fact and by argument) AFTER having stated clearly
" as he has done, the conditions and measures of hist-
" torical probability; AND AFTER having written
" as strongly as he has done against the abuse of
" words [5]." Did not I tell you so!

—— " This SUN's sick too;
" Shortly he'll be an EARTH;

as the Poet has it, in his description of the pestilence at Thebes; not more fatal to great Cities than this bloated Vapour of a *first Philosophy*, which mimics, and, as it reflects, defiles this SUN of Science, and turns Nature into Prodigy;

Et SOLEM geminum et duplices se ostendere THEBAS
&c.

But his Lordship's account of his other *Luminary*, BACON, is still more extraordinary—He *thinks he dis-*

[5] Vol. iv. p. 166.

cerns

cerns in him a tincture, and more than a tincture of those false notions, which we are apt to imbibe as MEN, *as* INDIVIDUALS, as MEMBERS OF SOCIETY, *and as* SCHOLARS. — That is, as *Men*, we are apt to think we have a SOUL; as *Individuals*, we are in expectation of a FUTURE STATE; as *Members of Society*, we are inclined to reverence the ESTABLISHED RELIGION; and as *Scholars*, we are taught to *reason*, and not to HARANGUE. If any of his Lordship's Followers can give a better account of this Oracular passage, I am very ready to resign the office of his Commentator.

In truth, his Lordship deals by RELIGION, and it's Advocates, as a certain french Author, I have read, does by ALCHEMY and the hermetic Philosophers; he brings almost every great name into the number; and after having entertained his reader much at their expence, concludes each various eulogy, alike, — "Now his folly was in hoping to "extract GOLD from *baser metals*:" just as the folly of all his Lordship's *Alchemists* is the hope of bettering *human nature* by GRACE.

You now, Sir, may understand, how well the disposition of his mind and temper was fitted to his System It often happens, that men who arraign Religion, have been first arraigned by it; and their defiance of Truth is only a reprisal upon Conscience. Under these circumstances it is no wonder they should go to work much out of humour; tho' it be in an affair which requires perfect tranquillity, and freedom from all perturbations. But his Lordship has the miserable advantage of being the first who has written under one unintermitting fit of rage and resentment.

In

In this ſtate, like a man in a fever whom no poſture can eaſe, whom no ſituation can accommodate, he is angry at PHILOSOPHERS for explaining what they cannot comprehend; he is angry at DIVINES for believing without explaining: Well then, they change hands; the *Philoſopher* believes, and the *Divine* explains. No matter. He is angry ſtill. In this temper then we leave him, and turn to the proper ſubject of my Letter.

You would know, you ſay, with what abilities he ſupports his Syſtem.

The attacks upon Religion have been always carried on like War, by *ſtratagem* and *force*. I ſhall therefore firſt ſpeak of his *Arts*, and then of his *Powers* of controverſy.

It has been obſerved how cloſely, and how humbly too, he copies the FREE-THINKERS who went before him, even to the ſtaleſt of their paultry ſtratagems.

When FREE-THINKING firſt went upon it's Miſſion, the PUBLIC were not diſpoſed to underſtand raillery on a ſubject of ſuch importance: ſo that it is poſſible there might be found, amongſt the more early of theſe our Anti-Apoſtles, a Confeſſor or two to the glorious cauſe of Infidelity. This put their Succeſſors on their guard; or, what was better, gave them a pretence to affect it. From henceforth you hardly ſaw an Infidel-book which was not introduced with a myſterious reſerve; with the obligations the Reader had to theſe ſervants of truth, for venturing ſo far in his ſervice, while the Secular arm hung ſo fearfully over them; with the diſadvantages their cauſe now lay under, while it could be but half explained and half ſupported; and with the wonders they would do

by

by Powers they had in reserve, when a little more *Christian Liberty* should suffer them to be drawn out. This miserable Crambe made so constant a part of our diet, and had been dished out from time to time with so little variety, that it grew both offensive and ridiculous; for what could more provoke our spleen or our laughter than to feign an apprehension of the Magistrate's resentment, after they had written at their ease for almost a whole century together, with the most uncontrolled and unbridled licence?

In such a state of things, would you easily believe his Lordship could pride himself in cooking up this cold kitchen-stuff, and serving it again and again, amidst so elegant an entertainment. "GASSENDI "(says he) apprehended enemies much more formi- "dable than mere Philosophers, because armed with "ecclesiastical and civil power. It is this fear which "has hindered those who have combated ERROR in "all ages; and who COMBAT IT STILL, from taking "all the ADVANTAGES which a FULL EXPOSITION "OF THE TRUTH would give them. Their adver- "saries triumph as if the goodness of their cause had "given them the Victory, when nothing has pre- "vented their ENTIRE DEFEAT, or reduced their "contest to a drawn battle, except this, that they "have employed Arms of every kind, fair and foul, "without any reserve; while the others have em- "ployed their offensive weapons with MUCH RE- "SERVE, and have even BLUNTED THEIR EDGE "when they used them [7]."

[7] Vol. iv. p. 163.

"The

" The adverſaries [of Religion] (ſays he again) " ſeldom ſpeak out, or puſh the inſtances and argu- " ments they bring, ſo far as THEY MIGHT BE CAR- " RIED. Inſtead of which theſe ORTHODOX BUL- " LIES affect to triumph over men who employ but " part of their ſtrength, &c. [8]."

What it is, which his Lordſhip, who affects to tread in the ſteps of theſe cautious men, keeps thus hid and is ſo ſhy of producing, is not eaſy to gueſs. But

" Sous cet air capable où l'on ne comprend rien,
" S'il cache un honnête homme, il ſe cache tres-bien.

However, having (after his Maſters) thus feigned a fear, he feigns all the obliquity and doubling, which fear produces. He profeſſes to believe the Miſſion of Chriſt, tho' founded on the Diſpenſation of Moſes, a Diſpenſation he ridicules and execrates: He profeſſes to believe the doctrines of Chriſt, tho' he rejects his gift of life and immortality; He profeſſes to believe him the Saviour of the World, tho' he laughs at the doctrine of Redemption which conſtitutes the eſſence of that character.

Well fare the New *Hiſtorian of Great Britain*; who having writ without controul againſt Miracles, and even the very Being of a God, gratefully acknowledges the bleſſing; and owns that *We now enjoy* TO THE FULL *that liberty of the Preſs which is ſo* NECESSARY *in every Monarchy confined by legal limitations* [9]. Nor is it, let me tell you, the worſt part of the obſervation, that tho' the *Monarch* ſhould be *confined by legal limitations*, yet the *Writer for the Preſs* ſhould not.

[8] Vol. iii. p. 273.

[9] *The Hiſtory of Great Britain*, Vol. i. p. 213.

It

It would be endleſs to enter into his Lordſhip's ſmall Arts of controverſy; yet it may not be amiſs to touch upon one or two of them, ſuch I mean as are of more general uſe and beſt diſpoſed for ſervice.

The firſt is, *To honour the name when you have taken away the thing:* As thus, To expreſs the higheſt devotion to GOD, when you have deprived him of his moral attributes:— the greateſt zeal for RELIGION, while you are undermining a future ſtate; — and the utmoſt reverence for REVELATION, when you have ſtript it of Miracles and Prophecies.

2. A ſecond is, *To diſhonour* Perſons *and* Opinions *the moſt reſpectable, by putting them into ill Company, or by joining them with diſcredited follies.* Thus, Divines and Atheiſts; Clarkians and Malebranchians, are well paired, and always ſhewn together: In like manner, The Propoſitions, *that the world was made for man,* and *that man was made for happineſs,* are to be boldly repreſented as inſeparable parts of the ſame Syſtem. From whence, theſe advantages follow, that if an Atheiſt be odious, a Malebranchian mad, and the propoſition of the World's being made for man, abſurd; the odium, the madneſs, and the abſurdity fall equally on the Divines, on Dr. Clarke, and on the propoſition, that man was made for happineſs.

3. A third is, *To bring the abuſe of a thing in diſcredit of the thing itſelf.* Thus the viſions of the Rabbins are made to confute JUDAISM; Popery and School-learning, to decry the diſcipline and doctrine of CHRISTIANITY; and the dreams of Malebranche, Leibnitz, and Berkeley, to confute the waking thoughts of CUDWORTH, CLARKE, WOLLASTON, and BAXTER: For his Lordſhip is juſt ſuch a Confuter of *Metaphyſics,* as that

that Man would be of *Ethics* or *Chemistry*, who should content himself with exposing the absurdities of the Stoics, and the whimsies of the Alchemists, and yet fraudulently forget that there are such Authors, as CICERO and BOERHAAVE. — To overturn a FUTURE STATE, he employs all the superstitious fables of the Poets and the People, concerning it: To discredit REVELATION, he enumerates all the Impostors, and Pretenders to revelation in all ages: And to dishonour DIVINE WORSHIP, he is very particular in describing the Rites and Ceremonies of the antient Church of Egypt, and the modern Church of Rome. In a word, you are sure to find, on these occasions, every sort of topic, but what a sober and intelligent Reader would require; *Considerations drawn from the nature of the thing itself.*

You expect, however, that when the ABUSES of things have done him this service, so as to stand, where he has placed them, for the *things themselves*, He would for once, at least, spare the AUTHORS of the abuse, if it were only for the sake of carrying on the fraud. But you expect more than you will find. His Lordship can, in the same breath, call the abuses of Revelation and the Gospel, by the names of Revelation and the Gospel, and rail at that Divine, or at that Church, which has introduced those abuses.

Thus far, for a specimen of his Lordship's *Arts of Controversy*. But as a good Mimic is commonly a bad Actor, and a good Juggler a bad Mechanic; so an artful Caviller is as often a very poor Reasoner.

You will not be surprized therefore, if, in examining his Lordship's Philosophic Character, under the several heads of his INGENUITY, his TRUTH, his CON-

CONSISTENCY, his LEARNING, and his REASONING, you find him not to make so good a figure, as in the *professed arts* of Controversy.

I. Of his INGENUITY, which comes first, I shall be very short: For his *Arts of Controversy*, of which you have had a taste, are one continued example of it.

1. Speaking of the Christians of the Apostolic age, he thus represents their character and manners. "Notwithstanding the *sanctity* of their *profession*, the "GREATEST CRIMES, even that of INCEST, were "practised amongst them [10]." Is it possible, (you ask) that his Lordship should give credit to the exploded calumnies of the Pagans and Apostates here alluded to? Think better of his sense: he alludes to no such matter. St. PAUL is his Authority: and on the Apostle's accusation he grounds his Charge. This surprises you the more. It may be so: for philosophers, as well as Poets, of a certain rank, aim at nothing but (as *Bays* expresses it) to *elevate and surprize*. Who would not conclude from this account that the first Christians began their *profession* in a total corruption of manners; and, like the Magi of old, intermarried with their Mothers and Daughters? It would never be imagined, that the simple fact, as St. Paul states it, in his first and second Epistles to the Corinthians, was but barely this, That a certain man (whether before or after his conversion, we know not) had married his Father's wife; and, on the Apostle's reprehension, convinced and ashamed of his folly, had repented and made satisfaction to the Church for the scandal he had occasioned.

[10] Vol. iv. p. 513.

2. Again,

2. Again, this *First Philosophy* tells us, that when JESUS speaks of *legions of Angels*, it is the language of *Paganism*; but when Lord BOLINGBROKE speaks of *numberless created intelligences superior to man*, it is the language of *Nature*: for, this doctrine of INTELLIGENCIES, his Lordship assures us, *is founded on what we know of actual existence. We are led to it by plain, direct, unforced* ANALOGY. But the doctrine of ANGELIC LEGIONS, if you will believe him, *stands on no other foundation, philosophically speaking, than of a* MERE POSSIBLE *existence of such spirits, as are admitted for divers* THEOLOGICAL USES [11]. But why this different measure for himself and his friends? The last words may let us into the secret. His *Philosophical Intelligencies* are a very harmless race; but the *Gospel Legions* are much given to *theological* mischief. *Ministring Angels* bring in, what he can by no means away with, a particular, and *moral* providence. God's *physical* Providence, and the *civil* Providence of the Magistrate, make the only Government he can relish. Now his *Intelligencies*, like Epicurus's Gods, are still, as they should be, at an idle end; but *Angels* are busy and meddling: indeed, too head-strong to be trusted under his Lordship's Philosophic Administration.

You cannot, however, but be pleased to find, that the method of reasoning by *Analogy*, which you had cause to believe his Lordship had totally discarded, from the hard language he has so often bestowed upon it, is brought again into favour, and now does wonders. For, it not only opens the door to his Lordship's *Intelligencies*, by a *plain, direct, and unforced* ap-

[11] Vol. iv. 179.

plication,

plication, but, as you will see under the next head, it shuts it against Jesus Christ's.

3. "I only intend to shew (says his Lordship) that "since men have not admitted, in favour of Revela- "tion, a System of PHYSICS that is inconsistent with "philosophic truth, there is no reason for admitting, "in favour of the same revelation, a System of "PNEUMATICS that is so, too [12]."

Now the Friends of Revelation say, this is a mere begging the question. The reasoning, when fairly represented, stands thus,—"Divines reject the Scripture System of PHYSICS, which THEY hold to be false, therefore, they should reject the Scripture-System of PNEUMATICS, which HIS LORDSHIP holds to be false."—— Indeed, they conceive the argument to be no better than if one should say —— because Politicians, in speaking of the first source of civil regimen, have called it the *primum mobile*, alluding to the old erroneous System of *Astronomy*; and because they have talked too of a *balance of Power*, alluding to the true principles of *Mechanics*; therefore, if we reject their System of *Astronomy*, we should reject their System of *Mechanics* likewise.

II. Thus much for this noble Philosopher's *Ingenuity*. Give me leave to lead you next and bring you to a place where you may have an advantageous view of his TRUTH, the very Soul of Philosophy.

1. "The Christian Theology (says he) has de- "rived a prophane licence from the Jewish, which "Divines have rendered so familiar and so habitual, "that Men BLASPHEME without knowing they blas-

[12] Vol. iv. p. 181.

"pheme,

" pheme, and that their very devotion is IMPIOUS. " The licence I mean is that of reaſoning and of " ſpeaking of the divine, as of the human, nature, " operations, and proceedings; ſometimes with, and " ſometimes without the ſalvo of thoſe diſtinguiſhing " epithets and forms of ſpeech, which can, in very " few inſtances, diſtinguiſh enough. The Jewiſh " Scriptures aſcribe to God, not only corporeal ap- " pearance, but corporeal action, and all the inſtru- " ments of it; eyes to ſee, ears to ear, mouth and " tongue to articulate, hands to handle, and feet to " walk. DIVINES TELL US INDEED that we are " not to underſtand all this according to the LITERAL " ſignification. The meaning is, they ſay, that God " has a power to execute all thoſe acts, to the effect- " ing of which, theſe parts, in us, are inſtrumental. " The literal ſignification is, indeed, abominable, " and the FLIMSY ANALOGICAL VEIL, thrown over " it, is ſtolen from the wardrobe of EPICURUS; for " he taught, that the Gods had not literally bodies, " but ſomething like to bodies, *quaſi corpus:* not " blood, but ſomething like to blood, *quaſi ſangui-* " *nem* [13]."

" DIVINES ſay, that God has no body nor any thing like to body, but is IMMATERIAL. EPICURUS ſaid, that his God had not a groſs earthly body, but ſomething like to that body, and was MATERIAL. Yet " Divines have ſtolen their *flimſy analogical veil* from the ward- robe of *Epicurus*." Truly a very ſubtle theft; which extracts MATTER from *figurative expreſſion!* and well ſuited to his Lordſhip's leger-de-main, which

[13] Vol. v. p. 519.

draws

draws an *analogical veil* out of a *metaphor*. Indeed, to fit it the better to *Epicurus's wardrobe*, he makes it but a *flimsy one*.

But, let us now observe, the various shifts he was reduced to, in order to support his principal calumny, that *Divines stole from Epicurus the method of explaining the nature of the Godhead*. He says, when the Jewish Scriptures had given GOD a Body, the Divines found out that it was not to be understood literally. They had been strange Divines had they not found it out, when these Scriptures declare that GOD is a SPIRIT, or *immaterial*; in contradistinction to *body* or MATTER. And the best of it is, that in other places, (as we have seen just before) his Lordship quarrels with the Scriptures on this very account, for their System of PNEUMATICS. Now what could these Divines conclude, but that where the Scriptures describe God's actions, in accommodation to the gross conceptions of men, they are to be understood figuratively. But this would not serve his Lordship's purpose; which was, to convict the Divines of nonsense and prevarication. He, therefore, turns, what every body else calls METAPHOR, which is a figure of speech, into ANALOGY, which is a mode of reasoning, — *a flimsy analogical veil:* and Epicurus's ANALOGY, (that the Gods had not earthly bodies but something like them, that is to say, *material)* he turns into a METAPHOR. *Epicurus* (says he) *taught that the Gods had not* LITERALLY *bodies*. Epicurus's question was not about literal or figurative expression; but about similar and dissimilar things.——But You have enough, You say, of this great Restorer of TRUTH, and Reformer of REA-

REASON. I will therefore be as ſhort as poſſibly I can, on this head.

2. THE JEWS (his Lordſhip tells us) SUPPOSED CRUELTY TO BE ONE OF THE ATTRIBUTES OF THE DEITY [14]. — Theſe very JEWS themſelves ſay, That *the Lord is gracious and full of compaſſion; ſlow to anger and of great mercy:* That *he is good to all; and his tender mercies are over* ALL HIS WORKS [15]: That *his mercy endureth for* EVER [16]: That *the* EARTH *is full of the goodneſs and mercy of the Lord* [17]: That *his mercy is from* EVERLASTING TO EVERLASTING [18]. --- Now, which of them will You believe?

3. "Superſtition (ſays his Lordſhip) impersonated "*Chance* under the name of FORTUNE: and this chime- "rical Divinity was ſuppoſed to direct arbitrarily all "the events, whoſe cauſes were not apparent, or "which exceeded in good or ill, the expectations of "men. The Heathens accounted, by it, for paſt "events; conſulted it about future; and referred "themſelves to it in doubtful caſes. It is ſtrange "that ſuch SUPERSTITIONS, inſtead of being confined "to the Heathen world, ſhould have been as PRE- "VALENT amongſt God's choſen People, both Jews "and Chriſtians; and ſhould be ſcarce exploded at "this hour. It is ſtranger ſtill, that a RECOURSE TO "THE DECISION OF CHANCE ſhould be expreſsly "commanded in the Old Teſtament, and occaſionally "countenanced in the New, even on ſo important an "occaſion as the election of an Apoſtle in the place "of Judas Iſcariot [19]".

[14] Vol. v. p. 507. [15] Pſ. cxlv. ver. 8, 9.
[16] Chron. Jer. Eſra, Pſalms, &c.
[17] Pſ. xxxiii. ver. 5. cxix. ver. 64.
[18] Pſ. c. ver. 5.---ciii. ver. 17. [19] Vol. iii. p. 477.

He

The assertion, you see, is, 1st, that the *Jews* and *Christians*, as well as the *Heathens*, impersonated *Chance* under the name of *Fortune:* and 2dly, that their having recourse to Lots was having recourse to the decision of *Fortune*.

As to the first, it is so remote from all truth, That the custom of the Jewish People, in referring all events to *God* and to him only and immediately, has given a handle to Spinoza, Toland, and others, to bring in question the very existence of an *extraordinary* providence in the mosaic Dispensation; in which, to observe it, by the way, and with the abhorrence it ought to excite, they have had too many Followers amongst the Divines who have written against the *Divine Legation*.

As to the second, we must consider that LOTS are of three distinct kinds.

One sort is a civil balloting; of general use in States to prevent intrigues and partialities. SORTEM *posuissent*, says Tacitus, *ne ambitioni aut inimicitiis locus foret*.

Another, is a superstitious appeal to the imaginary Deity, *Chance* or *Fortune*.

And there is yet another, which is a reference of the event to Heaven; and this, by God's own direction and appointment.

Of the second, and only reprehensible sort, Revelation, as we have just now shewn, is entirely innocent.

Of the first, his Lordship, as a Politician, will not disallow the use.

His quarrel, as a Philosopher, is with the third. And he has no way to support his charge, but by sophistically reducing it into the second; that is, representing it as having all the superstition of the second. Now in this he begs the question. —— Are the Jewish and Christian Revelations true or false? False,

ſays his Lordſhip, for ſeveral reaſons; and, amongſt the reſt, for this, they authorize the *Pagan ſuperſtition* of LOTS.—What made the Pagan ſuperſtition of Lots? Their being the inventions of men, while they pretended to be of divine appointment.---Very well: but the Jewiſh and Chriſtian Lots were of divine appointment. Pretended to be ſo, if you pleaſe, ſays his Lordſhip; and this puts them into the condition of Pagan lots.---Softly, my Lord; Your argument muſt not take that for granted, which your argument is employed to prove.

But his Lordſhip had his head full of that Maſter Sophiſm of the FIRST PHILOSOPHY, which concludes againſt the reaſon or juſtice of a DIVINE COMMISSION from the *abuſe* of it; and becauſe ſubſequent Impoſtors pretended to the like Authority. For, according to the Logic and Theology of theſe Gentlemen, GOD muſt not caſt out DEVILS, becauſe it afterwards gave a handle for Popiſh Prieſts to juggle with their *Exorciſms*. He muſt not direct a thing to be decided by LOTS, becauſe a village-conjurer would afterwards employ the *ſieve and ſhears*. He muſt not make uſe of HUMAN INSTRUMENTS in puniſhing a People abandoned to unnatural crimes, becauſe an *Arabian Impoſtor* would afterwards pretend to the like Commiſſion. He muſt not inſtitute a multifarous RITUAL, tho' it was to keep a People ſeparate, and to ſecure them from the contagion of Idolatry, becauſe wicked Prieſts or Politicians would eſtabliſh *ſuperſtitious ceremonies* to keep Communities enſlaved to civil or religious Tyrants. Theſe ſcrupulous Gentlemen, when their hand was in, had done well to tell us, that GOD ſhould not have given men Riches, Knowledge, and Power, becauſe there have been

such as CHARTRES, SPINOZA, and MULY MOLECH.

But to go on with his Lordship's *veracity*.

4. He asserts, that *they* [the Jews] *made beasts* ACCOUNTABLE LIKE MORAL AGENTS [19]. He is aware that *to mitigate this absurdity*, as he expresses it, both the Jewish and Christian Commentators say, that the pain inflicted on beasts was to shew the heinousness of human crimes---to blot out the memory of a great scandal---to punish the owner for his negligence. But he despises all these solutions, as so many pitiful evasions. Would you believe now that in the same breath, and merely to shew his reading, he should confute his own false assertion? *I know nothing more absurd* (says he) *than this, except a custom or law at* ATHENS. *The* WEAPONS *by which a murder had been committed were brought into Court; as if they, too, were liable to punishment; and the* STATUE *that had killed a man by it's fall, was, by a solemn sentence of that wise people, the Thasii, founded on a Law of* DRACO, *cast into the sea.* Now what was his Lordship to prove? That Moses was so ignorant a Law-giver, and the Jews so stupid a people, that *they made beasts accountable like moral agents.* And he illustrates it by a law of the most celebrated Legislator and of the politest People upon Earth, Draco and the Athenians; who, just in the same manner, made even *weapons and statues, moral agents.* The Athenians and Draco perhaps would have said, that they enacted these laws to shew their abhorrence of murder, and to punish the careless erecter of a statue. Mere SHIFTS AND EVASIONS, says his Lordship.

[19] Vol. v. p. 7.

But what I chiefly wonder at is, that when his Lordſhip was in ſo good a train, he had not told us, that the Stupidity of theſe *Jews* went ſtill further, even to imagine *Walls* and *Garments* [1] ſubject to human Diſeaſes. Here he would have had a little truth on his ſide, and a much better ſubject for his contempt. This is only a word to the Wiſe, and for his Followers to improve upon. Let them try what they can make of it, and then they may hear further of this matter.

5. Again, "God (ſays his Lordſhip) was FORCED "to indulge the Jews in ſeveral SUPERSTITIOUS "prejudices [2], as learned Divines *ſcruple not* to "affirm." Had *learned Divines* no more *ſcruples* in *affirming*, than his Lordſhip, I ſhould hardly have thought them worth a defence.

What they *ſcruple not* to ſay is this—That IDOLATROUS WORSHIP was never ſo entirely corrupt, but that ſome of it's Rites were ſtill rational, or, at leaſt, continued innocent; and might be uſed in the ſervice of the true God *without ſuperſtition:* That the Iſraelites being fond of Egyptian ceremonies, God indulged them in the uſe of ſuch as were harmleſs; and of no other. For this, his Lordſhip calls them, *bold Judges of the principles and views of God's proceedings* [3]. But in what does their temerity conſiſt? In teaching that God always chuſes to take the ordinary means, before the extraordinary, when either may be made indifferently to ſerve his purpoſe. And that, therefore, he ſaw fit to indulge the Jews in their fondneſs for old habits; and to turn their propenſities for the Egyptian Rites, upon ſuch only as were innocent; rather than to

[1] Levit. chap. xiv. [2] Vol. iv. p. 30. [3] P. 32.

give

give them new habits, and new propenſities, by a miraculous impreſſion on their minds, which ſhould over-rule their wills and affections.

6. WE KNOW (ſays his Lordſhip) THAT ALL THEIR [the Jews] SACRED WRITINGS WERE COMPILED AFTER THEIR CAPTIVITY [4]. Balzac ſpeaks of a certain Critic who uſed to boaſt, that no body, beſides God and himſelf, knew the meaning of ſuch or ſuch a verſe in Perſius. His Lordſhip's [WE KNOW] is juſt ſuch another revelation. Only the Critic's meaning might be true; but the Philoſopher's knowledge is certainly falſe. A falſehood ſo notorious, that I am in ſome doubt whether this ſtricture belong properly to his dogmatic or to his laconic ſtyle. For *we know*, may ſignify--*We know that the* SPURIOUS ESDRAS *ſays ſo*. And then he gets the two things he moſt wanted; a very uſeful Truth, and a very noble Authority.

7. "The Juſtice, [of the great day] (ſays his "Lordſhip) IF IT MAY BE CALLED JUSTICE, moſt "certainly requires that rewards and puniſhments "ſhould be meaſured out, in every particular caſe, in "proportion to the merit and demerit of each indivi-"dual. But inſtead of this, it is aſſumed, conform-"ably to the doctrine of PLATO, that the righteous "are ſet on the *right hand* of the Judge, and the "wicked, on the *left*; from whence, they are tranſ-"ported into Heaven, or plunged into Hell. They "are tried *individually*, they SEEM to be rewarded "or puniſhed *collectively*, without any diſtinction of the "particular caſes, which have been ſo ſolemnly deter-"mined, and without any proportion obſerved be-

[4] Vol. iv. p. 339.

" tween the various degrees of merit and demerit, of " innocence and guilt, in the application of these re- " wards and punishments [5]."

If it may be called Justice---Marry, well thought of. For who knows but as this is the general day of reckoning, and that men see, such a day will be wanted, rather than be without any, they might be foolish enough to take up with this? ---*They seem to be rewarded or punished collectively.* Should I seriously quote the Words of Jesus, --- *The servant which knew his Lord's will, neither did according to his will, shall be beaten with many stripes. But he, that knew not, and did commit things worthy of stripes, shall be beaten with few stripes* [6]; Should I seriously, I say, quote these words, to confute the noble Writer's observation, that men at the great Tribunal *seem to be rewarded or punished collectively*, he would, I suppose, have been amongst the first to laugh at my simplicity; at least, the intelligent Reader would not thank me for my diligence.

III. I proceed now to his Lordship's CONSISTENCY; the next feature in his philosophic Countenance. You have seen with what bravery he contradicts all others; you shall now see with what greater bravery, he contradicts himself.

There be two things which characterise the reasoning part of his Lordship's writings, (if any part of so declamatory a work can be called *reasoning*) and distinguish them from all other men's; His incessant REPETITIONS, and his incessant CONTRA-

[5] Vol. v. p. 495. [6] Luke xii. 47, 48.

DICTIONS,

DICTIONS. Indeed, these beauties beget one another. For when a Writer can furnish out no better an entertainment than a parcel of groundless flams, he will be much subject to repetition; and every repetition as likely to be graced with a variation; for his Tales having neither foundation in Fact, nor measure in Truth, what is produced for admiration, will be always new modeling for convenience, as best suits his present passions and purposes.

His REPETITIONS I leave for the refreshment of those who are disposed to read him through: This short specimen of his CONTRADICTIONS I propose for the amusement of more cursory readers.

But as *professed Answerers* never abuse our patience and understandings more than in this kind of discoveries; it may not be amiss, to say a word or two of a species of confutation, which such men are always ready to urge, on the very slightest grounds, for the convenience which attends it; the convenience of making an Author confute himself, when the Answerer is unable so to do.

Sometimes the imaginary inconsistence arises out of the slow conception or cloudy apprehension, of the Answerer, when the Author is too brief or too refined: sometimes from the less accurate expression of the Author, when the Answerer is too subtile or too captious. It sometimes arises from the Answerer's prejudices; and sometimes again from the Author's prevarication.

Nay, which is stranger still, the very exactness of the distinctions, and correctness of the terms, (and the corrector and exacter they will be in proportion to the Author's knowledge of words and things) the

more ſhall the diſcourſe abound with theſe fancied contradictions. For a heavy or a precipitate Anſwerer will never be able to diſtinguiſh things SIMILAR from things IDENTICAL.

Prejudice for a ſet of Opinions may make an Anſwerer miſtake ſome things to be in Nature, what they are only in the combinations of the Schools; and finding them conſidered differently, that is, under other aſſociations, by his Adverſary, who may have no prejudices, or prejudices of another kind, he will be extreme ready to call theſe differences, by the more commodious name of *contradictions*.

Laſtly, the Author, if he be a FREETHINKER, has a right by ancient cuſtom [7] to two or three, or indeed, to two or three dozen of Characters, as may beſt ſuit his purpoſe, or errand: A practice, which, being begun amongſt us Moderns, under a want of Liberty, was continued out of Licentiouſneſs, and is ſtill kept up for the ſake of it's Conveniencies. Now if ſuch a One be too lazy to aſſume a perſonated Character in form, then, (as Lord Shaftſbury obſerves) *a dull kind of* IRONY *which amuſes all alike*, becomes his favorite figure of ſpeech. But with ſuch a Writer, an inattentive or plain-dealing Anſwerer may give himſelf much trouble, to collect his contradictions, and all, to be well laughed at for his pains.

I have honeſtly marked out theſe various deluſions, that You may have it in your power to detect me, ſhould I be tempted to impoſe upon You, myſelf. Not that I claim much merit from this fair dealing; for his Lordſhip's contradictions are ſo groſs and

[7] See CELSUS and PORPHYRY.

ſub-

ſubſtantial, ſo frequent and obvious, that I was under no temptation to make out my ſpecimen by any thing doubtful or ambiguous.

1. "I could not (ſays his Lordſhip) have diſcover-
"ed, as NEWTON did, that *univerſal law* of corpo-
"real Nature, which he has demonſtrated. But fur-
"ther than that, he could go no more than I; nor
"diſcover the ACTION OF THE FIRST CAUSE, BY
"WHICH THIS LAW WAS IMPOSED ON ALL BO-
"DIES, AND IS MAINTAINED IN THEM [8]." Here he owns ATTRACTION not to be a REAL or eſſential, PROPERTY OF MATTER, but *the action of the firſt cauſe* upon it. Yet in another place he obſerves, that "ATTRACTION MAY BE, notwithſtanding all the "SILLY abſtract reaſoning to the contrary, A REAL "PROPERTY OF MATTER [9]." The truth is that, for any thing his Lordſhip knew of this *univerſal Law*, Attraction might be Action, Paſſion, Magic, or the Man in the Moon. He only followed his Leaders. Mr. COLLINS diſplayed the ſame Philoſophic ſpirit in ſpeaking of *gravity*, the effect of Attraction: And CLARKE's animadverſion on him will exactly ſuit his Lordſhip.—"Not content to "have erred ſo very groſsly in the firſt foundation of "all natural Philoſophy; you could not forbear pro-"feſſing further, that *you have often admired that* "GRAVITATION *ſhould be eſteemed a matter of ſuch dif-*"*ficulty amongſt Philoſophers; and that you think it to* "*be ſo evident and neceſſary an effect of matter in con-*"*ſtant motion perpetually ſtriking one part againſt an-*"*other, that you wonder every body ſhould not ſee it.* I

[8] Vol. iv. p. 8. [9] Vol. iii. p. 547.

"ſuppoſe the reſt of the world will no leſs *admire* at "*you*, for imagining that, by ſo ſlight an admiration "you could at once ſet aſide all the propoſitions in "that moſt excellent book [the *Principia* of New-"ton] wherein it is made appear by ſtrictly mathe-"cal demonſtrations, drawn from the Laws of mo-"tion, now agreed on by Mathematicians, and "eſtabliſhed by experiments, and from the Phæno-"mena of the heavenly bodies; that the preſent "operations of nature, depending upon gravitation, "cannot poſſibly be mechanical effects of *matter in* "*conſtant motion perpetually ſtriking one part againſt an-*"*other*. — Upon the whole, all that you have ad-"vanced about *gravitation* is ſuch marvellous reaſon-"ing, to be made uſe of in the preſent age, after ſo "many great diſcoveries, founded upon experience, "and even mathematical demonſtration; that tho' I "have no cauſe at all to be diſpleaſed with you for "arguing in ſuch a manner; yet, I believe, your "readers cannot but think you might very well have "forborn going out of your way, to give ſo very "diſadvantageous a repreſentation *of your own* Phi-"loſophy [10]."

2. In one place, his Lordſhip tells us, *that the right of the Iſraelites to the Land of Canaan was founded on the* PROPHECY *of Noah:* in another, that *it was founded on the* PROMISE *to Abraham*, Second thoughts are beſt. He ſeems to come a little nearer the truth here. For tho' a *Promiſe* may intitle to a poſſeſſion, I do not ſee how a *Propheſy* can do more

[10] Clarke's third defence of the immateriality and natural immortality of the Soul, againſt Collins.

than

than foretel one: Unleſs his Lordſhip has ſome ethical engine of a new invention, to extend the grounds of *Obligation*, unknown to GROTIUS, SELDEN, and CUMBERLAND; yet they travelled for it; and, if we may believe his Lordſhip's account of their famous *Journey to Paris*, ſpared for no room in laying foundations. But, in this affair of the PROMISE, his Lordſhip *inſinuates* an untruth; which is a great deal meaner than to *tell* one: For he repreſents the favour as capricious, arbitrary, and without any reaſon aſſigned.

3. "The Jews (ſays his Lordſhip) as often as "they made God deſcend from Heaven, and as much "as they made him reſide on earth, were *far from* "*cloathing him with corporeity*, and imputing corpo-"real vices to him [11]." Yet two or three pages forward, ſo prevalent is his luſt of abuſe, that he expreſsly ſays, *they* DID *cloath him with* CORPOREITY. Theſe are his words: "The Jewiſh Scriptures aſcribe "to God not only corporeal appearance, but corpo-"real action, and all the inſtruments of it; eyes to "ſee, ears to hear, mouth and tongue to articulate, "hands to handle, and feet to walk [12]." You will ſay, perhaps, that his Lordſhip meant, the Scriptures indeed aſcribed all this to God; but in a figurative, not in a literal, ſenſe. I would have ſaid ſo too, but that his Lordſhip goes on rating the Divines for underſtanding this ſcripture-repreſentation in a figurative ſenſe. Which, too, he ſhews does not mend the matter; for this figurative ſenſe, it ſeems, was ſtolen from Epicurus. Now we know that Epicurus

[11] Vol. v. p. 515. [12] P. 519.

certainly believed the Gods to be CORPOREAL, if he believed any, tho' made of ſomewhat a finer ſtuff than mere mortal bodies. "Divines (ſays his Lord-"ſhip) tell us indeed, that we are not to underſtand "all this according to the literal ſignification, &c. "But this *flimſy theological veil* thrown over the literal "ſignification is ſtolen from the wardrobe of Epicu-"rus [13]." His Lordſhip's wardrobe ſeems to be as rich as Epicurus's, in VEILS: a little after, we have a very curious one, *a thin and trite* VEIL *of analogy:* and he is ready to lend them to Divines, as Lucullus did his Cloaks to the Players, by the dozen.

But whenever his Lordſhip ſpeaks of CHRISTIANITY, a kind of fatality attends him; and then his contradictions have neither ſtop nor meaſure.

4. Speaking of the *laſt Supper*, he ſays, "The "perſon by whom it was inſtituted is repreſented "ſometimes under images, that render it impoſſible "to frame any, of the EFFICACY, or even of the "INSTITUTION of this Sacrament. Chriſt is a *vine*, "he is a *rock*, nay he is a *coat*, according to St. "Paul," &c. [14]. And yet no further off than four pages, he ſays, "There is no one [figura-"tive expreſſion] perhaps in the whole Goſpel, leſs "liable to any equivocal ſenſe than that which "Chriſt employed when he ſaid, *This is my body*, and "*This is my blood*, in the very act of giving bread and "wine to his Diſciples, who were at ſupper with him, "juſt before his death, for a remembrance of which, "this ceremony of a ſupper was then inſtituted by

[13] P. 519. [14] Vol. iv. p. 592.

"him.

" him. The figure was eaſy, the application natu-
" ral, and they could not underſtand the expreſſion
" literally [15]."

His Lordſhip, as you may well think, has often different purpoſes to ſerve by his contradictions. Here his purpoſe is one and the ſame; to diſcredit a Goſpel-Inſtitution: which is equally done by ſhewing it to be myſterious, obſcure, and incomprehenſible, where it pretends to clearneſs and preciſion; and low, trite, and mean, where it pretends to ſomething auguſt, peculiar, and in the higheſt degree efficacious. All the fault in this caſe, except his Lordſhip's moſt profound ignorance of the nature of the Rite, [16], is his bringing theſe two curious obſervations ſo near to one another.

5. " Chriſtianity [ſays his Lordſhip] as the Sa-
" viour publiſhed it, was full and ſufficient to all the
" purpoſes of it. It's ſimplicity and plainneſs ſhewed
" that it was deſigned to be the religion of mankind,
" and manifeſted likewiſe the divinity of it's origi-
" nal [17]." This is very gracious. Yet the Scene changes with his Lordſhip's humour: and the *ſimplicity* and *plainneſs* now become *dark*, *ambiguous* and *incomprehenſible*. " That there are many ambiguous
" expreſſions, many dark ſayings, in the Goſpel;
" MANY DOCTRINES, which reaſon could never have
" taught, nor is able to comprehend, now they are
" taught, cannot be denied [18]."

[15] P. 596.

[16] See what is ſaid of it, in the xth diſcourſe, *on the principles of Nat. and Rev. Religion*, preached at Lincoln's Inn.

[17] Vol. iv. p. 450. [18] Vol. iv. p. 318.

But

But let him recover his temper, and Chriſtianity brightens up with it, and we once again ſee it reſtored to his good graces. "The ſyſtem of Religion "(ſays he) which Chriſt publiſhed, and his Evange- "liſts recorded, is a compleat ſyſtem to all the pur- "poſes of true Religion, natural and revealed. It "contains all the duties of the former, it enforces "them by aſſerting the *divine* Miſſion of the Pu- "bliſher, who proved his aſſertion at the ſame time "by his *miracles* [19]." But it is only reſtored to be as ſuddenly depoſed. It's birth is ſo far from being *divine*, that he inſinuates it to be *ſpurious*, and neither better nor worſe than a kind of Baſtard-Platoniſm. "It is aſtoniſhing to obſerve the ſtrange conformity "between PLATONISM and GENUINE CHRISTIA- "NITY itſelf, ſuch as it is taught in the original "Goſpel. We need not ſtand to compare them "here: Particular inſtances of conformity will oc- "cur often enough. In general, the *Platonic* and "*Chriſtian* Syſtems have a very near reſemblance, "QUALIS DECET ESSE SORORUM [20]." He then goes on to ſhew, that the common Parent of both was not REASON but ENTHUSIASM.

Enthuſiaſm, you will ſay, is now fairly brought to bed of twins, PLATONISM and CHRISTIANITY. No ſuch matter. *Genuine Chriſtianity was taught of God* [1]. — "As it ſtands in the Goſpel it contains a "compleat ſyſtem of Religion: it is in truth the "ſyſtem of natural Religion [2]." Well then, we ſhall hear no more of this *ſiſterly reſemblance* to *Platoniſm*. Perhaps not. But you ſhall hear, and

[19] Vol. iv. p. 314.
[1] Vol. iv. p. 348-9.
[20] Vol. iv. p. 340.
[2] Vol. iv. p. 316.

that

that ſoon too, of as good a thing. This Chriſtianity is at laſt found to be derived from JUDAISM; that very JUDAISM, which, he had told us, was it ſelf raiſed on THEFT and MURDER — "On the Religion of the "Jews, and on the Authority of their Scriptures, "Chriſtianity was founded [2]." Again, "They "who prefer the example and doctrine of CHRIST to "thoſe of PAUL, will find reaſon to think that the Meſ- "ſiah intended rather to reform and to graft upon Ju- "daiſm, than to aboliſh it [3]." And again; He accuſes PAUL for preaching a *new Goſpel*, called by the Apoſtle, *my Goſpel:* And this new, or peculiar Goſpel, his Lordſhip tells us *was the Myſtery of God's purpoſe to* TAKE IN THE GENTILES, *ſo* INCONSISTENT *with the declarations and practice of* JESUS [4]. Yet for all this, had Chriſt's Goſpel "been propagated with the ſame ſimplicity with "which it was originally taught by CHRIST, it "would (he tells us) have been to the unſpeakable "benefit of MANKIND [5]."

Let us now ſum up his Lordſhip's Inſtructions to his Diſciples, concerning the GOSPEL OF JESUS. "It is ſimple, clear, and of divine original:" But it is, at the ſame time, "dark, ambiguous, incompre- "henſible; and like it's Siſter Platoniſm, the Iſſue of "Enthuſiaſm."—As Jeſus publiſhed it, the Goſpel is a *compleat Syſtem of Natural Religion*, and tends to the unſpeakable *benefit of mankind:* But as Jeſus publiſhed it, the Goſpel was only a *reform* of that Impoſture *Judaiſm*, on which it was *founded*, and was intended

[2] Vol. iv. p. 317.
[3] Vol. iv. p. 350.
[4] Vol. iv. p. 323.
[5] Vol. iv. p. 316.

by

by Jesus to be *confined to the Jewish People*; it being PAUL, who, in direct contradiction to the declarations and the practises of Jesus, turned it into a compleat System of Natural Religion, and made it tend to the *unspeakable benefit of mankind*, by extending it to the Gentiles." And thus he goes on contradicting his own assertions, as fast as he advances them, from one end of his ESSAYS to the other.

The same self-contradictions, which confute his calumnies against Christianity itself, still follow him when he comes to speak of the PROPAGATORS of Christianity.

6. " He [says this noble Lord] who compares " the Epistles of JAMES, of PETER, and JOHN, such " as we have them, with those of PAUL, and all " these with the doctrines of the GOSPEL, will be " perhaps of my opinion; at least he will have no " ground to say of the THREE FIRST, that they " were authors of NEW GOSPELS, as he will have " grounds to say of the last, and as the last does in " effect say of himself [6]." What was this *new Gospel?* It was, as we have seen just before, *the Mystery of God's purpose to take in the Gentiles.* JAMES, PETER, and JOHN, therefore, according to his Lordship, taught not this Mystery; so inconsistent, as he says, with the declarations and practice of Jesus. Yet soon after he confesses, that JAMES, PETER and JOHN, did teach this Mystery, and forsook CHRIST's for PAUL's NEW GOSPEL. For, speaking of the Council of Jerusalem, he says, *The* APOSTLES had *given no directions to insist that the* GENTILES *should or*

[6] Vol. iv. p. 320.

should

ſhould not, ſubmit to circumciſion, and to the yoaks of the Law [7]: Which neceſſarily implies a conceſſion that THEY too were Authors of this new Goſpel, the *Myſtery of God's purpoſe to take in the Gentiles.* The taking in the Gentiles, we ſee, he ſuppoſes a thing agreed on by all the Apoſtles: and that, what was yet undone, was the ſettling the preciſe *terms* of their admiſſion.

Our Unbelievers look ſo monſtrouſly aſquint upon Religion, that prejudice with oppoſite rays is always diſturbing and confounding it's own malignant aims. Yet, in general, it requires pains to fix the contradictions which ſpring out of theſe fugutive croſs lights. Commend me therefore to his Lordſhip, who brings his contradictions to a point; and requires nothing of you but eye-ſight to ſee them in their full glare.

His *pro* and *con* then, being ſo near neighbours, we ſhall not be ſurprized to find them at laſt incorporated, as it were, into one another! as in the following inſtances.

7. "I much DOUBT [ſays his Lordſhip] whether "the EVANGELISTS would underſtand the Epiſtles "of ST. PAUL, THO' ONE OF THEM WAS HIS "SCRIBE [8]."—It was ſaid of ſomebody, that he *believed againſt hope:* a matter of much mirth to our *firſt Philoſophy-Men.* But what is that, to his Lordſhip's greater ſtrength of mind, who can doubt againſt certainty! PAUL and LUKE agreed to preach the Goſpel together: and not only ſo, but that LUKE's pen ſhould be employed to convey their common ſen-

[7] Vol. iv. p. 324. [8] Vol. iv. p. 202.

timents,

timents, and adventures, to Poſterity. And yet he queſtions whether LUKE underſtood PAUL's EPISTLES. Some body, I ſuppoſe, when he had pened this *doubt*, might tell him, that one of theſe Evangeliſts was Paul's Companion, his Amanuenſis and Hiſtorian. But the obſervation was too good to be thrown away; he therefore adds, with infinite dexterity and addreſs —— *tho' one of them was his Scribe.*

8. Again, Speaking of the MORAL ATTRIBUTES, he obſerves, "We make God ſo much a copy of "man, that we deſign the worſt, as well as the beſt "of our own features, if I may ſo ſay, in our re-"preſentations of him: and, as common as it is, "no unprejudiced thinking man can hear, without "aſtoniſhment, our *perfections* and our *imperfections* "imputed to the divine Being in the ſame breath, "and by the ſame men; with this difference at moſt, "that the former are imputed directly, and the lat-"ter ſometimes under the THIN AND TRITE VEIL "OF ANALOGY. In a Being thus conſtituted, they "may well imagine that the moral virtues are the "ſame as they are in our ideas: and Theology may "eaſily deduce, from his attributes, the characters "Theology has given them [9]."

We cannot, ſays his Lordſhip, *without aſtoniſhment ſee our perfections and our imperfections imputed to the divine Being.* His aſtoniſhment is all a flam. His very words prove that he well knew *imperfections are not imputed.* For when he thus boldly affirms, *they are*, he was ſo twitched in conſcience, that he was forced to add, *under the thin and trite veil of analogy:* That is, *not imputed.* For when Scripture

[9] Vol. v. p. 89.

ſpeaks

ſpeaks of *the out-ſtretched arm of God, and his all-ſeeing eye*, does it impute *arms* and *eyes* to God, in the ſenſe it imputes *juſtice* and *goodneſs* to him? Yes, ſays he—*under the thin* and *trite veil of analogy*: i. e. *Not* in the ſame ſenſe. As if we ſhould ſay, His Lordſhip AFFIRMS under the *thin and trite veil of a* DENIAL.

This, Sir, is a very ſcanty ſpecimen of his Lordſhip's CONTRADICTIONS. Yet no man appears to be more ſenſible of the diſgrace which contradictions bring upon a Writer. For, ſpeaking of the whole COLLEGE OF APOSTLES, he ſays, *Theſe inconſiſtent Writers talk often a different language on the ſame ſubject; and* CONTRADICT *in one place what they have ſaid in another* [10].

IV. His Lordſhip's profound LEARNING comes next to be conſidered.

1. The firſt inſtance I ſhall give is fetched from the very penetralia of the *firſt Philoſophy*. "HUMAN "knowledge is ſo entirely and ſolely derived from "actual BEING, that, without actual Being, we "ſhould not have EVEN ONE of thoſe ſimple ideas, "whereof all the complex and abſtract notions that "TURN OUR HEADS are compoſed [11]."

Here, his Lordſhip cried ευρηκα, and ſhould have ſacrificed a Bull for his diſcovery: which informs us of no leſs a truth than this, that *if Men had had no Being they would have had no ſenſation*: in other words, that *qualities* cannot exiſt without a *ſubſtance*: For if, by *actual Being* he did not take in the Thinker's own, the obſervation is falſe: a rational Being, tho' exiſting ſingly, will have yet the idea of his own exiſtence.

[10] Vol. iv. p. 489. [11] Vol. iii. p. 411.

But

But the obſervation is every way extraordinary. He ſuppoſes our *ſimple* ideas to be real; he ſuppoſes our *complex* and *abſtract* notions to be compounded of the *ſimple* ideas; and yet he ſuppoſes that the compoſition has TURNED OUR HEADS. 'Till now, I underſtood it was *fantaſtic*, and not *real* knowledge, which *turned men's heads*. But I forget; His Lordſhip found the *whole World in a frenzy*; and then indeed it is hardly worth while to enquire what ſet them a going.

2. "The PAGANS [ſays his Lordſhip] do not appear to have interpolated the antient *Doctors* of "Paganiſm; nor is there any pretence to ſay that "THEY have impoſed any ſpurious books on the "world, under the name of thoſe *Doctors* [12]."

ORPHEUS and MERCURIUS TRISMEGISTUS were certainly *Pagan Doctors*, if ever there were any: And did his Lordſhip never hear, that the Books, Hymns, and Poems under their names, which are come down to us from times preceeding Chriſtianity, were Pagan forgeries? I will not inſiſt upon the SIBYLLINE ORACLES, which CICERO aſſures us had been interpolated, (for the Pagans interpolated their very forgeries) becauſe I do not know to what conditions his Lordſhip confines the *Doctorate* in the pagan World, or whether he admits the fair Sex to the honour of the Hood. However, let us not think him ſo unlearned as not to have heard of theſe forgeries. He had both heard of them, and conſidered them well: And as he is always for putting the ſaddle on the right horſe (as where he loads Divines with *atheiſm*) he charges all theſe iniquities on the CHRIS-

[12] Vol. iv. p. 195.

TIANS.

TIANS. "It was, says he, to promote the Opinion, "that all the Mysteries of their [the Christian's] Re- "ligion, had been revealed by the writings of *Pa- "gan Philosophers* many centuries before Christ, that "so many books were forged under the names of "*Mercurius Trismegistus*, of *Hystaspes*, of the SIBYLS, "and perhaps of others." We are got a good way towards Doctorating these old Women: They are become *Philosophers*, we see.—But whether the Christians were the *only* forgers of *Sibylline Oracles* must be left to be decided between Tully and his Lordship. The truth is, and who, that understands Antiquity, ever doubted of it! that some paganized Christians learnt this trade of forging Books, under antient names, from those whose Superstition they had left, but not that Spirit of imposture which supported it.

3. "The [greek] Historians, says his Lordship, "observing how fond their countrymen were of "those who writ Fables, turned History into Ro- "mance; and studied to make their relations mar- "vellous and agreeable, with little regard to truth, "in which they were encouraged, AFTER ALEX- "ANDER'S EXPEDITION INTO ASIA, by the DIF- "FICULTY of disproving any thing they said of "countries so remote [13]." A vulgar man, and one of those his Lordship calls, Pedants, would have said, — BEFORE ALEXANDER'S EXPEDITION: because the *difficulty* in a great measure ceased AFTER that Conqueror had opened, and his Successors had kept open, a communication with those *remote countries*.

[13] Vol. iv. p. 137--8.

4. He

4. He calls Ariſtotle's Logic, "the rules of a "Dialectic that ſeemed to prove, and DID PROVE "indifferently either in favor of truth or error [14]." Exaggeration is his Lordſhip's favorite figure of ſpeech: but here it ſeems puſhed a little too far; for, not content with ſaying that Ariſtotle's *rules of ſyllogizing* (for that is what he means by the *rules of a dialectic*) *ſeemed to prove*, he will needs add, and DID PROVE. Which ſhews ſuch a knowledge of Syllogiſm, as needed not the following words to ſet it off. "It muſt not (ſays he) be imagined, that "he who reaſons, or ſeems, rather, to reaſon cloſely "and conſequentially, has therefore truth always "on his ſide [15]." I deſire to know who ever thought he had, who did not miſtake, as his Lordſhip here ſeems to do, the art of *ranging* arguments, for the Art of *finding* them? "No body, his *Maſter* "*Locke* would tell him, can hinder, but that SYLLO-"GISM, which was intended for the ſervice of truth, "will ſometimes be made uſe of, againſt it. But it is "NEVERTHELESS on TRUTH'S SIDE, AND AL-"WAYS TURNS UPON THE ADVERSARIES OF "IT [16]."

5. Speaking of *Angels*, his Lordſhip thinks fit to hazard this Obſervation: "There is another cauſe "of this PNEUMATICAL MADNESS, [the belief of "ſuch Beings] the fondneſs of making *man* paſs for "one of thoſe Beings that participated of the *divine* "*Nature*. This had long poſſeſſed the heathen The-

[14] Vol. iv. p. 158. [15] P. 159.

[16] Second Letter to the Bp. of Worceſter, p. 31--2. 8vo. Ed. 1697.

iſts,

"ists; and IT POSSESSED THE CHRISTIANS WITH "MORE ADVANTAGE [17]."

This seems a demonstration that his Lordship either never read, or at least never understood, an antient Apologist. The truth is, there was not one extravagance in all Paganism, which afforded so much advantage to the primitive Christians, as this fond opinion of the antient Philosophers, that the human Soul was *a part or portion of the divine nature*; nor was there any, which they were more solicitous, and for a very important reason, [18] to expose: They laboured, indeed, with so much warmth, and sometimes with so little discretion, that it hath given a handle for some learned moderns to pretend, that all the antient Fathers believed the *natural mortality of the Soul* [19]. Well, but if the Christians were not *possessed with this fondness*, his Lordship will shew you, at least, they might have been possessed with it, and *to more advantage* too. But this part of his Lordship's philosophic Character, his *Argumentation*, I am not yet come to. However, as we are now upon the borders of it, you may not think it amiss to have it ushered in with this curious reason, which is to shew, that the impious notion of the human Soul's *participating of the divine nature*, *possessed*, or at least *might have possessed*, the Christians with *more advantage*, than it did the heathen Theists. Now, what do you think it is? You will hardly guess. It is, because *Christians are wont to* ASSUME *that man is compounded of body and* SOUL [20].

[17] Vol. iv. p. 478.
[18] See *Div. Leg.* Vol. i. part ii. p. 206. last Edit.
[19] See Dodwell on this Subject.
[20] Vol. iv. p. 478.

Well

Well, it must needs be allowed, that till we *assume*, man has a *Soul*, we can never be *possessed* with an opinion that his Soul participates of the divine Nature. So much then is admitted, that since Christians hold, *man is composed of soul and body*, they may be *possessed with advantage*. But how it should be with *more advantage*, than the Heathens, I cannot comprehend. Did not the Heathens as well as Christians hold that man was composed of soul and body? We need not, I think, any other proof than this notion of *participation*, imputed to them: For they could not, sure, be so absurd to hold that *nothing might participate of something*. However, of this I will not be over-positive, since his Lordship tells us, they all laboured under an incurable PNEUMATICAL MADNESS.

V. Such an escape of his Lordship's Logic, must needs awaken us to expect great things from this last capital accomplishment of the *Philosopher*, his ART OF REASONING: to which, we are now arrived.

1. He will prove against LOCKE, that *the notion of Spirit involves more difficulty or obscurity in it than the notion of body*. Nay, he says *he will* MAKE LOCKE PROVE THIS AGAINST HIMSELF, *that we have more and clearer primary ideas belonging to body than we have of those belonging to immaterial spirit*. And thus he argues, "Primary ideas are the ideas of such qualities as exist always in the substance to which they "belong, whether they are perceived or no. They "are therefore essential to it, and productive, by their "operations, of those secondary qualities which may "be said only to exist in our perceptions of them. "Of the first sort are solidity and extension, to men-

"tion

" tion no others, the primary qualities, and, in our " ideas the eſſence of Matter, of which we can frame " no conception excluſively of them. THESE NOTIONS " I HAVE TAKEN FROM MR. LOCKE, and they lead " me to aſk what the primary ideas are of ſpirit or " immaterial ſubſtance? The Primary idea, or the " eſſence of it, is THOUGHT; as body is the *extended*, " this is the thinking ſubſtance, SAYS DES CARTES. " THOUGHT then, ACTUAL THOUGHT, is the eſſence " of the ſoul or ſpirit, and, by conſequence, ſo inſe- " parable from it, that we cannot conceive the Soul " or Spirit to exiſt ſeparately from, or excluſively of, " thought. But this I know to be untrue: and I may " well own, ſince Locke has owned the ſame, that I " have *one of thoſe dull Souls that does not perceive itſelf* " *always to contemplate ideas* [1]."

You will naturally ſuſpect him of foul play, when you find him employing the language of one Philoſopher, to confute the ſentiment of another. He is confuting LOCKE's aſſertion concerning the equal evidence of the primary qualities of *Body* and *Spirit*; and he takes DES CARTES's DEFINITION of the primary qualities of *Spirit*, to make good his point. In plain truth, he puts the change upon us: he uſes *thought*, or *actual thinking*, for the *faculty of thinking*. It is this laſt, which is *eſſential* to the ſoul, and inſeparable from it: It is this laſt, which being a *power*, is fitly predicated of an *Agent*; as *extenſion*, which is a *property*, is fitly predicated of a *Patient*. It is this laſt, which Locke underſtood to be the *primary idea of a ſpirit or immaterial ſubſtance*, when he ſaid that *the no-*

[1] Vol. iii. p. 516---11.

tion of Spirit involves no more difficulty nor obscurity in it than that of body: And it is this last, of which it may be truly said, that *we cannot conceive the soul or spirit to exist separately from, or exclusively of it.*

2. His Lordship owns, that *it is above humanity to comprehend that virtue, whatever it be, whereby one Being acts upon another, and becomes a cause.* "Whatever "knowledge (says he) we acquire of *apparent causes*, "we can acquire none of *real causality:* by which, "I mean, that force, that power, that virtue, what- "ever it be, by which one Being ACTS on another, "and becomes a cause. We may call this by diffe- "rent names, according to the different effects of it; "but to know it in its first principles, to know the "nature of it, would be *to know as God himself knows*, "and therefore this will be always unknown to us *in* "*causes that seem to be most under our inspection*, as well "as in those that are the most remote from it [2]."

Would you believe, now, that it was but just before, in this very *Essay*, that for want of this knowledge, (which yet to affect even *in causes that seem to be most under our inspection*, would be to affect *knowing as God himself knows*) he denies the SOUL to be a substance distinct from body. "They (says he) who "hold the hypothesis of two distinct substances MUST "EXPLAIN in some tolerable manner, *which they* "*have not yet done*, the union and MUTUAL ACTION "ON ONE ANOTHER, of unextended and extended Be- "ings, or else deny the absolute existence of any "thing extrinsical to the mind [3]." That is, those who hold the hypothesis of two distinct Substances

[2] Vol. iii. p. 551. [3] Vol. iii. p. 521, 2.

muſt either do that which he holds no Being but the Omniſcient can do; or they muſt run mad; or (which I think is ſomething worſe) they muſt give themſelves up to his Lordſhip's guidance.

He employs the ſame arms to combat INSPIRATION; and with the ſame advantage. The Notion of *Inſpiration* is idle and viſionary, becauſe "He has "*no more conception of this ſuppoſed* ACTION *of the divine*, "*on the human mind*, than he has of the inſpiration by "which the Holy Ghoſt proceeds from the Father "and Son, according to the deciſion of the council "of Florence." That is, he rejects *Inſpiration* becauſe he does not comprehend that virtue *by which one Being acts upon another, and becomes a Cauſe*; altho' he owns none but God can comprehend it.

But his argument againſt the *exiſtence* of the SOUL, and the *reality* of INSPIRATION, is doubly faulty. For, as it is the height of extravagance to reject a *revealed truth*, becauſe the propoſition in which it is contained is unaccompanied with that explanation of the *cauſe*, of which our faculties are INCAPABLE; ſo is it no ſmall degree of unreaſonableneſs and folly to reject ſuch truth, becauſe the propoſition in which it is contained is unaccompanied with that explanation of which our faculties are CAPABLE.

3. His Lordſhip endeavours to ſhew, that a *future State was not the Sanction of the Law or Religion of Nature*. And thus he ſets about it. "Sanctions "muſt be contained in the Law to which they be-"long; they muſt be a part of it. In their promul-"gation, they muſt precede, as the Law does, neceſ-"ſarily, all acts of obedience, or diſobedience to it; "— they muſt be as public — Theſe conditions are

" eſſential, there can be no ſanction without them. " And therefore the rewards of a *future State*, which " have not theſe conditions, are no ſanctions of the " natural Law. Reaſon and experience, that taught " men this Law, ſhewed them the ſanctions of it. " But neither of them pointed out *theſe*. Have we " any grounds to believe, that they were known to " the antediluvian World? Do they ſtand at the head " or tail of the SEVEN PRECEPTS GIVEN TO THE " SONS OF NOAH? Were they ſo much as mentioned " by MOSES [4]?"

Can you forbear laughing? Had he found a *future ſtate* in the *ſeven precepts* of *Noah*, or in the *books of Moſes*, be aſſured he would have employed this lucky circumſtance to prove, that a *future ſtate* was not the Sanction of the *Law of Nature*, but of a *poſitive Law*, or of a *pretended Revelation*, only. For in the beginning of this very ſection, he has attempted to prove it was the ſanction of poſitive Law, from its being found in the GOSPEL. " God (ſays he) " has given a Law, the *Law of Nature and Reaſon*, " to all his human Creatures: the SANCTIONS of it are " a NATURAL TENDENCY of virtue to the happineſs, " and vice to the miſery, of mankind — They are " imperfect — To ſupply the imperfection [Revela- " tion pretends] that there muſt be neceſſarily ſome " FURTHER SANCTIONS of this Law, and theſe are " the rewards and puniſhments reſerved to a FUTURE " STATE. Here is ample room for *reflexions* [5]." — In truth there is: but as they would make ſo

[4] Vol. v. p. 512---13. [5] Vol. v. p. 511---12.

little

little for the credit of his Lordſhip's *learning*, his followers will not be offended with me for not purſuing them.

4. He tells us, *that the worſhip of the one true God was not the firſt Religious Worſhip.* — The BIBLE ſays it was. No matter for that. The BIBLE is a farrago of inconſiſtencies [6]. "*Methuſalem* ſaw both "*Adam* and *Noah*, to both of whom God revealed "himſelf in his Unity. *Shem*, the Son of *Noah*, "lived even to the days of *Abraham*. Need I ſtay "to ſhew HOW IMPOSSIBLE it is for any man IN HIS "SENSES to believe that a tradition derived from God "himſelf, through ſo *few generations*, was loſt amongſt "the greateſt part of mankind; or that Polytheiſm "and Idolatry were eſtabliſhed on the ruins of it in "the days of *Serug*, before thoſe of *Abraham*, and "ſo ſoon after the Deluge? I ſhould think it "IMPOSSIBLE even for the Jews themſelves to ſwal-"low ſo many fables and ſo many anacroniſms. "Since the unity of God was not univerſally taught "in thoſe early days, it was not ſo *revealed*, nor pre-"ſerved in the manner aſſumed [7]." This account, therefore, he tells us, is INCONSISTENT with itſelf [8]. Now the utmoſt that Prejudice in its ſenſes can make of it is an IMPROBALITY: and this *improbability*, his Lordſhip himſelf, but two pages afterwards, is ſo good to remove. He delivers it as a general Truth, that "the Vulgar EASILY embrace Polytheiſm and "Idolatry, even AFTER the true doctrine of the di-"vine unity has been taught and received; as we "may learn from the example of the *Iſraelites*: and

[6] Vol. iv. p. 19. [7] Vol. iv. p. 20.
[8] Vol. iv. p. 19.

"superstitions GROW APACE, AND SPREAD WIDE, "where *Christianity* has been established and is DAILY "TAUGHT, as we may learn from the example of "the Roman Churches [9]."

Now, Sir, I argue thus, If amongst the *Israelites*, Idolatry and Superstition so *easily*, so frequently, and so instantaneously *succeeded*, to the worship of the true God, and needed such severe punishments to bring men back again to reason, in a place where many extraordinary helps were provided to keep them in their duty; and if, amongst *Christians*, Idolatry and Superstition *grow apace and spread wide* where the *true doctrine of the unity* is *daily taught*, how can we wonder that, in the *few generations* from *Adam to Serug*, Polytheism and Idolatry should *establish themselves on the ruins* of the Unity; as this happened in an Age, where we hear of no other provision for the Truth than the *long lives* of the Patriarchs; and *Methusalem's seeing both Adam and Noah?* If You deny this to have been the case of *Jews* and *Christians*, his Lordship tells you, You are *out of your senses:* If you own this to have been the case of the *Antediluvians*, You are *out of your senses* still. What is to be done? There is but one way; which is, subscribing to his Lordship's unerring Wisdom.

But I have something more to say of this pretended INCONSISTENCY.—— *Can any man in his senses believe that a Tradition, derived from God himself, should be lost in so few generations, and so soon after the Deluge?*" —— How *few*, and how *soon*, I beseech your Lordship? I am not captious: I have a special reason for asking. The Chronology of this period is not uni-

[9] Vol. iv. p. 22.

form

form or conſtant; there is a wide difference in the ſeveral bible-accounts: ſo that I ſuſpect foul play as well as inaccuracy, in your thus putting us off with the vague reckoning of, *ſo few*, and, *ſo ſoon*.

To be plain, tho' the HEBREW Copy make it no more than *three hundred* years from the Deluge to Abraham; yet the SEPTUAGINT, and JOSEPHUS, reckon about a *thouſand*: time more than ſufficient to ſink *the greateſt part of Mankind into Idolatry and Polytheiſm, ſo early as the days of Serug*. And here lies the difficulty, the beſt Chronologers agree in preferring the *Septuagint* and *Joſephus*, to the *Hebrew Copy*.—— But I forget myſelf: His Lordſhip has "a thorough "contempt for the whole buſineſs of the Learned "lives of SCALIGER, BOCHART, PETAVIUS, USHER, "and MARSHAM [10]:" *to whom* (he ſays) *the whole tribe of ſcholars bow with reverence*, and conſequently he muſt have the ſame contempt for CHRONOLOGY; which, indeed, he has ſhewn on more occaſions than one; but never to ſo much advantage, as where he ſeems to have ſuppoſed that LIVY and TACITUS flouriſhed before VIRGIL [11].

But this by the way only. My buſineſs with his Lordſhip at preſent lies in another quarter. For, having, in his attempt to ſhew that the worſhip of the one true God was not the firſt religious worſhip, thrown the BIBLE out of the account, he goes on in this manner: "If the *inconſiſtency* of this account "makes us reject it, we ſhall find leſs reaſon to be-

[10] Vol. ii. p. 261, 2.

[11] See Dr. NEWTON's learned and judicious *Diſſertations on the Prophecies*, p. 33.

"lieve on the Authority of *prophane traditions* that "the UNITY OF GOD WAS THE PRIMITIVE "FAITH of mankind. Revelations to the Fa- "ther and to the Reſtorer of the whole human "race might have eſtabliſhed this Faith univerſally: "but without Revelation it could not be that of any "one people, till obſervation and meditation, till a "full and vigorous exerciſe of Reaſon made it ſuch "[12]." The reaſoning is truly admirable. The ſuppoſed Fact, as we find it in ANTIQUITY, ſtands thus, The BIBLE tells us, that the worſhip of the true God was the firſt religious worſhip: GENERAL TRADITION ſays the ſame. Between theſe two Teſtimonies there is a natural and ſtrong connection; the *Tradition* appearing to riſe out of the truth of the *Written word*; for, as his Lordſhip well obſerves, *nothing but a Revelation could eſtabliſh this Faith univerſally, not even amongſt one people, till obſervation and meditation had made it familiar to them.* Here you have the Fact proved in the ſtrongeſt manner a Fact can be proved; by the concurrence of two Witneſſes, coming from different quarters, and ſtrangers to each other's evidence; which yet not only agree, but mutually ſupport one another. What would you more? —Hold a little, ſays his Lordſhip. This boaſted connection is not real but imaginary: *ſacred Hiſtory* concerning a Revelation is not to be believed, becauſe *inconſiſtent: prophane Tradition* is not to be believed, becauſe without Revelation the unity of God could not be the firſt faith of any one people. Thus ſtands his Lordſhip's reaſoning, or thus, at leaſt, it

[12] Vol. iv. p. 20.

would

would ſtand, had he urged it to the beſt advantage. And to this, I reply, firſt, that his Lordſhip, in calling the Bible account *inconſiſtent*, is guilty of an abuſe of words: that, all which his own premiſſes infer is only an *improbability*; and this *improbability* likewiſe, he himſelf fairly contradicts and confutes. Secondly, He begs the queſtion, in taking it for granted that there was no *Revelation*. For the inconſiſtence of any Hiſtory concerning it, is no proof that it WAS NOT; tho' an univerſal Tradition that the *primitive faith* was the doctrine of the *unity*, (which doctrine, in his Lordſhip's reckoning, could come in no other way than by *Revelation*) be a very good proof that IT WAS. But I go farther, and, in defence of the Bible-account, obſerve, That, if what he ſays be true, that *obſervation and meditation, and a full and vigorous exerciſe of reaſon*, are neceſſary for the gaining the knowledge of the UNITY in a *natural* way, and that theſe qualities are long a coming, then it is highly probable, that the want of this *obſervation and meditation*, when the *unity* was revealed to the *firſt Man*, might have been the occaſion of the ſpeedy loſs of it. He expreſsly tells us, that this Truth has been ſubject to as ſudden revolutions, in the times of *Judaiſm* and *Popery*, when men were in full poſſeſſion of it, with all their *obſervation, meditation, and vigorous exerciſe of reaſon*, at the height; and twenty other advantages to boot.

BUT his Lordſhip's *general management* of this queſtion, of the FIRST RELIGIOUS WORSHIP, ſhould not be overlooked, tho' it belong properly to another Head. He diſcuſſes the point at large, in two ſeveral *Diſſertations*: each of which is ſo well qualified; and

ſo fitly accommodated to the other, that the ſecond is a complete confutation of the firſt. How this came about, is not unworthy the Reader's notice. His Lordſhip does things in order. He had it firſt of all in his purpoſe to diſcredit the Moſaic account of the Creation: And MOSES repreſenting the *worſhip of the true God* as the *original Religion*, he ſat himſelf to prove that Moſes was both a *fool* and a *liar*. Soon after, he had another Prophet to bring into contempt, the Prophet ISAIAH, who informs us, that the Jews were the only nation under heaven, which had the worſhip of the one God. A truth which EUSEBIUS has taken upon his word [13]. His Lordſhip will ſhew, they deſerve no credit. And then he ranſacks all the dark corners, not of Antiquity, but of thoſe Moderns who have rendered Antiquity ſtill darker: in which he ſucceeds ſo well, as to perſuade himſelf that the World, many ages before the foundation of the Jewiſh Republic, had the knowledge of the one God; nay, that there was no time ſo early in which the one God was unknown. In a word, he overturns, as we ſaid, and very completely too, every thing he had written on the ſame ſubject, in the other Diſſertation, againſt MOSES. But as all this is directly levelled at the Author of the *Divine Legation*, I leave that Writer to do his own argument juſtice as he ſhall find himſelf able.

5. In the mean time, I proceed to give you one of his Lordſhip's *palmary* arguments againſt REVELATION.

[13] See *Div. Leg.* Vol. i. Part i. p. 165.

Can

" Can he be leſs than MAD who boaſts a REVELA-
" TION ſuperadded to REASON, to ſupply the de-
" fects of it, and who ſuperadds REASON TO RE-
" VELATION to ſupply the defects of this too, at the
" ſame time? THIS IS MADNESS, OR THERE IS NO
" SUCH THING INCIDENT TO OUR NATURE [14]."

Now as every man, who believes REVELATION, was in theſe circumſtances, his Lordſhip (and reaſon good) concluded the MADNESS to be *univerſal*; and none but himſelf in his ſenſes: and ſtanding thus alone he has thought proper to give us frequent notice of this extraordinary caſe [5], *Inſanire me aiunt, ultro cum ipſi inſaniant.* But if he will needs reduce us to this ſad alternative, I ſhall make no ſcruple to vindicate our common nature, be it never ſo much at his Lordſhip's expence. For, as to the body of mankind, who " hold that Revelation was ſuperadded
" to Reaſon, to ſupply the defects of Reaſon; and
" that Reaſon was at the ſame time ſuperadded to
" Revelation to ſupply the defects of Revelation," I am ſo far from ſeeing in them any of thoſe unfavourable ſymptoms, his Lordſhip ſpeaks of, that I think, whoever had done otherwiſe, had deſerved, (at leaſt, on the principles of his Lordſhip's rigid juſtice) to be ſent to Bedlam. Indeed ſome, for ſo doing, have been actually ſent thither. For what, for the moſt part, are the *religious* inhabitants of that place, but ſuch, who, having ſuperadded Revelation to ſupply the defects of Reaſon, WOULD NOT SUPERADD REASON to ſupply the defects of Revelation; but were for making the *Laws of the Goſpel* the ſole rule

[14] Vol. iv. p. 172. [5] Vol. iv. p. 316--353--377.

of all *civil* as well as of all *religious* meaſures: in other words, ſuch as were grown FANATICAL.

Let us conſider how the caſe truly ſtands. The Religioniſt, his Lordſhip ſays, boaſts, that *Revelation* was *ſuperadded to Reaſon*, to *ſupply the defects* of Reaſon. Very well. Reaſon then is the foundation, and Revelation, the Superſtructure. Revelation meddles not with the work of Reaſon, but ſupplies us with new Truths, where Reaſon ſtops ſhort. And why was this done?—For the ſake of an ADEQUATE RULE OF LIFE. Is Reaſon *alone* this rule?—Then the ſuperſtructure of Revelation was not wanted. Is Revelation *alone* the rule?—Then Reaſon was built upon to no purpoſe. The ADEQUATE RULE therefore is compoſed of BOTH. But if ſo, When Revelation has been added to Reaſon to ſupply the wants of Reaſon, muſt not Reaſon be added to Revelation to ſupply the wants of Revelation? Muſt not two things, thus related, be mutually applied to the aid of one another's inſufficiencies? Reaſon is the Baſe; Revelation is the Upper-building. It is owned, the Upper-building is neceſſary to *perfect* the Baſe: Muſt it not be owned, that the Baſe is as neceſſary to *bear* the Upper-building?

But, (what is more) it is the GOSPEL itſelf, and not *artificial Theology*, as his Lordſhip pretends, which gives us this direction. For the *Goſpel* being to ſerve (as is confeſſed) for a ſuperaddition to the firſt building of *Natural Religion*, it delivers no complete ſyſtem of moral Law, (for which it is ſo often reproached by his Lordſhip) becauſe the general parts of that ſyſtem are to be found in *Natural Religion*. To ſupply this defect, if it be one, St. Paul has pointed out

an expedient; the ſtudy of *natural Religion*; from whence, together with the *Goſpel*, ſuch a complete ſyſtem may be collected. "Finally, Brethren, whatſoever things are true, whatſoever things are honeſt, whatſoever things are juſt, whatſoever things are pure, whatſoever things are lovely, whatſoever things are of good report; If there be any virtue, if there be any praiſe, think on theſe things [16]." This then is the Scheme of TRUE CHRISTIANITY. It *ſuperadds Revelation to Reaſon to ſupply the defects of it; and ſuperadds Reaſon to Revelation to ſupply the defects of this too at the ſame time.* And can any thing be more rational than ſuch a ſcheme?

Indeed, was REVELATION only a REPUBLICATION OF THE RELIGION OF NATURE, his Lordſhip's charge, tho' extravagantly urged, would appear to have ſome foundation. For then *Revelation* muſt be ſuppoſed to be the *Religion of Nature*, reſtored and perfected: and then to recur back to *Natural Religion* to rectify *Revelation*, after Revelation had been introduced to rectify Natural Religion, would have, tho' none of the marks of *madneſs*, which conſiſts in arguing conſequentially from *falſe* principles, yet great ſymptoms of *folly*, which conſiſts in arguing like his Lordſhip, from the *true*. But he owns Chriſtianity to be founded on the Principle of REDEMPTION. Indeed he is as variable in this, as in moſt other points, and as often repreſents it to be a *republication of the Religion of Nature:* When he chuſes to employ the gentler method of extirpation, the *explaining it away*, it is then a *republication*; when,

[16] Phil. iv. 8.

the

the rougher and directer method of *expoſing it to contempt*, it is then ſounded in the *doctrine of Redemption*. Therefore, as We have all along made the beſt of his *Contradictions*, e'en let Him do the ſame; for it ſeems not fit, he ſhould be deprived of any advantages of his own procuring.

Let us ſet his Lordſhip's argument in another light; and turn from his *Philoſophic* to his *Legiſlative* Character; and ſuppoſe him to reaſon thus, (for change but the terms, and the reaſoning will hold juſt as well in *civil* as in *theologic* matters.) "Can he be "leſs than mad who boaſts a *ſyſtem of civil Laws* ſu-"peradded to the *natural*, to ſupply the defects of it; "and who ſuperadds the *natural* to the *civil*, to ſup-"ply the defects of this too, at the ſame time?" Now look, what figure the Politician would make, who ſhould thus inſtruct his Pupils, even ſuch does our noble Theologian make in dictating to all Mankind.

Amongſt the numerous abſurdities in this famous argument, I don't know if it be worth while to take notice of one in the *expreſſion*; for as it ſeems not to be committed with deſign, it hardly deſerves the name of a ſophiſm; and that is, the repetition of the word SUPERADDS; for tho', Revelation may be *ſuperadded* to Reaſon, yet Reaſon can never be ſaid to be *ſuperadded* to Revelation, how cloſely ſoever it may be joined with it; becauſe the two ſyſtems can never become top and bottom in their turns, after it has been owned that One is the *foundation*, and the Other, the *ſuperſtructure*.

6. Another of his Lordſhip's *general* objections to *Revelation*, is as follows:

"It

"It is not, in any degree, so agreeable to the no-
"tions of infinite wisdom that God should deal out
"his Revelations BY PARCELS, instead of making a
"system of moral Law, when he created moral
"agents, that might answer his WHOLE purpose, in
"all circumstances of time, place, and persons;
"JUST AS HE MADE a physical system of Laws for
"the other part, the inanimate part of his Crea-
"tion [17]."

Now with his Lordship's good leave, I am bold to think, the contrary the more probable; and that too, on those very principles of Analogy, which his Lordship employs, to prove it less so. He argues against the likelihood of God's giving the *moral Law*, IN PARCELS, because the *Physical Law was given* AT ONCE. This plainly proceeds on a supposition that the nature of the two systems is the same; and that there is the like constancy and regularity in the *Moral* as in the *Physical*; or the like irregularity in the *Physical* as in the *Moral*; For unless there be the same tendency to order, or to disorder, in two general systems, the means of governing them can hardly be the same. But in these two systems, obedience to their respective Laws is far unlike: *Passive* MATTER, (the subject of the *physical)* obeys, with small irregularities, the Laws impressed upon it by it's Creator; but an *active* MIND, (the subject of the *moral)* is perpetually deviating from that rule of right which the Governor of the world, prescribed for its observance. The method therefore of governing in the two Systems must needs, according to all our ideas of wisdom, be

[17] Vol. v. p. 544.

very

very different. And this difference, which our senſes tell us *has* been obſerved, is that which natural reaſon teaches us to conclude, *ſhould* be obſerved; namely, to a *phyſical* ſyſtem (whoſe ſubject would conſtantly and invariably obey) a Law given AT ONCE: and to a *moral* ſyſtem (whoſe ſubject inclined it to frequent deviations) a Law given IN PARCELS; which might, from time to time, reform the diſorders as they aroſe.

But the folly, in thus embarraſing ourſelves about the fit ordinance of God's diſpenſations, has its ſource in a MADNESS, that his Lordſhip perhaps leaſt ſuſpected, and which yet he was moſt concerned to guard againſt; the madneſs of ſuppoſing, that eternal wiſdom needed the aid of our contrivance to make things as they ſhould be.

7. I ſhall conclude my ſpecimen with ſome of his Lordſhip's *more particular* objections to the BIBLE.

Speaking of the civil puniſhment of Idolatry, under the Jewiſh Theocracy, he ſays, "God himſelf "was the LEGISLATOR. The Citizens, therefore, "of that commonwealth, who apoſtatized, were "proceeded againſt as traytors and rebels, guilty of "no leſs than high-treaſon. Let it be ſo. *The ob-* "*jections of injuſtice and cruelty to thoſe Laws will re-* "*main in their full force*, and be of more weight to "prove them HUMAN, than all theſe hypotheſes to "prove them *divine*. God was KING, and idolatry was "no leſs than high treaſon; no objection therefore "can lye againſt the Puniſhment of it. None cer- "tainly, but every objection to the MANNER and

"DE-

" DEGREE in which this punishment was to be in-
" flicted, stands good [18]."

Here his Lordship to make amends, as it were, for his frequent *denial of the truth*, without understanding the question, has for once ventured to *agree to it*, upon the same terms. It had been said, " that as God was KING of the Jews, idolatry was " high treason." To this, his Lordship condescends. But to shew us how well he understood the principle on which it stands, he affirms that God's being their LEGISLATOR made Idolatry high treason. As if the bare giving Laws to a people conferred the MAGISTRACY on the Giver: or as if there could be *high treason* against any but the MAGISTRATE. But you shall see more of his talent for PHILOSOPHIC POLITICS, if it fall in my way (as perhaps it will) to speak of his abilities in his own trade. It is his *reasoning* on the subject, not his general *knowledge* of the case (things rarely to be found together in his Lordship's *Essays*) that I now propose to examine.

You observe then, he owns Idolatry, in Judea, to be high Treason; and the Punishment of it (which is every where *capital*) to be just. But the *manner* and *degree* of that punishment he pronounces, both *unjust* and *cruel*. Was this like a philosophic Legislator! — When the question is of the *justice* or *injustice* of a public Law, every man of common sense, and endowed with the instinctive knowledge of *right and wrong*, may pass a true judgment on it; because it stands on the unalterable nature of things; in *human* Laws, on the relation between Magistrate and Subject; in *divine* Laws, on the relation between God

[18] Vol. v. p. 193.

and

and man; and in a Syſtem of Laws, like the Moſaic, both on one and the other, in conjunction. Now his Lordſhip, in paſſing judgment on the caſe upon theſe principles pronounces the Law againſt Idolatry to be right and equitable. What can be more honourable for this part of the Jewiſh Syſtem? It is Lord Bolingbroke who decrees in favour of it; and is here aided, which he rarely is, by the plaineſt and cleareſt principles of common ſenſe. Hold, ſays his Lordſhip; take this along with you, *Tho' no objection can lie againſt the* PUNISHMENT, *yet every objection lies againſt the* MANNER and DEGREE of it.

Let us ſee then whether this ſtands upon the ſame plain and clear principles with the other.

To judge truly of the *manner* and *degree* of a puniſhment, I apprehend, more is required than to judge of the puniſhment itſelf. It requires an intimate acquaintance with the People to whom this Law againſt idolatry was given; a knowledge of their manners, tempers, diſpoſitions, prejudices, and ſituation; in a word, of a thouſand other circumſtances, which none but the Lawgiver himſelf could perfectly underſtand; certainly, not this Politician of Yeſterday. So that, it appears, the juſtice or injuſtice of the *manner* and *degree* of a puniſhment is not determinable on thoſe ſimple and obvious Principles which ſhew the juſtice or injuſtice of the *puniſhment* itſelf, but on other conſiderations which determine of *right and wrong* from many ſhifting circumſtances; from the degree of *temptation* in the Object; from the degree of *prejudice* in the Subject; of *propenſity* to the Crime; of *malignity* to the Syſtem; and from other various connexions, of which only Thoſe who are perfect in the know-

knowledge of antient Manners in general, and of the Jewish People's in particular, can form any reasonable ideas.

This is enough to shew the folly of cavilling at the *manner* and *degree* of the punishment of Idolatry, after the punishment itself is allowed to be just and right. But this is not all; the very allowance of the *punishment* implies a presumption in favour of the *manner* and *degree*. The Punishment of Idolatry, a punishment which could take place in no system of Government but the Mosaic, is, when examined on plain and clear principles, found to be just: admit now, the *manner* and *degree* of it to be doubtful for want of knowledge sufficient to shew us the *necessity*, and consequently, the *justice* of them. Is it not fair to infer, that the Lawgiver, who so wisely and equitably observed the rule of justice in the punishment itself, observed it likewise in the *manner* and *degree* of the punishment?

This, as to the general meaning, of the *manner* and *degree* of a Punishment. But, if I be not mistaken, this *manner* and *degree* here insisted on, have a peculiar reference to his Lordship's own System of divinity and politics. I suppose, his principal objection to the *manner* might arise from the punishment's being inflicted by the civil justice of the state, and not by the immediate hand of God. But he should have considered, that the LAW, all along distinguishes between the crimes capable of legal conviction, and such as were inscrutable to all but Omniscience. The latter God reserves for his own Inquisition [19]: But the crime in question was an overt-act of idolatrous worship, and therefore

[19] See *Div. Leg.*

came

came reaſonably and equitably before the Civil Tribunal. His cavil at the degree comes next to be conſidered. It's being ſimply CAPITAL was not, I believe, that for which his Lordſhip imputed *injuſtice and cruelty* to it. The being attended with CONFISCATION, as in the caſe of Naboth, was what ſeems principally to have incurred his diſpleaſure. But in a caſe, where his Lordſhip was perſonally prejudiced, he ſhould have miſtruſted his own judgment; he ſhould have examined the force of thoſe arguments, by which a great Lawyer had lately evinced, that *forfeiture for high treaſon* is perfectly juſt and equitable.

8. The noble Lord, haranguing on the conditions of *Hiſtorical Authenticity*, delivers this, for one of the chief, "That the facts, the principal Facts at leaſt, "be confirmed by COLLATERAL TESTIMONY. By "collateral teſtimony (ſays he) I mean the teſti-"mony of thoſe who had no common intereſt of "Country, of Religion, or of Profeſſion, to diſguiſe "or falſify the truth [19]."

This condition of *hiſtorical Authenticity* will be eaſily agreed to; as well as his definition of *collateral teſtimony*: And the quotations of JOSEPHUS and EUSEBIUS, from *Egyptians*, *Phœnicians*, *Chaldeans* and *Greeks* will, without doubt, be urged by the defenders of Religion, as SUCH *collateral teſtimony*, where the witneſſes *had no common intereſt of Country, of Religion, or of Profeſſion to diſguiſe or falſify the truth.*— Pardon me, ſays his Lordſhip, "JOSEPHUS indeed "attempts to ſupport his hiſtory [the Bible] by *col-*"*lateral teſtimonies*, thoſe of *Egyptians*, *Phœnicians*,

[19] Vol. iii. p. 281.

"*Chal-*

" *Chaldeans*, and even *Greeks*. But these testimonies, " were they never so full to his purpose, would " CEASE TO BE COLLATERAL testimonies, by COM- " ING THRO' HIM, who had a common interest of " Country and Religion to disguise and to falsify the " truth [20]."

This seems a little hard, that, when our advantages of defence are, in his Lordship's opinion, so rare, the few we have, should be lost the very moment they are gained. JOSEPHUS has no sooner seized this important mark of *historical authenticity*, but it slips thro' his fingers as he is urging it: and, what is still more extraordinary, BECAUSE he urges it. The *Book of life* and the *Seat of life*, it seems, have this property in common —

" Like following LIFE thro' Creatures you dissect,
" You lose it in the moment you detect.

For, as Tully well observes, all human things are given to change. " Corpora nostra non novimus. " Itaque *Medici* ipsi, quorum intererat ea nosse, apa- " ruerunt ut viderentur: nec eo tamen aiunt EMPI- " RICI notiora esse illa, quia possit fieri ut patefacta " et detecta, MUTENTUR."

But to canvas this wonderful reasoning a little closer; Let us make a supposition, or rather, let us lay down a *fact*, that APION, like his Lordship, had insisted on this very *condition of historical authenticity*; and that JOSEPHUS, who defended the Bible against his cavils, took him at his word, and agreed to put the issue of the debate on that circumstance; and

[20] Vol. iii. p. 281.

there-

thereupon produced the teſtimony of *Egyptians*, *Phœnicians*, *Chaldeans*, and even *Greeks*, to ſupport the ſacred Story. Thus far, his Lordſhip will allow, matters went glibly on, and the argument had its proper efficacy. JOSEPHUS quoted from the Works of *Pagan* writers, tranſmitted to him thro' the hands of *Pagan* readers; and being engaged with a clear-ſighted Adverſary, without doubt, quoted fairly. The *hiſtorical authenticity* of the BIBLE therefore was eſtabliſhed on the terms his Adverſary required. How then comes it to paſs, that an argument which was once concluſive, has now loſt its force? What was truth in that Age muſt be allowed to be truth in this; or not only the *Authenticity*, but the very *being* of Hiſtory will become precarious. Do theſe pagan teſtimonies, in running thro' the chanel of JOSEPHUS, become *polluted*, as ſoon as the original Books ceaſe to exiſt? No, ſays his Lordſhip; but they may be *ſuſpected*. On what account, I pray? Could he prove that JOSEPHUS burnt them; or was aiding in their deſtruction; or had a fore-knowledge of their loſs, his Lordſhip might then indeed have ſome reaſon to *ſuſpect*. But to talk of ſuſpicion, merely becauſe JOSEPHUS was *intereſted* that the quotations ſhould be to his purpoſe, is ſo vague a cavil, as ſhews the objector will never be at a loſs for an evaſion. Were the Originals ſtill in being, he would then *ſuſpect* that theſe paſſages had been foiſted in by ſome jewiſh or Chriſtian Impoſtor; at leaſt, by ſome body or other, who *had a common intereſt of Country, of Religion, or of Profeſſion, to diſguiſe or falſify the truth*. In ſhort, he would *ſuſpect* all the World ſooner than his own power to impoſe upon us.

To

To shew you, this is said neither at random nor in malice, consider his Lordship's conduct where this *collateral testimony* is circumstanced in the manner he himself requires. The defenders of Religion say that the PENTATEUCH, which represents MOSES as the Leader and Legislator of the Israelites, is supported by that *evidence* which his Lordship calls *collateral*. What says his good Lordship to this? "Be it so, that "the Israelites had a Leader and Legislator called "Moses is proved by the consent of *Foreign*, whom "I call *collateral Evidences*. But surely it will not "follow, that this man CONVERSED WITH THE "SUPREME BEING FACE TO FACE, which these "*collateral* Witnesses do not affirm [1]." Thus you see, these *collateral evidences* will always be rejected, whether they tell their story *viva voce*, or whether their depositions be taken down by such who avail themselves of their Testimony.——But, *they do not say that this man conversed with the supreme Being face to face.* Would his Lordship have believed them, if they did? Why, no, says he, my faith goes no further than to civil facts; and I must needs reckon such Tales amongst the Miracles of the Greek and Roman Historians. Very well, my Lord. And does not this shew, that if the *collateral evidence* speak but to Moses's Legislation and civil rule, they speak to every thing they are called for, in support of Scripture against such Writers as your Lordship. To illustrate the case; It is doubted, for instance, whether Livy gives us a true account of such or such a Campaign between Hannibal and the Roman Generals.

[1] Vol. iii. p. 282.

Poly-

Polybius, Plutarch and Appian being Greeks are produced as *collateral evidences*, but they ſpeak not a word of thoſe *Prodigies* which the Roman Hiſtorian relates at large.

9. BUT his hate to MOSES is immortal: Notwithſtanding all his Lordſhip's pretended contempt of him, as a Legiſlator, it looks as if, in his heart, he thought him a very formidable Rival. Archbiſhop TILLOTSON had attempted to defend the *Authenticity* of his writings, on this Poſtulatum, *that the Unbeliever would only give the ſame credit to them which he gives to every civil Hiſtory.* His Lordſhip owns the demand to be reaſonable; and is willing to try his Brother Legiſlator, on theſe terms. In order to this, he obſerves, "That one condition of the Authenti-"city of any human Hiſtory, and ſuch alone (ſays "he) we are to conſider in this place, is, that it "contains nothing *repugnant to the experience of man-*"*kind.* Things repugnant to this experience are to "be found in many that paſs however for authentic; "in that of LIVY, for inſtance: but then theſe in-"credible anecdotes ſtand by themſelves, as it were, "and the hiſtory may go on without them. But "this is not the caſe of the Pentateuch, *nor of the* "*other Books of the Old Teſtament.* Incredible anec-"dotes are not mentioned ſeldom and occaſionally "in them: THE WHOLE HISTORY IS FOUNDED "ON SUCH, it conſiſts of little elſe, and IF IT "WERE NOT A HISTORY OF THEM, IT WOULD "BE A HISTORY OF NOTHING [2]."

The Unbeliever's objection to the *Authencity* of the Bible as a *civil hiſtory*, is, that it is full of *Miracles:*

[2] Vol. iii. p. 279.

and,

and, ſuppoſing the Defender of Revelation ready to reply, " So likewiſe is the Hiſtory of *Livy* ; and yet " that does not deſtroy its credit ;" his Lordſhip obviates the reply extremely well. " There is an eſ- " ſential difference, (ſays he) between *the incredible* " *anecdotes* of MOSES and of LIVY. The Roman " Hiſtorian's Miracles are detached pieces; they " make no part of the ſubject, and are extraneous " to it : But the Miracles of the Jewiſh Writer are " intimately related to all the civil affairs, and make " a neceſſary and inſeparable part ; *the whole hiſtory* " *is founded on them.* Take away LIVY's miracles, " and the train of civil events *goes on* juſt as well " *without them:* Take away MOSES's, and his hiſ- " tory becomes a heap of confuſion, or more pro- " perly, *it is a hiſtory of nothing.*"

I am proud of any opportunity to acknowledge the obligations which Learning or Religion have to his Lordſhip ; I only wiſh the occaſions had been more frequent : As it is, I am unwilling to let the firſt that occurred to me paſs by without my thanks, leſt poſſibly the occaſion ſhould never return.

In a word, his Lordſhip's obſervation on the *difference* between the MIRACLES in MOSES and in LIVY, is ſolid and maſterly. And *this difference*, let me obſerve, is a certain mark, tho' not of that *civil authenticity* which the good Archbiſhop's argument requires, Yet of that *divine original* which the SCRIPTURES arrogate to themſelves.

It is the ſpecious, but trite, objection of Infidelity againſt the *Miracles* recorded in the Bible, that thoſe remote ages were full of prodigies and portents. " Why then, ſays the Freethinker, ſhould we believe

the *incredible anecdotes* of MOSES, rather than thoſe of LIVY?" For a very good reaſon, replies his Lordſhip, we find them in a hiſtory eſſentially different from that of *Livy*. Take away *his* miracles, together with all thoſe of the other pagan Hiſtorians, and the Story ſtands juſt as it did. But take away the BIBLE-MIRACLES, and you reduce the civil part of the relation to a ſtate of inexplicable confuſion.

Again, one of the leaſt hackmied, and indeed leaſt futile, obſervations I have ever heard urged againſt the Bible, (and it has been urged to me) is the WANT OF A NECESSARY CONNEXION between the *civil* and the *miraculous* parts of that Hiſtory. Here again his Lordſhip comes in, in ſupport of Revelation, and ſays, that this *neceſſary connexion* is evident to all, for that nothing can be made of the *civil* part if you take away the *miraculous*. Which ſure is a *connexion* of ſome ſtrength.

Thus has his Lordſhip, before he was aware, in attempting to deſtroy the *civil authenticity* of the Bible, ſupported its *divine original*. And this good, tho' undeſigned, ought however to be acknowledged. But you may think, perhaps, that a matter of this importance, is not here ſufficiently developed. Without doubt, it is not. This is a long ſtory; and as I pretend to have ſupplied this DESIDERATUM, *The want of a connexion between the miraculous and civil part of the ſacred Hiſtory*, I ſhall refer you to the proper place, where it is to be found.

In the mean time, give me leave to go on with his Lordſhip; and proceed to the propoſition itſelf, That the *Miracles recorded* in the BIBLE, *deſtroy its credit as a civil hiſtory*. Now this I apprehend to be a pure piece of

of chicane. Let us see how the matter stands between the Archbishop and his Lordship.

BELIEVERS say, the Bible-History is the history of a Dispensation really divine: UNBELIEVERS say, it is the history of one only pretended; and endeavour to support their assertion, by shewing it to have the *civil marks* of falsehood and imposture. Here the Archbishop steps forward and offers to try the authenticity of the Bible on the Standard of a CIVIL HISTORY. Agreed, replies his Lordship; And what say you now to MIRACLES? Say? Why, that *Miracles* are out of the question; and come not into consideration till the DIVINE authority be contended for. When we agreed to consider the Bible as a *civil history only*, it was not for truth's, but for argument's sake. If we held the Writers of it to be mere civil Historians, the miracles, recorded in it, might be fairly urged against us; and urged with advantage, if indeed there be that difference between them and Livy's, which is pretended. But we hold the Writers were indeed inspired; and You, my Lord, have shewn us, by that difference, to justify the *miraculous part*, whenever their inspiration becomes a question between us. In the mean time, stick to your point; and never fancy you can make our Divines the dupes of so pitiful a Sophism. You have drawn us, (while we debate a particular question with you) to exclude for argument's sake one of our principles [3]; and then urge against that question, a FACT [4], which stands, and is to be defended on the excluded principle; and so, cannot be maintained while the principle remains ex-

[3] The divine authority of the Bible. [4] Miracles.

cluded: Which is juſt as if, when you had perſuaded us to tye our hands, on promiſe that the queſtion ſhould be only about the uſe of our feet, You ſhould object to us our inability of laying faſt hold upon you. Your own words, my Lord, where you puſh this imaginary advantage, beſt detect the fraud and impoſture of your proceeding. "The Old Teſtament (you ſay) is founded in incredibility. Almoſt every event contained in it, is incredible in its cauſes and conſequences; and I muſt except or reject the whole, as I ſaid juſt now. No one, EXCEPT HERE AND THERE A DIVINE, will preſume to ſay, that the hiſtories of the old Teſtament are *conformable to the experience of Mankind*, and the natural courſe of things." —— *Except here and there a Divine*, do you ſay? Nor they neither, I aſſure your Lordſhip. What they ſay is this, That every thing of a mere civil nature in the Old Teſtament has all the marks of civil authenticity. This is all they ſaid, and all they meant to ſay. And, on what good grounds they ſaid it, give me leave to ſhew your Lordſhip a little more at large.

The Bible tells us, the world was created in time; and that time at no immenſe diſtance, as ſeveral fabulous relations of pagan Antiquity had pretended. —And does not the late invention of Arts prove that the Bible ſays nothing but what appears very probable?

It ſays, the Earth was overflowed by a deluge of waters.—And do not the contents of its ſurface demonſtrate that it has ſuffered this Cataſtrophe?

The Bible ſays, again, that the *Founders of Cities* were the *inventors of arts*; and that the firſt *civil* Govern-

vernments compoſed of ſmall Monarchies aroſe from the *Domeſtic*. And do not experience and the natural courſe of things ſupport ſo *credible* an *anecdote*?

The Pentateuch informs us, that the Iſraelites, after a long abode in Egypt, went out as a great People, and in a hoſtile manner, to ſeek new habitations.—And of this, have we not both external and internal evidence? The external in the Egyptian, Phœnician, Chaldee, and Greek Writers, quoted by Joſephus and Euſebius: the internal in the whole Jewiſh RITUAL.

Scripture relates the defection of the ten tribes to Idolatry; their tranſportation to a foreign land; and the re-peopling that part of Judea with a new Colony of Idolaters.—And of the truth of all this, we ſay, the Samaritan Pentateuch, yet exiſting, is a ſtrong and amazing Teſtimony.

Theſe, my Lord, are a very few of the numerous inſtances which might be produced to ſhew the *civil Authenticity* of the Bible. And on theſe and ſuch as theſe, the Clergy's challenge ſtood, when they undertook to prove that Authenticity, on the common principles of hiſtoric credit. Further, or other than this, they neither ſaid nor meant to ſay. They underſtood, as well as your Lordſhip, the difference between Moſes's *incredible anecdotes* and thoſe of Livy; and that the Jewiſh Hiſtory, unlike to all other, is *wholly founded on miracles*. But they diſtinguiſhed better than your Lordſhip, of Moſes' *civil Hiſtory*: which conſiſts of two parts; the peculiar Diſpenſation to that People; and the occaſional ſtory of the reſt of Mankind.

It is the *peculiar Diſpenſation* only to which his Lordſhip's obſervation can be applied, *viz.* that the *civil* cannot be ſeparated from the *miraculous* part: Nor did the clergy attempt to do it. It was the *occaſional ſtory* of the human race, we muſt needs ſuppoſe, to which the Archbiſhop's challenge referred: And I have ſhewn juſt above, that we are able to make his challenge good.

Thus would I have reaſoned with his Lordſhip; and thus, in fact was he reaſoned with, (as I may have occaſion to tell you in my next Letter) but he was deaf to all advice, tho' it was given in private, and to ſave his memory from the diſgrace of theſe portentous ESSAYS. What remained was to expoſe them as they deſerved to the laughter and contempt of Mankind.

And now, Sir, I think I have pretty well diſcharged my general promiſe to You. When one looks back upon this poor collection of meagre, disjointed reaſoning, tacked together by his Syſtem, and ſwelled up to the ſemblance of a body by the tumor of his Rhetoric, one ſees revived in theſe *Eſſays*, the old ſtory of Prometheus; his Lordſhip inſulting the ſanctity of the PUBLIC, juſt as that moſt antient of Freethinkers did the ALTAR OF JUPITER; on which, as the Poets tell us, he offered up to the King of Gods and Men, A HEAP OF DRY BONES COVERED WITH FAT.

I am, *&c.*

LET-

LETTER IV.

YOU will wonder to hear again from me on so trifling a subject as this FIRST PHILOSOPHY. And had not Lord Bolingbroke reduced us to this alternative, either to give up the BIBLE or his LORDSHIP to contempt, I should willingly have left him in possession of his Admirers.

My last Letter examined his Lordship's value in every point of *view*, in which a PHILOSOPHER would desire to shine. I shall now push my inquiry a little further, and venture into his own Province. I shall crave your patience while I try his talents in his POLITICAL capacity, as an Analyser of States, a Balancer of Power, and a Distributer of Civil and Religious Sanctions.

But now we must recede a little from the method hitherto observed, which was to defend against his Lordship's calumnies, not this or that body of Divines, but the general Principles of natural and revealed Religion. Here I shall have occasion to patronise a single Clergyman; and not such a one neither as I could have wished; a CUDWORTH, a CLARKE, a CUMBERLAND, or a TILLOTSON; (established Names! which the Public are ready to make their own quarrel) but a Writer of very ambiguous fame, the Author of the *Divine Legation of Moses*, and, of *The Alliance between Church and State:* Of whom,

I pretend to know little but from the talk of his Adverſaries; his Friends poſſeſſing him, as they do a good Conſcience, in ſilence and complacency; and from his Adverſaries I learn—" But hold, you cry, let us drop both his Friends and his Enemies, and hear what the learned abroad ſay of him; for his works are well known, and have been frequently tranſlated and criticiſed both in Germany and France; We may expect to hear truth from Strangers who are without ſelfiſh partialities or perſonal prejudices."—Indeed, the Author would owe you his thanks for referring him to that deciſion: Foreign Critics of the greateſt name have ſpoken ſo differently of him from the Scriblers at home, that, was I to tell you what they have told the world, you would ſuſpect their encomiums for the civilities of his moſt partial Friends. So to his Adverſaries, I ſay again, I commit him: And, from them I learn that he abounds in Paradoxes, that he delights in Refinements, and would fain paſs upon the World a heap of crude index-reading, for well-digeſted learning: that, on his firſt appearance, he was ſhrewdly ſuſpected of infidelity; but that (no body knows how) he has worked men into an opinion, of his being a ſort of friend to Religion; indeed, in his own way: I ſuppoſe he ſees it for his Intereſt to ſtick to the eſtabliſhed Church; for I know no other reaſon why there ſhould have been different opinions concerning him. In a word, as I judge of him from the repreſentation of his Enemies, I can allow him little other claim to literary merit, than that very doubtful one, *The Dunces, of all denominations, being in Confederacy againſt him.*

In-

Indeed, ſince his Lordſhip's diſcovery of a *Confederacy* between *Divines* and *Atheiſts*, the word *confederacy* is likely to become as ridiculous as the word *Ode*, which our Laureate foretells, no body for the future will hear ſpoken of without laughing. However, it ſhall paſs; for were there no more in this *confederacy*, than in his Lordſhip's; and that every individual Blockhead only followed the bent of his own natural bias, it would but make the wonder ſtill more.

Such then is the Writer I am forced to take up with: In truth I could not find another, ſo proper for my purpoſe; which was, as I ſaid, to diſplay Lord Bolingbroke's *political* talents. For tho' his Lordſhip be very profuſe in his ill Language to All, who have undertaken the defence of *Religion* and *Church Government*; yet the Author of *The Divine Legation of Moſes* is the only one whom he does more than rail at and abuſe on theſe accounts. For while he keeps at a reſpectful diſtance from the *Arguments* of others, he comes, boldly, up to this Writer's, and ſits down before them in form. He Diſputes with him, the Knowledge of the *Unity*—the ſenſe and reaſon of a *ſelect people*—of a *tutelary Deity*—of *compliance with human prejudices*, and, in a word, every leading principle of the Author's Book. This ſeems not greatly for his Lordſhip's honour after he had defied all the mighty Chieftains of Literature, to decline the combat, and think himſelf quit by accepting the Gauntlet from this puny Writer.

His Lordſhip begins his attack on that capital circumſtance in the Jewiſh Oeconomy, THE OMISSION OF A FUTURE STATE: He pretends to account for it independently of the EXTRAORDINARY OR EQUAL

PROVIDENCE, which Moſes aſſured his people was to be adminiſtred under a *Theocracy*; and which the Author of the *Divine Legation* attempts to prove, from this very circumſtance of the *Omiſſion*, was actually adminiſtered.

But to make this intelligible to the common Reader, it will be neceſſary to give a ſummary View of that famous Argument purſued at large thro' two volumes of the *Divine Legation*, and yet conceived by many of the Learned, to be left imperfect; marry, by ſome, if you were to judge from the knowledge they ſeem to have of it, hardly to be begun.

RELIGION has been always held neceſſary to the ſupport of CIVIL SOCIETY; and (under the common diſpenſation of Providence) a FUTURE STATE, as neceſſary to RELIGION; becauſe, nothing but a *future ſtate* can remove the objections to God's moral Government, under ſuch a Providence; whoſe phænomena are apt to diſturb the ſerious Profeſſors of Religion, as it is of the eſſence of religious profeſſion, to believe that *God is a rewarder of thoſe who diligently ſeek him.*

MOSES, who inſtituted a *Religion* and a *Republic*, and incorporated them together, ſtands ſingle amongſt ancient and modern Lawgivers, in teaching a *Religion* WITHOUT the ſanction, or even the mention, of a *Future State of Rewards and Puniſhments.* The ſame MOSES, by uniting the Religion and the Republic of the Jews into one ſyſtem, made God by conſequence their ſupreme civil Magiſtrate, whereby the form of Government became truly and properly THEOCRATICAL.

The

The natural consequence of a *Theocratic* rule is an *extraordinary* or EQUAL PROVIDENCE. And such indeed, the Jewish Lawgiver has every where represented it to be.

Now, the question between Infidels and Believers is, whether this extraordinary Providence was REAL or only PRETENDED?

Here the Author of the *Divine Legation* interposes; and undertakes to prove, from the circumstance of the *omission of a future state*, that it was REAL. His Argument stands thus:

If Religion be necessary to Civil Government, and if Religion cannot subsist, under the common dispensation of Providence, without a future state of rewards and punishments, so consummate a Lawgiver would never have omitted to inculcate the belief of such a State, unless he had been well assured that an *extraordinary Providence* was indeed to be administred over his People: or were it possible he had been so infatuated, the impotency of a Religion wanting a future state, must very soon have concluded in the destruction of his REPUBLIC; But his Republic nevertheless continued flourishing and Sovereign, for many ages.

This is the plain and simple ARGUMENT of the *Divine Legatian*; which the first and the second Volumes of that Work are employed to explain and illustrate. And it must be owned, Lord Bolingbroke saw it in its force, as appears from his various contrivances to evade it. This praise it would be unjust to deny him, when others have understood so little of the *Argument*, as to imagine that the two first Volumes had left it unfinished; and that the Third was

to compleat the *Syllogiſm*; tho' the Author had told us, more than once, that the purpoſe of the laſt Volume was only to INFORCE the various parts of the foregoing ARGUMENT, by many new conſiderations.

To evade, as we ſay, this Argument, his Lordſhip caſts about for a reaſon, independent of the EXTRAORDINARY PROVIDENCE, to account for Moſes's OMISSION of a future ſtate. And his firſt ſolution is this, "MOSES DID NOT BELIEVE THE IMMORTALITY OF THE SOUL, nor the rewards "and puniſhments of another life, tho' it is poſſible "he might have learnt theſe Doctrines from the "Egyptians, WHO TAUGHT THEM VERY EARLY, "perhaps as they taught that of the Unity of God. "When I ſay, *that Moſes did not believe the immortality of the ſoul*, nor future rewards and puniſhments, my reaſon is this, that he taught neither, "when *he had to do with a people whom a Theocracy could not reſtrain*; and on whom, therefore, "terrors of Puniſhment, *future* as well as preſent, "*eternal* as well as temporary, could never be too "much multiplied, or too ſtrongly inculcated [1]."

This reaſoning is altogether worthy of his Lordſhip. Here we have a *Doctrine*, plauſible in itſelf, and therefore of eaſy admittance; Moſt alluring to human nature, and therefore embraced by all mankind; Of higheſt account among the Egyptians, and therefore ready to be embraced by the Iſraelites, who were fond of Egyptian manners; Of ſtrongeſt efficacy on the minds of an unruly people, and therefore of indiſpenſable uſe; Yet, all this notwithſtanding, *Moſes*

[1] Vol. iii. p. 289.

did

did not believe it, and, on that account, would not teach it. — But then, had MOSES's integrity been so severe, How came he to write a History which, my Lord thinks, is, in part at least, a fiction of his own? Did he *believe* that? How came he to leave the Israelites, as my Lord assures us he did, in possession of many of the superstitious opinions of Egypt? he *believe* them too? No, but they served his purpose; which was, The better governing an unruly People. Well, but his Lordship tells us, the doctrine of a future state served this purpose best of all; for *having to do with a People whom a Theocracy could not restrain, terrors of punishment,* FUTURE *as well as present,* ETERNAL *as well as temporary, could never be too much multiplied, or too strongly inculcated.* No matter for that. MOSES, as other men may, on a sudden grows scrupulous; and so, together with the maxims of common politics, throws aside the principles of common sense; and when he had employed all the other inventions of fraud, he boggles at this, which best served his purpose; was most innocent in itself; and was most important in its general, as well as particular, use.

In his Lordship's next Volume, this *Omission* comes again upon the stage; and then we have *another* reason assigned for MOSES's conduct in this matter. "MOSES would not teach the Doctrine of the immortality of the soul, and of a future state, *on account of the many superstitions* which this Doctrine had begot in Egypt, as we must believe, or *believe that he knew nothing of it,* or ASSIGN SOME WHIMSICAL REASON FOR HIS OMISSION [2]."

[2] Vol. iv. p. 470.

We have seen before, that MOSES omitted a future state, because he did not believe it. This reason is now out of date; and one or other of the three following is to be assigned; either because it *begot superstitions*; or because *he knew nothing of it*; or because HE COULD DO WITHOUT IT, as the Jews were under an *extraordinary* providence; that being what he means, by the *whimsical reason assigned*, [by the Author of the *Divine Legation*] *for its omission*.

Let us take him then, at his word, without expecting however that he will stand to it, and having shewn, his two first reasons not worth a rush, leave the last established even on his own concessions.

1. *Moses*, says he, *omitted a future state on account of the many superstitions, which this doctrine had begot in Egypt*. But if the *omission* stands upon this principle, MOSES must have omitted an infinite number of Rites and Doctrines, which, Lord Bolingbroke says, he borrowed from the Egyptians; part of which, in his Lordship's opinion, were those very superstitions, which this *Doctrine had begot*; such as the notion of *tutelary Deities*; and part, such as arose out of those; in which number were *distinction between things clean and unclean*; an *hereditary Priesthood*; *sacerdotal habits*; and *Rites of sacrifice*.

2. However, he has another reason for the omission: MOSES *might know nothing of it*. To which if I only opposed his Lordship's own words in another place, (where, giving us the reasons why MOSES did *know something* of a future state, he observes, there are *certain rites, which seem to allude or have a remote relation to this very doctrine* [3], it might be deemed

[3] Vol. v. p. 239.

suffi-

ſufficient. But I go further, and obſerve, that, from the very LAWS of MOSES themſelves, we have an internal evidence of his knowledge of this doctrine. Amongſt the Laws againſt Gentile Divinations, there is one concerning that ſpecies of them, called by the Greeks NECROMANCY, or *invocation of the dead*; which neceſſarily implies, in the Lawgiver who forbids it, as well as in the offender who uſes it, the *knowledge of a future ſtate*.

3. This being the fate of his Lordſhip's two reaſons, we are now abandoned by him, and left to follow our own inventions, and to take up with SOME WHIMSICAL REASON FOR THE OMISSION; that is, to allow that, as the Jews were under an *extraordinary* Providence, MOSES in quality of Lawgiver had NO OCCASION for the doctrine of a *future ſtate*.

However, his Lordſhip diſſatisfied, as well he might, with the ſolutions hitherto propoſed, returns again to the charge; And in his *Corona operis*, the book of FRAGMENTS, more openly oppoſes the doctrine of the *Divine Legation*; and enlarges and expatiates upon the reaſon, before given, for the *omiſſion*; namely, *the many ſuperſtitions this doctrine had begotten in Egypt*.

" ONE CANNOT SEE WITHOUT SURPRIZE (ſays " his Lordſhip) a doctrine ſo uſeful to ALL Religion, " and therefore incorporated into ALL the Syſtems of " Paganiſm, left wholly out of that of the JEWS. Ma- " ny probable reaſons might be brought to ſhew, that " it was an Egyptian doctrine before the Exode, and " this particularly, that it was propagated from Egypt, " ſo ſoon, at leaſt, afterwards, by all thoſe who were " inſtructed like MOSES, in the wiſdom of that people.

" He

" He tranſported much of his Wiſdom into the " ſcheme of Religion and Government, which he " gave the Iſraelites; and, amongſt other things, " certain Rites, which may ſeem to allude, or have " a remote relation to, this very doctrine. Tho' this " doctrine therefore, had not been that of ABRAHAM, " ISAAC, and JACOB, He might have adopted it with " as little ſcruple, as he did many cuſtoms and inſti- " tutions merely Egyptian. He had to do with a re- " bellious, but a ſuperſtitious, people. In the firſt " Character, they made it neceſſary that he ſhould " neglect nothing which might add weight to his or- " dinances, and contribute to keep them in awe. In " the ſecond, their diſpoſition was extremely proper " to receive ſuch a doctrine, and to be influenced by " it. *Shall we ſay that an hypotheſis of future rewards* " *and puniſhments, was uſeleſs among a People who lived* " *under a Theocracy*, and that the future Judge of other " People, was their immediate Judge and King, " who reſided in the midſt of them, and who dealed " out rewards and puniſhments on every occaſion? " Why then were ſo many precautions taken? Why " was a ſolemn Covenant made with God, as with a " temporal Prince? Why were ſo many promiſes and " threatnings of rewards and puniſhments, temporal " indeed, but future and contingent, as we find in the " book of Deuteronomy, moſt pathetically held out " by MOSES? Would there have been any more im- " propriety in holding out thoſe of one kind than " thoſe of another, becauſe the ſupreme Being, who " diſpoſed and ordered both, was in a particular man- " ner preſent amongſt them? Would an addition to " the catalogue of rewards and puniſhments more " remote, but eternal, and in all reſpects far greater,

" have

" have had no effect? I think neither of these things " can be said.

" What shall we say then? How came it to pass, " this addition was not made? I will mention what " occurs to me, and shall not be over sollicitous about " the weight that my reflexions may deserve. If the " doctrines of the immortality of the soul and of a " future state had been revealed to MOSES, that he " might teach them to the Israelites, he would have " taught them most certainly. But he did not teach " them. They were therefore not revealed to him. " Why they were not so revealed some PERT DIVINE " or other will be ready to tell you. For me, I dare " not presume to guess. But this, I may presume to " advance, that since these Doctrines were not re- " vealed by God to his servant MOSES, it is highly " probable that this Legislator made a scruple of " teaching them to the Israelites, how well soever " instructed he might be in them himself, and how- " soever useful to Government he might think them. " The superstitious and idolatrous rites of the Egyp- " tians, like those of other nations, were founded on " the Polytheism, and the Mythology that prevailed, " and were suffered to prevail, amongst the Vulgar, " and that made the sum of their Religion. It seem- " ed to be a point of policy to direct all these absurd " opinions and practices to the service of Govern- " ment, instead of attempting to root them out. But " then the great difference between rude and ignorant " nations and such as were civilized and learned, " like the Egyptians, seems to have been this, that " the former had no other system of Religion than " these absurd opinions and practices, whereas the

" latter

" latter had an inward as well as an outward Doc-
" trine. There is reaſon to believe that natural
" Theology and natural Religion had been taught
" and practiſed in the ancient Theban Dynaſty; and
" it is probable that they continued to be an *inward*
" doctrine in the reſt of Egypt, while Polytheiſm,
" Idolatry, and all the MYSTERIES, all the impieties,
" and all the follies of Magic, were the *outward*
" doctrine. MOSES might be let into a knowledge
" of both; and under the patronage of the Princeſs,
" whoſe Foundling he was, he might be initiated
" into thoſe *Myſteries*, where the ſecret doctrine alone
" was taught, and the outward exploded. But we
" cannot imagine that the Children of Iſrael, in ge-
" neral, enjoyed the ſame privilege, nor that the
" Maſters were ſo laviſh, to their Slaves, of a favour
" ſo diſtinguiſhed, and often ſo hard to obtain. No.
" The Children of Iſrael knew nothing more than
" the outſide of the Religion of Egypt, and if the
" doctrine, we ſpeak of, was known to them, it was
" known only in the ſuperſtitious rites, and with all
" the fabulous circumſtances in which it was dreſſed
" up and preſented to vulgar belief. It would have
" been hard therefore to teach, or to renew this Doc-
" trine in the minds of the Iſraelites, without giving
" them an occaſion the more, to recall the polythe-
" iſtical fables, and practiſe the idolatrous Rites they
" had learnt during their Captivity. Rites and Ce-
" remonies are often ſo equivocal, that they may be
" applied to very different doctrines. But when they
" are ſo cloſely connected with one Doctrine that
" they are not applicable to another, to teach the
" Doctrine is, in ſome ſort, to teach the Rites and Ce-
" remonies,

"remonies, and to authorize the fables on which "they are founded. MOSES therefore being at liberty "to teach this doctrine of rewards and punishments "in a future state, or not to teach it, might very well "choose the latter; tho' he indulged the Israelites, "on account of the hardness of their hearts, and by "the divine permission, as it is presumed, in several "observances and customs which did not lead direct-"ly, tho' even they did so perhaps in consequence, "to the Polytheism and Idolatry of Egypt [4]."

What a Babel of bad reasoning has his Lordship here accumulated out of the rubbish of false and inconsistent Principles! And all, to insult the Temple of God and the Fortress of Mount Sion. Sometimes, he represents MOSES as a divine Messenger, and distinguishes between what was revealed, and what was not revealed, unto him; and then, *a future state not being revealed to* MOSES *was the reason he did not teach it.* Sometimes again, he considers him as a mere human Lawgiver, acquiring all his knowledge of Religion and Politics from the Egyptians, in whose secret Learning he had been intimately instructed; and then, the reason of the *omission* is, *lest the Doctrine of a future state should have drawn* the *Israelites into those Egyptian superstitions*, from which, it was MOSES's purpose to estrange them. All these inconsistencies in *Fact* and *Reasoning*, his Lordship delivers in the same breath, and without the least intimation of any change in his Principles or Opinions.

But let us follow him step by step, without troubling our heads about his real sentiments; which this

[4] Vol. v. p. 238—9—40—41.

View

View of his talents regards with indifference. It is enough, that we confute all he says, whether under his own, or any assumed Character.

He begins with confessing, that ONE CANNOT SEE WITHOUT SURPRIZE, *a doctrine so useful to* ALL *Religions, and therefore incorporated into* ALL *the Systems of Paganism, left wholly out of that of the Jews.*

It seems then, this OMISSION is no light or trivial matter, which may be accounted for by MOSES's *disbelief* of the doctrine; his *ignorance* of it; or the *imaginary mischiefs* it might possibly produce. So that we may be allowed to think it deserved all the pains, the Author of the *Divine Legation of Moses* has bestowed upon it: whose *whimsical reasoning*, if it ended in a demonstration of Revealed Religion, sufficiently attoned for it's going a little out of the way.

His Lordship proceeds to shew, in direct opposition to what he said before, that MOSES could not be ignorant of the doctrine of a future state, because the Egyptians taught it: His knowledge of it, (my Lord tells us) further appears from an *internal* circumstance, *some of his rites seeming to allude, or to have a remote relation to, this very doctrine.* This I observe, to his Lordship's credit. The remark is just and accurate. But we are in no want of his *remote relation*; I have shewn just above, that the jewish Laws against *Necromancy* necessarily imply Moses's knowledge of the Doctrine.

He then goes on to explain the advantages which, humanly speaking, the Israelites must have received from this Doctrine, in the temper and circumstances with which they left Egypt. MOSES, says he, *had to do with a rebellious and a superstitious People.* This likewise

likewise I observe to his credit: It has the same marks of sagacity and truth; and brings us to the very verge of the *Solution*, proposed by the Author of the *Divine Legation*; which is, that the Israelites were indeed under an *extraordinary Providence*, which supplied all the disadvantages of the *Omission*. Under a *common and unequal* Providence, RELIGION cannot subsist without the doctrine of a future state: for Religion implying a just retribution of reward and punishment, which under such a Providence is not dispensed, a future state must needs subvene, to prevent the whole Edifice from falling into ruin. And thus we account for the *fact*, which his Lordship so amply acknowledges, viz. *that the doctrine of a future state was most useful to* ALL *Religions, and therefore incorporated into* ALL *the Religions of Paganism.* But where an *extraordinary* Providence is administered, good and evil are exactly distributed; and therefore, in this circumstance, a future state is not necessary for the support of Religion. It is not to be found in the Mosaic Oeconomy; yet this Oeconomy subsisted for many ages: Religion therefore did not need it; or, in other words, it was supported by an *extraordinary Providence.*

This is the argument of the *Divine Legation.* Let us now consider his Lordship's present attempts to evade it.

Shall we say, that an Hypothesis of future rewards and punishments was useless amongst a people who lived under a THEOCRACY, *and that the future Judge of other People was their immediate Judge and King, who resided in the midst of them, and who dealt out rewards and punishments*

niſtments on every occaſion? WHY THEN WERE SO MANY PRECAUTIONS *taken?* &c.

Firſt, let me obſerve, that the PRECAUTIONS here objected to are intended for an inſinuation againſt the truth of Moſes's Promiſe of an extraordinary Providence. A kind of SOPHISM which his Lordſhip advances and only holds in common with the reſt who have written againſt the *Divine Legation:* and which I ſhall here, after much forbearance on the Author's part, expoſe as it deſerves.

MOSES affirms again and again, that his People were under an extraordinary Providence. He affirms it indeed; but as it is not a ſelf evident truth, it needs to be proved. Till then, the Unbeliever is at liberty to urge any circumſtance in the jewiſh Law or Hiſtory, which may ſeem to bring the reality of that Providence into queſtion: The ſame liberty too, has the Believer; if, at leaſt, he canperſuade himſelf to make uſe of it; as many, ſo profeſſing themſelves, have done both in their Writings and Diſcourſings againſt the *Divine Legation.* Things were in this train, when the Author of that book undertook the defence of MOSES: And to obviate all objections to the Legiſlator's credit, ariſing from any doubtful or unfavourable circumſtance in the Law or Hiſtory of the Jews concerning this extraordinary Providence, he advanced the INTERNAL ARGUMENT of the OMISSION. An argument which neceſſarily inferred that an extraordinary Providence was in fact adminiſtred in the jewiſh Republic. What change did this make in the ſtate of the caſe? A very great one. Unbelievers were now indeed at liberty, and Believers too, if ſo perverſely inclined, to oppoſe, and, as they could, to confute the

the Argument of the *Divine Legation:* But by no rules of good Logic could they come over again with thoſe ſcripture-difficulties to Moſes's credit, which the argument of the *Divine Legation* had entirely obviated, and which it ſtill continued to exclude ſo long as it remained unanſwered. For while a demonſtrated truth ſtands good, no difficulties ariſing from it, however inexplicable, can have any weight againſt that ſuperior evidence. Not to admit this fundamental maxim of common ſenſe, would be to unſettle many a *phyſical* and *mathematical* demonſtration, as well as this *moral* one.

I ſay therefore, as things now ſtand, To oppoſe *difficulties* againſt the adminiſtration of an extraordinary Providence, after that providence has been *proved,* and before the *proof* has been confuted, is the moſt palpable and barefaced impoſition on our underſtanding. In which however, his Lordſhip is but one of a hundred: and indeed, the leaſt indecent and inconſiſtent of the hundred; as his declared purpoſe is to deſtroy the credit and authority of the Jewiſh Lawgiver.

I ſhall not however decline to examine the weight of theſe objections, tho' they be ſo fooliſhly and ſophiſtically obtruded.

If there was this EXTRAORDINARY Providence adminiſtred, ſays his Lordſhip, *Why ſo many Precautions taken? Why was a ſolemn covenant made with God as with a temporal Prince? Why were ſo many promiſes and threatnings of rewards and puniſhments, temporal indeed, but future and contingent, as we find, in the Book of Deuteronomy, moſt pathetically held out by Moſes?* This difficulty is not hard to be reſolved. We find throughout, what *we* Believers are wont to call the *Hiſtory of Providence,*

Providence, but which *his Lordſhip* is pleaſed to intitle, *Tales more extravagant than thoſe of Amadis de Gaule*, that God, in his moral Government of the World, always makes uſe of human means, as far as thoſe means will go; and never interpoſes with his *extraordinary* Providence, but when they will go no further. To do otherwiſe, would be to make an unneceſſary waſte of Miracles; better fitted to confound our knowledge of NATURE, by obſcuring the harmony of order, than to manifeſt it's Lord and Sovereign, by controlling its delegated Powers. This method in God's moral Government, all our ideas of Wiſdom ſeem to ſupport. Now when He, the great Maſter of the Univerſe, had decreed to rule the Jewiſh People in an extraordinary way, he did not propoſe to ſuperſede any of the meaſures of civil regimen. And this, I hope, will be eſteemed a ſufficient anſwer to—WHY SO MANY PRECAUTIONS TAKEN, &c. But would you ſee it drawn out more at large, you may conſult the Author's *remarks* on the ſame kind of Sophiſtry employed by Dr. SYKES againſt the *Divine Legation*.

But, (ſays his Lordſhip) *would the hypotheſis of a future ſtate have been uſeleſs*, &c? *Would there* (as his Lordſhip goes on) *have been any more impropriety in holding out thoſe* [ſanctions] *of one kind than thoſe of another, becauſe the ſupreme Being, who diſpoſed and ordered both, was in a particular manner preſent amongſt them? Would an addition of rewards and puniſhments, (more remote, but eternal, and in all reſpects far greater) to the catalogue, have had no effect? I think neither of theſe things can be ſaid.* His Lordſhip totally miſtakes the drift of the Author's Argument. The *Divine Lega-*

tion

tion infers no more from the fact of the *omiſſion* than this, That the Jewiſh Oeconomy, adminiſtred by an extraordinary providence, could do without the ſervice of the *omitted* Doctrine; not, that that Doctrine, even under ſuch a Diſpenſation, was *of no uſe*, much leſs that it was IMPROPER. But then one of his Followers, or, what is as good, one of the Adverſaries of the *Divine Legation*, will be ready to ſay, "If a *future ſtate* was not *improper*, much more if it was of *uſe*, under an extraordinary diſpenſation, How came MOSES not to give it? For great and wiſe ends of Providence vaſtly countervailing the uſe of that Doctrine, if you will believe the Author of the *Divine Legation:* Who, if he did not impoſe upon us, when he promiſed a third volume, (as his Lordſhip conſtantly believed he did) will there explain thoſe ends at large.

Lord Bolingbroke proceeds next to tell us, what occurs to Him, concerning the REASONS of the *omiſſion*; And previouſly aſſures us, he is *not over ſollicitous about their weight*. This, I ſuppoſe, is to make his Counters paſs current: For then, as Hobbes expreſſes it, they become the *money of fools*, when we ceaſe to be *ſollicitous* about their worth; when we try them by their colour, not their weight; their Rhetoric, and not their Logic. But this muſt be ſaid with exception to the firſt, which is altogether logical, and very entertaining.

If (ſays his Lordſhip) *the doctrine of the immortality of the ſoul and a future ſtate had been revealed to Moſes, that he might teach them to the Iſraelites, he would have taught them moſt certainly. But he did not teach them. They were, therefore, not revealed.* It is in mood and figure, you ſee; and, I warrant you, deſigned to ſupply what was wanting in the

Divine Legation: Tho' as the Author of that book certainly believed, *the doctrines were not revealed*, 'tis ten to one but he thought Moſes was not at liberty to teach them; unleſs you can ſuppoſe that his Lordſhip, who believed nothing of Revelation, might believe Moſes to be reſtrained from teaching what God had not revealed to him; and yet, that the Author of the *Divine Legation*, who held Moſes's pretenſions to be true, might think him at liberty to go beyond his Commiſſion. Thus far, then, theſe two Writers may be ſaid to agree: But this good underſtanding laſts not long. His Lordſhip's *modeſty* and the other's *pertneſs* ſoon make the breach as wide as ever. — *Why they were not ſo revealed* (ſays his Lordſhip) *ſome* PERT DIVINE *or other will be ready to tell you. For me, I dare not pretend to gueſs.* The forwardneſs of the one and the backwardneſs of the other, are equally well ſuited to their reſpective principles. Should his Lordſhip have gueſſed, it might have brought him to what he moſt dreaded, the divine original of the Jewiſh Religion: Had his Adverſary forborn to gueſs, he had betrayed his cauſe, and left thoſe data unemployed, which enabled him, I do not ſay to gueſs, but to diſcover, and to *demonſtrate the Divine Legation of Moſes.*

However, *This*, his Lordſhip *will preſume to advance, that ſince theſe doctrines were not revealed by God to his ſervant* MOSES, *it is highly probable, that the Legiſlator made a ſcruple of teaching them to the Iſraelites, howſoever well inſtructed he might be in them himſelf, and howſoever uſeful to Government he might think them.*

Here, you ſee, he perſonates a Believer, who holds MOSES to be an inſpired Lawgiver: But obſerve how poorly he ſuſtains his part! Either MOSES did indeed receive

receive the LAW from God, or he did not. If he did not, Why are we mocked with the diſtinction between what was revealed, and what was not revealed, when nothing was revealed? If MOSES did receive the *Law* from God, Why are we ſtill worſe mocked with the diſtinction between what was revealed, and what was not revealed, when every thing was revealed; as well, the direction for omitting *a future ſtate*, as the direction to *inculcate the Unity of the Godhead?* Why was all this mockery, you ſay? For a very good purpoſe: it was to draw us from the TRUE object of our inquiry, which is, What GOD intended by the *omiſſion*; to that FANTASTIC object, which only reſpects, what MOSES intended by it. For the intention of GOD ſuppoſes the miſſion and inſpiration of a Prophet; but the intention of MOSES, when conſidered in contradiſtinction to God's, terminates in the human views of an ordinary Lawgiver; which leads us back again to Infidelity.

But he ſoon ſtrips Moſes of his Miſſion, and inveſts him again with his civil Character: And here he conſiders, What it was, which, under this character, might induce Moſes to *omit* a future ſtate; and he finds it to be, leſt this doctrine ſhould have hurt the doctrine of the Unity, which it was his purpoſe to inculcate amongſt his People, in oppoſition to the Egyptian Polytheiſm.

Moſes (ſays his Lordſhip) *it is highly probable, made a ſcruple of teaching theſe Doctrines to the Iſraelites, howſoever well inſtructed he might be in them, himſelf, and howſoever uſeful to Government he might think them. The People of Egypt, like all other nations, were Polytheiſts, but different from all others: there was in Egypt an inward as well as outward Doctrine: Natural Theo-*

logy and natural Religion were the inward Doctrine; while Polytheism, Idolatry, and ALL THE MYSTERIES, *all the impieties and follies of magic, were the* OUTWARD *Doctrine. Moses was initiated into those Mysteries where the secret doctrine alone was taught, and the outward exploded* — For an accurate Divider, commend me to his Lordship. In distinguishing between the *inward* and *outward* doctrines of the Egyptians, he puts *all the Mysteries* amongst the *outward:* tho' if they had an *inward,* it must necessarily be part of those *Mysteries.* But he makes amends presently, (tho' his amends to truth is as it should be, always at the expence of a contradiction) and says, that *Moses learnt the inward doctrine in the Mysteries.* Let this pass. He proceeds — *Moses had the knowledge of both outward and inward. Not so the Israelites in general. They knew nothing more than the outside of the Religion of Egypt. And if a future state was known to them, it was known only in the superstitious rites, and with all the fabulous circumstances, in which it was dressed up and presented to the vulgar belief. It would be hard therefore to teach or to renew this doctrine in the minds of the Israelites, without giving them an occasion the more to recal the Polytheistical fables, and practise the idolatrous rites they had learnt during their Captivity.*

The Children of Israel, it seems, *knew no more of a future state, than by the superstitious rites and fabulous circumstances with which it was dressed up and presented to the public belief.* What then? MOSES, he owns, *knew more.* And what hindered MOSES from communicating of his knowledge to the People, when he took them under his protection, and gave them a new Law and a new Religion? His Lordship lets us understand that this People knew as little of the Unity; for

for he tells us, it was amongſt the inward Doctrines of the Egyptians: yet this did not hinder Moſes from inſtructing his people in the doctrine of the Unity. What then ſhould hinder his teaching them the inward doctrine of a future ſtate, diveſted of its fabulous circumſtances? He had diveſted *Religious worſhip* of the abſurdities of Demi-Gods and Heroes; What ſhould hinder him from diveſting a *future ſtate* of Charon's boat and the Elyſian fields? But the notion of a future ſtate would have recalled thoſe fabulous circumſtances which had been long connected with it. And was not Religious worſhip, under the idea of a *tutelar Deity*, and a *temporal King*, much more apt to recal the polytheiſm of Egypt? Yet Moſes ventured upon this inconvenience, for the ſake of great advantages: Why ſhould he not venture on the other, for the ſake of greater? for the doctrine of a future ſtate, is, as his Lordſhip confeſſes, even neceſſary both to civil and religious Society. But what does he talk of the danger of giving entry to the fables and ſuperſtitions concerning the ſoul (ſuperſtitions, which, tho' learnt indeed in the Captivity, were common to all the nations of Polytheiſm) when in other places he aſſures us, that Moſes indulged the Iſraelites in the moſt characteriſtic ſuperſtitions of Egypt?

However, let us ſee how he ſupports this wiſe obſervation. *Rites and Ceremonies* (ſays his Lordſhip) *are often ſo equivocal, that they may be applied to very different doctrines. But when they are ſo cloſely connected with a doctrine, that they are not applicable to another, to teach the doctrine, is,* IN SOME SORT, *to teach the rites and ceremonies.*— *In ſome ſort*, is well put in, to ſoften

deformity of this inverted logic. His point is to shew that a superstitious Rite, relating to, and dependent on, a certain Doctrine, will obtrude itself whenever that Doctrine is taught: and his reasoning is only calculated to prove, that where the Rite is practised, the Doctrine will soon follow. This may indeed be true. But then it does not hold in the reverse, that the Rite follows the Doctrine: because a Principal may stand without its Dependent; but a Dependent can never subsist without its Principal.

Under cover of these grotesque shapes, into which his Lordship has travestied the Jewish Law-giver, he concludes, that MOSES *being* AT LIBERTY *to teach this doctrine of rewards and punishments in a future state, or not to teach it, he might very well chuse the latter* — Yet it was but at the very beginning of this paragraph that he tells us, *Moses was* NOT AT LIBERTY *to teach or not to teach.* His words are these, *Since this doctrine was not revealed by God to his servant Moses, it is highly probable that this Legislator* MADE A SCRUPLE *of teaching it.* But his Lordship well knows that Statesmen soon get the better of their *scruples*; and then, by another fetch of political casuistry, find themselves more at liberty than ever.

I had observed above that our noble Discourser who makes MOSES so *scrupulous* that he would on no terms afford a handle for one single superstition of Egypt to get footing among his people; has, on other occasions, charged him with introducing them by wholesale. He was sensible, his Inconsistency was likely to be detected, and therefore he now attempts to obviate it. — *Tho' he* [Moses] *indulged the Israelites, on account of the hardness of their hearts, and by the divine*

vine permiſſion, as it is preſumed, in ſeveral obſervations and cuſtoms, which did not LEAD *directly, tho' even they did ſo perhaps* IN CONSEQUENCE, *to the Polytheiſm and Idolatry of Egypt.* And could the teaching the doctrine of a future ſtate poſſibly do more than LEAD IN CONSEQUENCE, (as his Lordſhip elegantly expreſſes it) *to the Polytheiſm and Idolatry of Egypt,* by drawing after it thoſe *ſuperſtitious Rites and fabulous circumſtances* which, he tells us, then attended the popular notion of ſuch a State? If, for the *hardneſs of their hearts,* they were indulged in *ſeveral obſervances and cuſtoms,* which only *led in conſequence* to Polytheiſm and Idolatry, Why, for the *ſame* hardneſs of heart, were they not indulged with the doctrine of a future ſtate, which did not lead, but by a very remote conſequence, to Polytheiſm and Idolatry? Eſpecially ſince this *hardneſs of heart* would leſs bear the denial of a DOCTRINE ſo alluring to the human mind, than the denial of a RITE, to which habit only and old cuſtom had given an occaſional propenſity. Again, thoſe Rites, indulged to the People, for the *hardneſs of their hearts,* had, in themſelves, little uſe or tendency to advance the ends of the Jewiſh Diſpenſation; but rather retarded them: Whereas a future ſtate, by his Lordſhip's own confeſſion, is moſt uſeful to all Religions, and therefore incorporated into all the Syſtems of Paganiſm; and was particularly uſeful to the Iſraelites, who were, he ſays, both a *rebellious* and a *ſuperſtitious* people: diſpoſitions, which not only made it neceſſary to omit nothing that might inforce obedience, but likewiſe facilitated the reception and ſupported the influence of the doctrine in queſtion.

You have here the whole of his Lordſhip's boaſted ſolution of this important Circumſtance of the OMISSION. And you ſee how vainly he ſtrives to elude its force. Overwhelmed, as it were, with the weight of ſo irreſiſtible a Power, after long wriggling to get free, he at length crawls forth; but ſo maimed and broken, ſo impotent and fretful, that all his remaining ſtrength is in his venom. And this, he now ſheds in abundance over the whole Moſaic Oeconomy. It is pronounced to be a groſs impoſture; and this very circumſtance of the OMISSION is given as an undoubted proof of the accuſation.

—"Can we be ſurpriſed then (ſays his Lordſhip) "that the Jews aſcribed to the all-perfect Being, on "various occaſions, ſuch a conduct and ſuch Laws "as are inconſiſtent with his moſt obvious per-"fections? Can we believe ſuch a conduct and ſuch "Laws to have been his, on the word of the proudeſt "and moſt lying Nation in the world? Many other "conſiderations might have their place here. But "I ſhall confine myſelf to one; *which I do not re-"member to have ſeen nor heard urged on one ſide, nor* "ANTICIPATED *on the other*. To ſhew then, the "more evidently, how ABSURD, as well as IMPIOUS "it is to aſcribe theſe Moſaical Laws to God, let it "be conſidered, that NEITHER the people of Iſrael, "nor their Legiſlator perhaps, KNEW ANY THING "OF ANOTHER LIFE, wherein the crimes committed "in this life are to be puniſhed. Altho' he might "have learned this Doctrine, which was not ſo much "a ſecret doctrine as it may be preſumed that the "Unity of the ſupreme God was, amongſt the Egyp-"tians. Whether he had learned both or either, or

"neither

" neither of them in thoſe ſchools, cannot be deter-
" mined: BUT THIS MAY BE ADVANCED WITH
" ASSURANCE; If MOSES knew, that crimes, and
" therefore Idolatry, one of the greateſt, were to be
" puniſhed in another life, he deceived the people in
" the Covenant they made, by his intervention, with
" God. If he did not know it, I ſay it with horror,
" the conſequence, *according to the hypotheſis I oppoſe*,
" muſt be, that God deceived both him and them.
" In either caſe, a covenant or bargain was made,
" wherein, the conditions of obedience and diſobe-
" dience were not fully, nor by conſequence, fairly
" ſtated. The Iſraelites had better things to hope,
" and worſe to fear, than thoſe which were expreſſed
" in it: and their whole hiſtory ſeems to ſhew how
" much need they had of theſe additional motives
" to reſtrain them from Polytheiſm and Idolatry, and
" to anſwer the aſſumed Purpoſes of divine Provi-
" dence [2]."

This argument, *advanced with* ſo much *aſſurance*, his Lordſhip ſays, he does *not remember to have ſeen, or heard urged on one ſide, nor anticipated on the other*. A gentle reproof, as we are to underſtand it, of the Author of the *Divine Legation*: for none but He, I think, could *anticipate* an objection to an Argument which none but He had employed. Give me leave then to ſupply his defects: I am the firſt good natured Animadverter on him that has done ſo; the reſt have contented themſelves with their beſt endeavours to expoſe them. And as his Lordſhip is ſo generous to invite an anſwer to it, he ſhall not be diſappointed.

[2] Vol. v. p. 194—5.

Let it be conſidered (ſays his Lordſhip) *that perhaps Moſes* KNEW NOTHING *of another life, wherein the crimes committed in this life are to be puniſhed.*— *Conſidered* by whom? Not by his Lordſhip, or his kind Readers: for his reaſoning has brought them to *conſider* the contrary. "Many probable reaſons (ſays he) "might be brought to ſhew, that this was an Egyp- "tian doctrine before the exode; and this particularly, "that it was propagated from Egypt, ſo ſoon at "leaſt afterwards, by all thoſe who were inſtructed "LIKE MOSES, in the wiſdom of that People. He "tranſported much of this wiſdom into the ſcheme of "Religion and Government which he gave the Iſrael- "ites; and, among other things, certain Rites, which "SEEM TO ALLUDE, OR HAVE A REMOTE RELA- "TION TO, THIS DOCTRINE [3]." This poſſibly might have recurred to his Lordſhip, while he was boaſting of this new and *unanticipated* argument, and therefore, in the tricking it up amongſt his *Fragments*, to his *perhaps*, he adds, by a very happy corrective, *altho' Moſes might have learnt this Doctrine, which* WAS NOT SO MUCH A SECRET *doctrine, as it may be preſumed that the Unity of the ſupreme God was amongſt the Egyptians.* But he had done better to have left his contradictions uncorrected, and have truſted to the rare ſagacity of his Readers to find them out. He had ever an ill hand at reconciling matters; ſo in the caſe before us, in the very act of covering one contradiction, he commits another. He is here ſpeaking of a future ſtate, diveſted of its fabulous circumſtances; *Perhaps*,

[3] Vol. v. p. 328—9.

ſays he, MOSES KNEW NOTHING OF ANOTHER LIFE. *Which, was* NOT SO MUCH A SECRET *doctrine as that of the Unity.* Now, Sir, turn back a moment, to the long quotation from his 239th page, and there you will find, that a future ſtate, diveſted of its fabulous circumſtances, WAS AS MUCH A SECRET *Doctrine, as that of the Unity.*— "There is reaſon to believe, "that natural Theology and natural Religion were "INWARD doctrines amongſt the Egyptians. Mo- "SES might be let into a knowledge of BOTH by "being initiated into thoſe *Myſteries* where the *ſecret* "doctrine alone was taught. But we cannot imagine, "that the Children of Iſrael in general enjoyed the "ſame privilege. No, *they knew nothing more than the* "*outſide* of the Egyptian Religion: and if the *Doctrine* "*we ſpeak of* [A FUTURE STATE] was known to them, "it was known only in the ſuperſtitious Rites, and with "all the fabulous circumſtances, in which it was "dreſſed up and preſented to vulgar belief."—Is not this, now, a plain declaration, that a *future ſtate*, diveſted of its fabulous circumſtances, *was as much a ſecret Doctrine as the doctrine of the Unity?*

But his Lordſhip's contradictions are the leaſt of my concern. It is his Argument I have now to do with. And this, he ſays, he *advances* WITH ASSURANCE. It is fit he ſhould. *Modeſty* would be very ill beſtowed on ſuch opinions.

He thinks he can reduce thoſe who hold no future ſtate in the Jewiſh Oeconomy, to the neceſſity of owning, that MOSES, *or that* GOD *himſelf, acted unfairly by the Iſraelites.* How ſo, You aſk? Becauſe One or Other of them concealed that *ſtate.* And what if they did? Why then they concealed one of

the actual Sanctions of moral conduct, *future punishment*. But who told him, that this, which was no sanction of the *Jewish Law*, was a Sanction to the moral conduct of the *Jewish People?* Who, unless the *artificial Theologer?* the man he most despises and decries.

And, even in *artificial Theology*, there is nothing but the CALVINISTICAL tenet of *Original Sin*, which gives the least countenance to so monstrous an opinion; every thing in the GOSPEL, every thing in NATURAL THEOLOGY, exclaims against it.

JESUS, indeed, to prove that the departed Israelites still existed, quotes the title God was pleased to give himself, of *the God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob*; and this, together with their *existence*, proves likewise the *happiness* of their condition: for the relation they are said to stand in with God, shews them to be of his Kingdom. But we must remember, that the question with his Lordship is, not of *reward*, but *punishment*. Again, JESUS speaks, (indeed in a parable) of the deceased *rich man*, as *in a place of torment*. But we must remember that the scene was laid at a time when the Doctrine of a *future state* was become national. To know his sentiments on the question of *subjection to an unknown Sanction*, we should do well to consider the following words, "The ser-"vant which knew his Lord's will, and prepared not "himself, neither did according to his will, shall be "beaten with many stripes; but he that knew not, "and did commit things worthy of stripes, shall be "beaten with few stripes [4]." Now the will of a

[4] Luke xii. ver. 47—8.

Master

Master or Sovereign, declared in his Laws, always includes in it, the *Sanctions* of those Laws. The Author of the Epistle to the *Hebrews* expressly distinguishes the sanction of the Jewish law from that of the Gospel; and makes the difference to consist in this, that the one was of *temporal* punishments, and the other of *future*. *He that despised Moses's Law died without mercy under two or three witnesses. Of how much sorer punishment, suppose ye, shall he be thought worthy who hath trodden under foot the Son of God* [10]? Which appeal is without common sense or honesty, on supposition that the apostle held the Jews to be subject to *future* punishments, before that Sanction was promulged unto them. From the GOSPEL therefore it cannot be inferred, that the Israelites, while only following the Law of Moses in which the sanction of a *future state* is not delivered, were liable or subject to the punishments of that state.

Let us see next, Whether NATURAL THEOLOGY, or *natural Religion* (as his Lordship is pleased, for some reason or other, to distinguish the terms) hath taught us, that a people, living under an *extraordinary providence* or the immediate government of God, to whom he had given a Law and revealed a Religion, both supported by *temporal* sanctions only, could be deemed subject to those *future* punishments, unknown to them, which *natural* Religion before, and *Revealed* Religion since, have discovered to be due to bad men living under a *common Providence*.

NATURAL RELIGION standeth, (as has been already shewn) on this Principle, " that the Governor

[10] C. x. ℣ 28--9.

" of the Univerſe REWARDS and PUNISHES moral " Agents." The length or ſhortneſs of human exiſtence come not primarily into the idea of Religion: not even into that compleat idea of Religion delivered by St. Paul, in his general definition of it. The Religioniſt, ſays he, *muſt believe that God is, and that he* IS A REWARDER *of thoſe who ſeek him.*

While God exactly diſtributed his rewards and puniſhments *here*, the light of Nature directed men to look no further for the Sanctions of his Laws. But when it came to be ſeen, that He was *not always* a rewarder and a puniſher *here*, men neceſſarily concluded, from his moral attributes, that he would be ſo, *hereafter:* and conſequently, that this life was but a ſmall portion of human duration. They had not yet ſpeculated on the permanent nature of the Soul; And when they did ſo, that conſideration, which, under an *ordinary* providence came ſtrongly in aid of the *moral argument* for another life, had no tendency, under the *extraordinary*, to open to them the proſpects of *futurity:* becauſe, tho' they ſaw the Soul unaffected by thoſe cauſes which brought the body to deſtruction, yet they held it to be equally dependent on the Creator's Will; who, amongſt the various means of its diſſolution, of which they had no idea, had, for aught they knew, provided one or more than one for that purpoſe.

In this manner was a FUTURE STATE brought, by natural light, into Religion: and from thenceforth, became a neceſſary part of it. But, in the Jewiſh THEOCRACY, God was an exact rewarder and puniſher, *here*. Natural light therefore ſhewed that under ſuch an adminiſtration, the ſubjects of it did not

not become liable to future Puniſhments till that ſanction was known amongſt them.

Thus both natural and revealed Religion ſhew, that his Lordſhip calumniated them, when he affirmed, that, *according to the hypotheſis he oppoſed*, MOSES *Deceived the people in the Covenant they made, by his intervention, with God: Or that, if Moſes did not know the doctrine of a future ſtate, then* GOD *deceived both him and them.*

Should it be aſked, how God will deal with wicked men thus dying under the Moſaic Diſpenſation? give me leave to anſwer, in the words of Dr. CLARKE, on a like occaſion. He had demonſtrated a ſelf-moving Subſtance to be immaterial, and ſo, not periſhable like Bodies. But, as this included the Souls of irrational animals, it was aſked "How theſe were to be diſpoſed of, when they had left their reſpective habitations?" To which he very properly replies, "Certainly, the omnipotent and infinitely wiſe God "may, without any great difficulty, be ſuppoſed to "have more ways of diſpoſing of his Creatures [I add, with perfect juſtice and equity, and with equal meaſure, to all] "than we are, at preſent, let into "the ſecret of [11]." — But if the Author of the *Divine Legation* has not promiſed more than he can perform (as his long delay gives us too much cauſe to ſuſpect) this matter will be explained at large, in his account of the SCRIPTURE DOCTRINE OF THE REDEMPTION, which, he has told us, is to have a place in his laſt Volume.

[11] Octavo Tracts againſt Dodwell and Collins, p. 103.

Nothing

Nothing now remains of this objection but the ſanction of *future rewards:* And I would by no means deprive the faithful Iſraelites of theſe. His Lordſhip therefore has this to make his beſt of: and, in his opinion, even an unclaimed *reward* is foul dealing; for he joins it with *puniſhment*, as if his conſequence, againſt God's juſtice and goodneſs, might be equally deduced from either of them.—*A covenant*, ſays he, *was made, wherein the conditions of obedience and diſobedience were not* FULLY, *nor, by conſequence*, FAIRLY *ſtated. The Iſraelites had* BETTER THINGS TO HOPE, *and worſe to fear than thoſe which were expreſſed in it.* Tho' it be hard on a generous *Benefactor* to be denied the right of giving more than he had promiſed; it is ſtill harder on the poor Debtor, that he is not atl iberty to receive more. True it is, that, in this caſe, the *conditions* are not FULLY *ſtated*; and therefore, according to his Lordſhip's Logic, BY CONSEQUENCE NOT FAIRLY. To ſtrengthen this *Conſequence*, his Lordſhip concludes in theſe words—*And their whole Hiſtory ſeems to ſhew how much need they had of theſe additional motives* [future Rewards and Puniſhments] *to reſtrain them from Polytheiſm and Idolatry, and to anſwer the* ASSUMED *purpoſes of Divine Providence.*

Whoever puts all theſe things together—"That Moſes was himſelf of the race of Iſrael—was learned in all the wiſdom of Egypt—and capable of freeing his People from their Yoke—that he brought them within ſight of the promiſed Land; a fertile Country, which they were to conquer and inhabit—that he inſtituted a ſyſtem of Laws, which has been the admiration of the wiſeſt men of all ages—that he underſtood the doctrine of a FUTURE STATE:

and

and by his experience gained in Egypt, knew the efficacy of it in general; and by his perfect knowledge of the rebellious and superstitious temper of his own People, could not but see how useful it was to them in particular"—Whoever, I say, puts all these things together (and all these things are amongst his Lordship's concessions) and at the same time considers, that MOSES, throughout his whole system of Law and Religion, is entirely silent concerning a *future state* of Rewards and Punishments, will, I believe, conclude, that there was something more in the OMISSION than Lord BOLINGBROKE could fathom, or, at least, was willing to discover.

But let us turn from MOSES's conduct, (which will be elsewhere considered at large) to his Lordship's, which is our present business.

1. First, he gives us his conjectures, to account for the *Omission*, exclusive of MOSES's *Divine Legation:* but, as if dissatisfied with them himself (which he well might be, for they destroy one another)

2. He next attempts, You see, to prove, that the *Legation* could not be *divine*, from this very circumstance of the *omission*.

3. But now he will go further, and demonstrate that an *extraordinary providence* in general, such a one as is represented by Moses, and which, the Author of the *Divine Legation* has proved, from the circumstance of the *omission*, was actually administered in the Jewish Republic, could not possibly be administered, without destroying free will; without making Virtue servile; and without relaxing universal benevolence.

4. And

4. And laſtly, to make all ſure, he ſhuts up the account by ſhewing, that an *extraordinary* providence could anſwer no reaſonable end or purpoſe.

In his firſt and laſt order of evaſions, he ſeems to be alone; but in the ſecond and third, he had the pleaſure of ſeeing, many an orthodox Writer againſt the *Divine Legation*, (to uſe his Lordſhip's language) in *confederacy* with him.

I have examined his Lordſhip's firſt and ſecond order. The third and fourth remain to be conſidered; it is the laſt refuge of his infidelity; and then, I think, I may return him back to the Author of the *Divine Legation*, to give us a freſh VIEW of him; if ſo be he think it worth his while to defend the other principles of his book againſt him.

1. His firſt objection to the adminiſtration of an extraordinary providence, ſuch as MOSES promiſed to his people on the part of GOD, is, that it would DESTROY FREE-WILL. But here let me obſerve, that he affects to diſguiſe the immediate Object of his attack; and, in arguing againſt an extraordinary Providence, chuſes to conſider it in the general, as the Point ariſes out of an imaginary diſpute between Him and the Divines; who, he pretends, are diſſatisfied with the preſent order of things, and require, as the terms of their acquieſcence in God's government, the adminiſtration of an equal Providence, *here*. But, this obliquity in diſguiſing the true object of his attack not being of itſelf ſufficient to embarras his adverſaries, he further ſupports it by a prevarication: for it is not true, that Divines are diſſatisfied with the preſent order of things, or that they require a better. All the ground they ever gave his Lordſhip for imputing

ting this ſcandal to them, being only this aſſertion, "That if the preſent ſtate be the whole of Man's exiſtence, then the Juſtice of God would have more exactly diſpenſed good and evil *here:* but, as he has not done ſo, it follows, that there will be a ſtate of rewards and puniſhments *hereafter.*"

This premiſed, I proceed to his firſt objection,— "In good earneſt (ſays his Lordſhip) is a ſyſtem of "particular providences, in which the ſupreme Be- "ing, or his Angels, like his Miniſters to reward, "and his Executioners to puniſh, are conſtantly em- "ployed in the affairs of mankind, much more rea- "ſonable?" [than the *Gods* of EPICURUS or the *morals* of POLEMO] "Would the JUSTICE of God be "more MANIFEST in ſuch a ſtate of things than in "the preſent? I ſee no room for MERIT on the part "of Man, nor for JUSTICE on the part of God, in "ſuch a ſtate [12]."

His Lordſhip aſks, *whether the Juſtice of God would be more manifeſt* in ſuch a ſtate of things, where good is conſtantly diſpenſed to the virtuous, and evil to the wicked, *than in the preſent*, where good and evil happen indifferently to all men? If his Lordſhip, by *the preſent ſtate of things*, includes the rectification of them in a future ſtate, I anſwer, that the *juſtice of God would not be more manifeſt*, but equally and fully manifeſt in either caſe. If his Lordſhip does not include this rectification in a future ſtate, then I anſwer his queſtion by another; Would the Juſtice of the Civil Magiſtrate be more manifeſt, where he exactly diſpenſes rewards to good men, and puniſhment to evil, than

[12] Vol. v. p. 425--6.

where

where he ſuffers the Cunning and the Powerful to carve for themſelves ?

But *he ſees no room for merit on the part of Man, nor Juſtice on the part of God.* If he does not ſee, it is his own fault. It is owing to his prevaricating both with himſelf and his Reader ; to the turning his view from the Scripture-repreſentation of an equal Providence, to the iniquity of Calviniſtical election, and to the partialities of Fanatics concerning the favoured workings of the Spirit ; and to his giving theſe to the reader, in its ſtead. How dextrouſly does he ſlide *Enthuſiaſm* and *Predeſtination* into the Scripture-doctrine of an equal Providence !—*If ſome men were* DETERMINED TO GOODNESS *by the ſecret workings of the ſpirit*, &c. Yes indeed, if you will be ſo kind to allow him, that under an equal providence, the will is over-ruled, he will be able to ſhew you, there is an end of all merit and demerit. But this ſubſtituting *artificial theology* (as he calls it) in the place of *bible-theology*, is his uſual leger-de-main. So again,—*I can conceive ſtill leſs, that individual Creatures before they have done either good or evil, nay, before their actual exiſtence, can be the objects of predilection or averſion, of love or hatred, to God.* Who, of the Goſpel-Divines, againſt whom he is here writing, would have him *conceive* any thing of this at all ? It is the *artificial Theologer*, the depraver, as he ſays, of the Goſpel who would draw him into ſo abſurd a ſyſtem. But what has this exploded *Theology*, that abounds only in human inventions, to do with the extraordinary Providence, repreſented in holy Writ ! To ſay, that this Providence takes away man's merit and God's juſtice, is confounding all our ideas of right

and

and wrong. Is it not the higheſt merit of a rational creature to comply with that motive which has moſt real weight? And is not God's juſtice then moſt manifeſt when the order of things preſent feweſt difficulties and obſcurities in our contemplation of it? His Lordſhip was plainly of theſe ſentiments, when, arguing againſt God's compliance with the Jewiſh *hardneſs of heart*, he thought it more becoming the Maſter of the Univerſe, to bend the perverſe ſtiffneſs of their Wills: and, when, arguing againſt a *future ſtate* from the preſent good order of things, he pretends to ſhew, againſt Divines and Atheiſts in conjunction, that there is little or no irregularity in the preſent diſpenſations of Providence; at leaſt, not ſo much as the World commonly imagine. And why was this paradox advanced, but from a conſciouſneſs that the more exact the preſent adminiſtration of God's providence appeared, the more manifeſt it made his Juſtice? But now his Lordſhip's followers may be apt to pretend, that their Maſter has here, done no more, indeed ſcarce ſo much, at leaſt not in ſo expreſs terms, as a celebrated Prelate, in one of his *diſcourſes* at the *Temple*; who tells us, "That an "immediate and viſible interpoſition of Providence "in Behalf of the righteous, and for the puniſh-"ment of the wicked, would INTERFERE WITH "THE FREEDOM OF MORAL AGENTS, AND NOT "LEAVE ROOM FOR THEIR TRYAL [13]." But they who object this to us, have not conſidered the nature of moral differences. For, as another learned Prelate well obſerves, *A little experience may con-*

[13] Vol. ii. p. 258--9.

vince

vince us, that the same thing, at different times, is not the same [14]. Now if *different times* may make such alterations in identity, what must *different men* do? The *thing said* being by all candid interpretation to be regulated on the *purpose of saying*.

2. Lord Bolingbroke's second objection against an equal Providence is, that it would MAKE VIRTUE, SERVILE.—"If the Good, besides the enjoyment "of all that happiness which is inseparable from "Virtue, were exempted from all kinds of evil, "and if the wicked, besides all those evils which "are inseparable from Vice, and those which happen "to all men in the ordinary course of events, were "exposed to others that the hand of God inflicted on "them in an extraordinary manner, such Good men "would have VERY LITTLE MERIT; they would "have, while they continued to be good, no other "merit than that of children who are cajoled into "their duty; or than that of Galley-slaves who ply "at the oar, because they hear and see and fear the "lash of the boat-swain [15]."

If the perfection of a rational Creature consists in acting according to reason: and if his merit rises in proportion as he advances in perfection; How can that state which best secures him from acting irrationally, lessen or take away his merit? Are the actions of the Deity of less worth for his moral incapacity of being unjust or malignant? The motive which induces to right action is indeed more or less *excellent*

[14] *Scripture vindicated from the misrepresentations of the Bp. of Bangor*, p. 165.

[15] Vol. v. p. 428.

accord-

according to the dignity or nature of the Agent: But the queſtion here is not concerning the *excellence*, but the *power* of the motive to turn action into paſſion; which is the only way I can conceive of deſtroying *merit* in the ſubject. Now I hold, that this fancy, That motives exterior to the Being on which they work, may be able to turn an Agent to a Patient, is one of the greateſt of Phyſical abſurdities; and therefore commonly goes about diſguiſed, in the garb of *metaphyſics*. For while agency remains, merit ſubſiſts: the degrees of which do not depend on the leſs or greater force the motives have on the affections, but on the more or leſs reaſon of the choice. In a word, there is no means of taking away the merit and demerit of human actions, but by taking away agency, and making man paſſive, or, in other terms, a Machine.

But, to expoſe in a more popular way the futility of this reaſoning, it will be ſufficient to obſerve that the objection holds equally againſt all religious Sanctions whatſoever. And ſo indeed it was fairly urged by Lord Shaftſbury: who pretended that every motive regarding SELF, tended to ſervilize Virtue. Without doubt, one ſort, juſt as much as another; a *future ſtate*, juſt as well as an *equal Providence*. Nay, if we were to appreciate matters very nicely, it would ſeem, that *a future ſtate without an equal providence* (for they are alway to be conſidered ſeparately, as they belong to different ſyſtems) would more ſtrongly incline the Will, than *an equal providence without a future ſtate*: as the value of *future* above *preſent* good is immenſely great. But the human mind being ſo conſtituted, that the *diſtance* of a good takes off pro-

por-

portionably from its influence, this brings the force of the two ſanctions nearer to an equality; which at length proves but this, That the objection to the *merit of Virtue* holds againſt all religious ſanctions whatſoever. In the uſe of which objection Lord Shaftſbury was not only more ingenuous, as he urged it againſt them *all*, but more conſiſtent, as he urged it on his doctrine of a perfect *diſintereſtedneſs* in our nature; whereas Lord Bolingbroke is amongſt thoſe who hold, that *ſelf-love* and *ſocial*, tho' coincident, are two eſſential principles in the human frame.

" That two conſiſtent motions act the Soul,
" And one regards ITSELF, and one the WHOLE.

But we might go further, and retort upon both theſe noble Adverſaries of Religion, that the charge of *making virtue ſervile* affects all *moral*, as well as all *religious* ſanctions; as well that, whoſe exiſtence they allow, as thoſe, which they would perſuade us to be viſionary; both theſe illuſtrious Patrons of infidelity acknowledging that moral ſanction which ariſes from *God's making the practice of virtue our* INTEREST *as well as duty* [16]. Now *intereſt* and *ſervility* is, it ſeems, the ſame thing, with theſe generous Spirits.

His Lordſhip's third cavil to an equal Providence is, that it would RELAX GENERAL BENEVOLENCE.

—— " But would there not be, as the ſame time, " ſome further defects in this ſcheme? I think there " would. It ſeems to me, that theſe good men being " thus diſtinguiſhed by particular providences, in " their favour, from the reſt of mankind, might be " apt either not to contract, or to LOSE THAT GE-

[16] Vol. v. p. 429.

" NERAL

" NERAL BENEVOLENCE, which is a fundamental " Principle of the Law of Nature, and that PUB- " LIC SPIRIT, which is the life and soul of Society. " God has made the practice of morality our inter- " eſt, as well as our duty. But men who found " themſelves conſtantly protected from the evils that " fell on others, might grow inſenſibly to think " themſelves unconcerned in the common fate: and " if they relaxed in their zeal for the Public good, " they would relax in their virtue; for public good " is the object of Virtue. They might do worſe, " ſpiritual pride might infect them. They might " become in their own imaginations the little Flock, " or the choſen Sheep. Others have been ſo by the " mere force of Enthuſiaſm, without any ſuch in- " ducements as thoſe which we aſſume, in the ſame " caſe; and experience has ſhewn, that there are " no Wolves like theſe Sheep [17]."

The *caſe aſſumed*, to which his Lordſhip objects, and againſt which he pretends to argue, is that of an *equal Providence which exactly diſtributes good to Virtue, and to Vice, evil.* Now the preſent objection to ſuch a ſtate is, an' pleaſe you, that this *favourable diſtinction* of good, to the virtuous man, would be apt to *deſtroy his general benevolence and public ſpirit.* Theſe, in his Lordſhip's account, and ſo in mine too, are the moſt ſublime of all Virtues; and therefore, it is agreed, will be moſt highly rewarded: But the tendency of this *favourable diſtinction*, if you will believe him, may prove *the loſs of general benevolence and public ſpirit.* As much as this ſhocks common ſenſe, his Lordſhip

[17] Vol. v. p. 429.

has his reaſons. *God has made the practice of morality our* INTEREST *as well as duty. But men, who find themſelves conſtantly protected from the evils that fall on others, might grow inſenſibly to think themſelves unconcerned in the common fate.*

God has made the practice of morality our INTEREST *as well as duty.* Without doubt he has. But does it not continue to be our *intereſt*, under an equal, as well as under an unequal Providence? Nay, is it not more evidently and invariably ſo, in the abſence of thoſe inequalities which hinder our ſeeing clearly, and feeling conſtantly, that *the practice of morality is our* INTEREST *as well as duty.*

—*But men, who found themſelves conſtantly protected from the evils that fall on others, might grow inſenſibly to think themſelves unconcerned in the* COMMON FATE. What are thoſe *evils*, under an equal Providence, which *fall on others*, and from which the good man is *protected?* Are they not the puniſhments inflicted on the wicked? And how is the good man protected from them? Is it not by his perſeverance in Virtue? It is therefore impoſſible he ſhould grow unconcerned to thoſe evils which his Lordſhip calls the *common fate*, when he ſees his *intereſt* and his duty ſo cloſely connected, that there is no way of avoiding thoſe evils but by perſevering in virtue. But the name of *common fate*, which he gives unto them, detects his prevarication. He pretends to reaſon againſt an equal Providence, yet ſlurs in upon us, in it's ſtead, a *Providence which only protects good men; or rather one certain ſpecies of good men; and leaves all other to their* COMMON FATE. But admit it poſſible for the good man to *relax in his benevolence, and to grow inſenſible*

ſenſible to the common fate: there is, in *the ſtate here aſſumed*, a ſpeedy means of bringing him to himſelf; and that is, his being no longer *protected from the evils that fall on others:* for when men *relax in their benevolence*, his Lordſhip tells you, *they relax in their virtue:* and, give me leave to tell his Lordſhip, that when men relax in their virtue, Providence relaxes in its protection; or, to ſpeak more properly, the rewards of virtue are abated in proportion.

However, *ſpiritual pride* (he ſays) *might infect the virtuous, thus protected:* And this he will prove *a fortiori*, from the caſe of ENTHUSIASTS; who only imagine they have this protection, and have it not. Now, what if we ſhould ſay, it is this very *enthuſiaſtic ſpirit* itſelf, and not the viſions of *Protection* it is apt to raiſe, which is the true cauſe of *ſpiritual pride?* ENTHUSIASM is that temper of mind, in which the imagination has got the better of the judgment. In this diſordered ſtate of things, Enthuſiaſm, when it happens to be turned upon religious matters, becomes FANATICISM: and this, in it's extreme, begets the fancy of our being the peculiar favorites of Heaven. Now, every one ſees, that SPIRITUAL PRIDE is the cauſe, and not the effect of the diſorder. For what but ſpiritual pride ſpringing out of preſumptive holineſs, could bring the Fanatic to fancy himſelf exalted above the common condition of the Faithful? It is true, when he was got thus far, the folly which brought him thither, might carry him further; and then, all to come would be indeed the effect of his diſorder. But ſuppoſe it was not the enthuſiaſtic Spirit, but the viſions of protection it is apt to raiſe, which is the cauſe of ſpiritual pride; Is there no difference between a

viſion and a reality? Fancy may occaſion thoſe diſorders which fact may remove. This, I perſuade myſelf, is the caſe here: The real communication of Grace purifies thoſe paſſions, and exalts them into virtues, which the ſtrong deluſion of ſuch a ſtate only renders more groſs and violent. And here it may be worth while to take notice that his Lordſhip, in this objection to an extraordinary Providence, from the hurt it does to general benevolence, ſeems to have had the *Jewiſh People* in his eye; who in the latter ages of their republic, were commonly charged, and perhaps truly, with want of benevolence to the reſt of mankind: a fact, which tho' it makes nothing for his purpoſe, makes very much for mine, as it furniſhes me with an example to ſupport what is here ſaid of Fanaticiſm; an infirmity pretty general amongſt the Jews of thoſe Ages. They had outlived their extraordinary Providence; but not the memory, nor even the effects of it; Nay, the warmer tempers were hardly brought to think it had ceaſed. This filled them with ſpiritual pride, as the elect of God; a diſpoſition which, it is confeſſed, tends readily to deſtroy or to *relax* general benevolence. But what now are the natural conſequences, which the actual adminiſtration of an equal Providence would have on the human mind? In this caſe, as in the other, a warm temper, whoſe object was Religion, would be obnoxious to the common weakneſs of our nature, and too apt to diſgrace itſelf by ſpiritual pride: but as this is one of the vices which an equal Providence is always at hand to puniſh, the cure would be direct and ſpeedy. The recovered Votary, we will now ſuppoſe to be received again into the

number of the Good; and to find himself in the *little flock and chosen sheep*, as they are nick-named by this noble Writer. Well, but his danger is not yet over; the sense of this high prerogative of humanity might revive, in a warm temper, the still unmortified seeds of spiritual pride. Admit this to be the case; what follows? His pride revives indeed, but it is only to be again humbled: for punishment is still closely attendant on vice and folly. At length, this holy discipline, the necessary consequence of an equal Providence, effectually does its work; it purifies the mind from low and selfish partialities, and adorns the Will with general benevolence, public spirit, and love of all its fellow creatures.

What then could support his Lordship in so perverse a judgment concerning the state and condition of good men under an equal Providence? That which supports all his other insults on Religion; his sophistical change of the question. He objects to an equal providence (which Religionists pretend has been administred during one period of the Dispensation of Grace) where good men are constantly rewarded, and wicked men as constantly punished; and he takes the matter of his objection from the fanatical idea of a *favoured elect*, (which never existed but in over-heated brains) where reward and punishment are distributed, not on the proportions of merit and demerit, but on the diabolic dreams of certain eternal decrees of election and reprobation, unrelated to any human principle of justice.

But now, Sir, keep the question steddily in your eye, and his Lordship's reasoning in this paragraph will disclose such a complication of absurdities as will

aſtoniſh you. You will ſee an equal Providence, which, in and thro' the very act of rewarding benevolence, public ſpirit, and humility, becomes inſtrumental in producing, in thoſe ſo rewarded, ſelfiſhneſs, neglect of the public, and ſpiritual pride.——

His Lordſhip's laſt objection to an extraordinary Providence is, that it would NOT ANSWER ITS END.

" I will conclude this head (ſays he) by obſerv-
" ing, that we have *example* as well as *reaſon* for us,
" when we reject the hypotheſis of particular provi-
" dences. God was the king of the Jewiſh People.
" His preſence reſided amongſt them, and his juſ-
" tice was manifeſted daily in rewarding and puniſh-
" ing by unequivocal, ſignal, and miraculous in-
" terpoſitions of his power. The effect of all was
" this, the People rebelled at one time and repented
" at another. Particular providences, directed by
" God himſelf immediately, upon the ſpot, if I may
" ſay ſo, had particular temporal effects only, none
" general nor laſting: and the People were ſo little
" ſatisfied with this ſyſtem of Government that they
" depoſed the ſupreme Being, and inſiſted to have
" another King, and to be governed like their neigh-
" bours [18]."

In ſupport of this laſt objection, you ſee his Lordſhip was forced to throw off the maſk; and fairly tell us what he aimed at; that is to ſay, to diſcredit the extraordinary Providence mentioned by Moſes. An equal Providence, ſays he, will not anſwer its *end*. What is it's end? Here, his prevarications bring

[18] Vol. v. p. 430.

us,

us, as usual, to our distinctions.—When this Providence is administered for the sake of *Particulars*, it's first end is to discipline us in virtue, and keep us in our duty: When administred for the sake of a *Community*, its first end is to support the Institution it had erected. Now his Lordship, proceeding from reason to example, gives us this of the Jewish Republic, to prove that an equal or extraordinary Providence does not answer one or other or both these ends.

But it is unlucky for him, that here, where he employs the example, he cannot forbear, any more than in numberless other places of his writings, to tell us that he believes nothing of the matter.—*How long this Theocracy may be said to have continued* (says he) *I am quite unconcerned to know, and should be sorry to mispend my time in inquiring.* The example then is only an argument *ad hominem*. But the misfortune is, that no laws of good reasoning will admit an argument *ad hominem* on this question, *Of the* EFFECTS *of a* REAL *extraordinary providence*; because the nature of the effects of REAL providence can never be discovered by the effects of a PRETENDED one. To say the truth, his Lordship is at present out of luck. For had he indeed believed the extraordinary providence of the Jews to be *real*, his own representation of the case would, on his own principles, have proved it but *pretended*. For 'tis a principle with him, that where the means do not produce the end, such means (all pretences notwithstanding) are but human inventions. It is thus he argues against the Divinity of the Christian Religion; which he concludes to be an imposture for its not having effected that lasting reforma-

tion of manners, which he ſuppoſes was its principal deſign to accompliſh.

So far as to the CHOICE of his example. He manages no better in the APPLICATION of it.

We have diſtinguiſhed, concerning the *ends* of an extraordinary providence. Let us ſuppoſe now, that his Lordſhip takes the principal end of the Jewiſh Theocracy to be the reformation of *Particulars*. He refers to their hiſtory, and pretends to ſhew they were not reformed. Now whatever other conſequences may attend this ſuppoſed Fact, the moſt obvious and glaring is this, That his Lordſhip, in proceeding from reaſon to example, has given us ſuch an example as overturns or ſuperſedes all his reaſoning. According to his reaſoning, an extraordinary providence would tye virtue and good manners ſo faſt down upon every Individual, that his very Will would be forced, and the merit of doing what he had it not in his power to forbear, abſolutely deſtroyed. You would now perhaps expect his example ſhould confirm this pretended fact? Juſt otherwiſe. His example ſhews his fact to be a fiction, and that men remained as bad as ever.

But I have no need of taking any artificial advantage of his Lordſhip's bad reaſoning. For, when we ſee it ſo conſtantly oppoſed to truth, it is ſo far from being an additional diſcredit to it, that it is as conſtantly oppoſed to himſelf.

The truth indeed is, that the great and principal end of the JEWISH THEOCRACY, was to keep that People a ſeparate nation, under their own Law and Religion, till the coming of the MESSIAH; and to prepare things for his reception by preſerving amongſt them the doctrine of the UNITY. Now, to judge whether the

the Theocracy or extraordinary Providence compaſſed it's end, we have only to conſider, Whether this people, to the coming of Chriſt, did continue a diſtinct Nation ſeparated from all the other tribes of Mankind, and diſtinguiſhed from them by the worſhip of the one true God. And on inquiry, we ſhall find, they not only did continue thus diſtinct and diſtinguiſhed, but have ſo continued ever ſince. A ſingularity which has had no example amongſt any other People: And is ſufficient to convince us, that there muſt have been ſome amazing power in that Theocracy, which could go on operating for ſo many ages after the extraordinary adminiſtration of it had ceaſed. Let us conclude therefore, that the having nothing to urge againſt the due efficacy of this extraordinary providence, but that, *the people rebelled at one time and repented at another, and that this providence had only temporary effects*, is the moſt ample confeſſion of his defeat. And ſo much, for his Lordſhip's exploits in ANTIENT POLITICS.

LET us now come a little nearer to him, and conſider him in his capacity for the MODERN.

Here his Lordſhip ſhines without a Rival.

" Whether to *ſettle peace*, or to *unfold*
" The drift of hollow States--beſides to know
" Both SPIRITUAL POWER AND CIVIL, what each
" What ſevers each"—— [means,

as was ſaid by a Poet [18] of the laſt age of *his* turbulent Friend; who if he did not ſerve his country better

[18] Milton.

than this Politician of later date, had much more to anſwer for, as by all accounts, his talents were vaſtly ſuperior.

His Lordſhip however, with the beſt he has, proceeds to overturn the PRINCIPLES of the ALLIANCE BETWEEN CHURCH AND STATE. But the pains he had taken, and the oppoſition he had found from the ARGUMENT of the DIVINE LEGATION, had, by the time he came upon this ſecond Adventure, ſo ruffled his temper and diſcompoſed his manners, that he now breaks out in all kinds of opprobrious language, not only againſt the Syſtem, but even againſt the perſon of the Author.

To underſtand the nature of his Lordſhip's provocation, if at leaſt it aroſe from this treatiſe of the *Alliance*, it may not be improper to ſay a word or two of the occaſion of that Book, and of the Principles on which it is compoſed.

After the many violent convulſions our Country had ſuffered ſince the REFORMATION by the rage of religious Parties (in which, at one time, liberty of Conſcience was oppreſſed; and at another, the eſtabliſhed Church overturned and deſolated) it pleaſed divine Providence to ſettle our religious Rights on ſuch fundamental principles of juſtice and equity, and to ſecure the civil peace on ſuch maxims of wiſdom and true policy, as moſt effectually guarded both againſt the return of their reſpective violations: and the means made uſe of were the giving, on proper terms of ſecurity to the national Religion, a free toleration to all who diſſented from the eſtabliſhed Worſhip. This ſeemed to be going as far towards perfection in religious Communion as the long diſtracted ſtate of the

the chriſtian World would ſuffer us to indulge our hopes.

But men had not been long in poſſeſſion of this bleſſing before they grew weary of it, and ſet on foot many inventions, to throw us back into our old diſorders. For it is to be obſerved with ſorrow, that this reform of the Engliſh Conſtitution happened not to be the good work of the CHURCH, begun in the conviction of Truth, and carried on upon the principles of Charity: but was rather owing to the vigilance of the STATE; at one time, vainly perhaps, anxious for the eſtabliſhed Religion [19], at another, wiſely provident for the ſupport of civil Liberty [20]. So that when ſucceeding diſſentions in Church and State had made this newly reformed Conſtitution the ſubject of enquiry, the Parties who managed the debate being thoſe who before had both perſecuted and ſuffered in their turns, the principles and tempers they brought with them to the diſcuſſion of the queſtion, were not ſuch perhaps as were beſt fitted either to regulate their judgments, or to moderate their partialities. *One* ſide ſeemed to regard the TOLERATION as an evil in itſelf, and only a temporary expedient to prevent a worſe; while their conduct ſhewed, they lay at watch for the firſt occaſion to break in upon it. This was enough to miſlead the *Other* to conſider the TEST LAW, which covered and ſecured the eſtabliſhed Religion, as no better than a new ſpecies of perſecution: and having now no real injury to complain of, they began to take umbrage at this ſhadow of a grievance; "To have

[19] *Ch.* II. [20] *Will.* III.

"vine Worſhip really free, they ſaid, no religious "profeſſion ſhould be attended with civil incapaci- "ties: a TEST had made that diſtinction amongſt "God's Worſhipers; it was therefore to be ſet aſide." But every man ſaw (and perhaps the enemies of the *Teſt* were not amongſt the laſt who ſaw it) that to ſet aſide this Law, which, under a general *Toleration* was the only ſecurity of the *eſtabliſhed* Church, was expoſing the National worſhip, to all the inroads of a ſectarian rabble. This miſchievous project, ariſing out of abuſed liberty, was at firſt entertained, as we may well ſuppoſe, by the tolerated Churches only. Some of the more ingenuous of them adopted it out of fear, on the diſcovery of that bigoted principle in their Adverſaries, which conſidered *Toleration* as only a temporary expedient. And where was the wonder if thoſe who believed, they had no ſecurity for what they had got, while ſuch principles prevailed, ſhould endeavour to put it out of the power of their adverſaries to do them harm? Others of a more politic turn cheriſhed it from views of ambition, and in hopes of ſharing the emoluments of the eſtabliſhed Church. It was ſome time before any Member of the Church of England joined with Diſſenters in their clamours againſt a *Teſt Law*, or, more properly ſpeaking, againſt *their own Eſtabliſhment*. This monſtrous coalition did not happen till a warm diſpute on certain metaphyſical queſtions [1], (if conſidered in one light, too ſublime to become the ſubject of human wit; if in another, too trifling to gain the attention of reaſonable men,) had ſtarted new ſcruples concerning Church-Subſcription. And to get rid of this neceſ-

[1] The Trinitarian controverſy.

ſary

fary engagement to PEACE, and acquiescence in the eſtabliſhed Religion, theſe wiſe and faithful Miniſters of the National Worſhip were amongſt the foremoſt to diſcredit it, and the buſieſt to trample down all its fences and ſecurities.

BIGOTRY, you ſee, was at the bottom of the firſt ſet of principles; and FANATICISM, at the top of the other. In their ſeparate appeals to the experience of Mankind, there was this remarkable difference; All ages had felt the miſchiefs of religious reſtraint and perſecution; but there was no example, either in Pagan or in Chriſtian times, of the evils attending the WANT *of an eſtabliſhed Religion.* The Fanatics therefore, were perpetually urging their experience againſt perſecution, ſecure in not having the argument retorted on them. But, in this imaginary triumph they deceived themſelves; and the very *want* of examples was the greateſt Advantage the Bigots had over them: Who if they had no inſtance of the evils attending the *want* of an Eſtabliſhment, to retort upon their adverſaries, it was becauſe ſuch *want* was never known: The neceſſity of a national Religion for the ſupport of Society, being ſo indiſpenſable, that Men even in the wildeſt times, the ſworn Enemies of religious Eſtabliſhments, and *leagued* together for their deſtruction, were no ſooner become able to effect their purpoſe, than they found, in beginning to new model the ſtate, which they had ſubdued by the ſuperiority of their arms, that there was even a neceſſity of ſupporting an eſtabliſhed Church. Of this, we have a remarkable example in the INDEPENDENT *Republic*, and in the *Protectorſhip* of OLIVER; both of which under their ſeveral Uſurpations,

were

were forced to erect PRESBYTERY, the Religion they moſt hated, into a NATIONAL CHURCH.

To proceed; The diſtempers of the State, ſtill further contributed to inflame thoſe of the Church: And, on the Acceſſion of the preſent royal Line to the Throne, a long, a famous, and a regular diſpute concerning the powers, bounds, and limits of the TWO SOCIETIES, was begun and carried on by two parties of Church-men. But as the ſeveral diſputants had reciprocally aſſigned too much, and allowed too little to the two Societies, and had erected their arguments on one common fallacy; the Maintainers of an Eſtabliſhment ſupported a Teſt-law on ſuch reaſoning as deſtroyed a Toleration; and the Defenders of religious Liberty, argued againſt the juſtice of that ſecurity on ſuch principles as concluded equally againſt a national Church.

In this ferment, and in this embroiled condition, the Author of the *Alliance between Church and State* found the ſentiments of men concerning religious Liberty and Eſtabliſhments when he propoſed his *Theory* to their conſideration: a Theory calculated to vindicate our preſent happy Conſtitution ON A PRINCIPLE OF RIGHT, by adjuſting the preciſe bounds of either Society; by ſhewing how they come to act in conjunction; and by explaining the nature of their Union: and from thence, by natural and neceſſary conſequence, inducing, on the one hand, an ESTABLISHED RELIGION, with all its rights and privileges, ſecured by a TEST LAW; and on the other, a full and free TOLERATION to all who diſſented from the National Worſhip.

He firſt ſhewed the uſe of Religion to Society, from the experience and practice of all Ages: He inquired

from whence the uſe aroſe, and found it to be from certain original defects in the very eſſence and plan of Civil Society. He went on to the nature of Religion; and ſhewed how, and for what cauſes, it conſtituted a Society: And then, from the natures of the *two Societies*, he collected, that the object of the Civil, is only the *Body* and its intereſts; and the object of the Religious, only the *Soul*. Hence he concluded, that both Societies are Sovereign, and Independent; becauſe they ariſe not out of one another; and becauſe, as they are concerned in contrary provinces, they can never meet to claſh; the ſameneſs of *original*, or the ſameneſs of *adminiſtration*, being the only cauſes which can bring one, of two diſtinct Societies, into natural ſubjection to the other.

To apply Religion therefore to the ſervice of Civil Society, in the beſt manner it is capable of being applied, he ſhewed it was neceſſary that the two Societies ſhould UNITE: For each being ſovereign and independent, there was no other way of applying the ſervice of Religion in any ſolid or effectual manner. But no ſuch union could ariſe but from *free compact* and convention. And free convention is never likely to happen, unleſs each Society has its mutual motives, and mutual advantages. The Author therefore, from what he had laid down of the natures of the two Societies, explained what thoſe motives and advantages were. Whence, it appeared that all the rights, privileges, and prerogatives of the two Societies, thus united, with the Civil Magiſtrate at their head, were indeed thoſe very rights, privileges, and prerogatives, which we find eſtabliſhed and enjoyed under our preſent happy Conſtitution in Church and State: The reſult of this was that an

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ESTABLISHED CHURCH and a free TOLERATION, are made perfectly to agree by the medium of a TEST LAW. This Law therefore the Author in the laſt place, proceeded to vindicate, on the ſame general principles of the Law of Nature and Nations.

You have here, Sir, a true tho' ſhort analyſis of the *Alliance between Church and State*; with the Principles on which the Theory is conducted.

Let us now conſider the account his Lordſhip has been pleaſed to give of it. I ſhall take him paragraph by paragraph, in his native diſorder, as he lies: And for the ſame reaſon that I followed a different method in confuting his Arguments againſt the *moral attributes*, which I choſe to methodize and digeſt. For when a diſorderly writer is tolerably clear, you may make him ſtill clearer, and ſhew his arguments to advantage, by bringing them into order. But when ſuch a one is beyond remedy cloudy and confuſed, as our noble Writer is here where he reaſons againſt the book of the *Alliance*, this aſſiſtance would be ſuſpicious: for the Reader might come to fancy that as well the *obſcurity* as the *order* were of the Anſwerer's making. Therefore the ſafeſt, as well as faireſt way in this caſe is to take the Writer as you find him. The obſcurities in thought and expreſſion will be then ſeen to be his own; and nothing can be objected to his Adverſary, but a few repetitions, which, in this method of anſwering, can never be avoided.

His Lordſhip preludes his attack upon the Book and the Author with this curious Narrative.

" I have heard of a Sermon preached by one " Doctor SENIOR, a Fellow of Trinity College, in " Cambridge, before King Charles the Second, at New-

" New-market, *in the days of passive obedience and* " *non-resistance*, and afterwards printed. His text was " taken from the 14th, 15th, and 16th verses of the " fourth Ch. of Exodus, or some of them; wherein " God directs MOSES to take AARON the Levite, be- " cause he knew that AARON could speak well to " the People, and joins them together in Commission, " that they might assist one another mutually; that " AARON might be instead of a mouth to MOSES, " and that MOSES might be instead of God to AARON. " What other applications the good Doctor made of " these texts, I know not. But I am informed by " Mr. LEWIS, who has read the Sermon, that he " established on them a supposed *Alliance between the* " *Church and the State:* or rather between the Church " and the King. By this *Alliance* the well-spoken " Levite was to instil passive obedience to the King, " in the minds of the People, and to insist on it, as " on a Law of God; The King, on the other hand, " was to be the nursing Father of the Church, to " support her Authority, to preserve, at least, if not " increase, her immunities, and to keep her in the " full possession of all the advantages she claimed. " The Church performed her part, and had a right, " by virtue of this alliance, if the King did not " perform his, to teach this doctrine no longer, and to " resume her independency on the State and on him. " This was the purport of the sermon, at least: and " WARBURTON took his hint, POSSIBLY, from it, " and turned it to serve his purpose; that is, to lay " down the same principles and TO BANTER MAN- " KIND IF HE COULD, by NOT drawing directly, and " avowedly, from them the same conclusion. Dr.

SENIOR's

" Senior's authority is, no doubt, as good in this " caſe, as that of De Marca or even of Bossuet. " The firſt, a time-ſerving Prieſt, intereſted, and a " great flatterer, if ever there was one, and who " made no ſcruple to explain away whatſoever he " had found himſelf obliged to ſay in favour of the " State. The latter was as wiſe, if not as cunning, " as learned, and a much better man, tho' not ſo " much in the favour of Mr. Warburton, who " gave them Characters in his aſſuming ſtyle, with- " out knowing any thing of them; and who has the " *impertinence to pronounce* of the greateſt Scholar, the " greateſt Divine, and the greateſt Orator of his age, " that *he was a good ſenſible man.* He was all I have " ſaid of him: but he was an Eccleſiaſtic, and a " ſubject of France [1]."

As to this account of Dr. Senior, I ſcarce know what to make of it, or what credit it deſerves: For he who will falſify a Book in every body's hands, will hardly be very ſcrupulous of what he ſays of a Sermon, which nobody has heard of, but his Friend Mr. Lewis. At leaſt if Doctor Senior was ever a man of this world, I ſhould fancy he muſt be later than where his Lordſhip, who is no great Chronologer, has placed him. He tells us it was *in the days of paſſive obedience and non-reſiſtance*, and that the doctrine of his ſermon was calculated for the ſervice of popery and arbitrary power. May we not ſuppoſe then, that he flouriſhed under his Lordſhip's *Auſpices*, when the Church was laſt in danger? If this were the caſe, his Lordſhip

[1] Vol. iv. p. 515.

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uſes Dr. SENIOR juſt as he uſed St. PAUL [2], firſt ſets him upon preaching *paſſive Obedience*, and then abuſes him for his pains.

But let Dr. SENIOR live when and where he will, he thinks it POSSIBLE that WARBURTON *might have taken the hint of the Alliance from him.* Yes, juſt as *poſſible* as that LOCKE took the hint of the *original compact* from FILMAR.

He aſſures us, however, that *the Authority of Dr.* SENIOR *is as good as that of* DE MARCA, *or even of* BOSSUET. The authority of Dr. SENIOR! For what?—To ſupport Mr. WARBURTON's *doctrine of the Alliance.* But where is it to be had: Suppoſe this difficulty to be got over; and Dr. SENIOR as ready at hand as DE MARCA or BOSSUET, and as willing to declare againſt the incroachments of the Church; yet the Author of the *Alliance*, perhaps, would not think it altogether ſo fit for his purpoſe: For he tells us, that his purpoſe in ſo frequently quoting the acknowledgments of DE MARCA and BOSSUET, in favour of the State, was to ſhame thoſe *Proteſtant* Divines who had contended for the *independency* of the Church, after it became eſtabliſhed; and even for its *ſuperiority*, before.

But, of theſe two famous Frenchmen, *The firſt* (he ſays) *was a time-ſerving Prieſt, intereſted, and a great flatterer — the latter was as wiſe if not as cunning, as learned and a much better Man, tho' not ſo much in the*

[2] "By this *Alliance* of the Hierarchy and the Monarchy, "Religion that ſhould ſupport good government alone, was em-"ployed to ſupport good and bad government alike, AS IT HAS "BEEN BY ST. PAUL." Vol. iv. p. 516.

favour

favour of Mr. Warburton, who gave them Characters, in his assuming style, without knowing any thing of them, and who has the impertinence to pronounce, of the greatest Scholar, the greatest Divine, and the greatest Orator of his age, that HE WAS A GOOD SENSIBLE MAN.

The Author of the *Alliance,* in the *Advertisement* to the last Edition of his Book, speaking of the French Translator, has these words—" He supported " them [the conclusions] all along with quotations " from the two famous works of DE MARCA and " BOSSUET; the one the wisest, and the other the " MOST SENSIBLE DIVINE THAT NATION EVER " PRODUCED [3]."

From these words, I leave you, Sir, to reflect upon the truth and ingenuity of the noble Writer's representation, that BOSSUET is *not so much in Mr. Warburton's favour* as DE MARCA; and that Mr. Warburton has *the impertinence to pronounce* that BOSSUET was A GOOD SENSIBLE MAN. In the heavy distresses of Controversy, many a Writer has been found to misrepresent. But to do this out of mere wantonness and gayety of heart, and then, on the credit of his own false quotations, to abuse and call names, is altogether in his Lordship's manner.

But you will say, perhaps, that the IMPERTINENCE was not in the familiarity of the commendation, but in the choice of the topic. It may be so; and then we get another Rule of good writing from his Lordship, who has already supplied us with so many: " That when the authority of an Author is urged " in a point concerning Civil and Religious Rights, his

[3] P. 13.

learning,

learning, his *divinity*, and above all, his *eloquence* ſhould be inſiſted on, rather than his GOOD SENSE."

All this is but a prelude to the Combat. "The "notion (ſays this great Politician) of a FORMAL "ALLIANCE between Church and State, as between "two independent, diſtinct powers, is a very ground-"leſs and WHIMSICAL notion. But a fraudulent or "ſilent compact between princes and prieſts became "very real, as ſoon as an eccleſiaſtical order was "eſtabliſhed [4]." The latter part of this period is but too true; and the Theory of the *Alliance*, (miſrepreſented in the former part,) was propoſed to remedy theſe miſchiefs. It is this Theory only, which I ſhall undertake to vindicate againſt his Lordſhip's Objections.

If, by *formal*, he means (and what ſhould he mean elſe?) one actually executed in form; and ſuppoſes that the Author of the *Alliance between Church and State*, aſſerted the actual execution of ſuch a one, we may, with more juſtice perhaps, apply to his Lordſhip what he ſays of the Author, concerning DE MARCA and BOSSUET, *That he gives a Character of the book called the Alliance, without knowing any thing of it.* Give me leave to quote the Author's own words— "From all this it appears, that our plan of Alliance "is no precarious arbitrary Hypotheſis, but a The-"ory founded in reaſon, and the invariable nature of "things. For having, from the eſſence, collected "the *neceſſity* of allying, and the *freedom* of the com-"pact; we have from the ſame *neceſſity*, fairly intro-"duced it; and from its *freedom*, conſequentially

[4] Vol. iv. p. 515—16.

"eſta-

" eſtabliſhed every mutual term and condition of it. " So that now if the reader ſhould aſk, where this " Charter or treaty of convention for the union of " the two Societies, on the terms here delivered, is " to be met with? we are able to anſwer him. We " ſay, it may be found in the ſame Archive with the " famous ORIGINAL COMPACT between Magiſtrate " and People; ſo much inſiſted on, in vindication of " the common rights of Subjects. Now when a ſight " of this *compact* is required of the Defenders of Ci- " vil liberty, they hold it ſufficient to ſay, that it is " enough for all the purpoſes of fact and right, that " ſuch original compact is the only legitimate foun- " dation of Civil Society: That if there were NO " SUCH THING FORMALLY executed, there was, " *virtually:* That all differences between Magiſtrate " and People ought to be regulated on the ſuppoſi- " tion of ſuch a Compact; and all Government re- " duced to the principles therein laid down; for " that the happineſs of which Civil Society is pro- " ductive, can only be attained by it, when formed " on thoſe principles. Now ſomething like this we " ſay of our *Alliance between Church and State* [5].

Let this ſerve too, for an anſwer to his Lordſhip's inſulting queſtion in another place—" But where ſhall " we look for the conditions of that *original contract* " *which was made between the religious and the civil* " *Society*, I know not; unleſs we ſuppoſe them writ- " ten on the back of Conſtantine's grant to Sylve- " ſter [6]." Does his Lordſhip know where to look

[5] Alliance, third Edition, p. 165—6—7.
[6] Vol. iv. p. 419.

for

for the *original contract which was made between the prince and people*, in any place of easier access? Or will he, when at a loss, send us to the *back of Constantine's grant to Sylvester*, for this contract likewise?

But to proceed. If by *formally*, through a perverse use of words, his Lordship means only *virtually*, like the *original compact* between King and People, This indeed, the Author of the *Alliance* does venture to say, and not only to say, but to prove likewise.

It is true, the foundation of the proof, in his Lordship's opinion, stands upon a WHIMSICAL principle: so did the argument of the Divine Legation of Moses, from the Omission of a future State [7]. Indeed his Lordship seems to have been as much distressed by WHIMSICAL *Divines*, when he turned Philosopher, as he was by WHIMSICAL *Politicians*, while he continued a Statesman [8]. However, the *whimsical* principle in question, is this, That THE CHURCH OF CHRIST COMPOSES A SOCIETY SOVEREIGN, AND INDEPENDENT OF THE CIVIL.

This principle, his Lordship rejects: and it must be confessed, not, as is his wont, altogether absurdly: For he who makes Religion itself a Fantom, can surely have little or no idea how it should become embodied.

"Neither NATURE nor REASON (says his Lordship) could ever lead men to imagine TWO DISTINCT AND INDEPENDENT SOCIETIES IN THE SAME SOCIETY. This imagination was broached by ecclesiastical ambition [9]."

[7] See p. 204.

[8] See his Letter to Sir W. Windham.

[9] Vol. iv. p. 412.

A grave

A grave ſentence! which to me ſeems equivalent to this, That *neither nature nor reaſon could ever lead men to imagine that* ONE *was* TWO. In this, I readily agree with him. But then the difficulty remains, how ſuch a thing could ever come to be *broached*, (as his Lordſhip ſays it was) by any *imagination* not more diſordered than it uſually is by *Eccleſiaſtical Ambition*. School-Learning, indeed, might do much; for there, his Lordſhip has fixed his theological-Bedlam: But *Church Ambition*, he aſſures us, is of another mould; which, as it never failed, he ſays, to *aim at*, ſo, it never failed to *obtain, immoderate Wealth and exorbitant Power*. What then are we to think? That his Lordſhip meant, that *neither Nature nor Reaſon could ever lead men to imagine two diſtinct and independent Societies in the ſame* COMMUNITY? for *Community* being the genus, ſeveral *Societies*, as the ſpecies, may, indeed, be contained in it. This, I am ready to ſuppoſe, merely for my own eaſe; becauſe when his Lordſhip is well underſtood he is always more than half confuted.

In this paragraph then are contained theſe two propoſitions:

1. That the Church does not compoſe a *Society*.

2. That it does not compoſe a Society *independent and ſoverign*.

Let us examine his reaſoning on theſe points as it lies in his works; for as diſorderly as it lies, it is intended, I aſſure you, to overturn the whole Theory of the *Alliance*.

" A RELIGIOUS SOCIETY (ſays his Lordſhip) BY " WHICH IS MEANT, ON THIS OCCASION, A CLERGY, " is, or is not, a creature of the State. *If the firſt*, " it

" it follows, that this Order no more than others,
" which the State has inſtituted for the maintenance
" of good government, can aſſume any rights, or ex-
" erciſe any powers, except ſuch as the State has
" thought fit to attribute to it, and that the State
" may, and ought to keep a conſtant controul over
" it, not only to prevent uſurpations and abuſes, but
" to direct the public and private influence of the
" Clergy, in a ſtrict conformity to the letter and ſpi-
" rit of the Conſtitution; the ſervants of which, in
" a much truer ſenſe, they are, than what they affect
" ſometimes to call themſelves, the Ambaſſadors of
" God to other men. *If the laſt* is ſaid, if it be aſ-
" ſerted, that the Church is in any ſort independent
" on the State, there ariſes from this pretenſion the
" greateſt abſurdity imaginable, that, I mean, of
" Imperium in Imperio; an Empire of divine, in an
" Empire of human inſtitution [9]."

Thus far his Lordſhip, who is here reaſoning againſt the principles laid down in the book of the *Alliance*. He introduces his Dilemma with telling the Reader, that the Author of that Book has defined a *religious Society*, to be the *body of the Clergy*.—*A religious Society, by which* (ſays he) IS MEANT ON THIS OCCASION A CLERGY, *is, or is not, a Creature of the State* [10].

You cannot, I believe, ſee this aſſertion without ſome ſurprize, when you obſerve, that the Author of

[9] Vol. iv. p. 413.

[10] So again, *This order of men which we* CALL *the Religious Society*,—V. iv. p. 440. And again, *The Religious Society, as we have accuſtomed ourſelves to* CALL *the Clergy*. V. iv. p. 561.

the *Alliance* has defined a religious Society to be A NUMBER OF RELIGIOUS CREATURES ASSOCIATED [11]. — When you obſerve, that He makes it one of the principal cares of a religious Society, to provide an Order of men, to be ſet apart for miniſtring in holy things, or in other words, a CLERGY. — "The "greateſt care is to be had, that the acts of religious "worſhip be preſerved ſimple, decent, and ſignifica- "tive. But this can be done only by providing perſons "ſet apart for this office; whoſe peculiar employ- "ment it ſhall be to preſide in, direct, and ſuperintend "the Acts and Services of Religion, *&c.* [12]" — When you obſerve, he makes the *end* of religious Society to be, *ſalvation of ſouls*, and one of the *means*, the Order of the *Clergy*. — Laſtly when you obſerve, he oppoſes the *Church* and the *Clergy* to each other. "It is unjuſt in the CHURCH to aim at the Propaga- "tion of Religion by force, and impertinent to aim "at riches, honours, and powers. But what mo- "tives the CLERGY OF A CHURCH might have, is "nothing to the purpoſe of our inquiry. We have "only to conſider what the CHURCH had, WHICH, "as a religious Society, conſiſts of the whole body "of the Community, BOTH LAITY AND CLER- "GY [13]."

[11] *Alliance*, p. 55. [12] *Alliance*, p. 61.

[13] *Alliance*, p. 112. The very popiſh Clergy, nay DE MARCA himſelf, that *time-ſerving Prieſt and great Flatterer*, was more honeſt (as his Lordſhip might have ſeen by the quotation at the bottom of this very page of the *Alliance* — ECCLESIÆ CORPUS, EX FIDELIUM OMNIUM COMPAGE CONSTITUITUR) than he chuſes to repreſent the body of the Engliſh Clergy.

In

In a word, the Author of the *Alliance* was at much pains to prove that a religious Society or *Church* does not mean the *Clergy*, but the whole body of the faithful: and this for two reasons, for the sake of truth in general, and of his own system in particular.

1. It shocks common Sense to call one Order or rank in Society, by the name of the Society: it is little better than calling one of the qualities of a Substance, by the name of the Substance.

2. It subverted the Theory of the *Alliance* to make the *Clergy* constitute the *Church*: for then the Church could neither be a distinct Society, nor independent; both of which it must be to make it capable of an Alliance with the State. It could not be a distinct Society; for an Order of men, as I observed just before, is the same in politics, as a quality in physics; the one must inhere in a *Society*, the other in a *Substance*: and these being the substrata of the other, to talk of a distinct, much more, of the independent existence of an *order*, or of a *quality*, is the profoundest nonsense in Politics and Physics. But admitting that such a Church, which like *Trinculo's* kingdom, consists only of *Viceroys and Viceroys over them*, were capable of allying with the State, the Author has shewn, in the place quoted above, that it's *motives* for allying would be such as the State could never comply with, either in justice or policy.

Extreme necessity (to do his Lordship all the right we can) forced him upon this bold and violent falsification of the doctrine of the *Alliance*. He saw no other way of discrediting the opinion of an *independent religious Society*, than by making it believed that such a Society would be an "*Imperium in Imperio, an Empire*

of divine, in an Empire of human Inſtitution;" a miſchief, againſt which the State is always on its guard. And if a religious Society ſignified the Church, and the Church, only the CLERGY, the claim to Independency would imply ſuch an Imperium. But the Author of the *Alliance* goes upon other principles; he holds that the Church ſignifies the whole body of the Faithful; that though this Society be independent, yet, from its independency, no ſuch ſoleciſm in Politics can ariſe as an Imperium in Imperio. This argument, which the Author has drawn out at large, the noble perſon, in the following words, miſrepreſents, perverts, and attempts to overthrow.

" An Imperium in Imperio (ſays he) is in truth " ſo expreſly contained in the very terms of the aſ- " ſertion, that none of THE TEDIOUS SOPHISTICAL " REASONINGS, which have been employed for the " purpoſe, can evade or diſguiſe it. One of theſe " I will mention, becauſe it has a CERTAIN AIR OF " PLAUSIBILITY, that impoſes on many; and becauſe, " if it cannot ſtand a ſhort and fair examination, as I " think it cannot, the whole edifice of eccleſiaſtical in- " dependency and grandeur, falls to the ground. It has " been ſaid then, that religious and civil ſocieties are " widely diſtinguiſhed by the diſtinct ends of their " inſtitutions, which imply neceſſarily diſtinct powers " and a mutual independency; that the end of the one, " is the Salvation of Souls, and that of the other the " ſecurity of temporal intereſts; that the ſtate pu- " niſhes overt acts, and can puniſh nothing elſe, be- " cauſe it can have cognizance of nothing that paſſes " in the mind, and does not break out into criminal " actions; but that the Church employing her in-

" fluence

" influence to temper the passions, to regulate the " inward dispositions, and to prevent sins, as well as " crimes, is that tribunal at which even intentions " are to be tried, and sins, that do not ripen into " crimes, nor immediately affect civil Society, are " to be punished [14]."

This, I will suppose, his Lordship intended as a fair representation of the Author's argument for the *independency* of the Church. But the Argument, as it stands in the *Alliance*, is drawn from the different *powers* belonging to the two Societies; as those *powers* are deduced from their different *ends*. But different powers implying different administrations, they create a mutual independency; and different administrations implying an incapacity of their clashing with one another, shew plainly that such an independency can never produce an Imperium in Imperio. This is the natural order of the argument, as it stands in the *Alliance*. Let us see now, how his Lordship represents it. He begins rightly, with the different ends, *viz. Salvation of Souls*, and *Security of temporal interests:* But, proceeding to speak of the different *powers*, adapted to those different *ends*, *viz. Coertion* in the State, and *Persuasion* only in the Church (from whence arises a mutual independency) he mistakes the *consequences* of these powers, which are *punishment of overt acts*, and *subdual of the passions*, he mistakes them, I say, for the *powers themselves*; from which *consequences* indeed no independency ensues; because *subdual of the passions* may, in his Lordship's opinion at least, be obtained by coercive power, as well as

[14] Vol. iv. p. 413—14.

puniſhment of overt acts. And if both Societies have *coercive power*, one muſt needs be dependent on the other. I take notice of this miſtake only to ſhew you, what a poor and imperfect conception, his Lordſhip had of the Argument of the *Alliance*. Had he told us, tho' in fewer words, that the Author's reaſoning againſt the pretence of an Imperium in Imperio ariſing out of a mutual independency, was this, That the State having coercive power, and the Church having none, the adminiſtration of the two Societies could never claſh; ſo as to induce the miſchief of an Imperium in Imperio; Had he told us this, I ſay, we ſhould have ſeen, that at leaſt he *underſtood* his Adverſary.

But let us conſider how he goes about to anſwer what he ſo ill repreſents.

" Now in anſwer to all this (ſays his Lordſhip) " WE MAY DENY, with truth and reaſon on our " ſide, that the avowed ends of religious, and the " real ends of civil Society are ſo diſtinct as to re- " quire diſtinct powers, *and a mutual independency.* " The Salvation of Souls is not the immediate end " of civil Society, and I wiſh it was not rather the " pretence, than the end of eccleſiaſtical policy; but " if to abſtain from evil and to do good works be " means of ſalvation, the means of ſalvation are the " objects of civil government. It is the duty of " Princes and Magiſtrates to promote a ſtrict ob- " ſervation of the Law of Nature, of private and " public morality, and to make thoſe who live in " ſubjection to them, good men, in order to make " them good citizens. For this purpoſe, the balance " and the ſword are put into their hands, that they " may meaſure out puniſhment to every one, who " injures

" injures the Community, or does wrong to his " neighbour; and a rigorous punishment of crimes, " especially if it be accompanied with rewards and " encouragements to virtue, *for both are intrusted to* " *the same men* [15], is the surest way not only to " reform the outward behaviour, but to create an " habitual inward disposition to the practice of Vir- " tue [16]."

We may, says his Lordship, *deny that the avowed ends of religious, and the real ends of civil Society, are so distinct.*—Here he contradicts his master LOCKE. This indeed is a small matter. I shall shew he contradicts Truth, and the whole system of human affairs, both in the constitution of Laws and in the administration of Justice.— But before we come to that, there is a great deal to be done.— *We may*, says his Lordship, *deny that the* AVOWED *ends of religious, and the* REAL *ends of civil Society, are so distinct, as to require distinct powers and a mutual dependency.* The *avowed ends*, does he say? *Avowed* by whom? Common sense requires he should mean, *avowed* by those who go upon the principles of the book of *Alliance*. But then he *might* have said *real*; for the *avowed* and the *real* ends are the same: He *should* have said *real*; for the fair use of the proposition, and the force of the argument drawn from it, both require this word. But by what he predicates of these *avowed ends*, *viz.* their *not re-*

[15] This is said, I suppose, in opposition to what is asserted in the Book of the *Alliance*, (to shew the imperfection of the plan of civil power) that *reward* is not (as it is generally understood to be) one of the Sanctions of civil government, in the sense that *Punishment* is so. But as this is all his Lordship has to say against it, I shall here let the matter rest between them.

[16] Vol. iv. p. 414.

quiring diſtinct powers, we ſee, he means *avowed* by corrupt Churchmen. (*The ſalvation of ſouls* (ſays he, immediately after) *is rather the pretence than the end of eccleſiaſtical policy:*) and theſe *ends* are Church Uniformity for the ſake of ſpiritual dominion. Now theſe *avowed ends*, we readily confeſs, cannot be obtained without *coercive power* of the civil kind. Here then you have his Lordſhip, after all his declamation againſt ſpiritual tyranny, coming at laſt, in the true ſpirit of a free-thinking politician, to profeſs that religious perſecution and coercive power are, in the order of things, as juſtly and reaſonably employed in matters of conſcience, as in the overt acts of civil life: now tho' this be altogether upon principle, (for what ſhould reſtrain a Stateſman, who believes nothing of the truth of religion and ſees all the miſchiefs of diverſity of opinions, from attempting to bring about an outward uniformity, by force?) Yet you would not have expected it in this place, where his Lordſhip is defending religious Liberty, againſt the Prieſt-craft of the *Alliance:* Nor would you have found it, had not the diſtreſſes of controverſy driven him into his native quarters, before his time. The *Alliance* went on this principle, that the Church was a Society, independent of the Civil, as not having coercive power like the Civil. To overturn this argument, his Lordſhip was forced to deny the minor, and ſo unawares has brought in PERSECUTION as one of the natural powers of the Church. But to compaſs this matter neatly, and without noiſe, he has recourſe to his old trade, the employing, under an ambiguous expreſſion, the *abuſe* of the thing for the thing itſelf.—*The avowed ends of religious — the real ends of civil ſociety.*——But

it

it was so evident a truth, that the *salvation of souls* was the real end of religious Society, and *the security of temporal interests*, the real end of the Civil, that he must have lost his senses who could be brought to believe that *coercive power* was as proper to promote the first as the second; or that *instruction and exhortation* was as proper to promote the second as the first: one of which things, his assertion, *that the Church and State have not distinct powers*, necessarily implies: To disguise this absurdity therefore for, *real*, which fair argument required, he substitutes the ambiguous word, *avowed*, which his bad cause required: And under this cover, he denies, that the two societies are *so distinct as to require distinct powers*.—Well, this however we understand; and have thoroughly canvassed. But what mean the words that follow?——AND A MUTUAL INDEPENDENCY. The author of the *Alliance* indeed had said, that the ends of the two societies were so distinct as to require *distinct powers*. But he was not so absurd to add—*and a mutual independency*; because, *independency* was not the *mean* of attaining an end, like *distinct powers*, but a *consequence* of those powers: for if the powers, by which two societies are administered, be different, those societies, (seeing their administrations can never clash,) must needs be independent on one another. This is given only as a fresh instance of the cloudy apprehension this great Statesman had of a plain argument, the argument of the *Alliance*, built on the first principles of Law and Politics.

Let me now proceed with his reasoning. He is to prove, what he had asserted, that the two Societies *are not so distinct as to require distinct powers*. He is writ-

ting againſt the book or rather againſt the Author of the *Alliance*; who lays it down as an acknowledged truth, that the end of the Religious is *ſalvation of Souls*; the end of the Civil, *ſecurity of temporal intereſts*. To this his Lordſhip replies, that ſalvation of ſouls is only the *pretended* end of the Religious; but it is the *real*, tho' not *immediate* end, of the Civil. And thus he has with great dexterity wiped out all diſtinction between the two Societies. I have already detected both the fraud and the fallacy of the firſt part of his aſſertion. I come now to the other, *that ſalvation of ſouls is the real, tho' not immediate, end of civil Government*. Here the meanneſs of his ſophiſtry is ſtill more apparent, than in the former part. It ſtands thus,—"The *immediate* end of civil government is confeſſed, on all hands to be *ſecurity of temporal intereſts*.—This is done by keeping men *to abſtain from evil*, and exciting them *to good works*—*Good works are the means of ſalvation*—Therefore the *means of ſalvation are the objects of civil government*; or, in other words, the ſalvation of ſouls is at leaſt the *real*, tho' *mediate* end of civil Society."

The Author of the *Alliance* had obviated all this paultry Chicane in the following words: "Civil "Government, I ſuppoſe, will be allowed to have "been invented for the attainment of ſome certain "end or ends excluſive of others: and this implies "the neceſſity of diſtinguiſhing this end from others. "Which diſtinction ariſes from the different proper- "ties of the things pretending. But amongſt all "thoſe things which are apt to obtrude, or have in "fact obtruded, upon men as the ends of civil Go- "vernment, there is but one difference in their pro- "perties,

" perties, as ENDS: which is this, *that one of these* " *is attainable by civil Society only, and all the rest are* " *easily attained without it.* The thing then with the " first mentioned property must needs be that *genuine* " *end* of civil Society. And this is no other than " *security to the temporal liberty and property of man* [17]."

But his Lordship's sophism consists in the ambiguity of the word END; which either signifies the consequence or issue of a *mean*, simply; or, the consequence and issue, with intention and fore-thought. In the first sense it may be true, that salvation is the mediate end of civil Society; but then it is nothing to the purpose. In the second sense it is to the purpose, but not true. The civil Magistrate, all men see, had not this consequence or issue in his thoughts; as is evident from hence, that, in adapting his punishments to the various species of unlawful actions, he does not proportion them to the heinousness of the offence, as estimated on the principles of *natural* or of *revealed* Religion, but on their malignant influence on civil Society. A plain indication, that, when he measured out punishments to offences, he had only *political* and not *religious* considerations in his view. But you shall hear what the Author of the *Alliance* has said on this subject, who had confuted his Lordship's sophism even before he had conceived it.

" We have shewn (says this writer) that it was " the care of the *Bodies*, not of the *Souls* of men, that " the Magistrate undertook to give account of. What- " ever therefore refers to the *body*, is in his jurisdic- " tion; whatever to the soul, is not. But, and if

[17] *Alliance*, p. 32—3.

" there be that which refers equally to both (as
" *Morals* plainly do) such thing must needs be partly
" within, and partly without his province; that is,
" it is to be *partially* considered by him; his care
" thereto extending so far only as it affects Civil So-
" ciety. The other consideration of it, namely as
" it makes part of Religion, being in the Hands of
" those, who preside in another kind of Society.
" Again, with regard to civil practice; if we cast
" our eye on any Digest of Laws, we find that evil
" actions have their annexed punishment denounced,
" not as they are VICES, *i. e.* not in proportion to
" their deviation from the eternal rule of right: nor
" as they are SINS, *i. e.* not in proportion to their
" deviation from the extraordinary revealed will of
" God; which two things indeed coincide: but as
" they are CRIMES, *i. e.* in proportion to their ma-
" lignant influence on civil Society. But the view
" in which the *State* regards the *practice of Morality*
" is evidently seen, in its recognition of that famous
" maxim, by which penal laws in all Communities
" are fashioned and directed, THAT THE SEVERITY
" OF THE PUNISHMENT MUST ALWAYS RISE IN
" PROPORTION TO THE PROPENSITY TO THE CRIME.
" A maxim evidently *unjust* were actions regarded by
" the State, as they are in themselves only; because
" the *Law of Nature* enjoins only in proportion to the
" ability of performance; and human abilities abate
" in proportion to the contrary propensities: evi-
" dently *impious*, were actions regarded by the State
" as they refer to the will of God, because this State-
" measure directly contradicts his method and rule
" of punishing. But suppose the Magistrate's office

" to

" to be what is here assigned, his aim must be " the SUPPRESSION of *crimes*, or of those actions " which malignantly affect society; and then no- " thing can be more reasonable than this proceeding; " for then his end must be the good of the *whole*, " not of *particulars*, but as they come within that " view. But the good of the whole being to be pro- " cured only by the *prevention* of crimes, and those " to which there is the greatest propensity being of " the most difficult prevention, the full severity of " his Laws must of necessity be turned against " these [18]."

But, his Lordship goes on to inform us, What those *means* are which Princes and Magistrates employ to procure this *mediate end* of civil Society, the *Salvation of Souls*; and they are, he says, COERCIVE force.—*For this purpose, the ballance and the sword are put into their hands, that they may measure out punishment to every one, who injures the community or does wrong to his neighbour. And a rigorous punishment of crimes, especially if it be accompanied with rewards and encouragements to virtue, is the surest way not only to reform the outward behaviour, but to create an inward disposition to the practice of virtue.*

Who would have expected that it should come at last to this, so contrary to his Lordship's assertion in the case of an *extraordinary providence*, That a vigorous and exact distribution of rewards and punishments under the MAGISTRATE'S PROVIDENCE (which indeed is the only one his Lordship thinks worth a rush) should be so far from *taking away merit and making*

[18] *Alliance*, p. 35—6—7.

virtue ſervile, that it is the *ſureſt way of creating an inward diſpoſition to the practice of virtue!* i. e. the ſureſt way of making virtue *free* and *meritorious*. But there is ſomething marvelouſly perverſe in his Lordſhip's conduct. The exact diſtribution of rewards and puniſhments by Heaven makes virtue worthleſs and ſervile, tho' the adminiſtration of Providence be able to operate on the mind and intention, the only way if any, of *creating an inward diſpoſition to the practice of virtue*; that is, of making it free and meritorious. On the contrary, if you will continue to believe him, the exact diſtribution of rewards and puniſhments by the civil Magiſtrate, makes virtue free and meritorious, tho' the Magiſtrate's adminiſtration be unable to operate on the mind and intention, and influences only the outward act; which is (if any be) to make virtue worthleſs and ſervile.

But to come to the point, which theſe obſervations naturally lead to. The very means his Lordſhip aſſigns for the promotion of this imaginary end, namely *coercive force* for *ſalvation of ſouls*, entirely ſubverts his principle, and ſhews that ſalvation of ſouls could be no end of civil Society, ſince the means are in no wiſe calculated to promote the end; it not being action ſimply, which intitles to the favour of God, but action, upon proper motives. Now with theſe, (which reſult into what we call Conſcience,) force, or coercion, is abſolutely inconſiſtent: Force may make hypocrites, but nothing but the rational convictions of Religion can make men lovers of Virtue.

Now if it be by ſuch kind of reaſoning as this that the *whole edifice of eccleſiaſtical independency and grandeur may be brought to the ground*, (to uſe his Lordſhip's

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big language) Church Power was never worth the reariug.

To proceed. His Lordſhip with much gravity, tells us next, that "A Clergy might co-operate with "the civil Magiſtrate very uſefully, no doubt, by ex- "hortations, reproofs, and example.—This they might "do as aſſiſtants to the civil Magiſtrate, in concert "with him, and in ſubordination to him. *To what "purpoſe therefore do they claim and affect independency "on him?* Greater power never did, nor can enable "them to do greater good. Would they erect a tri- "bunal to *puniſh intentions?* The very pretence is im- "pertinent. Would they erect it to *puniſh where no "injury is offered, nor wrong done?* The deſign is un- "juſt and arbitrary. The ideas of crimes are deter- "minate and fixed The Magiſtrate cannot alter "them. The ideas of Sins are more confuſed and "vague; and we know by long and general expe- "rience, how they vary in the minds, or at leaſt in "the writings of caſuiſts. Would they erect ſuch a "tribunal *to try the orthodoxy of men's faith?* Such a "one is erected in ſome countries, under the name of "the Inquiſition, and is juſtly deteſted in all. To "what end and purpoſe then can SPIRITUAL "COURTS and COERCIVE POWERS ATTRIBUTED "TO THE CLERGY ſerve, unleſs it be to make "them Judges and Parties in their own cauſe, when "matters of intereſt are concerned [18]?"

His Lordſhip, it muſt be remembered, is here reaſoning with the Author of the *Alliance*, againſt his notions of the rights of a Clergy in an eſtabliſhed

[18] Vol. iv. p. 415—16.

Church. And the noble perſon's firſt miſrepreſentation, you ſee, is, that amongſt theſe rights, the claim of independency on the State during their eſtabliſhment, is one; and that the coercive power exerciſed by them, under the Alliance, is exerciſed as *inherent* in their order. *To what purpoſe* (ſays his Lordſhip) *do they* [the Clergy] CLAIM AND AFFECT *independency on him, the civil Magiſtrate?* And again, *To what end and purpoſe can ſpiritual Courts, and coercive powers,* ATTRIBUTED *to the Clergy, ſerve?* And, as if this was not plain enough, in the very next page, addreſſing himſelf to POPE, he ſays, "Amongſt all the fallacies which have been em-"ployed by Churchmen, one of the moſt abſurd has "been advanced, tho' not invented [18], by a paradox-"ical Acquaintance of yours; and it is to maintain "the INDEPENDENCY of the Church, and to ſup-"poſe, AT THE SAME TIME, a ſort of original "Contract between the Church and State, the terms "of which, every whimſical Writer, EVEN THIS "SCRIBLER, adjuſts as he pleaſes [19]." Falſhood and ill language commonly go together. But let them go.

You ſhall now hear what the Author of the *Alliance* holds on theſe two points, and from his own mouth. Firſt, as to the *independency*,—"Let us ſee next (ſays "he) what the STATE gains by it [the *Alliance*.] "Theſe [advantages] in a word may be comprized "in ITS SUPREMACY IN MATTERS ECCLESIAS-"TICAL. THE CHURCH RESIGNING UP HER IN-"DEPENDENCY, and making the Magiſtrate her ſu-

[18] It was invented, it ſeems, by his friend Dr. Senior.

[19] Vol. iv. p. 417.

"PREME

" SUPREME HEAD, without whose approbation and al-
" lowance, she can administer, transact, or decree
" nothing [1]."

Secondly, as to *coercive power*. " The third and
" last PRIVILEGE THE CHURCH GAINS, by this
" Alliance, is the being INTRUSTED WITH A JU-
" RISDICTION, INFORCED BY COACTIVE POW-
" ER [2]."

His Lordship assures us, the Author of the Alliance holds, that the *independency* of the Church is *retained* in an establishment: the Author himself, says that it is *given up*. His Lordship assures us, the Author holds an *inherent coercive power* in the Church; the Author himself says, that *coercive power is a grant of the State*, during the Alliance.

And here you may take notice, how greatly his Lordship has improved upon his Masters, the Authors of the *Rights of the Christian Church*, and of the *Independent Whig*. They had ventured indeed to charge both these doctrines on the body of the English Clergy: But as one can never be sure what an indiscreet or corrupt member of so large a body may have said, the confutation of their calumny was not so easy. His Lordship is more bold, he charges these opinions on a particular member of the established Church, by name: but then he is more fair, he puts it in the power of the person injured to do himself justice; for it so happens, that this person not only denies the independency of the Church under an establishment, and all claim to inherent coercive power whatsoever, but has laid down principles

[1] *Alliance*, p. 147. [2] *Alliance*, p. 134.

to

to discredit, and rules to prevent the return of, those usurpations. The Author of the *Alliance* has vindicated [3] the English Clergy from the prevarications of TINDAL and GORDON; It had been hard, had he found no charitable hand to vindicate him from the same calumny, when revived by this noble Lord.

As therefore, no independency in alliance, is either claimed or affected; and no inherent coercive power is attributed to the Clergy, We will suppose his Lordship's simple question to be, "For what end is "that tribunal, called a *Spiritual Court*, erected?" And had he been so candid to let the Author of the *Alliance*, to whom he directs his question, speak for himself, he had not waited for an answer. For the Author tells us, in the most conspicuous part of his book, and in great letters, that it is FOR REFORMATION OF MANNERS *only* [4]. But, as if the Author had entirely left us to ourselves to conjecture how he intended to employ this *spiritual tribunal*, his Lordship falls a guessing: and there is no kind of absurdity, he does not propose, as favoured by his Adversary, tho' they be such as his Adversary had already exploded.

To what purpose, says his Lordship, *do the Clergy claim and affect independency on the Magistrate? Greater power never did, nor can enable them to do greater good Would they erect a tribunal to* PUNISH INTENTIONS? *The very pretence is impertinent.*

Before I come to his Lordship's *conjecture*, give me leave, Sir, to say one word of the happiness of his

[3] *Alliance*, p. 81, & seq. [4] *Ibid.* p. 134.

vindi-

induction. This *Tribunal*, or this coercive power, which he makes to follow independency, is so far from being produced by it, that coercive power never comes into the Church till it has given up it's independency. The Author of the *Alliance* assigns a plain reason. "The State (says he) having, by this Alliance, bestowed upon the Clergy a Jurisdiction with coactive power, such privilege would create an IMPERIUM IN IMPERIO had not the *civil Magistrate* in return, the *supremacy of the Church* [5]."

And now, to his conjecture. Is it, says he, *to punish intentions?* The Author of the *Alliance* says, No, it is for *reformation of manners only.* But you understand not half his Lordship's drift, unless you consider these questions as proposed to insinuate, that the Author of the *Alliance* held the Absurdities contained in them. So here, for instance, you are to understand, that Mr. W. held this Tribunal was to *punish intentions.* However, I will acquit his Lordship of malice; it seems to be an innocent blunder. The Author of the *Alliance* did indeed talk of a *Tribunal regarding irregular intentions as criminal*; and by ill luck, the noble Person mistook this tribunal, for a *spiritual Court.* The Author's words are these—"The effectual correction of such evils [as arise from the *intemperance of the sensual appetites*] must be begun by moderating and subduing the Passions themselves. But this, civil Laws are not understood to prescribe, as punishing those passions only when they proceed to act: and not rewarding the attempts to subdue them. *It must be a tribunal re-*

[5] *Alliance*, p. 149.

"*garding*

" *garding irregular intentions as criminal which can do* " *this; and that is no other than the tribunal of Reli-* " *gion.* When this is done, a coactive power of the " civil kind may have a good effect, but not till " then. And who so proper to apply this coactive " power, in such cases, as that Society, which fitted " and prepared the subject, for its due reception and " application [6]." This *tribunal regarding irregular intentions as criminal*, the Author calls the *tribunal of Religion, (Forum conscientiæ)* and distinguishes it from that other tribunal, which is invested with *coactive power of the civil kind*, called *spiritual Courts:* he makes the first a preparative to the other. Yet, strange to believe! his Lordship mistook this *tribunal of Religion*, so described and distinguished, for a *spiritual Court:* and upbraids the Author of the *Alliance* for supporting a *tribunal with coercive powers, to* PUNISH INTENTIONS. But we shall see more of his Lordship's acumen, as we go along.

His second charge against the principles of the *Alliance* is in these words — *Would they erect this tribunal to punish, where* NO INJURY IS OFFERED, NOR WRONG DONE? *The design is unjust and arbitrary. The ideas of crimes are determinate and fixed. The Magistrate cannot alter them. The ideas of sins are more confused and vague; and we know by long and general experience, how they vary in the minds, or at least in the writings of Casuists.*

To punish where no injury is offered nor wrong done, is his Lordship's periphrasis for the *punishment of vague taste*, which the Author of the *Alliance* makes one

[6] *Alliance*, p. 99—100.

branch

branch of the reformation of manners, and conſequently an object of ſpiritual Courts. But his Lordſhip's own opinion of the *quality* of vague luſt, intimated in this periphraſis, is but a ſecond conſideration. His principal purpoſe in giving it, was to diſcredit the tyranny of ſpiritual Courts, in puniſhing where no fault is committed. To forget his BIBLE is nothing: but to forget his HORACE is a diſgrace indeed. Now this honeſt Pagan reckoned the prohibition of *vague luſt*, as one of the chief objects of *civil laws*.

" Fuit hæc ſapientia quondam
" Publica privatis ſecernere, *ſacra profanis*;
" CONCUBITU PROHIBERE VAGO; dare jura maritis.

All this is ſo very extraordinary, that you will not readily believe his Lordſhip could deſign the *puniſhment of vague luſt*, by the words—*puniſhing where no injury is offered nor wrong done*; nor would I neither, did he not ſo clearly explain himſelf, in his curious diſtinction between *crimes* and *ſins*: which, becauſe it was occaſioned by, and alludes to, a paſſage in the *Alliance*, it may not be amiſs previouſly to tranſcribe that paſſage: " If we caſt our eye on any digeſt of Laws " we find that evil actions have their annexed pu- " niſhment denounced, not as they are VICES, *i. e.* " in proportion to their deviation from the eternal " rule of right: nor as they are SINS, *i. e.* not in " proportion to their deviation from the extraordi- " nary revealed will of God; which two things in- " deed coincide; but as they are CRIMES, *i. e.* in " proportion to their malignant influence on civil

" So-

"Society [7]." The Author of the *Alliance* ſaid this, to ſhew that the civil Magiſtrate does not concern himſelf with Religion, *as ſuch*. His Lordſhip borrows the ſame diſtinction between *crimes* and *ſins*, to ſhew, that it is arbitrary and unjuſt to puniſh *ſins*, as *ſpiritual Courts* undertake to do: for, ſays he, *the ideas of* CRIMES *are determinate and fixed: The ideas of* SINS *are more confuſed and vague*. From this, it appears, that his Lordſhip miſtook *vices*, *ſins*, *and crimes*, for different actions; whereas they are the ſame actions under different conſiderations: either as they reſpect *natural light*, *revealed Religion*, or *civil laws*; and ſo have different names impoſed upon them. The *ideas* therefore of theſe three modifications of forbidden actions are all equally *determinate and fixed*, or all equally *confuſed and vague*. But it comes with a peculiar ill grace from his Lordſhip to object to the *confuſed and vague idea of* SINS, ſince this idea is formed upon the revealed will of God in the Goſpel, which, in a hundred places of his ESSAYS he tells us, coincides with the eternal rule of right; a rule, which he acknowledges to be the moſt determinate and fixed of all things.

But he ſays, *the Magiſtrate cannot alter the ideas of crimes*, *as the Caſuiſt may*, *the idea of ſins*. That is, the Magiſtrate cannot give the Name of Crimes to innocent actions. What ſhould hinder him? He had two advantages above the Caſuiſt: Firſt, *coercive power*: ſecondly, the *vague and confuſed* meaſure to which crimes refer; namely, to the influence of actions on Society. Matter of fact confirms this obſervation. Look round the World; enquire through antient and

[7] *Alliance*, p. 35—6.

modern

modern Times, and you ſhall find, that the *Magiſtrate* has been guilty of infinitely more abuſe in ranging actions under the idea of *Crimes*, than the *Caſuiſt*, in ranging actions under the idea of *Sins*. This was not improper to be obſerved in anſwer to his Lordſhip's EXPERIENCE, which uſhers in his old ſophiſm, ready at every turn to help him out, the *abuſe* of the thing for the thing itſelf—*We know*, ſays he, *by long and general experience, how the ideas of ſins vary in the minds, or at leaſt in the* WRITINGS *of caſuiſts*. By which it would ſeem, the noble Author knows as little of *Caſuiſts*, as of any other ſort of learned men, whoſe characters he has treated ſo Lordly. For corrupt caſuiſtry does not ſo much conſiſt *in varying the ideas of Sins*, concerning which they are generally agreed, as in contriving to evade the puniſhment denounced againſt them.

His laſt conjecture about the uſe of an eccleſiaſtical Tribunal, on the principles of the *Alliance*, is, that it is erected for the puniſhment of Opinions. *Would they erect*, ſays he, *ſuch a tribunal to try the orthodoxy of men's faith?* Why no, ſays the Author of the ALLIANCE, in as plain terms as he can ſpeak; —NO MATTERS OF OPINION COME WITHIN THIS SPIRITUAL JURISDICTION [8]: And he not only ſays it, but proves it too [9].—*To what end and purpoſe then*, ſays his Lordſhip, can *ſpiritual courts and coercive powers ſerve, unleſs it be to make the Clergy judges and parties in their own cauſe, when matters of intereſt are concerned?—To what end?* The Author of the *Alliance* has told him plainly and directly; FOR THE

[8] *Alliance*, p. 136. [9] P. 137—8.

REFOR-

REFORMATION OF MANNERS ONLY. But such an answer did not serve his Lordship's turn. He will make the Author say as he would have him; or injoin him silence, and answer for him, himself. He insinuates therefore, in the last place, that the end aimed at is to determine in civil matters where the temporal interest of the Clergy is concerned, and where they become Judges in their own cause. Hear then what the Author of the *Alliance* says upon this head likewise; "CIVIL MATTERS, which tempo-
" poral Courts may conveniently inspect, can never
" belong to an ecclesiastical Jurisdiction. It hath
" been shewn, that this Court was erected as a suc-
" cedaneum to the Civil, to take cognizance of such
" actions as the Civil could not reach, or could not
" remedy: which shews, the State could never in-
" tend to put those things under the ecclesiastical
" Jurisdiction that fall most conveniently under it's
" own. Besides, for ecclesiastical Courts to ingross
" matters that belong to the civil jurisdiction, as it
" can possibly have no good use, may very possibly
" be attended with this evil, of inviting and en-
" couraging the Church to aim at more power than
" is consistent, either with her own good, or the
" good of the State. The great Founder of our Re-
" ligion said, *Who made me a Judge or Divider be-*
" *tween you?* And what he would not assume to him-
" self, he would hardly bestow upon his Church:
" and that the State should ever intend to give her
" what was the peculiar right of temporal Courts, is
" as difficult to suppose. We must conclude then,
" that such practice, wherever it is found, was de-
" rived not from the reasonable Laws of this *Alli-*

" *ance*,

" *ance*, but from the authority of old papal uſurpa-
" tions [19]." Thus far the Author of the *Alliance*; where you may find a great deal more to the ſame purpoſe.

But his Lordſhip goes on with his confutation. — " By admitting the independency of the Church on " the State, the State acknowledges an original in-" dependency in the Church, derived from a greater " authority than her own: and the ſuppoſed terms " of *Union* may be conſtrued to be rather conceſſions " of the religious Society to the civil, for the ſake of " order and peace, than grants of the civil to the re-" ligious Society. Thus Religion and the Church " are ſet on the ſame foot: no human authority can " alter one, but muſt receive it in *the terms* in which " it has been revealed; and ſo may a good Caſuiſt " prove on this hypotheſis, that no human authority " can meaſure out any conditions of Eſtabliſhment " to the other. Thus the State becomes no better " than a coordinate, but inferior power [20]." I once met with a Philoſopher of deep thought, who profeſſed the ſame reverence for artificial Nonſenſe, that the Turks pay to naturally Folly. His Syſtem on this point was very ſingular. He ſuppoſed that, as in the *material* World there was an univerſal, tho' very ſubtile fire, diffuſed in ſecret thro' all bodies; which, by a late contrivance might be allured or drawn out from the moſt inanimate or lumpiſh Matter, even from the dirty ſhoes of the Chronologer of Leiceſter, the Man who makes Time of Eternity; So, in the *intellectual*, that there was a certain witty

[19] *Alliance*, p. 138—9—40. [20] V. iv. p. 417.

Spirit, which lay dormant in the moſt inexplicable Nonſenſe; and only wanted the application of ſome Engine of analogous invention to rouſe it, and ſet it free. 'Till ſuch a one be diſcovered, we can but gueſs at his Lordſhip's meaning.

By admitting the independency of the Church on the State, (ſays he) *the State acknowledges an original independency in the Church derived from a greater Authority than her own.* If, by *Church*, he means the chriſtian Church, in general, it is confeſſed that it's independency is derived from a greater authority than what the State claims for any of it's rights. The Church holding of God immediately and in an extraordinary manner; the State, only mediately, and in a common way. But what are the conſequences his Lordſhip would deduce from thence? The firſt is, that *then the ſuppoſed terms of union may be conſtrued to be rather conceſſions of the religious Society to the civil, for the ſake of order and peace, than grants of the civil to the religious Society.* The *ſuppoſed terms* are terms of Alliance between two independent Societies. Theſe terms cannot, in the nature of things, be any other than *mutual conceſſions* and *mutual grants.* What then does he mean, by their being *conſtrued to be rather conceſſions of the religious Society than grants of the civil?* By the *ſuppoſition* on which his Lordſhip condeſcends to reaſon, When the Church in Alliance gives up its original independency it is without doubt a *conceſſion*; becauſe it is giving up a right: And when the State in Alliance, confers a coercive power on the Church, this, is certainly a *grant*; becauſe an original independent religious Society can have no inherent coercive power. However ſome meaning, it is likely, his Lordſhip had.

And

And it seems to be this, "That if the Church have an original independency, no such *Alliance* as is supposed, could be made: for that the terms on the side of the Church, would not be conditional but voluntary concessions, the State having nothing to give, in return." This would be talking sense at least, tho' not truth. But, first to *suppose* the fact, that the terms of this Union are mutual grants and mutual concessions; and then to deny mutual grants, and mutual concessions, is giving such a form to his argument as will need a *first Logic* to turn into sense, as much as the doctrine conveyed under it needs a *first Philosophy* to turn into truth. Thus much however You may see; Some cloudy conception his Lordship plainly had, that a Society of *divine* original could never enter into Alliance with another, only of *human*. When the Sons of God came down amongst the Daughters of Men, we are told they begot Giants. His Lordship betrays his apprehensions, that this coalition between the civil and religious Societies would produce an issue altogether as monstrous, a kind of STATE LEVIATHAN. Indeed, he charges the Author of the *Alliance* with being no better than a Pander or Procurer in this intrigue. But whatever his apprehensions were, his conception was altogether unworthy both of a Philosopher and a Statesman. The AUTHOR OF THE ALLIANCE hath shewn from the nature of things, that Religion composes an independent society: The GOSPEL, by divine institution hath declared the Christian Religion to be an independent society. His LORDSHIP hath shewn, from the nature of things, that civil wants create an independent society of the civil kind: And the LAW, by divine

inſtitution, hath declared the Jewiſh Republic to be an independent civil ſociety. Now I would aſk his Lordſhip, if nothing hindered this *civil Society of divine original*, from entering into leagues and conventions with all the neighbouring nations, which were not, for political reaſons, excepted by name, what ſhould hinder this *religious Society of divine original* from entering into Alliance with the State?

Another Conſequence his Lordſhip draws from an original independency in the Church is, that RELIGION *and the* CHURCH *are ſet on the ſame foot*. That is, as I underſtand him, for he might have expreſſed himſelf better, the DISCIPLINE of the Church is as unalterable as the DOCTRINE: The inference from which is, that the *State muſt receive the* CHURCH *on the terms in which it was revealed:* From whence his Lordſhip draws another conſequence, that *no human Authority can meaſure out any conditions of eſtabliſhment to the Church:* and, from thence another, (for his Lordſhip's falſe conceptions are always attended with ſuperfetations,) that the *State becomes an inferior Power, or Creature to the Church.* All theſe brave conſequences, we ſee, ariſe out of this principle, "that, "in a Church of Divine Original, the *Diſcipline* is as "unalterable as the *Doctrine.*" And of the truth of this principle his Lordſhip is ſo confident, that he calls his Adverſary a *ſtupid Fellow* for not owning it. "The STUPID FELLOW, who advanced this Para-"dox in Engliſh, did not ſee how ill the parts of it "hang together, nor that if eccleſiaſtical Govern-"ment was, by divine appointment, independent "of civil, no ſuch contract as he ſuppoſes could be "made. The religious ſociety, notwithſtanding their

"known

" known moderation, could not have parted from " that independency AND SUPERIORITY over the " civil power, which God had given them [3]."

It is true, this STUPID FELLOW did not see it. And I don't well know how he should; since, on the other hand, he saw it to be impossible that any *such contract as he supposes* could be made, unless the Church or religious Society were *independent* of the civil. For what *contract* is it, which this Author supposes to have been made between Church and State? He tells us, in express words, it is a *mutual compact by* FREE CONVENTION [4]. Now the entering into a *free convention* is at the pleasure of the contracting parties. But Parties who have this liberty, must needs be *independent* on one another.

Well, but he has his reason, such as it is, to confound this STUPID FELLOW. *The Religious Society* (says he) *could not have parted from that independency*, AND SUPERIORITY, *over the civil Power, which God had given them.* And now indeed, after much cloudy flourishing, we are come to the point; which is, WHETHER A RELIGIOUS SOCIETY CAN PART WITH THAT INDEPENDENCY WHICH GOD, *as well as the nature of things*, HATH BESTOWED UPON IT? This is in truth a question worth debating. But as his Lordship rarely suffers an important proposition, which he is set either upon denying or depraving, to pass thro' his hands without first perplexing it, in the expression with an absurdity or an equivocation, I shall be obliged, before we can pass forward, to free this from the Bolingbrokian embarrass. *The religious*

[3] Vol. iv. p. 418. [4] *Alliance*, p. 87.

Society (says he) *could not have parted from that independency* AND SUPERIORITY *over the civil power which God hath given them.* Now as the Author of the *Alliance* contends only for the independency of the Church *before Alliance*, and as his Lordship's reasoning acknowledges that the question is only concerning independency *before Alliance*, he must needs suppose, by adding, AND SUPERIORITY *over the civil*, that this *superiority* is a consequence of *independency*. And so, indeed, he speaks of it more plainly just before,— *Thus*, [i. e. from the *independency* of the Church,] *the State becomes no better than a coordinate*, BUT INFERIOR, *Power*. Now if we judge of this matter on the principles of the Law of Nature and Nations, *superiority* is so far from following *independency*, that it cannot consist with it. For why is religious Society by nature *independent*, (as the Author of the *Alliance* shews it is) but for the reason that Author gives, that it is *essentially different* from the civil, *by having different ends and means* [5]." But there is no ground for superiority of one Person or Society over another, but where some natural relation or connexion exists between them: none exists in this case; therefore a pretence of superiority on the one side, and of dependency on the other, is absurd. However, as I am verily persuaded his Lordship did not know enough of these matters even to prevaricate neatly in the point in question, I consider it as an innocent blunder, arising from the following words of the *Alliance*, shamefully, indeed, misunderstood.— "Such "then is the nature of Christ's kingdom [*i. e.* the

[5] *Alliance*, p. 65.

"chris-

" chriſtian Church] it is eſſentially framed to com-
" poſe a firm and laſting Society; it is made ſuch by
" divine appointment, and in order to fit it for pub-
" lic ſervice, it is both by nature and inſtitution de-
" clared SOVEREIGN, and independent of civil Go-
" vernment, that it may adapt itſelf by *free Alliance*
" to the various kinds of human Policies [6]."
Now *ſovereign in itſelf and independent of civil govern-
ment*, this great Writer hath paraphraſed to ſignify,
independency and ſuperiority over the civil,

— " Thalem talento non emam Mileſium:
" Nam, ad ſapientiam Hujus, nimius nugator fuit.

But, to come to the queſtion; which is WHETHER A RELIGIOUS SOCIETY CAN PART WITH THAT INDEPENCENCY WHICH GOD, *as well as the Nature of things*, HATH BESTOWED UPON IT. His Lordſhip determines in the negative. *For if*, ſays he, *eccleſiaſtical Govern-
ment was by divine appointment independent of the civil,
the Religious Society could not have parted with that inde-
pendency which God had given them.*

Man was, by *divine appointment*, made free and independent; therefore, according to this reaſoning, he could not part with his *independency*, and become ſubject to civil Laws. Hold, ſays his Lordſhip, Man was made free, that he might be ſubject to no laws but thoſe to which he had given his conſent; and as he needed protection from Laws, he had a right to part with his independency if he could get protection upon no other terms. And is not this the very caſe of the religious Society in queſtion, which is only an

[6] *Ibid.* p. 180.

artificial perſon, by nature and inſtitution free, and ſtanding in need of protection?

But his Lordſhip's aſſertion, you will find, bottoms at laſt upon this Principle, that DIVINE AUTHORITY REDUCES ALL IT'S LAWS TO ONE AND THE SAME SPECIES: An Error which *Bigots* and *Fanatics* indeed, are equally fond of indulging; and has been indulged by them to the infinite diſſervice both of civil and of religious Society: But that a *Philoſopher* and a *Stateſman* ſhould know ſo little of the NATURE OF LAWS is perfectly aſtoniſhing. The firſt elements of his profeſſion might have taught him, "That the Authority by which a thing is commanded makes no alteration in the eſſence of the thing." Natural and poſitive duties retain their reſpective natures in the Code of Religion. Natural duties are eternal; Poſitive duties are revocable. Of theſe latter, ſome are laſting as the Diſpenſation to which they belong; others only temporary. Of the temporary, ſome ceaſe not till they are expreſly revoked; others ceaſe with the occaſion that enjoined them. Theſe laſt are again to be diſtinguiſhed into Privileges and Duties; privileges may be receded from at pleaſure; but duties muſt either be revoked, or the occaſion muſt be plainly ſeen to ceaſe. Now the INDEPENDENCY in queſtion, is one of thoſe inſtitutions in the divine Law, which ceaſes with the occaſion; and is beſides, a privilege, which may be receded from, at pleaſure. Again, In the divine Laws, ſome things are enjoined to be believed as Truths; others to be practiſed as Utilities. Of utilities ſome are general; others particular: The firſt of theſe are permanent and conſtant; the ſecond variable. Of the firſt, is

the

the Church's compoſing a *Society:* of the ſecond, is it's *particular form.* Thus, Jeſus ſeemed to inſtitute an equal Miniſtry; the Apoſtles, epiſcopal Government; and modern Churches have choſen one or the other, as beſt ſuited to the various civil Governments with which they had allied.

As Chriſtianity was, by divine inſtitution, a *Society at large,* to authorize and to enable the ſeveral Churches to give particular forms to eccleſiaſtical Government; ſo the *independency* was beſtowed upon it, to enable it to enter into free Alliance with the State. When God himſelf allied the Jewiſh Church with the State, he did not leave that Religion a *ſociety at large*; neither did he ordain it *independent:* he preſcribed, in the minuteſt manner, the form of Church Government; and made it dependent on the State. But the Author of the *Alliance* tells his ſtory better. "The "chriſtian religion (ſays he) was not only left *inde-* "*pendent* of the State by not being united to it like "the Jewiſh; (and being ſo left it muſt needs by the "Law of Nature be independent,) but its indepen- "dency, was likewiſe ſecured by divine appoint- "ment, in that famous declaration of it's founder, "*My kingdom is not of this world*; which bears this "plain and obvious ſenſe, *That the kingdom of Chriſt,* "*to be extended over all Mankind, was not like the king-* "*dom of God, confined to the Jewiſh people, where Reli-* "*gion was incorporated with the State*; *and therefore,* "of this world, *as well in the exerciſe of it, as in the* "*rewards and puniſhments by which it was adminiſtered:* "*but was independent of all civil communities*; *and* "*therefore, neither* of this world, *as to the exerciſe of* "*it, nor as to the rewards and puniſhments by which it*

" *was administered.*—But whoever imagines that, from " this *independency by institution*, the Church cannot " convene and unite with the State, concludes much " too fast. We have observed, that this property in " the *Kingdom of Christ* was given as a mark to dis- " tinguish it from the *kingdom of God*, that is, it was " given to shew that this Religion extended to all " mankind; and was not, like the Mosaic, confined " to one only people. Consequently, that very rea- " son which made it proper for the Mosaic Religion " to be united by divine appointment to the State, " made it fit, the Christian should be left free and " independent. But for what end, if not for this, " To be at liberty to adapt itself to the many various " kinds of civil policies, by a suitable union and al- " liance.—An Alliance then we must conclude the " christian Church was at liberty to make, notwith- " standing this declared nature of *Christ's kingdom.* " So far is indeed true, that it is debarred from enter- " ing into any such *Alliance* with the State as may " admit any LEGISLATOR in Christ's kingdom but " himself [that is, a power in the Magistrate to al- " ter DOCTRINES.] But no such power is granted " or usurped by the *supremacy* of the State [7]." [which extends only to DISCIPLINE.]

From all this it appears, that the *unalterable* part of the Law of Christ is the DOCTRINE: and the only *alterable* part, the DISCIPLINE: but it is the latter, with which Society, as such, is chiefly concerned, when it enters on *Alliance* with the Church. Therefore, when his Lordship says, *Religion and the*

[7] *Alliance*, p. 178--9, &c.

Church

Church being ſet on the ſame foot, no human authority can alter one, but muſt receive it on the terms in which it has been revealed, if he means, there can be no alteration in *diſcipline*, I have ſhewn he is miſtaken: if he means, there can be no alteration in *doctrine*, he is certainly right; and I conſider his Lordſhip's obſervation as a complaint, that, by the conſtitution of the Chriſtian Church, the Magiſtrate cannot tyrannize over Conſcience.

In the mean time we ſee to what little purpoſe this great Philoſopher and Stateſman had read his HOOKER; of whom he confeſſes ſomething might be learnt. Now, HOOKER would have ſhewn him, that divine authority does not reduce all it's Laws to one and the ſame ſpecies.—"Poſitive Laws (ſays this "truly great Man) are either permanent or elſe "changeable, according as the matter itſelf is, con-"cerning which they were firſt made. Whether "GOD or MAN be the maker of them, ALTERA-"TION they ſo far forth admit, as the MATTER doth "exact. Wherefore, to end with a general rule con-"cerning all the Laws which God hath tied men "unto: thoſe Laws divine, that belong, whether "naturally or ſupernaturally, either to men as men, "or to men as they live in politique Society, or to "men as they are of that politique Society which is "the Church, without any further reſpect had unto "any ſuch variable accident as the State of men, "and of Societies of men, and of the Church itſelf "in this world, is ſubject unto; all Laws that ſo be-"long unto men, they belong for ever, yea altho' "they be poſitive Laws, unleſs, being poſitive, "God himſelf which made them, alter them. The

" ſon is, becauſe the ſubject or matter of Laws in " general, is thus far forth conſtant: which matter " is that for the ordering whereof, Laws were inſti- " tuted, and being inſtituted are not changeable " without cauſe, neither can they have cauſe of " change, when that which gave them their firſt in- " ſtitution remaineth for ever one and the ſame. *On* " *the other ſide, Laws that were made for men, or So-* " *cieties, or Churches, in regard of their being ſuch as do* " *not always continue, but may perhaps be clean other-* " *wiſe a-while after, and ſo may be required to be other-* " *wiſe ordered than before; the Laws of God himſelf* " *which are of this nature,* NO MAN ENDOWED WITH " COMMON SENSE *will ever deny to be of a different* " *conſtitution from the former, in reſpect of the one's con-* " *ſtancy, and the mutability of the other* [8]."

So much for this country Parſon. And how poorly does his Lordſhip figure before him with his aſſertion, that *divine law makes every thing, which relates to the Church, equally unalterable?* Yet this noble Haranguer, thus ignorant of the very firſt elements of Law, can dictate with the authority of an Oracle, and be received with the reverence due to one, concerning *civil liberty, Church uſurpations, a Patriot King* and the *ballance of power*. But Maſter Hooker will tell you, how eaſily all this may be done without knowing more than our neighbours.

—" Thus far therefore (ſays he) we have endea- " deavoured in part to open, of what nature and " force Laws are, according unto their ſeveral kinds: " the Law which God himſelf hath eternally ſet

[8] *Eccl. Pol.* L. i. Sect. 15.

" down

" down to follow in his own works ; the Law which " he hath made for his creatures to keep ; the Law " of natural and neceſſary Agents ; the law which " angels in Heaven obey ; the Law whereunto, by " the light of reaſon, men find themſelves bound, in " that they are men ; the Law which they made by " compoſition for multitudes and politique Societies " of men to be guided by ; the Law which belong- " eth unto each nation ; the Law that concerneth " the fellowſhip of all ; and laſtly the Law which " God himſelf hath ſupernaturally revealed. *It* " *might peradventure have been more* POPULAR AND " MORE PLAUSIBLE TO VULGAR EARS, *if this* " *diſcourſe had been ſpent in* EXTOLLING THE FORCE " OF LAWS, *in ſhewing the* GREAT NECESSITY OF " THEM, *when they are* GOOD, and in AGGRAVAT- " ING THEIR OFFENCE BY WHOM PUBLIC LAWS " ARE INJURIOUSLY TRADUCED. *But foraſmuch* " *as with ſuch kind of matter* THE PASSIONS OF MEN " *are rather ſtirred one way or other, than* THEIR " KNOWLEDGE *any way ſet forward* unto the trial of " that whereof there is doubt made, I have there- " fore turned aſide from that BEATEN PATH, and " choſen, tho' a LESS EASY, yet a more profitable " way, in regard of the end we propoſe [9]."

Great Names, however, are ſtill of good uſe to his Lordſhip : for tho' he cannot profit by their lights, he can ſhine at their expence : and, having well chi-caned their expreſſions, can afterwards convert the truths contained in them to his own uſe. Let me give you, out of many, one example of this kind.

[9] *Eccl. Pol.* L. i. Sect. 16.

HOOKER

HOOKER and LOCKE have been ſuppoſed to write tolerably well on the origin of civil Government. Alas; *nil ſine Theſeo.* - There is nothing ſo well done, which his Lordſhip cannot mend. He reproves Both of them, with much ſolemnity, for *repreſenting mankind to themſelves, like a number of ſavage individuals out of Society, in their natural State, inſtead of conſidering them as members of families from their birth.* "This "(he ſays) has made them reaſon INCONSISTENTLY, "and on a FALSE FOUNDATION. Inconſiſtently, "becauſe they ſometimes acknowledge paternal Go"vernment to have preceded civil, and yet reaſon "about the inſtitution of civil, as if men had then "firſt aſſembled in any kind of ſociety, or had been "ſubject to any kind of rule; for to ſay that the Law "of nature was of itſelf ſuch a rule, and that every "one of theſe independent inhabitants of the earth "did or might exerciſe Juſtice for himſelf, and "others on thoſe who violated the Law, was lan"guage unworthy of Mr. LOCKE, and unneceſſary "to his Syſtem.—Falſely, becauſe it is *eaſy to demon"ſtrate* that mankind never was in ſuch a State [10] "

To ſay the truth *eaſy* enough, and like *demonſtrating* day-light. A man need only open his eyes to ſee that a Mother does not abandon her infant as ſoon as ſhe has dropt it, nor the Father renounce the care of it and her. Is it poſſible then that HOOKER, LOCKE, and their Followers, ſhould want to be told by his Lordſhip ſo obvious a truth, That, before civil Society, mankind did not ſtart up like muſhrooms, a number of ſavage individuals at once,

[10] Vol. v. p. 125—6.

but

but came as they could be got, and entered as they were born, into tribes and families. Why then, you aſk, did not HOOKER and LOCKE ſo conſider them, when they were deducing the origin of civil Society? For very important reaſons; and, one would think, very obvious ones.

Firſt becauſe the real origin of civil Society being equally ſhewn on either ſuppoſition, the truths which followed from it, were clearer ſeen, as they were leſs embarraſſed, by conſidering Mankind before civil Society, as individuals.

But this was not all. Had They conſidered men before civil Society as ranked under tribes, the *rights* belonging to the Heads of families, thus brought into view, tho' neither relative to, nor connected with, thoſe of a civil kind, might have too much countenanced that abſurd Syſtem, which derives political Rule from the *Patriarchal*; a ſyſtem which, both for its abſurdities and miſchiefs, it was the purpoſe of LOCKE and HOOKER to expoſe and diſcredit. The former therefore did judiciouſly, to aſſert, as he might do it truly; (for the *exerciſe of juſtice* no more belonged to Fathers of Families, as ſuch, than the *exerciſe of Regal prerogative*) that, before the inſtitution of Civil Society, *every one of theſe independent inhabitants of the earth did, or might, exerciſe juſtice for himſelf and others, on thoſe who violated the Law.* Yet this, his Lordſhip calls language unworthy of his Maſter. Nay, ſo great a ſtranger is he to this whole matter, that he declares the repreſentation to be UNNECESSARY: whereas we ſee it was done to keep the unwary from the ſight of circumſtances of no uſe to aſſiſt their judgment,

judgment, and eaſily abuſed by deſigning men, to miſlead them.

—But to proceed with our Subject. His Lordſhip goes on againſt the Book of the *Alliance* in this Manner. " This imaginary Contract, in ſhort, whether " well or ill made, never exiſted at any time, nor " in any Country; though, to have been real, and " really authorized, it ſhould have been the ſame at " all times and in all Countries where Chriſtianity " was propagated. Political Societies make and al- " ter and break their *Alliances*, as the varying reaſon " of ſtate ſuggeſts. Different orders of civil Go- " vernment in the ſame Society change, and with " them the whole Conſtitution of ſuch Governments, " as reaſon or paſſion, the intereſts or the diſpoſitions " of men determine them. *But a Religion given by* " *God is in its nature invariable.* And therefore if a " Religious Society with certain privileges, immuni- " ties, and prerogatives be neceſſary to preſerve it ſo, " the *order and conſtitution* of ſuch a Society muſt be " *invariable* too. The CHURCH muſt be eſtabliſhed by " the ſame divine Authority as the RELIGION, and " be by conſequence independent of the State. But " nothing of this kind has been. Chriſt's *kingdom* " *was not of this World.* He ſent out his Apoſtles to " teach, and to baptize; and the utmoſt power he " gave them, beſides that of working Miracles to " convince and to convert, was to ſhake off the duſt " of their feet, and to proteſt againſt the infidelity of " thoſe who refuſed to receive them, and the Goſpel " they publiſhed. The Apoſtles ordained others to " accompany and to ſucceed them in the ſame office, " the office of teaching and baptizing. The Apo-

" ſtles

" ſiles could give no more power than they received; " and no argument *of right* can be drawn from any " thing that paſſed, or from any thing that theſe " Men did for the Maintenance of their Sect, while " Chriſtianity was a Sect [11]."

This imaginary Contract (he ſays) *never exiſted at any time or in any country.* If he means, a *Contract* actually and formally executed, I have anſwered that already, and ſhewn, that the objection holds equally againſt *the original contract between King and People*; which I ſuppoſe his Lordſhip allows not to be ſo *imaginary* but that the prerogative of the one, and the rights of the other, ought every where to be regulated on the conditions of it. But You ſhall hear the Author of the *Alliance* on this matter.

" [12] When I ſay that *all* regular policied States " had *an Eſtabliſhed Religion*, I mean no more than " He would do, who, deducing Civil Society from " its true Original, ſhould, in order to perſuade Men " of the Benefits it produces, affirm that all Nations " had a *Civil Policy*. For as this Writer could not " be ſuppoſed to mean that every one conſtituted a " free State, on the Principles of public Liberty, " which yet was the only Society he purpoſed to prove " was founded on Truth, and productive of public " Good; becauſe it is notorious, that the far greater " Part of Civil Policies are founded on different Prin- " ciples; or abuſed to different Ends: ſo neither " would I be underſtood to mean, when I ſay all " Nations concurred in making this *Union*, that they " all exactly diſcriminated the Natures, and fairly

[11] Vol. iv. p. 419—20. [12] *Alliance*, p. 114—117.

" adjuſted

" adjuſted the Rights of both Societies, on the Prin-
" ciples here laid down; tho' an *Eſtabliſhment* reſult-
" ing from this Diſcrimination and Adjuſtment be the
" only one I would be ſuppoſed to recommend. On
" the contrary, I know this Union has been gene-
" rally made on miſtaken Principles; or, if not ſo,
" hath degenerated in length of Time; by which
" means the national Religion in the Pagan World
" hath been moſt commonly a Slave to the State;
" and in the Chriſtian Syſtem, the State ſometimes a
" Slave to the Eſtabliſhed Church. And as it was
" ſufficient for that Writer's Purpoſe, that thoſe So-
" cieties, whether good or bad, proved the Senſe all
" Men had of the Benefits reſulting from Civil Policy
" in general, though they were oft miſtaken in the
" Application; ſo it is for Ours, that this univerſal
" Concurrence in the two Societies to *unite*, ſhews
" the Senſe Mankind had of the Uſefulneſs of ſuch
" an *Union*. And laſtly, as that Writer's Principles
" are not the leſs true on account of the general De-
" viation from them in forming Civil Societies; ſo
" may not the plain ones of *Alliance* here delivered;
" tho' ſo few States have ſuffered themſelves to be
" directed by them in Practice; nor any Man before
" delivered them in Speculation; eſpecially if, as in
" that Caſe, ſo in this, we can derive ſuch *Miſtake*
" and *Degeneracy* from their Cauſes. It would draw
" me too far out of my Way to explain diſtinctly the
" Cauſes of the *Miſtake*; and the intelligent Reader,
" who carefully attends to the whole of this Diſ-
" courſe, will not be at a Loſs to diſcover the moſt
" conſiderable of them; ſome of which I have al-
" ready hinted at; and others, I may poſſibly, in the
" Sequel

" Sequel of this Diſcourſe, take occaſion to mention. " As for the *Degeneracy*, we have obſerved, that the " *Alliance* is of the Nature of the FOEDERA INÆ- " QUALIA: Now, the common Iſſue of ſuch, *Grotius* " acquaints us with, in theſe Words: *Interim verum* " *eſt accidere plerumque, ut qui ſuperior eſt in fœdere,* SI " IS POTENTIA MULTUM ANTECELLAT, PAULATIM " IMPERIUM PROPRIE DICTUM USURPET: PRÆ- " SERTIM SI FOEDUS PERPETUUM SIT [13]."

But if, by, *never exiſted*, his Lordſhip means, that the mutual rights and privileges of either Society, which naturally follow ſuch an *Alliance*, were never actually exerciſed and enjoyed by the two Societies, his aſſertion is falſe. They are at this preſent actually exerciſed and enjoyed by the two Societies, in ENGLAND, under our happy Conſtitution of Church and State. And it was a principal purpoſe of the Book of the *Alliance* to ſhew they are ſo, in order to realize the Theory. Here again it may not be improper to give you the Author's words: " We ſee how unrea- " ſonable and even how impolitic our Adverſaries " are, when in their ill humour with *Eſtabliſhments*, " they chuſe to pick a quarrel with their own; where " the national Religion is on a footing exactly agree- " able to the nature of a *free Convention between* " *Church and State*, on the principles of the Laws of " Nature and Nations. A felicity, they ſhould have " known, that ſcarce any other People on the face of " the earth can boaſt of. In *England* alone the ori- " ginal terms of this *Convention* are kept up, to ſo " exactly, that this account of the *Alliance between*

[13] *De jure Belli & Pacis*, Lib. i. cap. iii. § 21.

" *Church*

" *Church and State* seems rather a copy of the Church " and State of *England*, than a Theory, as indeed it " was, formed solely on the contemplation of Na- " ture, and the unvariable reason of things [14]."

To make this contract (says his Lordship) *real, and to be really authorized, it should have been the same at all times and in all countries where Christianity was professed.* In plain terms, *Right* waits to receive it's nature from Man's acceptance of it: or, in still plainer, Right becomes *Wrong* when rejected. How would this political aphorism of his Lordship's sound when applied to the ORIGINAL CONTRACT between Prince and People? — *to make it real and to be really authorized, it should have been the same at all times and in all countries, where civil rule had been introduced.*

But *political Societies* (he says) *make and alter and break their alliances as the varying reason of state suggests.* If he would be here meant to speak of such which make these *alterations* justly, the same may be said of the *Alliance between Church and State.* The Author has shewn that, in this respect, the Alliances of political Societies with one another, and the Alliance of the political with the religious, stand just upon the same footing. " If there be (says the Author) more " religious Societies than one at the time of Conven- " tion, the State allies itself with the largest of those " religious Societies. It is *fit* the State should do so, " because the larger the religious Society is, where " there is an equality in other points, the better en- " abled it will be to answer the ends of the Alliance. " It is *scarce possible* it should be otherwise, because

[14] *Alliance*, p. 167—8.

" the

" the two Societies being compoſed of the ſame in-
" dividuals, the greatly prevailing Religion muſt
" have a majority of it's members in the aſſemblies
" of State, who will naturally prefer their own Re-
" ligion to any other. Hence we ſee the reaſon why
" the *Epiſcopal* is the eſtabliſhed Church in *England*;
" and the *Preſbyterian* the eſtabliſhed Church in *Scot-*
" *land*. Hence too we ſee the reaſon of what was
" before obſerved, concerning the duration of this
" Alliance: that it is *perpetual* but not *irrevocable*:
" i. e. It ſubſiſts juſt ſo long as the Church thereby
" eſtabliſhed maintains it's ſuperiority of extent;
" which when it loſes to any conſiderable degree the
" Alliance becomes void. For the united Church
" being then no longer able to perform it's part of
" the Convention which is formed on reciprocal con-
" ditions, the State becomes diſengaged; and a *new*
" *Alliance* is of courſe contracted with the now pre-
" vailing Church, for the reaſons which made the
" *old*. Thus formerly, the Alliance between the
" *Pagan Church* and the Empire of Rome was diſſolv-
" ed; and the *Chriſtian* eſtabliſhed in it's place: and
" of late, the Alliance between the *Popiſh Church* and
" the Kingdom of England was broken; and an-
" other made with the *Proteſtant*, in it's ſtead [15]."

Different orders of civil government, in the ſame Society, change, (ſays his Lordſhip) *and with them the whole Conſtitution of ſuch Governments, as reaſon or paſſion, the intereſts or diſpoſitions of men determine them.* — And is it not the ſame in Church-Government? It is here Epiſcopacy; there Preſbytery; and in another place Independency.

[15] *Alliance*, p. 197—98.

But, *a Religion given by God is in its nature invariable*. In its DOCTRINE it is. Yes, and in its DISCIPLINE likewiſe, (ſays his Lordſhip) and thus I prove it. *If a religious Society with certain privileges, immunities, and prerogatives, be neceſſary to preſerve it ſo, the order and conſtitution of ſuch a Society muſt be invariable too.* The inference is juſt. But what principle of the *Alliance* (againſt which his Lordſhip is here arguing) ſuppoſes, that *one certain ſet of privileges, immunities, and prerogatives* is neceſſary to preſerve a religious Society in that State and Condition? This Theory ſays, Religion compoſed a Society before it had any of thoſe *privileges, immunities, and prerogatives*; and will remain a Society when it has loſt them. For it had none of them till it came into Alliance with the State, and will hold none of them longer than that Alliance continues. But, if by a ſtrange liberty of expreſſion, his Lordſhip means, by *privileges, immunities, and prerogatives*, only CHURCH-GOVERNMENT in general, ſo far forth as it is a Society; I own that this is *neceſſary to preſerve a religious Society* in the State and Condition of a Society: But then, give me leave to ſay, it does not follow from thence, that *the order and conſtitution of ſuch a Society muſt be invariable too:* Becauſe Church Government may be adminiſtred by an Epiſcopacy, a Preſbytery, or an Independency. The Specific form of Church-Government amongſt the Jews was preſcribed, and therefore intended to be invariable, becauſe Moſes united the Religion to the State, under the collective name of LAW: The ſpecific form of Church-Government amongſt Chriſtians was not preſcribed, and therefore none ſeems intended to be invariably followed, becauſe Jeſus did not unite his

Religion

Religion to the State, but left it to particular Churches to follow such as were most agreeable to the forms of those civil Societies, in which they were to be established. For this purpose it was sufficient that he instituted his Religion, a *Society*, by directing the members of it to *hear the Church*, and by appointing Officers as it's organs to convey it's decisions. On this matter it may not be improper again to hear the Author of the *Alliance*, who speaking of the *Jewish* and *Christian* Churches, says, "This, Both had in com-"mon, to be political Societies by divine appoint-"ment; but different in this, that GOD, for *wise* "*ends*, minutely prescribed the whole mode of "Jewish policy: and CHRIST, on the contrary, with "the same divine wisdom only constituted his Church "a policied Society at large, and left the mode of "it to human discretion [16]."

Those *ends*, the Author thus explains, in another place. "The *Jewish* Religion was, like the true "*natural*, which it ratified, essentially fitted to com-"pose a Society; and like the *Christian*, of which it "was the first rudiment, made such by divine ap-"pointment. But then unlike the Christian, in this, "that it was not left independent of civil Govern-"ment, to unite with it at its pleasure, on terms agreed "upon; but was for great and wise reasons at once "united to it, by God himself. Which also he was "pleased to do, not by way of *Alliance* as between "two bodies that were to continue distinct, and "might be separated, but by mutual conversion into "one another, and perfect incorporation [17]."

[16] *Alliance*, p. 164. [17] *Alliance*, p. 176.

His Lordſhip then owns, that if *the Church be eſtabliſhed by the ſame divine authority as the religion*, (that is, if religion be formed into a Society) *it is by conſequence independent of the State*. I am apt to ſuſpect, he here grants more than he is aware of: For it follows from this conceſſion, that if the Chriſtian Religion even compoſes a Society by nature, tho' not by divine appointment, it muſt be *independent* of the State: becauſe the *independency* does not ariſe from the *Authority* which formed it, but from the *nature* it poſſeſſes: And the Author of the Alliance has ſhewn [18] that Religion compoſes a Society by natural right. His Lordſhip's endeavour therefore to avoid the *conſequence* of *independency*, by affirming that *the Church was not eſtabliſhed by the ſame divine authority as the Religion*, would be to no purpoſe even tho' he could prove it. However let us hear how he ſupports his aſſertion.

His firſt argument is the declaration of Jeſus himſelf, that *his Kingdom was not of this World*. The queſtion is, Whether Chriſt's Religion compoſes a Society, and a Society independent? And his Lordſhip quotes a declaration of Jeſus to prove it does *neither*, which in the very terms imply that it does *both*. For what is a *Kingdom*, but a *Society?* And what is the *not being of this World*, but a declaration of *independency?* Indeed the Author of the *Alliance* employed the *ſubject* of the propoſition, *Chriſt's Kingdom*, to prove it was a SOCIETY; and the *attribute*, its not being of *this World*, to prove, that Church and State are INDEPENDENT of one another. For

[18] Book i. c. 5.

was

was Christ's Religion a *Kingdom of this World*, the consequence would be, that either the State is *dependent* on the Church, or the Church on the State; because, in that case, both having COERCIVE POWER, (as all *kingdoms of this World* have) a mutual *independency* would make that solecism in Politics called, IMPERIUM IN IMPERIO: Whereas, *Christ's Kingdom not being of this World*, and *his Apostles*, as his Lordship rightly observes, having *no power, (besides Miracles) but that of teaching, exhorting, and protesting against infidelity*, i. e. having no *coercive* power, there remained no pretence for its *dependency* on the State.

His Lordship's second Argument against the *independency* of the Church is, that Jesus *sent out his Apostles to teach, and to baptize, and the utmost power he gave them, besides that of working miracles to convince and to convert, was to shake off the dust of their feet, and to protest against the infidelity of those who refused to receive them, and the Gospel they published. The Apostles ordained others to accompany and to succeed them in the same Office of teaching and baptizing. The Apostles could give no more power than they had received.*

1. He is to prove that the Christian Religion did not compose a Society by institution. And how does he set to work? With an argument which shews it to be a Society by *institution*, and without *coercive* power; the very Society which the Author of the *Alliance* contends for. *Jesus sent out his Apostles,—they ordained others to accompany and to succeed them.* Here a Society is plainly instituted; for you find officers appointed; and they provide for a Succession.—*The utmost power they had was to teach and baptize those who wil-*

lingly received the Goſpel. Here all *coercive* power is excluded; and that excluſion makes the Society *independent.* What more may be inferred from this account (and which his Lordſhip ſhould have inferred) is, that tho' a Society was inſtituted, yet the particular form of Church-Government was left to human diſcretion: But he could find no Society of Chriſt's appointment, where he ſaw no particular form of Church-Government minutely marked out, as in the Moſaic Diſpenſation. Tho', had he found any ſuch it would, when he leaſt ſuſpected it, have been moſt to his purpoſe; for of ſuch, and only of ſuch, he might have ſaid truly, that being *given by God, it is in its nature invariable.*

2. His obſervation, that the *Apoſtles could give no more power than they had received,* inſinuates that the Author of the *Alliance* contended for *inherent coercive power* in the Church; which is a groſs miſrepreſentation of his Adverſary, who expreſsly affirms that the Church has no ſuch power, while *unallied*; and when *allied,* receives it, in a very limited manner, from the State; and enjoys it no longer than the *Alliance* continues. But theſe miſrepreſentations are things eſſential to his Lordſhip's polemics. So again, "To pretend (ſays he) that the Church has a right "to the former [*i. e.* wealth and grandeur] by *com-* "*pact* or by virtue of an *Alliance* with the State, "would be to ſay whatever comes uppermoſt in a "WHIMSICAL HEAD [19]." This is to inſinuate that the Author of the *Alliance pretends* that the *wealth and grandeur* of the Church neceſſarily ariſes from it's

[19] Vol. iv. p. 604.

alliance

alliance with the State. But let him speak for himself, and you shall hear him saying the direct contrary —— *the acquisition of honours, riches, and power could not be a motive for Alliance.* His reason is, that *it would be impertinent in a Church to aim at them, because they are things a Church could neither use nor profit by* [20]."

His Lordship concludes this long paragraph in these words—*No argument of right can be drawn from any thing that passed, nor from any thing that these men* [the Apostles] *did for the maintenance of their Sect, while Christianity was a Sect.* His Lordship here forgets, as usual, the personage he assumes, which is that of a Believer, who supposes, the Apostles acted, in all things, by the direction of their Master: consequently, *an argument of* RIGHT MAY *be drawn from every thing that passed, and from all they did, in support or maintenance of their sect, while Christianity was a Sect.* It is true, if we suppose the Apostles to be Politicians like his Lordship, a sort of men who put in practice all kind of means to support and maintain their Cause or Party, no argument *of right* can be drawn from any thing they did or said. But when God directs the actions and organs of his Ministers in the propagation of Religion, we know from the knowledge of his Attributes, that no rights of Humanity or Society will be violated; and consequently, that from every such action, *an argument of right may be drawn.*

If, indeed, his Lordship meant no more by his profound observation than this, That, from what the Apostles did, to assert and maintain the *independency* of Christ's Religion while it remained a Sect, *no argument of*

[20] *Alliance*, p. 112.

right can be drawn to prove it muſt *continue* independent when it becomes eſtabliſhed, I perfectly agree with him: and I have but one objection to the underſtanding him in ſo reaſonable a ſenſe, which is, that it ſupports the Theory of the *Alliance*; which, I preſume, was not in his Lordſhip's intention. Beſides, it contradicts what he ſo much labours to prove, That, if the independency of the Church was of divine inſtitution, the Church could not give it up, when it entered into Alliance.

In a word, the whole of his Lordſhip's reaſoning againſt an *Alliance between Church and State* from the nature of a *Church*, may be reduced to theſe four propoſitions:

1. If Chriſtianity be not a Society by divine inſtitution it is no Society at all.

2. If Chriſtianity be an independent Society by divine inſtitution it could not give up its independency to the State.

3. If Chriſtianity be a Society by divine inſtitution a certain form of Church government muſt be explicitly preſcribed.

4. If ſuch a form be explicitly preſcribed then that Form, and the Diſcipline which belongs to it, muſt be as unalterable as the Doctrine; which is contrary to the genius of this ſuppoſed Alliance.

Now I have ſhewn, that every one of theſe four propoſitions is utterly void of all truth and reaſon.

After theſe exploits, nothing was wanting to make his Lordſhip's victory compleat againſt *Alliances* and *Eſtabliſhments*, but to diſcredit that firſt and moſt famous one of all, made by CONSTANTINE. "This great "Revolution (ſays he) was effected in part by circumſtances

" cumſtances I have mentioned, and by others that
" favoured the growth of Chriſtianity. The impe-
" rial Authority did the reſt, but did it ill; ſo ill,
" that the chief of thoſe political views which CON-
" STANTINE had in making this ESTABLISHMENT
" were defeated by it, and the admiſſion of a reli-
" gious Society into the State, in the manner in
" which he admitted it, was the cauſe of all the
" eccleſiaſtical and theological evils that have fol-
" lowed from his time to ours, and that are ſo falſly
" imputed to Religion itſelf. We may be aſſured,
" that the SOCIETY co-operated with the COURT,
" to bring about a Revolution ſo much to their ad-
" vantage; and thought themſelves happy enough
" to be *dependent*, not *independent* on the Emperor;
" his *inſtruments* not his *allies*, whatever appearances
" he might give, or ſuffer them to aſſume, in thoſe
" ſolemn eccleſiaſtical Farces, wherein he conde-
" ſcended to act, in ſome reſpects, a ſecond part.——
" But while he recalled to his mind, as he did moſt
" probably, the great ſervice Religion was of to an-
" cient Rome, he ſeemed to forget, that when that
" Religion flouriſhed, and was of ſo much ſervice to
" the State, it was under the immediate inſpection
" of the State. There was no Council but the Se-
" nate to define Doctrines, nor to regulate Diſci-
" pline. And men were at the head of the religious,
" becauſe they were at the head of the civil, admini-
" ſtration; inſtead of being at the head of the latter,
" becauſe they were at the head of the former.——
" He [*Conſtantine*] meaned that this [ſpiritual power]
" ſhould be diſtinct from the civil; THAT THEY

"SHOULD BE INDEPENDENT OF ONE ANOTHER, and "both dependent on him [1]."

That nobleſt part of Legiſlation, the adjuſting the rights and privileges, and ſettling the bounds and limits of the TWO SOCIETIES, his Lordſhip, as we ſaid before, ſeems much a ſtranger to. Indeed, every new paragraph makes his ignorance but the more conſpicuous by his endeavouring to diſguiſe it; as his attempts are generally made at the expence of a Contradiction.

In the Eſtabliſhment of Religion under CONSTANTINE, the Church, he ſays, became dependent on the ſupreme civil Magiſtrate. *They thought themſelves happy enough to be dependent, not independent on the Emperor; his inſtruments, not his allies.* Yet, in the ſame breath, he tells us, that this very Emperor was contented to *act a ſecond part* to theſe his *inſtruments*, or, in other words, to become *theirs:* Nay, he expreſsly affirms, that Chriſtianity was on another footing in new Rome, than Paganiſm had been in the old: Now Paganiſm, he tells us, was the *inſtrument* of the ſupreme Magiſtrate. Chriſtianity then, muſt be an *Ally*, not an *inſtrument* to the ſupreme Magiſtrate. His Lordſhip ſays, this Eſtabliſhment was *ill, very ill, made:* However that be, every body ſees it is *very ill* repreſented.——*It defeated all Conſtantine's political views, all the good he intended.* It is not unlikely. We have an example before us, in his Lordſhip's *Eſſays* throughout, that his *contradictions* can *defeat* all the evil *intended*; this is doing ſomething more, for malice is not ſo eaſily defeated as benevolence.

[1] Vol. iv. p. 442—445.

But

But if you ask, Why, in this account of CONSTANTINE's Establishment, the Church is one while made the *Instrument*, and another, the *Ally* of the civil Magistrate? I will tell you. His Lordship had decried the ALLIANCE both in *fact* and *right*. There never was, he says, in FACT, such an Alliance. To countenance this assertion, CONSTANTINE's Establishment is represented as being made on different terms; terms whereby the Church became the tool and instrument of the civil Magistrate. But then again, he was to shew that such an Alliance was not of RIGHT, as being very mischievous to the State: This turns the Tables; and then CONSTANTINE *meaned, that the spiritual power should be distinct from the civil, and that they should be* INDEPENDENT OF ONE ANOTHER (for he all along misrepresents the Theory of the *Alliance*, as making the Church keep its independency after the Union) indeed he says,—and *both dependent on himself* [2]; but this was only added to soften the absurdity. To such wretched shifts do his Principles ever and anon reduce him:—The Religious and the Civil Society are independent of one another; yet the Religious is dependent on the supreme Magistrate; *i. e.* on him who represents the civil Society, and is at it's head.

But now let us examine the ground-work of this curious paragraph, without any particular regard to the embroidery of his contradictions.

He says, *the Church was happy enough to be dependent*, NOT INDEPENDENT, *on the Emperor*; *his Instruments*, NOT HIS ALLIES. This sentence is made up of a

[2] Vol. iv. p. 445.

falſe inſinuation, and a miſtaken conſequence. The inſinuation is that the Author of the *Alliance* holds, the independency of the Church, on the Magiſtrate, during an Eſtabliſhment. The miſtaken conſequence is, that if the Church be dependent, it is the Inſtrument, not the Ally, of the State. But GROTIUS, as he is quoted in the book of the *Alliance*, might have ſet his Lordſhip right in this matter. "This (ſays "the Author) is what GROTIUS calls *fœdus inæ-* "*quale*. Inæquale FOEDUS, hic intelligo quod ex "ipſa vi pactionis MANENTEM PRÆLATIONEM quan- "dam alteri donat: Hoc eſt ubi quis tenetur alterius "imperium ac majeſtatem conſervare, ut POTENTIORI "PLUS HONORIS, inferiori plus auxilii deferatur. *De* "*jur. B. & P.* L i. c. iii. Sect. 21 [3]." Hence, in the opinion of this great Lawyer, alliance and dependence are very conſiſtent things.

In ancient Rome, ſays his Lordſhip, *there was no Council, but the Senate, to* DEFINE DOCTRINES, *nor to* REGULATE DISCIPLINE. Now in antient Rome it ſo happened, there were no Doctrines to define [4]. And as to Diſcipline, this was regulated not by the Senate, but by the Colleges of the Prieſts. When the Senate imagined the neceſſities of State required the obſervance of religious Rites, they ſent to the Prieſts for their directions concerning the choice and regulation of them. The Senate were the Maſters whether they would have any celebrated; but if of that they had determined, they were tied down to the rules and

[3] *Alliance*, p. 88.

[4] See *Div. Leg.* B. ii. Sect. 6.

di-

directions of the ſacred Books, as the ſenſe of them was repreſented and interpreted by the Prieſts [5].

On the whole, his Lordſhip aſſures us, that CONSTANTINE *eſtabliſhed the Church very ill*; and ſo ſays the Author of the *Alliance*. Nay, which is more, he proves he did ſo, and explains the cauſes of his miſtakes.

His Lordſhip's account of *Conſtantine's* Eſtabliſhment, and the Author's account of that by an *Alliance*, ſtand thus,

[5] When the Romans entered on a war with Philip of Macedon, Senatus decrevit (they are the words of Livy) uti Conſules majoribus hoſtiis rem divinam facerent *quibus Diis ipſis videretur*, cum precatione ea: Quam rem, &c. He then tells us that the Conſuls made their report to the Senate; and there we find the part their Prieſts had in this matter. — Quum pronunciaſſent Conſules; rem divinam RITE perfectam eſſe, et precationem admiſiſſe Deos ARUSPICES RESPONDERE, *lætaque exta eſſe* et prolationem finium, victoriamque et triumphum portendi. — L. xxxi. c. 5. But the State further ordered that the Conſul, to make the Gods propitious, ſhould according to old cuſtom make a Vow: and on this occaſion we have a more explicite account of the Share the old Pagan Church had in this matter, by which we find it was not the Senate, but the College of Prieſts which regulated Diſcipline, or, if his Lordſhip will have it ſo, *defined Doctrine*. Civitas religioſa (ſays the Hiſtorian) ne quid prætermitteretur, quod aliquando factum eſſet; ludos Jovi, donumque *vovere Conſulem* juſſit *moram voto publico Licinius pontifex maximus attulit*, qui negavit ex incerta pecunia vovere debere. Si ea pecunia non poſſet in bellum uſui eſſe; reponi ſtatim debere, nec cum alia pecunia miſceri. *Quod niſi factum eſſet, Votum* RITE *ſolvi non poſſe*. Quanquam et res, et *auctor movebat*; tamen ad COLLEGIUM PONTIFICUM *referre* Conſul juſſus, ſi poſſet *recte* votum incertæ pecuniæ ſuſcipi. Poſſe rectiuſque etiam eſſe, *Pontifices decreverunt*. Vovit in eadem verba Conſul, *præeunte maximo Pontifice*. — L. xxxi. c. 9.

1. CONSTANTINE *made the Church his Inſtruments, not his Allies.* The ALLIANCE makes the Church the Ally, and not the Inſtrument, of the Civil Magiſtrate.

2. CONSTANTINE *placed men at the head of the civil Adminiſtration, becauſe they were at the head of the religious.* The ALLIANCE places men at the head of the religious, becauſe they were at the head of the civil adminiſtration.

3. CONSTANTINE *did not take to himſelf the title of ſupreme head of the Church under God and Chriſt.* The ALLIANCE makes the ſupreme Magiſtrate head of the Church under God and Chriſt.

4. CONSTANTINE *gave riches and coercive power to the Church without aſſuming this ſupremacy or headſhip.* The ALLIANCE, when it gave riches and coercive power to the Church, conferred the Supremacy on the civil Magiſtrate.

His Lordſhip's concluſion from this long ſtory of CONSTANTINE is this, that "He and his Succeſſors "raiſed that ſpiritual tyranny, which was eſtabliſhed "and grown into full ſtrength before CHARLES THE "GREAT [6]." And what could we expect leſs when every term in the *Alliance* was violated or neglected? This was juſt as natural as that civil Tyranny ſhould grow to a head, when the terms of the *original contract* between prince and people, had not been adverted to or obſerved? In a word, the miſchiefs, which, his Lordſhip tells us, followed from *Conſtantine's eſtabliſhment* are the beſt recommendation of the *theory of the Alliance*; a theory formed, as it were, and

[6] Vol. iv. p. 446.

fitted

fitted to avoid and guard againſt them: It has in fact done ſo, and rendered our preſent Conſtitution of Church and State the moſt happy and proſperous of any upon the face of the Earth.

At laſt, as if on ſet purpoſe to recommend the *Theory of the Alliance*, his Lordſhip concludes his Section concerning CONSTANTINE in theſe words: "Thus it ſeems to me that the great and fundamental error, from whence ſo many others proceeded, "and which CONSTANTINE COMMITTED IN THE "ESTABLISHMENT OF CHRISTIANITY, was this, "*he admitted a Clergy into an eſtabliſhment, on the ſame "foot, on which this order had ſtood, while Chriſtianity "was the Religion, and theſe men were the heads, the "directors, the governors, and magiſtrates of a Sect, by no "authority, but that of the Sect itſelf.* He admitted "them veſted with this authority, which might be "neceſſary as long as Chriſtians made a Sect apart, "out of the protection of the laws; and which became unneceſſary and dangerous, when Chriſtianity had a legal eſtabliſhment.—The conduct of "Conſtantine on this occaſion muſt needs appear extremely abſurd to every one who conſiders the conſequences it had [7]." Can there be a greater encomium on the principles of the *Alliance?* The *fundamental error* of CONSTANTINE's eſtabliſhment was, the ſuffering the Church to RETAIN IT'S INDEPENDENCY. The fundamental condition of eſtabliſhment on the theory of *Alliance* is, that the Church GIVES UP IT'S INDEPENDENCY.

[7] Vol. iv. p. 438—9.

After this, would you expect to hear him return again to his abuse of the ALLIANCE? :" The sole " intention and sole effect of it [the theologic system of the schools] " was to establish an ecclesiastical " Empire, under that spiritual Monarch the Pope, " and his spiritual Ministers the Clergy. THIS WAS " THE EFFECT OF THAT SUPPOSED ALLIANCE " BETWEEN THE CHURCH AND STATE [8]."

Before, It was CONSTANTINE *and his Successors, who raised that spiritual Tyranny* [9]: And it was done, he says, by means of *his Establishment*; which suffered the Church to retain its independency, *and admitted it on the same foot on which it had stood while it was a Sect* [10]. But now, it is the *supposed Alliance between Church and State* which raised this spiritual Tyranny; an Alliance which will not suffer the Church to retain in it's dependency; or *admit it on the same foot on which it stood while it was a Sect.*

We have seen such amazing instances of his Lordship's contradictions, as not to be surprized at the boldest of them. Sometimes, when rapt in a fit of rhetoric, he does, by his contradictions, what the man in the Play did by his *ingratitude*, he strives *to cover the monstrous bulk of them*, by a proportionable *size of words*; sometimes again, to shew his utter contempt of the Public, he chuses to follow the advice there given; *to let them go naked, that men may see them the better.* But, when he masks his double face, the falsification of the Theory of the Alliance always affords him the best play. He constantly takes it for grant-

[8] Vol. iv. p. 621--2. [9] Vol. iv. p. 446.
[10] Vol. iv. p. 438.

ed

ed or avouches it for a fact, throughout his whole argument againſt the Book, that the Author contends for and maintains the *independency of the Church on the State, under an eſtabliſhment*. This brings CONSTANTINE's Eſtabliſhment, and the Eſtabliſhment on the principles of the ALLIANCE, pretty much to the ſame thing; ſo that the miſchiefs aſcribed to one, may be ſafely transferred to the other.

And here, Sir, in concluſion, the odd fortune of this book of the *Alliance* is worth Your notice. It had been writ againſt by many nameleſs ſcribblers, before his Lordſhip: And two very capital crimes had been objected to it: The one was, *That it makes the Church a Creature of the civil Magiſtrate*; the other, *That it makes the civil Magiſtrate a Creature of the Church*. Some inſiſted on the firſt of theſe charges, ſome on the ſecond. But to prevent it's eſcaping, one furious fellow, in a thing called a *Comment on the Alliance*, roundly inſiſted upon both. So that his Lordſhip, whoſe care is for the State, and the Diſſenting Anſwerers who are as anxious for the Church, will come in but for halves in the full merit of this illuſtrious Commentator.

I have now, Sir, given you, as I promiſed, a view of his Lordſhip's POLITICAL TALENTS. The Author whom I have defended againſt him, is no further my concern than as he afforded me the occaſion. Nor is there any reaſon he ſhould grow vain of the ſuperior diſtinction of being picked out to be immolated, as it were, to the FIRST PHILOSOPHY. For let me tell him, that as I defended him for want of a bet-

a better, ſo his Lordſhip abuſed him becauſe he could not find a worſe. He had perſonally *injured* and *affronted* his Lordſhip. And to theſe inſolencies, the following words allude where his Lordſhip takes leave of his Friend, in the laſt volume of his never-dying Works, "You have, I know, at your elbow a *very foul-mouthed and very trifling Critic*, who will endeavour to IMPOSE UPON YOU ON THIS OCCASION, AS HE DID ON A FORMER. He will tell you, again, that I CONTRADICT myſelf, *&c.* But if the *dogmatic pedant* ſhould make this objection, be pleaſed to give him this anſwer, &c. [11]."

This, the Curious will readily perceive ſmells of the Anecdote. As the ſecret has been communicated to me by a good hand, I ſhall not ſcruple to lay it before You. It may ſerve at leaſt to entertain you, in the quality of Farce to this ſerious Piece.

Mr. POPE had permitted Lord BOLINGBROKE to be conſidered by the public, as his PHILOSOPHER AND GUIDE: and in their converſations concerning the impious complaints againſt Providence on account of the unequal diſtribution of things natural and moral in the preſent Syſtem, they agreed that ſuch objections might be well evaded on the Platonic principle of THE BEST. This encouraged the Poet to philoſophiſe: and the fruits of his ſpeculations we have in the celebrated ESSAY ON MAN. In which, if you will take his Lordſhip's word, or indeed, attend to his argument, you will find that Pope was ſo far from putting his proſe into verſe, (as has been invidiouſly ſuggeſted) that he has put

[11] Vol. v. page the laſt.

Pope's

Pope's verſe into proſe. They agreed, as we obſerved, in the principle of *the Beſt*. And Mr. Pope thought they had agreed in the queſtion, to which this principle was to be applied. But time has ſince ſhewn that they differed very widely. The *Eſſay on Man* is a real vindication of Providence, againſt Libertines and Atheiſts.—The *Eſſays on the firſt Philoſophy* are a pretended vindication of Providence againſt an imaginary confederacy between Divines and Atheiſts.—The Poet directs his argument againſt Atheiſts and Libertines in ſupport of RELIGION; —— The Philoſopher, againſt Divines, in ſupport of NATURALISM. But tho' his Lordſhip thought fit to keep this a ſecret from his Friend, as well as from the Public; yet he took ſo friendly a ſhare in the prodigious ſucceſs of the *Eſſay on Man*, that he could not forbear making the Poet, then alive and at his devotion, the frequent topic of his ridicule amongſt their common Acquaintance, as a man who underſtood nothing of his own principles, nor ſaw to what they naturally tended. For the truth of this inſtance of his Lordſhip's virtuous emulation, I appeal to a right honourable Gentleman now living.

While things were in this State, Mr. de Crouſaz wrote ſome malignant and abſurd *remarks* on the *Eſſay on Man*; accuſing it of Spinoziſm, Naturaliſm, and all the heretical *-iſms* in the Bigot's Dictionary. Theſe Remarks by great chance fell into the hands of the author of the *Divine Legation*. And mere indignation at an ill-natured caviller put him upon writing a defence of the *firſt epiſtle*. Which, being well received by the Public, he was induced to defend the reſt

reſt on the ſame principles of natural and revealed Religion, againſt this blundering Swiſs Philoſopher; frequently indeed miſled by a very faithleſs tranſlation of the *Eſſay* into french verſe.

Mr. Pope, who was naturally on the ſide of Religion, embraced the ſenſe given to the *Eſſay* by his new Commentator, with the utmoſt pleaſure and ſatisfaction; as appears by the Letters he wrote on that occaſion. You will hardly ſuppoſe, his Lordſhip took the ſame delight in them. He ſaw his Pupil *reaſoned* out of his hands; He ſaw (what was worſe) the Eſſay republiſhed with a Defence, which put the Poem on the ſide of Religion, and the Poet out of the neceſſity of ſupporting himſelf on his Lordſhip's Syſtem, when he ſhould condeſcend to impart it to him: And, (what was worſt of all) he ſaw a great number of lines appear, which out of complaiſance had been ſtruck out of the MS. and which, at the Commentator's requeſt, being now reſtored to their places, no longer left the religious ſentiments of the Poet, equivocal.

It was his chagrine at theſe changes which occaſioned his Lordſhip, (when he NEW MODELED the *introductory Letter to his Eſſays, addreſſed to Mr. Pope)* to end it in this manner, "I cannot conclude my diſ-"courſe on this occaſion better than by *putting you in* "*mind* of a paſſage you quoted to me *once* with great "applauſe from a ſermon of FORSTER, and to this "effect, "Where MYSTERY begins, RELIGION ends." "The Apophthegm pleaſed me much, and I was glad "to hear ſuch a truth from any pulpit, ſince it ſhews "an inclination at leaſt, to purify Chriſtianity from "the leaven of *artificial Theology*; which conſiſts prin-

"cipally

" cipally in making things that are very plain, myſ-
" terious; and in pretending to make things that are
" impenetrably myſterious, very plain. *If you con-*
" *tinue ſtill of the ſame mind, I ſhall have no excuſe to*
" *make to you, for what I have written, and ſhall write.*
" *Our opinions coincide. If you have changed your mind,*
" *think again and examine further.* You will find it is
" the MODEST, not the PRESUMPTUOUS, Enquirer
" who makes a real and ſafe progreſs in the diſcovery
" of divine truths. One follows Nature and Nature's
" God; that is, he follows God in his Works, and
" in his Word; nor preſumes to go further, by *me-*
" *taphyſical and theological commentaries of his own in-*
" *vention*, than the two texts, if I may uſe this ex-
" preſſion, carry him very evidently.—They who
" have done otherwiſe, have been either ENTHUSI-
" ASTS OR KNAVES [12]." But alas; this kind admonition came too late. Mr. Pope had now got a better *Guide* than either FORSTER or his LORDSHIP, I mean, Mr. LOCKE; who, in the concluſion of his firſt Letter to Biſhop Stillingfleet, had taught the Poet to anſwer thus, " I know not any thing more diſin-
" genuous, than not publicly to own a conviction
" one has received, concerning any thing erroneous
" in what one has printed; nor can there, I think,
" be a greater offence againſt Mankind than to pro-
" pagate a falſhood, whereof one is convinced;
" eſpecially in a matter wherein Men are highly con-
" cerned not to be miſled. The HOLY SCRIPTURE
" is to me, and always will be, the conſtant GUIDE

[12] Vol. iv. p. 344.

" of

" of my assent: and I shall always hearken to it, as " containing infallible truth, relating to things of the " highest concernment. *And I wish I could say there* " *were no* MYSTERIES *in it. I acknowledge there are,* " *to me,* and I fear always will be. But where I " want the evidence of things, there yet is ground " enough for me to believe, because God has said it: " and I shall presently condemn and quit any opinion " of mine, as soon as I am shewn that it is contrary " to any Revelation in the holy Scripture [13]."

But the Author of the *Divine Legation* soon after committed a much greater offence against his Lordship's philosophic Dignity. And to this, the following words, quoted above, more particularly allude: *You have, I know, at your elbow, a very foul-mouthed and a very trifling Critic, who will endeavour to impose upon you on this occasion, as he did on a* FORMER.

About the year 1742, a little before Lord Bolingbroke's return to England, this *Critic* was with Mr. Pope at T. who shewed him a printed book of *Letters on the Study and use of History,* and desired his opinion of it. It was the first volume of the work since published under that name. Mr. W. on turning over the book, told him his thoughts of it with great ingenuity. What he said to Mr. Pope of the main subject is not material: but of the Digression concerning the Authenticity of the Old Testament, he told his Friend very frankly, that the Author's arguments, poor as they were, were all borrowed from other

[13] *Locke's Works,* Vol. i. p. 405.

Wri-

Writers; and had been often confuted to the full satisfaction of the learned world: that, the Author of these *Letters*, whoever he was, had mistaken some of those reasonings; had misrepresented others; and had added such mistakes of his own, as must discredit him with the learned, and dishonour him with all honest men: that therefore, as he understood the Author was his Friend, he could not do him better service then advise him to strike out this *Digression*, a digression that had nothing to do with his subject, and would set half his Readers against the work, which, without this occasion of scandal, would have much ado to make head against the other half, whenever it should appear. Mr. Pope said, his friend (whose name he kept secret,) was the most candid of all Writers; and that he the Author of the D. L. could not do him a greater pleasure than to tell him his thoughts with all freedom on this occasion. He urged this so warmly, that his friend complied, and, as they were then alone, scribled over half a dozen sheets of paper before he rose from the table, where they were then sitting. Mr. Pope read what was written: and, as he had a wonderful partiality for those he loved, approved of them: and to convince his friend (the *Scribler* as my Lord rightly calls him) that he did so, he took up the printed Volume and crossed out the whole *Digression*. The remarks were written, as you may well suppose, with all the civility, Mr. W. was likely to use to a friend Mr. Pope appeared so much to reverence: but the word *prevarication*, or something like it, chanced, it seems, to escape his pen. The papers were sent to Paris; and

received

received with unparalleled indignation. Little broke out; but something did; and Mr. Pope found he had not paid his court by this officious piece of service. However, with regard to the Writer of the papers, all was carried, when his Lordship came over, with singular complaisance; such as men use when their design is to draw on those whose homage they propose to gain. In the mean time, his Lordship was meditating and compiling an angry, and elaborate Answer to this private, hasty, and impertinent, tho' well meant, *Scribble:* and it was as much as They could do, who had most influence over him, to prevail with him at length to burn it. For the truth of all this, I might appeal to a noble Person, one of the greatest Characters of this, or indeed of any age; who being much courted by his Lordship, (for superior virtue will force homage from the most unlike) was for some time able, and at all times most desirous, of restraining the extravagance of that *first Philosophy*, which he detested and despised.

The event has since shewn, that it had been happy for his Lordship's reputation, had the advice to strike out the *Digression*, been approved. For it is this which first sunk him in the popular opinion; and made men overlook the merit of the very best of all his Compositions.

Mr. Pope, however, was still flattered and caressed. And the vengeance treasured up against him for the impiety of erasing those sacred pages, did not break out till the Poet's death: then indeed it came forth with redoubled vehemence, and on the most ridi-

ridiculous pretence. Pope had, as his Lordſhip pretended, unknown to him, printed an Edition of the *Patriot Prince*, or *Patriot King*, (for it had two titles, as his Lordſhip's various occaſions required) a very innocent thing, which might have been proclaimed by the common Cryer, without giving the leaſt umbrage or offence. To ſay the truth, it was a mere School-declamation, which, in great pomp of words, informs us of this Secret, *That if a Prince could but once be brought to love his Country, he would always act for the good of it.* As extraordinary as this diſcovery appears, there was much odd practice employed to give a colour of neceſſity for the publiſhing it. However, publiſhed it was, and the memory of Pope traduced in ſo cruel, ſo ſcandalous a manner, that the Reader is ſuffered to conclude, even CURL himſelf could not have acted a more infamous or raſcally part: For it muſt be owned, his Lordſhip has dealt one equal meaſure to his COUNTRY, his RELIGION, and his FRIEND. And for what was all this outrage? To ſpeak the worſt of the offence, For one of thoſe private offices of indiſcreet good will, which generous men are always ready to forgive, even when they ſee themſelves moſt incommoded by it.

The Public ſtood amazed. And thoſe who had any regard for the Poet's Memory, waited with impatience to ſee, Which of his *old* Friends would reſcue it from his Lordſhip's talons. Contempt I ſuppoſe, of ſo cruel a treatment, kept them all ſilent. However, the ſame contempt at length provoked an Anonymous Writer to publiſh a Letter to the *Editor of the Patriot King*; for his Lordſhip had divided himſelf

ſelf into the two perſonages of *Editor* and *Author*. This Letter, written with all the reſpect due to his Rank and Character, he thought fit to aſcribe to the Author of the *Divine Legation*; ſo that you need not wonder if it expoſed the ſuſpected writer to all his Lordſhip's rage, and to all the ribaldry of his Sycophants; of which, ſome, that was ſaid to paſs through this great Man's hands, was in language bad enough to diſgrace even Gaols and Garrets.

This, SIR, is the Anecdote I promiſed you. And now I ſhall releaſe you from ſo tedious a Subject. I have compleated my *View of his Lordſhip's Philoſophy*; which I choſe to addreſs to YOU in compliance with his Challenge; who appeals, for the truth of all he advances, from *Artificial Theology* and *School-Learning*, to the breaſt of the PLAIN HONEST MAN,

" Slave to no Sect, who takes no private road,
" But looks through nature up to nature's God;

HIM whoſe heart is filled with the love of God and Man. To this Tribunal he appeals: and to this I have now brought him. What he will gain by it, YOU, whom he has made his judge, muſt now tell us. I greatly ſuſpect, that of all his Principles one only is likely to eſcape your cenſure; and with this, as I would part with him upon good terms, I ſhall conclude: it breaks out unexpectedly from amidſt the corruption of party politics; and in all likelihood was ingendered by them. — SOME MEN THERE ARE, THE PESTS OF SOCIETY I THINK THEM, WHO PRETEND A GREAT REGARD TO RELIGION IN GENERAL, BUT WHO TAKE EVERY OPPORTUNITY OF DECLAIMING PUBLICKLY

PUBLICKLY AGAINST THAT SYSTEM OF RELIGION, OR AT LEAST AGAINST THAT CHURCH-ESTABLISHMENT, WHICH IS RECEIVED IN BRITAIN [14].

I am, &c.

[19] *Dissertation on Parties*, p. 148. 8vo. Edit.

FINIS.

ERRATA.

P. 205. *l.* 8. *for* — he believe them too? — *read* — Did he believe them too?
P. 248. *l.* 25 *dele the first* so
P. 273. *l.* 7. *for* — one of which things, — *read* — one or both of which things,
P. 275. *l.* 20. *for* — on their — *read* — to their
P. 324. *l.* 17. *dele* in

B
1358
B65
1756

Bolingbroke, Henry Saint-John
A view of Lord Bolingbroke's
philosophy. 3d ed.

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